

आ नो भद्राः क्रतवो यन्तु विश्वतः

ā no bhadrāḥ kratavo yantu viśvataḥ

Let noble thoughts come to us from every side

(R̥gveda, I-89-i)



JAGADGURU SRI SANKARACHARYA

सत्सङ्गत्वे निस्सङ्गत्वं
निस्सङ्गत्वे निर्मोहत्वम् ।
निर्मोहत्वे निश्चलितत्वं
निश्चलितत्वे जीवन्मुक्तिः ॥

satsaṅgatve nissāṅgatvaṁ
nissāṅgatve nirmohaṭvam,
nirmohaṭve niścalitatvaṁ
niścalitatve jīvanmukṭiḥ.

Through the company of the good, there arises non-attachment; through non-attachment, there arises freedom from delusion; through delusionlessness, there arises steadfastness; through steadfastness, there arises liberation in life.

Bhaja Govindam -9



BHAGAVAN SRI RAMANA

நானு ரேனமனமுன் னுடிபுள நன்னவே
நானு மவன்றலை நானமுற—நானுகத்
தோன்று மொன்று தானுகத் தோன்றினுநானன்று பொருள்
பூன்றமது தானும் பொருள்

nānā renamanamun ṇāḍiyuḷa naṇṇave
nānā mavunralai nāṇamura - nānānāt
tōnrumonru tānāgat tōnṛinunānanru poruḷ
pūnramadu tānām poruḷ

When the mind, turning inward, inquires 'Who am I' ?
and reaches the Heart, that which is 'I' sinks
crest-fallen, and the one reality appears of its
own accord as 'I', 'I'. Though it appears thus,
the 'I' is not an object; it is the whole.
That, verily, is the Self which is real.

Uḷḷadu Nārpadu - 30

ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO

Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan

ON HIS FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY

CONTRIBUTED BY

FIFTY-TWO SCHOLARS

EASTERN AND WESTERN

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Dr. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY

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EDITORIAL

IN offering to the public the essays contained in this volume, we are honouring not a paragon of *le dernier cri* but a quiet and unostentatious Indian philosopher who has dedicated himself for years to that least commercial of all pursuits: the quest of ancient wisdom. Luther said that an apple tree needs no special commandment that it must bear fruit. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's sensitive personality ripened under the spiritual influences to which he was open from his early years. He preferred Sanskrit to mathematics after excelling in the latter at school; and at college he decided in favour of philosophy after demonstrating his secure grasp of Sanskrit. A Doctor of Philosophy in his twenties, he was irresistibly lured into buying the pearl of great price by selling his all. Professor Mahadevan is more than a single-minded Advaitic scholar; he is a teacher of Indian philosophy in the largest sense of the word, a harmonizer and holder of balances, a wide and generous interpreter of classical and modern systems, who has been honoured by secular and sacred institutions all over the world. Any impression that the volume written in honour of him suffers from a philosophic garrulousness, a too obvious preciosity, an untiring effort to display mere learning, must be instantly discounted. The Indian philosopher questing for wisdom cannot fall back on the novelist's trick of dramatizing his own experiences. Professor Mahadevan has shown that truth must be first lived before it can be possessed. He has survived and will survive a lot of admiration. "So to live as to realize oneself"—Ibsen wrote to Björnson. Any biographical sketch of Professor Mahadevan, and our own is no exception, is little more than an *obbligato* to a difficult concerto.

If the accompanying essays are not offered in the belief that knowledge is of no use unless others know that you have it (Schopenhauer's cynical axiom), neither are they submitted with the one-sided conviction that Canaan lies on the other side

of logical degrees (Kierkegaard's cherished dictum). Whatever private opinion we may form of philosophy, whether or no sensible things alone can be described by sensible terms, whether or no insight into what is opaque to ordinary vision and language alone marks genius, it is obvious that much metaphysics is bound up with much culture. The time is ripe for inter-cultural ventures. Introducing a symposium on "Perspectives in Personality Study," G. W. Allport said that a content-analysis of regional publications in the field of scientific psychology is a desideratum today; the Continental and the Anglo-American schools diverge sharply in their evaluation of human personality. So great a savant as the late Erwin Schrödinger said that the internationality of science is fine and inspiring, like the internationality of the discus throw or the high jump; it renders the *consensus omnium* dubious as an argument in favour of objectivity. The importance of Indian philosophy and of classical Indian psychology has steadily grown since Voltaire talked quaintly of "Ezour Vedam" and "Cormo-Vedam" and the significance of the Indian epics has increasingly taken shape since the irate Occidental critic discovered that they violated Aristotle's "three unities". East-West studies may well provide the corrective to an exaggerated emphasis on the "scientific world-view".

But the "Essays in Honour of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan" are not a simple apology for Oriental wisdom and the hegemony of spirit. We submit that an entire cultural spectrum, with many fine lines and shades discernible in it, has been flashed by the distinguished contributors to the volume. Scholars of different nationalities, of different scientific, ethical and religious persuasions, working in vastly different technical fields of inquiry, have co-operated with us. Professor Mahadevan could not have been honoured in a more fitting fashion. *Ex Oriente lux* is no glib formula with which we can charm our idleness. May we hope that the volume we are offering to the public will survive its blemishes?

Much has been written about this troubled age of ours. Walls which we built round us have tottered. The perfectibility

✓ of man, the infallibility of physics, and the inevitability of progress, have all come under the lash of modern criticism. But surely the mood of spiritual listlessness is as old as the human race and its language familiar to the student of the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*. There are countless dialects in the world but one universal cry of the human heart in distress. It has seemed worth while for us to come together with a common purpose.

In our pilgrimage from an intellectual Dan to an intellectual Beersheba, we should not forget to express our gratitude to those who toiled so bravely and unceasingly for us : to Dr. V. N. Sharma for his scholarly translation of Von Rintelen's paper; to Messrs. Ganesh & Co. for undertaking to publish the straddling bulk of the volume; to the Sri Aurobindo Ashram Press, Pondicherry, for the patient printing of the "Essays". We realize, too, how much we owe to the protecting mantle of the puissant Vice-Chancellor of the Madras University, Dr. Sir A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar; he encouraged us in our first venture. There are many others we have not named without whose generous help we could never have addressed ourselves to our arduous task.

Madras
June 1962

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DR. T. M. P. MAHADEVAN — A PROFILE

IN India, more than in any other part of the world, there has been an impressive and unbroken tradition in theory and practice of the perennial philosophy. It has established a two-way passage between religion and science, body and mind, the emotions and the higher faculties of inner being. There has never been any sense of inadequacy or frustration arising from processes of exclusion, subordination or denial of any set of values such as marks the history of European thought, especially in the modern era. The dialectical approach is ever softened by calling into aid the potentialities of the self so that the secret of enduring harmony or abiding *śānti* is wrested from ourselves. Thus, a total view of the supreme Reality has never been lost sight of. Dr. Mahadevan comes in this tradition.

The academic career and philosophical standing of Dr. Mahadevan are a lively reminder of the possibility of combining intellectual distinction with the equipoise of a practising philosopher.

Mahadevan was born on 24th August 1911 and was educated in the Ramakrishna Mission Residential High School, Madras. Even from his childhood he came under the benign influence of the Ramakrishna Order of monks and was privileged to get his spiritual training under one of Sri Ramakrishna's direct disciples. He was taught the basic scriptures of the Hindu religion, the *Upaniṣads* and *Bhagavad-gītā*. It was not long before he fully imbibed the spirit of these scriptures. He was able to see in these scriptures a freedom which would not brook narrowness in things spiritual, an insistence on life divine rather than a conformity to set traditions, a message of hope with a universal appeal to all. The name of Sankara always had a fascination for him even during this early period. Later, in his mature years, he took to a systematic study of this

great philosopher. Both intellectually and emotionally Sankara's ✓ Advaita Vedanta had an irresistible appeal to his mind.

Mahadevan had his higher education in Presidency College and Pachaiyappa's College, Madras. He took his B.A. Honours Degree in Philosophy with a First Class and First Rank in 1933 winning the Samuel Sathyanathan Gold Medal. A year before his graduation he passed the Diploma Examination of the Madras University in German with distinction. Immediately after taking his Honours Degree, Mahadevan joined the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, as a Research Scholar in 1933 to work for his Degree of Doctor of Philosophy under that veteran philosopher, the late Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri who was then Reader and Head of the Department of Philosophy in the University. The subject of his thesis was *The Philosophy of Advaita* as expounded by Bharatī-tīrtha Vidyaranya. His work in the Department as a Research Scholar was so outstanding that Sri S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri known for his exacting standards and conservative appraisal of scholars and their work, said that "he might without exaggeration say that it had been his lot to meet few students of his ✓ (Mahadevan's) calibre and attainment." "The closeness of application, quickness of perception, clarity of thought and modesty of behaviour" that were conspicuous in Mahadevan left a deep impression on him. Mahadevan was able to complete his work in two years but had to wait for one more year since the University regulations required that a thesis for the Doctorate Degree could be submitted only after the lapse of three years from the time one took his Honours or Master of Arts Degree. The thesis was submitted in 1936 and the Doctorate Degree was awarded in 1937.

By this time Mahadevan had become Lecturer in Logic (1935) in the Maharaja's College, Pudukkottai in South India. In 1937 Dr. Mahadevan joined the Pachaiyappa's College, Madras, as Assistant Professor of Philosophy, and in 1940 he was made the Professor and Head of the Department and served the college till 1943.

In 1943, the sudden and premature death of Sri S.S.

Suryanarayana Sastri made it inevitable that his star-pupil should succeed him. So Dr. Mahadevan became the Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, which position he is holding with conspicuous distinction since then. From this time onwards Dr. Mahadevan's academic career becomes enlarged and international in character. He lectured at Cornell University, Ithaca, on Indian Philosophy in 1948. He delivered two series of weekly lectures during the fall and the spring terms. The first series was on "The Basic Ideas in Indian Thought" and the second was on "Vedanta". The lectures were sponsored by the Sage School of Philosophy of the University and were attended by both students and members of the Faculty. He addressed several groups of students at Cornell, in their classes, clubs and fraternities. He delivered public lectures at the Columbia University, University of Texas, University of Philadelphia, University of Mexico, Well's College in Aurora, International Student House in Washington D.C., Town Hall in Los Angeles, World Affairs Council in San Francisco, several centres of the Ramakrishna Mission, and the branches of the Hindusthan Association.

In December 1948 he attended and took part in the Annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association held at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. He delivered on May 24, 1949, the Forster Foundation Lecture on the *Immortality of the Soul* at the University of California, Berkeley. In July 1947, on the invitation of the Goethe Bicentennial Foundation to represent India at the Convocation held at Aspen, Colorado he delivered a lecture on *Eastern and Western Thought* under the presidency of Professor Hocking of Harvard.

The Second East-West Philosophers' Conference was held under the auspices of the University of Hawaii from June 20th to July 29th 1949. Dr. Mahadevan was invited to take part in the Conference. Besides conducting a survey course in Indian Philosophy and participating in Seminars and discussions, he presented a paper entitled: *The Basis of Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy*. He attended

the Third East-West Philosophers' Conference held at Hawaii in 1959 again. He was one of the Programme Members. This time his theme was *Indian Ethics and Social Practice*. In 1953 he delivered the Miller Lectures on *Time and the Timeless*, in the University of Madras. He presided over the Indian Philosophical Congress that met at Nagpur in the year 1955. He chose the theme *The Re-discovery of Man* for his Presidential Address. He delivered Sri-la-Sri Arulnandi Sivacarya Swamigal Sivajnanasiddhiar Endowment Lectures at Allahabad and Banaras Hindu Universities in 1953. He is the Area Secretary for the Union for the Study of the Great Religions in India which has conducted two All-India Congresses, one in Bangalore in 1955, and the other in Madras in 1956, the proceedings of which have been published. The title "Vedanta Vittahar" was conferred on Dr. Mahadevan by the 25th Head of the Math of the Dharmapuram Adheenam, Kailai Sri la Sri Subramanya Desika Jnanasambandha Paramacarya at a special function got up on the 11th September 1959 at Dharmapuram, South India. He presided over the Akhila Bharatiya Darshana Parishad held in Banaras in December 1961, under the auspices of Kashi Vidyapeeth.

The work and personality of Sankara and the philosophy of Advaita as has been noted earlier exerted a great influence on Mahadevan. In Advaita, he finds the consummation of human thought and spiritual experience. He enjoyed the privilege of being in Bhagavan Ramana's presence on several occasions during the sage's life-time. "Masters such as Ramana stand witness to the eternal truth that the non-dual Self is the sole reality and that we are that Self". Dr. Mahadevan's conception of Advaita is that it is not a closed system but the most complete experience. Advaita is not in contradiction with any sincere attempt to understand the truth. It is the philosophy of total experience or limitless consciousness, and knows no distinction of race or colour, clime or country. As a mark of his devotion to Sankara Dr. Mahadevan has built a shrine for Sankara in Madras wherefrom he hopes to spread the message of Sankara through every kind of spiritual activity.

It is but to be naturally expected that Mahatma Gandhi has been a source of deep inspiration in Dr. Mahadevan's life. Gandhi's advocacy of *ahimsā* and his unique application of it to political and social affairs captured his imagination. What struck him in Gandhi was, of course, his saintliness and unswerving devotion to truth. "Gandhi was one of the most potent factors contributing to the sanity of our time". Dr. Mahadevan himself wrote: "If I could walk along the Fifth Avenue or around the Times Square in the city of New York without being overawed by the towering sky-scrappers or disturbed by the shopping crowds, street cars and automobiles and if I could ignore at Waikiki, the holiday-makers and sun-bathers and look beyond at the blue waters, the white surf and the Diamond Head, it was because of the earlier experience in India evoked by the teachings of Gandhi seeking to revive in the minds of his people reverence for their ancient spiritual ideal".

Dr. Mahadevan's love for the company of great men¹ was matched only by his love for his subject, viz. philosophy. He was in his element when he chose philosophy as the subject of study at college. He had a natural inclination towards philosophy. Right from the time he became a teacher twenty-seven years ago in 1935, when there was not much difference in age between him and his students, Mahadevan has been enjoying the affection and admiration of his students in an abundant measure.

In the words of the President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "Dr. Mahadevan has been an earnest and devoted student of Indian thought and has made significant contributions to it. It is our hope and desire that he may live for many years to continue his good work."

¹ He is fond of quoting the verse:

*dhṛṭabhaṁ trayamevaitat
dāidnugrahaṁtukam
mānasyarāmā mamukṣurām
mahāpuruṣa saṁtaraṇaḥ*

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A FEW STRAY THOUGHTS ON NON-DUALISTIC VEDANTA

SWAMI NIKHILANANDA

ON the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the birth of Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan I offer a few vignettes of non-dualism with my sincere respect and affection for the outstanding non-dualistic philosopher of modern India, who by his speeches and writings, and above all by his personal life, has upheld Vedanta and so raised India in the estimation of contemporary philosophical thinkers.

Vedanta is the perennial philosophy of India. Based upon the Vedas, whose teachings are without beginning or end and are not the product of the ingenious human intellect, it has created and sustained Indian culture in its many and various aspects. In its non-dualistic formulation Vedanta proclaims the oneness of the subject and the object and thus represents the final reach of human thinking, beyond which philosophical speculation or spiritual experience cannot go. Affirming the sole reality of Brahman, which is one and without a second, it is free from friction (*avivāda*) and contradiction (*aviruddha*) and leads to the welfare of all (*sarva-bhūta-hiterataḥ*).

The essence of Vedanta has been expressed in a single sentence: "Brahman is real and the world unreal; the living creature is none other than Brahman." The final aim of Vedanta is not to negate the world through its doctrine of *māyā* (*māyā-vāda*), but to establish the sole reality of Brahman (*Brahmāstitva-vāda*). All that exists is Brahman (*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*). To the enlightened, *māyā* is also Brahman. What ignorant people perceive as non-Brahman or material phenomena is, to the

wise, Brahman or undifferentiated consciousness—ever pure, ever illumined, and ever free. After investigating into the nature of the changing universe, some philosophers have found behind it an unlimited and all-pervading reality, which is, however, not directly perceived, and which may very well be of the nature of matter. Likewise they have found behind the changing psycho-physical complex of man a soul or conscious entity (*pratyak caitanya*), which is directly experienced but which is not omnipresent and may be limited by other souls. The non-dualist, through searching analysis and deep contemplation, has realized the identity of Brahman and *ātman* and thus revealed a unique concept of reality as pure consciousness, which is all-pervading and unlimited.

The analysis of the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep (*avasthātraya*) to arrive at reality is the philosophical method of non-dualism. It is mentioned frequently in the major Upanishads and is especially emphasized by Gaudapada in the *Kārikā* of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Modern philosophers depend upon experience in order to arrive at true knowledge. They resent the influence of scriptural and supernatural authority. The concept of reality must be based upon facts verifiable by logic. What is real must be rational, and what is rational must be logical. The philosophers of naturalism, empiricism, and logical positivism uphold this position. Non-dualists accept their point of view but say that an analysis of only a part of experience gives only a partial truth, whereas total truth demands the investigation of the totality of experience. The physical sciences, psychology, and religion confine their inquiry to the data provided by the waking state, that is to say, to the physical world perceived by the sense-organs. Freud and some other psychologists analyse dreams, not in order to arrive at philosophical truth but merely for the limited purpose of determining the nature of a man's inhibited tendencies. The study of the phenomenon of deep sleep has not been undertaken at all by Western thinkers, who generally describe it as total unconsciousness and therefore hold it to be meaningless.

If reality is exhausted by the tangible universe, there is no need to consider other forms of experience; materialistic philosophy should be complete and adequate. But there will be no end of systems of philosophy based on the data of the waking state alone. On the other hand, the analysis of the dream state—when the physical body and the organs are inactive and when an internal world is revealed, with its own subject, object, and instruments of knowledge—provides the data of idealistic philosophy, or more correctly, subjective idealism. The study of deep sleep—when the knowledge of particulars is covered, as it were, by a veil and the sleeping person experiences both happiness and absence of knowledge—may lead to a kind of spurious mysticism. Non-dualistic Vedānta in a unique fashion coordinates the experiences of the three states and arrives at the unique conclusion that there exists an unconditioned, undifferentiated pure consciousness which transcends the limitations of the three states, which is immutable and unaffected by time, space, and causality, and which from its own standpoint is without content.

Brahman or pure spirit, through its own inscrutable *māyā*, projects out of itself the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep, and as *Turiya* experiences them. Sankaracharya, in his invocation to the *Kārikā* of Gaudapada, says :

“I bow to Brahman, which experiences (during the waking state) gross objects by covering the universe with the tendrillike rays of its consciousness, enfolding all movable and immovable entities; which, further, experiences during the dream state the objects produced by the mind due to desires; and which, again, in deep sleep, absorbs the various particulars and enjoys bliss, and also makes us experience, through *māyā*, the same bliss—I bow to the supreme, immortal, and birthless Brahman, designated, in terms of *māyā*, as *Turiya*, the Fourth.

“May that *Turiya*, which as the World Soul (*Viśva*) experiences in the waking state gross objects, good and evil; which, again, experiences in the dream state (*Taijasa*) other and subtle objects produced by its own mind and illumined by its own light; and which, lastly, in dreamless sleep (*Prājña*) withdraws

all objects and remains devoid of distinctions—may that attributeless *Turiya* protect us !”

Four conclusions of non-dualism can be useful for the human situation. These are the divinity of the soul, the unity of existence, the non-duality of the Godhead, and the harmony of religions. Every soul is potentially divine. Whatever difference exists between the individual soul and Brahman can be bridged by personal evolution. Neither *dharma* nor *adharma* can enhance or distort man's innate divine nature. Therefore every man should be treated with respect and dignity irrespective of his position in society. This is the spiritual basis of freedom and democracy. The unity of existence gives the *rationale* of ethics, which is based upon the eternal solidarity of man. It is the foundation of the Golden Rule, both in its positive and in its negative formulation, which is emphasized by all the great religious faiths. Violence, hatred, and injustice should be discarded because they ultimately injure those who use them. Love and charity become spontaneous with us when we see ourselves in all and all in ourselves. The non-duality of the Godhead leads to the harmony of religions. “Reality is one : sages call it by various names.” This non-dualistic concept alone can banish religious fanaticism and bigotry and establish mutual respect among the different religions.

Mysticism, theology, art, science, and psychology give partial truths. Non-dualism does not reject any of them. They are stages in the evolution of true philosophical thinking, and they culminate in the experience : “All that exists is Brahman.” In the Brahman of non-dualism all conflicts and contradictions are harmonized (*tattu samavayāt*).

SCIENCE AND ADVAITA VEDANTA

G. R. MALKANI

SCIENCE and Advaita appear to represent two diametrically opposed attitudes to life and things. For science, everything is real. Life is real, nature is real, time is real, etc. We must study all facts of human existence in a truly scientific spirit, which is the spirit of dispassionate and objective study, and thus build up a scientific society, dedicated to the uplift of the human race. We can ignore all questions about the super-sensible, the super-natural, the hereafter, etc. They are no facts for science. They are at best matters of religious faith—not matters for any possible theoretic consciousness. If they have a value, it is a purely personal, if not an illusory, value. Religion falls outside the scope of science. There may be no antagonism between the two, but there is also no meeting-point between them. If anything, science is indifferent to religion, and religion is contemptuous of science.

The attitude of Advaita Vedanta is just the opposite of that of science. All phenomena that science studies, both natural and human, are mere appearance, illusory in character. They do not deserve any very serious study. If we take them very seriously, we get farther and farther away from the truth. To know the truth, we must turn our gaze inwards. It is there that we shall find the key to absolute truth. Vedanta thus takes us to a realm which is a closed book to science, even the science of psychology. It demands a new way of looking and of knowing reality. In fact, the more we are scientific-minded, the less we are fitted for the higher knowledge which Vedanta seeks.

It is quite evident to us that there can be no compromise between these two attitudes. Science represents the dominant attitude of the matter-of-fact West. Vedanta represents the dominant attitude of the spiritualistic India. The question before us is not their respective *value*, which is entirely a personal matter, but their respective *truth* for the theoretic consciousness. What is certain is that the standpoint of science and the standpoint of Vedanta cannot be accommodated within a single and wider standpoint. There can be no synthesis of the two. We have to choose.

The factual starting-point and the experimental method of science require no justification. Science grows out of common experience and is merely the systematization of that experience. The facts of science are common facts, about which there is no dispute. The method of science is the hypothetico-experimental method, which too is beyond dispute. It is best calculated to give concrete results. Science has thus a well-defined place in the culture of a community. The average man has a natural predilection for it. What has Vedanta to offer as an alternative? Is it not a purely personal way of looking at matters and therefore far removed from the accepted methods of knowledge of reality? It would besides be paradoxical to suppose that what is truth to everybody is really error, and *vice versa*. We should therefore have no hesitation in rejecting the claims of Vedanta to superior truth.

But is science after all *true*? Evidently, it takes certain facts for granted. Facts are all the reality there is for it. The questions which it raises are factual too. How do things behave? What are the laws of nature? The answers it seeks are again factual answers. Thus do things behave. These are the laws of nature, etc. Science at no stage questions facts. It is in this sense wholly *unreflective*. This is its limitation. It naturally invites the criticism of philosophy, which is nothing if it is not reflective. Philosophy goes behind facts, analyses them into subjective and objective factors and exhibits them as ideal constructions which have little or no relation to the basic reality or the thing as it is in itself. Thus philosophy grows out of science and completely supersedes it.

Kant undertook to give us a philosophy of science. Only he did not follow it up to its logical conclusion. He was satisfied with the knowledge of phenomena which science gives us. He did not carry his analysis to a point where knowledge of phenomena could be replaced by a higher and a truer knowledge. He left the problem, after pronouncing all metaphysical knowledge to be unattainable, and even impossible. Modern positivists have whole-heartedly accepted the Kantian thesis and gone a step beyond him. Knowledge of metaphysical reality was at least a problem for Kant,—a problem which the human mind could not profitably tackle. Modern positivists have no such problem. It is a meaningless problem by the logic of their own analysis. They are for ever freed from the lure of metaphysics.

Vedanta accepts the Kantian analysis but does not stop with it. The object is a subjective construct. It is something *to me*. It is not *the reality*. The reality must be sought in the only other direction available to us, namely the subject. All objects are an *appearance* only; and an appearance is an idea that is mixed up or confused with reality. It has no more than an illusory status. This illusion is reinforced by the use of common language. This use gives rise to the impression that what it refers to is something public, a reality that exists in itself and can be observed by all alike. But this is only another illusion. We do not first know and then associate a name with what we know independently. There is no external relation between the name and the thing, so that we can go from the one to the other. The truth is that to know is to give a name. To use language meaningfully is the presupposition of knowledge, not an adventitious product of it. The world as the Upanishads say, "began in speech". The use of language does not prove that there is a common, independent and real world,—it only proves that there is an illusion of one. We use language in a dream also. But it proves nothing.

Sense-experience and the use of language are not the only factors in causing the illusion of a real world. The illusion is further strengthened by correct scientific predictions. The

laws of nature appear to be true. Although they are formulated by the human mind, their truth is not dependent upon the latter. There must therefore be an independent world with laws of its own which we seek to explore. It is not we that give the law to nature, it is nature that gives the law to us.

We now contend that these laws are not literally true. In formulating them, we largely draw upon our imagination. Man does in this sense *legislate for nature*. Every generalization of science, because it has a purely human origin, is always and necessarily open to modification and what goes by the name of correction. The truth is that there is no formulation of any law which is true *absolutely*. Theoretically, all we can get is probability. But that opens the whole question of truth, with nothing to distinguish absolute truth from absolute error; for these are qualitative differences, and not differences of degree only. All that we can say in favour of the laws is that they work within certain limits and prove useful to life. But that is a far cry from theoretic truth. The laws are only human contrivances to seek to understand and control nature. Their objectivity is the objectivity of all sensuous facts, which we have already doubted and dubbed "phenomena".

It will naturally be argued here that the very possibility of amending the laws implies a progressive approach to the truth. There must therefore be *some objective truth*, which is not man-made, but which is nature's own truth. We now contend that the very ideal of this truth is illusory, so far as we are concerned. All the truth for us is humanly formulated truth, and that is as far from real objective truth or truth as it is in itself as error is from truth. What is important to note is that scientific truth is a function of a certain *method* or certain *capabilities* for truth. It is not something standing by itself and unrelated to all human approach. This human approach is tainted with all kinds of limitations and deficiencies. The scientific method therefore, however perfected, will always remain inadequate for the great and inestimable task of theoretic correctness. But if that is so, all so-called progress is *theoretically valueless*. How far have we gone? No one can say, who

does not know the end and the goal and never *can* know it. When the goal is infinite, any sum-total of finites can register no progress. It is a qualitative difference, not a quantitative one. The truth-values are just incomparable. It is no exaggeration to say that scientific truth compares quite favourably with what we should pronounce simply as error. We need to go from error to truth. This is the sole business of true philosophy. It is no wonder then that Vedānta begins where science ends.

We break with scientific knowledge by turning from all forms of objective reality to the reality of the subject. The object is *to me*. What is this *me* in the end? Is it the empirical subject? But the empirical subject is an object of a sort. It too is *to me*. The real *me* or the true subject must be beyond it. Is it a logical entity,—the so-called “transcendental unity of apperception”? But that too is no longer *transcendental* in the analysis of knowledge. It is known as a *definite function of the subject* in knowledge. It can be reduced to a form of the object, perhaps subtle, but not mysterious. It can be known by a reflective mind. The true subject must be beyond that too. It must be no object of any kind. It must be truly transcendental, and yet not wholly unknown and unknowable. It must be self-revealing for what it is, *i.e. as object of no kind and therefore not to be known in the objective attitude*. It is the subject that is the *knower* only, never the known. We can thus pass from a mere logical presupposition of knowledge to the ontological reality of the pure subject, which is subject only and never an object. Vedānta clarifies the nature of this intelligent subject or substance. It is the ultimate ground and presupposition of all knowledge. Although the Self can never be known as *this* or as *that*, it can always be *spoken* as what is absolutely immediate or as ‘I’. It is the only true spirit. Knowledge of the spirit, in its fullness and completeness, can be shown to have every character of Absolute Truth which is the ideal of the theoretic consciousness. This is what Advaita Vedānta does. If it is true that the highest form of good living is life in the Truth, then that certainly is the goal of this science of the Spirit or *adhyātmic vidyā* called Advaita Vedānta.

PHILOSOPHY AND LANGUAGE

J. F. STAAL

PROFESSOR HIRIYANNA, in a discussion of an Indian view of "present time"¹, shows in passing how philosophical doctrines may be established by referring to linguistic usage. Vatsyayana, for example, argues in the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* that the philosophical present cannot be rejected because this would oppose the presuppositions of grammar. The idea obviously is that we have a present tense in grammar and employ it in actual linguistic usage, which indicates that there must also exist such an entity as present time in reality, which is denoted by these expressions. Further on, Vatsyayana distinguishes between two kinds of present : that in which it is dissociated from the past and future, and denotes an action which can be perceived in its entirety ; and that in which it is associated with both past and future. These two are exemplified by instances taken from ordinary linguistic usage : the first occurs in expressions such as *pacati* "he cooks", the second in expressions such as *asti dravyam* "substance is". This is further elucidated by observing that the first expression is related to, but not dependent on, the expressions *apākṣit* "he has cooked" and *pakṣyati* "he will cook" ; while the second expression occurs in itself and it is meaningless to consider for its elucidation expressions such as "substance has been" or "substance will be" : for all these would merely denote the same, non-temporal state of affairs.

It may first of all be stressed here that this text of Vatsyayana provides a valid observation of a linguistic fact : the present tense in Sanskrit, and, for that matter, in a number of other

languages including English (but excluding, for example, Arabic, where different forms of the verb are used) is used in two entirely different ways : in order to denote events which take place in the present moment, and in order to denote non-temporal situations². A second point to be observed here is that in this passage a philosophical doctrine is *established by referring to linguistic usage*. But the question naturally arises whether it would not be possible that the philosophical doctrine is *based upon linguistic usage*. This would of course contradict our philosophical intuition, which suggests that philosophy deals with reality as it is and that language expresses this awareness and therefore merely follows reality, corresponds to it and represents it. But some further reflections may cause us to be sceptical with regard to this intuition. After all, philosophical doctrines are not seen to have achieved great unanimity in their accounts of reality, and as linguistic diversity is an indisputable fact whereas philosophers express themselves in language, it is at least possible to assume that at times philosophical thought may have been influenced by the language in which it is expressed. In the above case this would mean that we can consider the present time in two different ways only on account of the fact that our language happens to make use of the present tense in two different ways.

In Indian thought examples of references to linguistic usage are not rare in philosophical discussions. The language of philosophical Sanskrit is often much nearer to linguistic reality than is manifest in the translations into a modern language. For example, common terms for past and future in Sanskrit are *atīta* "gone (beyond)" and *anāgata* "not come", and these may be accompanied by the expressions *abhūt* "has been" and *bhaviṣyati* "will be" respectively³.

In addition, Indian philosophy does not only reflect certain linguistic structures, but is also closely related to certain structures of the science which deals with language, i.e., grammar. This need not surprise anybody who knows that the most highly developed science among the Indian scientific disciplines is grammar. One example may be quoted here for the depen-

dence of philosophical doctrines upon grammatical techniques and methods. This is taken from Renou, who has dealt with this and with similar cases in a study on the relationships between ritual and grammar in Sanskrit⁴. According to the grammarians quoted in that article a rule (*vidhi*) is often followed by further specifications which are called restrictive rules (*niyama*). After this another rule follows, and the distinguishing mark of this rule and of grammatical rules in general is that it naturally conveys information on a new topic. Patanjali expresses this by saying, : *apūrho vidhi*, "the rule denotes what did not exist (i.e., has not been dealt with) before"⁵. The same idea returns several centuries later in one of the most famous doctrines of Mimamsa : the doctrine according to which a Vedic injunction (*vidhi*)⁶ which does not directly and immediately produce a visible effect, produces an invisible effect which is called *apūrho* "what did not exist before". This *apūrho* in turn leads in course of time to the final effect, which may for example be *svarga*, "celestial felicity".

Here we have a philosophical doctrine expressed in the same terminology which was earlier used in grammar. Of course, the doctrine itself seems merely the outcome of a rigorous and consistent application of the law of causality (of which the Western theistic religions offer no exact counterpart). Nevertheless it appears at least a possible hypothesis, to hold that the development of the grammatical concept led to the philosophical expression, which therefore in a sense is based upon it.

This completes our short review of two examples, where philosophical doctrines can be related to, and perhaps based upon, facts of language. In the first case the relation is with ordinary linguistic usage, in the second with grammatical formulations dealing with linguistic usage. This state of affairs, which could be easily exemplified further with the help of similar relationships, provides striking parallels to a contemporary development which has taken place both in modern philosophy and in modern linguistics. In philosophy this development is often referred to as analytical philosophy or linguistic philo-

sophy. It is largely inspired by the work of Wittgenstein, a philosopher who stressed and developed the idea that while we sometimes express in language what we think, we are often in a position where language comes first and where we think in accordance with the structure of our language. "Thinking" itself is a term which is used in a very particular way which shows what the word "really means", and we may therefore have to study this usage first before we are in a position to philosophise about problems such as the relation between language and thought. Wittgenstein actually started his second series of investigations⁷ with the analysis of one leading idea: all words in a sentence are not names of objects. Therefore if we are asking for the meaning of a word, we need not always be in a position to point at an object to which the word as a name corresponds. For example, while the last word in the sentence "he gradually lost all his money" can in some sense be considered a name for an object to which we can point in the outside world, the other words of the sentence do not denote objects in a similar way. Even if we would claim (which is possible, though not without difficulties) that the first word of the sentence still denotes a kind of outside object, the other words all behave in an entirely different fashion.

Wittgenstein therefore speaks of the meaning of the sentence as a whole, and this meaning is constituted by the use which can be made of the sentence, and not for instance on the basis of the meanings of individual words which belong to the sentence. In fact it is very often the other way round: a word has meaning only within a sentence. The meaning of a word then becomes its use, in particular its use in sentences.

In linguistics the corresponding development referred to above is often called the "Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis". A partial formulation of this hypothesis, due to Sapir, is the following: "We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation".⁸ This hypothesis was reached when both Whorf and Sapir, independently, studied languages of American Indians which have a structure very different from

e.g., Indo-European languages. They noticed that it becomes difficult to say that the same representation of reality in the mind of an American Indian and in the mind of an Indo-European is expressed differently in the different languages concerned. It seems much more reasonable to suppose that the mental representations of reality themselves are different, for the language structure segments reality in a different way in each case. Our language maps our universe on the base of an outside reality which is principally unorganised and chaotic. Therefore our language is the first and main determinant of our world view.

Whether this hypothesis is true is at present not yet decided. But the great advantage of this development is that we are now in a position from which we can investigate the problem of the relation between thought and language on an empirical basis. Both Wittgenstein's approach and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis point in the same direction : what is left to be done is to make an attempt to verify or falsify these ideas by studying more material, but also and especially by concentrating attention upon a different kind of material.

Such investigations should naturally take into account both what philosophers have said about language and how philosophers have utilised language. Can we find instances where philosophical ideas seem to depend on linguistic structures ? We may not become aware of such dependence when we merely remain within the language of one philosophical tradition, where the means of expression are generally taken for granted. It seems preferable to attempt the comparison of apparently similar philosophical ideas which are expressed differently in different languages. If this is our point of departure we have to limit ourselves to languages in which well developed philosophical traditions are available, e.g., Sanskrit or Greek. Under these circumstances a vast field becomes available for investigation.

It will now be attempted to survey some of the possibilities which may be envisaged by starting from the consideration of the structure of a sentence and by discussing under what condi-

tions it would be possible for a constituent element of this structure to modify the meaning or to suggest a new meaning. We shall be able to find several instances where linguistic structures appear to lead to philosophical ideas.

First let it be noted that Wittgenstein's discussion of the sentence structure was foreshadowed in Indian philosophy many centuries earlier. Bhartrihari was clearly aware of a fact which has been recognised only gradually in modern linguistics : namely, that the meaning of a sentence cannot be arrived at by adding the meanings of the words which constitute the sentence. This was expressed in the doctrine of *vākyasphoṭa*. The grammarians postulated accordingly a special intuition, called *pratibhā*, by means of which the meaning of a whole sentence can be grasped.⁹ This implies, among other things, that the traditional parts of speech cannot be defined in the way they are usually defined : "nouns are chiefly concerned with existents" (*nānmāṇi sattvapradhānatā*), "verbs are chiefly concerned with activities" (*kriyāpradhānam ākhyātam*), etc. The reason for this is that the meaning of the individual words occurring in a sentence can only be established by referring to their function and use within the sentence. As was shown by Brough, from whose study the above quotations were taken, this view was attributed, long before Bhartrihari, to a grammarian by the name of Audumbarayana in the *Nirukta* of Yaska.¹⁰

One of the most important divisions of the sentence, in Sanskrit as well as in Greek and in most well known modern languages, is into subject and predicate. We shall limit ourselves to this linguistic type, though we are now aware of the existence of languages where the analysis of the sentence into subject and predicate does not seem to be appropriate¹¹. Modern logic is in this respect clearly affiliated to Indo-European : a sentence, therefore, is here expressed by the symbol $F(x)$, where x denotes the subject and F denotes the predicate. The subject is often a noun, while the predicate may sometimes be either an adjective or a verb. Examples are : "the king is powerful" and "the king reigns". Here in both cases the noun "king" is the subject. In the one sentence the verb "reigns" is the predicate, in the

other the adjective "powerful" is part of the predicate (the latter being itself verbal) "is powerful", as holds for all predicates which occur outside the purely nominal sentences¹².

Both Greek and Indian thinkers arrived at a system of categories by considering simple sentences of this type. The first category of the system they set up is generally expressed by nouns and is called *substance* (*dravya* by the Vaiseshika philosophers, *ousia* by Aristotle). The second category is generally expressed by adjectives (see, however, below), and is called *quality*¹³ or *attribute* (*guṇa* or *dharma* in Vaiseshika, *poion* in Aristotle). The third category is generally expressed by verbs and is called *activity* in Indian thought (*kriyā* in the Vaiseshika system); there is no one corresponding category in Aristotle. From here on the Vaiseshika thinkers and Aristotle diverge further from each other and the reason for this divergence will not occupy us here, as this means in addition a further alienation from the linguistic background. In both cases this linguistic background was not only similar (in actual usage), but was also similarly analysed (in grammar), so that it could lead relatively easily to the above logical classification. The Greek grammarians distinguished between *onoma* "name, noun", *rema* "verb" and *sundesmos* or *arthron*, covering other words of the sentence¹⁴. This is parallel to Panini's purely formal distinction between *sup*, *tiñ*, and *avyaya*. In Greece the old Stoa separated from the *sundesmoi* the *arthra*, which denoted only pronouns and articles¹⁵. This approaches the Indian classification in the Nirukta and the Pratisakhya literature of *nāman* "name, noun", *ākhyāta* "verb", *upasarga* "preverb" and *nipāta* "particle". The parallels are not exact but the differences can be explained fairly well. The main point which strikes us here is that the grammarians in both cultures deleted the adjectives as a separate category from the substantives (obviously on account of the fact that their formal structure is the same as that of the substantives, while in particular in Sanskrit it is often difficult to distinguish between substantive and adjective), while the philosophers in both traditions introduced quality as a separate philosophical category. The reason for this is given by the analysis of simple predicative

sentences of the kind considered before. In other words, the second category in both Sanskrit and Greek has for its linguistic background not only the adjective, but also and more in general the predicate. It is therefore not only based upon a classification of the parts of speech, but in addition upon an analysis of the entire sentence. In a language like Japanese, where verb and adjective do not seem to be clearly distinguished, the parts of speech are different but the analysis of the sentence remains in this respect similar and would therefore lead to a similar philosophical classification of categories.

Here we have a clear instance where philosophical concepts are related to grammatical concepts and to facts of language. Let us now look somewhat closer at the first two categories, substance and quality or attribute. From Audumbarayana's and Wittgenstein's criticisms we know that it would be unprofitable to define a noun as what refers to a substance. In Indian philosophy an instance where this was further specified occurs in a definition of the Absolute. For this we have first to go back once more to the grammarians and to the Vaisesika system. According to Patanjali, *dravya* "substance" can be defined as *guṇasamudāya* "collection of qualities" or *guṇasaṃdrāva* "running together of qualities"¹⁶. In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* it is defined as *guṇāstaya* "locus of qualities". In Advaita, however, the Absolute is without qualities (*nirguṇa*). Hence it follows that Brahman is not a *dravya*. This does clearly imply that nothing can be predicated of Brahman, that it cannot be the subject of a sentence, that it cannot be represented by a noun, in short, that it is "that from which all words return" (*yato vāco nivartante*)¹⁷. Similarly, in the existentialism of Heidegger, human being is characterised as *existence*, which is clearly distinguished from *substance*¹⁸. A human being should therefore not be thought of as a "thing". Heidegger, accordingly, does not characterise it by qualities expressed by means of adjectives, but by making special use of verbal constructions. In both these philosophical developments there is a reaction against the nominalisation or "objectification" which Whorf considered as characteristic for European languages as distinct from Hopi,

an American Indian language¹⁹. In both cases we have at the same time an example of Wittgenstein's general remark, that not all words in the sentence, not even all nouns, refer to objects or substances. In both cases, finally, we see that philosophy frees itself from the grammatical background which in general it follows unconditionally, but which is seen in special cases to lead to pseudo-problems—problems which are both apparent and superfluous.

The relationship between *dravya* and *guṇa* leads to many more philosophical developments. We will shortly refer to two of these. The first is related to doctrines of causation and change. It has been established by J.M. Le Blond that Aristotle's theory of change is based upon the analysis of sentences where the subject or noun remains the same while the predicate (adjective or verb) is different. Le Blond had first observed how Aristotle's refutation of Parmenides and the school of Elea consisted essentially in a critical examination of the propositions by means of which these doctrines had been formulated²⁰. When Aristotle subsequently develops his own theory of change he bases this upon the analysis of sentences of the type "a becomes b" or "not-b becomes b". W.D. Ross who describes this in detail says: "In the former case that which becomes persists, in the latter it passes away. But whether we say 'a becomes b' or 'not-b becomes b', what always happens is that a-not-b becomes ab. The product *contains* two elements (a substratum and a form), but a third element is *presupposed* by the change (the privation of the form)"²¹. We thus arrive at three elements of change: matter (*húle*, corresponding to the subject or noun); form (*morphé*, corresponding to the predicate); and privation (*stérésis*, corresponding to the (function of the) negative particle). Privation is in some sense the counterpart of the Vaiseshika category of *abhāva* "non-existence, absence" (neglected by Aristotle as a separate category, because his category classification is exclusively based upon the analysis of sentences where the copula "is" plays a part²²).

This analysis of change closely corresponds to the Indian analysis of causation²³. Whatever the interpretation of causation

(here the schools, as is well known, differ greatly and fundamentally), the point of departure is formed by sentences which are analysed into subject and predicate. The *Nyāyasūtra* for example discusses the transformation (*vikāra*) of gold in earrings and necklaces, and the commentator Vatsyayana explains this as follows: "gold is the continuing (*avasthita*) substratum (*dharmin*) with properties (*dharma*) which are disappearing and coming into being"²⁴. Here *dharmin* refers to *dravya* and subject, while *dharma* refers to *guṇa* and predicate. The disappearing element (*hīyamāna*) points to the Aristotelian privation. The similarity is not due to any historical connection, but to the common linguistic heritage of an Indo-European structure. We have shown elsewhere that the Indian analysis also corresponds to a purely grammatical analysis, while it has at the same time important implications on the purely logical level, leading to specific doctrines of formal logic in Navya-nyaya.²⁵

The other development to which a consideration of the relationship between substance and attribute may lead, originates in the logical problem, whether expressions such as *nīlotpala* "blue lotus" denote a lotus. This has a parallel in a famous Chinese discussion on the difference between ■ white horse and a horse²⁶, but the present writer is not qualified to assess the importance of the linguistic background in this case²⁷. In Sanskrit the answer is given in advance by the structure of the linguistic expression which has been used: for *nīlotpala* is a *karmadhāraya* compound, classified as ■ kind of *tatpuruṣa* compound. According to the Sanskrit grammarians' analysis a *tatpuruṣa* denotes its second member (*uttarapada*). Hence a blue lotus denotes a lotus and nothing else. This is at the same time the conclusion which is reached by the Naiyayikas²⁸.

This same fact may be related to a very different development in Indian thought. It has always been ■ natural first approach and *pūrvapakṣa*—which may of course be later discarded—to consider the principle of the world and the world itself respectively as cause and effect, or as subject and predicate, or as noun and adjective or verb. But if the adjective is evanescent in the *karmadhāraya* compound, the predicate is corres-

pondingly evanescent in the sentence "the lotus is blue" and this calls for a special theory of causation, where the effect is nothing but an illusory imposition upon the cause, which adds nothing to it and subtracts nothing from it. However, this is precisely what is expressed in the *vivartavāda* of Advaita Vedānta. Apart from this general linguistic background, a purely grammatical background is also available as was discovered by Ruegg.²⁹ This unexpected relationship may be seen symbolised in words which denote the deity by means of a *tatpuruṣa* compound of the type *jagannātha* "Lord of the world". Here the world is as much an illusory imposition upon the Lord, as the first member of the compound is an illusory imposition upon the second. This could be related to the fact that *vivartavāda* is a specifically Indian doctrine, which has no exact counterpart in any other system of thought: for the corresponding compounds are much more frequent in Sanskrit than in any other Indo-European language.

Compound formation in Sanskrit is related to various other doctrines in philosophy and logic. One of the main concepts utilised by Sanskrit grammarians to describe a close relationship is *sāmānādhikarāṇya* "the fact of possessing the same locus or reference". This concept serves to define the *karmadhāraya* compound. It is also used to explain the relation between subject and predicate both in purely nominal sentences such as *ayam brahmadattaḥ* "this is Brahmadatta" and in verbal sentences such as *tvam pacasi* "you are cooking"³⁰. In Navya-nyāya the same term is used to define *vyāpti* "pervasion", the relation which holds between *hetu* "reason" and *sādhya* "thing-to-be-inferred". The definition in terms of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is arrived at after discarding numerous other definitions of *vyāpti*. This characterisation of *vyāpti* was accepted in almost unmodified form by Advaita Vedānta³¹. In later Advaita the same concepts are used to characterize the relations between the world and Brahman and between the individual soul and Brahman, which are further differentiated by additional qualifications [as *bādhā-sāmānādhikarāṇya* and *aikya-sāmānādhikarāṇya* respectively.

The formal structure of compound formation is utilised in the technical Sanskrit of Navya-nyaya. The principles of compound formation can therefore be formalised by means of symbolic logic, and when these formalisations are subsequently applied to the expressions of Navya-nyaya, a formalisation of the definitions of *vyāpti* can be obtained. In this formalisation the structure of the linguistic means of expression is reflected as has been shown by the present author³².

However not only Navya-nyaya but also symbolic logic reflects the structure of the language or languages, in the framework of which it was expressed and developed. For this we may return to the expression $F(x)$, mentioned earlier, and consider possible negations of this expression. We have already referred to an example of negation of the subject in "not- b becomes b ". If the negative particle be denoted by the symbol \neg , which always precedes what it negates, the question arises how to write the negation of $F(x)$. If the subject-predicate relationship were expressed by e.g., FX or fx , and not in the somewhat biased form $F(x)$, there would be only two possibilities: $\neg FX$, i.e. $(\neg F)X$, and $F\neg X$, i.e. $F(\neg X)$ (and analogously for fx). But in modern logic $F(x)$ is always negated as $\neg F(x)$, while the expression $F(\neg x)$ is not even permitted, or, as it is technically called, is not a well-formed expression (because the constructed formation rules do not lead to its formation). This preference can be traced back to Aristotle's statement that a sentence is negated if the predicate is negated, but not if the subject is negated. For example, the negation of "patience is reasonable" is "patience is not reasonable" or "patience is unreasonable", but not "impatience is reasonable".

Indian thinkers were not particularly in favour of one alternative to the exclusion of the other. They considered negation of the subject of a sentence as well and on a par with negation of the predicate. These two negations were employed by the grammarians, but they were also adopted in Mimamsa. The technical terms used to refer to both kinds of negation were *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* and *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (in grammar) or *paryudāsa* and *niṣedha* (in Mimamsa). In Mimamsa a further

distinction is made because not only indicative sentences are studied, but also and especially injunctions (*vidhi*). If an indicative sentence be again denoted by the subject-predicate structure $F(x)$, the corresponding injunction may be denoted by $N(F(x))$. For example, if $F(x)$ stands for "the knot is tied" or "(he) tie (s) the knot", $N(F(x))$ will stand for "the knot should be tied !" or "tie the knot !". The *niṣedha* negation of this would be : "the knot should not be tied !" or "don't tie the knot", represented by $\sim N(F(x))$. There are two kinds of *paryudāsa* negations. In the one the subject is negated, e.g. "another knot should be tied !" or "tie another knot !". In the other it is not the injunctive character of the verb (expressed by the ending) which is negated, but the verbal meaning (expressed by the root), e.g. "the knot should be untied !" or "untie the knot !". The first kind of *paryudāsa* can be represented by $N(F(\sim x))$, the second by $N(\sim F(x))$. In this system all possibilities are realised. This leads to very interesting logical doctrines, which cannot however be fully analysed here³³.

All these examples show that the relation between philosophy and language is not in the first place a topic for speculation, where general points of view can be defended as it were *a priori*. On the contrary there is an extensive field for investigation, the study of which may clarify step by step the particular relationships which obtain between specific linguistic structures and specific philosophical problems. It would of course be unwarranted to adopt the view that either of these is primary and that we must necessarily arrive at the conclusion that either philosophy can be derived from language or that language can be derived from philosophy. If a philosophical doctrine can be shown to be based upon a linguistic structure, the problem is shifted for the linguistic structure itself must have a cause. This cause may often lie again in the ambiguous domain of thought or of mental representation in general. On the other hand if philosophy has influenced language, this also stands in need of further elucidation. It is at any rate clear that neither mere philosophical analysis, as carried out by Wittgenstein and his followers, nor mere empirical investigations, as given in

modern linguistics, can obtain far-reaching conclusions unless the language in which philosophical and logical problems are formulated is taken into account, as well as the explicit testimony of philosophers on problems of language. It is obvious that especially Indian philosophy, with its traditional emphasis on problems connected with language, will provide also from this point of view a vast and interesting field for research. However not only the language of Indian philosophy is a subject for study: Indian thinkers have throughout the centuries contributed valuable solutions to various problems which in the West have been dealt with only recently. If these problems are properly understood and not merely regarded as a specialised field of philosophical research, fundamental clarifications will result and philosophy will have made some progress. Wittgenstein was at least partly right when he made the statement that "philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language"³⁴.

Greek terms in Roman transliteration.

οὐσία	ousia
ποιόν	poion
ὄνομα	onoma
ῥήμα	rema
σύνδεσμος	sundesmos
ἄρθρον	arthron
σύνδεσμοι	sundesmoi
ἄρθρα	arthra
ὑλή	hule
μορφή	morphe
στέρεσις	steresis

NOTES

¹ M. Hiriyanna, *An Indian view of 'present time'* in : *Indian Philosophical Studies* I, Mysore 1957, 121-6 (reprinted from : *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, April 1924).

² This enables the mystic to speak of eternity in terms of the temporal present or to speak about "the eternal present".

³ For example in *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.5.

⁴ L. Renou, *Connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en sanskrit*, *Journal Asiatique* 233 (1941-42) 105-65.

⁵ *Mahābhāṣya* ed. Kielborn I, 312, in : Renou, *op.cit.*, 126.

⁶ On the difference between rules in grammar and rules in *Mīmāṃsā* see the present author's *Are Indian philosophers vegetarians? Comparative studies on negation and contradiction*, to be published in : *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*.

⁷ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford 1958.

⁸ B. L. Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality*, ed. J. B. Carroll, New York—London 1956, 134.

⁹ See especially : G. Kavira, *The doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy*, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 5 (1923-24) 1-18, 113-132.

¹⁰ J. Brough, *Audumbarayana's theory of language*, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 14 (1952) 73-7.

¹¹ Whorf, *op. cit.*, 243.

¹² Cf. the present author in : *Transactions of the Philological Society* (1960) 100-1.

¹³ Cf. K. H. Potter, "Are the Vaisesika 'Gunas' qualities?" *Philosophy East and West* 4 (1954-55) 259-64 and the present author in : *Indo-Iranian Journal* 4 (1960) 71.

¹⁴ See e.g. H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern*, Berlin 1863, 290.

¹⁵ Cf. *op. cit.*, *ibid.* and 569, 623.

¹⁶ See D. S. Ruegg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*, Paris 1959, 41.

¹⁷ *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* 2.4.

¹⁸ See the present author's *An introduction to the existentialism of Martin Heidegger*, *Madras University Journal* 28 (1956) 13.

¹⁹ Whorf, *op.cit.*, 142 and following.

²⁰ J. M. Le Blond, *Logique et méthode chez Aristote. Étude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique aristotélicienne*, Paris 1939, 308.

²¹ W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London 1953, 65.

²² See e.g. I. M. Bochénski, *Ancient formal logic*, Amsterdam 1951, 33.

²³ This was treated by the present author without special reference to the linguistic background in : *Parmenides and Indian thought*, *The Philosophical Quarterly* 28 (1955) 81-106.

²⁴ *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 2.2.49 : *acarthitām svarāṇāṁ kīyamāṇena dharmānopajāyāmānena ca dharmena dharmī bhavati*.

²⁵ See the present author's *Contraposition in Indian logic*, to be published in : *Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science* (Stanford 1960).

²⁶ See : Fung Yu-lan, *A history of Chinese philosophy*, translated by D. Bodde, I, Princeton 1952, 203-5.

²⁷ See however : A. C. Graham, "Being" in Western philosophy compared with *shih'f'i* and *yu'wu* in Chinese philosophy, *Asia Major*, new series 7 (1959) 81, 88-9.—Elements indicating a different analysis can be found in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, chapter 2.

¹⁸ See especially D. H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the study of Navyanyaya logic*, Cambridge Mass. 1951, 69-71.

¹⁹ *op.cit.*, 41-8; cf. the present author in : *Philosophy East and West* 10 (1960) 55-6.

²⁰ L. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit*, Paris 1957, 320-1, 335-6.

²¹ *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* ed. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri 2.10.

²² In : *Correlations between language and logic in Indian thought*, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23 (1960) 109-22.

²³ See the article quoted above, note 6.

²⁴ *Philosophical Investigations* I 109.

THE LOGIC OF CREATIONISM, ADVAITA, AND VISISHTADVAITA: A CRITIQUE

PETER A. BERTOCCHI

How is Brahman or God related to the world of Nature and especially to finite persons? There is one answer to this question to which astute Indian religious and philosophical minds resolutely object, and that is creation "out of nothing." In this rejection, of course, they enjoy unanimous support of ancient Greek philosophy. Furthermore, there are many western thinkers, ancient, modern and contemporary, who chime in on the chorus. Indeed, we have been singularly impressed by ■ kind of intellectual impatience with the doctrine, and the not always subtle suggestion that a philosophically sophisticated mind would no sooner look at it than give it up.

In this essay we shall first expound the main line of thought involved in theistic creationism (Absolute Theism), Advaita (non-dualist Monism or Absolutism), Visishtadvaita (Qualified Absolutistic Monism). We shall then try to show that, contrary to the assumption usually made by Advaitins and Visishtadvaitins, the rejection of the theory that God created man *ex* or *ab nihilo* leaves them with problems at least as serious as those they wished to avoid by rejecting creationism. In the last section, we shall consider a weakness which pervades all three perspectives and suggest another approach. We begin by reviewing the background for creationism so that we can better appreciate the problems all three perspectives are attempting to solve.

I

We have said that the Greek mind did not even suggest a doctrine of radical, metaphysical creation. The exact ontological

relation of Aristotle's Prime Mover Unmoved to the world and man is certainly not clear, but it is not creationism. Plato's valiant struggle with the problems of the relation of the Ideas, or the Good, to the World of Appearance is a matter of record. As we interpret Plato's struggle, the early Plato, who had seriously considered that the changing world was an imperfect copy or imitation of the Ideas, who had also held that things "participate" in the Ideas, gave way to the doctrine of the middle Plato's *Republic*, that the Good is the Source of the world's being and being known. The later Plato saw such difficulties in these earlier views that he was willing to consider a radically different view in the *Timaeus*. There an infinitely Good but not infinitely powerful God, with his eyes "fixed" upon the co-eternal ideas, strove to "persuade" the co-eternal Ananké of the Receptacle to take on as much of the perfect as possible.

We can learn from Plato that the metaphysician cannot allow his philosophical imagination to be restricted arbitrarily by impositions of revealed or conventional religious dogma. But we can also learn from this great mind's "sense of the problem" that, on such ultimate issues, the metaphysician must not impose his own desire for certainty, but realize that perhaps he will only be able to reach what at best will be the most probable account. Thus, Plato's own reflections led him, tentatively at least, to suggest an alternative which, for all its tantalizing qualities, poses insuperable obstacles to philosophical understanding.

For in this *Timaeus* account, as we said, the imperfect beings in the changing world are the product of the cosmic Demi-Urge's effort to conform the "womb of all becoming" to the requirements of the eternally independent Ideas. No outright creation is contemplated. Plato envisages three independent and co-eternal metaphysical ultimates: the Demi-Urge, Eternal Forms, and the Receptacle. Inter-action between them produces the world of time and space.

But the deadly fault in this theory is one that, once realized, forces a thinker to some form of metaphysical monism or creationism. For, if, by definition, co-eternal entities A, B, and C

are not responsible in any way for each other's being and Nature, since no common factor other than "self-existence" can be assumed, one is left to ponder. On what grounds could we expect such beings (a) to affect, or be affected by, each other to begin with, (b) to combine and give the degree of order and goodness we actually find in existence ?

There are difficulties in Absolute Monism, in Qualified Monism, and in Creationism, but they certainly are not as harsh as those faced by posing ultimate plural entities—be they two, three, or infinite in number—for though metaphysically independent and primitively indifferent to each other, the Entities somehow came together to create the dominant order of the finite world. Until one has faced this difficulty, decided that it simply will not do, he will not be appreciative of the alternative views which, whatever mystery they still involve, escape this one.

This is the time for us to realize that exponents of theism and absolutistic monism are not proposing that all mystery is dispelled on their views of the relation of the finite world to God. They agree with Whitehead that the problem of philosophy is not to solve all mystery, but "to corner it." Hence, if a thinker has decided that metaphysical dualism and pluralism render mystery more mysterious, he may ask how well Creationism, or Advaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita (to which we are restricting ourselves) "corner" the mystery.

We have given the context in which the creationist advances the view that God created the world "out of nothing." He means to deny that God depended on, or created "out of," something other than his own being, independent of his being, and co-eternal with it. To escape the shoals of metaphysical pluralism is one fundamental motive. The other is his desire, usually, to protect the self-sufficiency and infinity of God.

The creationist is ready to admit that he does not know the technical "how" by which an infinite Being creates the finite world. He confesses that this remains a mystery, but he reminds us that as created beings we should expect to fail in understanding *this* "how." He does not mean, however,

that God, as it were, takes "nothing," zero-being, and makes "something" out of it. To repeat, the creationist does not know what the process of actual creation is, and he has no final confidence in analogies drawn from the finite world, for both imagination and conception run dry at this point. In the doctrine of creation he wishes to affirm one basic and to him all-important conviction: that nothing other than God's own nature and purpose is intrinsically responsible for the existence of finite persons. (We might have said "finite Nature and persons," but since theistic idealists would not hold that Nature does not exist independent of God's own being, we have limited ourselves and shall continue in this essay to do so, to the relation of the ultimate to finite persons.)

Whatever differences a creationist theist might have with other creationists, as to the nature of relation of the physical and organic world to God, his crucial insistence is that finite persons, however intimately related to and dependent upon, God, are no parts of His being, or no modes of His being, or any kind of "filaments" thereof. Convinced that the finite person cannot exist for a moment without being dependent upon God his creator, recreator, sustainer, the creationist steadfastly maintains that the person cannot be ontologically one with, or "any part of," or an emanation from, or effulgeration of, or a transformation for God's being.

Why does the creationist theist hold so tenaciously to such relative ontological independence or dependence-independence for persons? There are two main reasons, especially in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. He believes that the person's experience of (limited) free-will, his responsibility for moral good and evil, would be in fact annulled in any monistic view. He simply cannot see how the person's actions can be in any degree his own if his total being is identical with, or non-different from, God's being, or if he is regarded as part of God's nature. Only creationism can, he believes, be fair to the limited autonomy or freedom of the human person.

Similarly, cognitive error, the abuse of reason, is man's responsibility, and has its locus in man's mind. The creationist

cannot understand how an Absolute Consciousness can be said to know at the same time the limited perspective and errors of finite minds and the truth. For an infinite Mind who knows "error and delusion" for what it is does not really know what it is to *experience the erroneousness*, the taking of something to be what it is not ! If error, illusion, and delusion exist for finite minds, it will not do, therefore, to say that they can exist in an Infinite Mind who "sees through" them and is not led astray by them.

Again, the very objection to error is that one does not know at the time that he is in error. Where is this "not knowing at the time" going to be lodged if a finite mind is not, to use F.R. Tennant's terms, "planted out," "posited," with "delegated" spontaneity and autonomy? Thus, to anticipate a moment, if the Visishtadvaitin, taking his lead from Ramanuja, thinks that "creation is explained as the self-differentiation of the Absolute which Brahman wills to be the many,"¹ the creationist theist wonders whether the Visishtadvaitin can, if pushed, consistently maintain what is central to Ramanuja's own rebellion against Sankara and the Advaitins, namely: "Every person is primarily responsible for his conduct and it is morally unjustifiable to throw the blame on supernatural agencies or on the highest Lord."²

We have purposely introduced the Visishtadvaitin into the discussion at this point, for it is, among other things, his central insistence on the moral responsibility of the (limitedly) free person that leads him to join forces with the "western" theist against Advaita. For we must note that, however much the case against the Advaitin is based on the contention that "existence of a plurality of selves is a fact of experience in all its levels,"³ all three positions are equally insistent that the Ultimate be protected from any possible imputation of imperfection. Furthermore, each perspective grounds its conviction about the perfections of God's nature on what are claimed to be revelations of religious and mystical experience. But we must realize, before passing on, that because each side will resort to religious "faith" and "realization" to ground its

conviction about the necessary perfection of God's being, this appeal cannot give advantage to anyone perspective over the others.

II

The rational case against creationism consists mainly in pressing home to the creationist the consequences of even his relative pluralism for the nature of God. The trouble with the creationist, says the monist, is that while he properly realizes that pluralism is untenable, he does not seem to realize that creationism, in conceiving of a created world and persons as independent of God, involves an externalism in the relation between God and his creation which finitizes God. For God is now limited by the creation, which stands over against him; he still remains One over against the Other or Others. Such metaphysical remoteness not only limits God's omnipotence, but also jeopardizes the intimacy attested to and needed for religious experience and confidence.⁴

Furthermore, does not creationism mean that God existed *for an inestimable period without the world and man*? Why would an all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful Being be without his creation, even assuming that the idea of a God without any world is plausible?

The first type of objection need not bother the Judaeo-Christian theist who has granted the mystery of the *how* of creation. For his view is that God is both immanent in creation and transcendent; ontologically, God sustains his world and even the delegated autonomy of finite persons is supported by his continued recreation.

But it is the second question that gives the creationist real pause. He knows that as long as it is suggested that the temporal process, as a whole or in any part, is said to affect or influence God, the unchanging nature and infinite qualities of God's being are threatened. Furthermore, the traditional creationist theist is at one with the Advaitin and Visishtadvaitin in what he believes to be the inexorable theoretical and religious

demand that the Ultimate be self-sufficient in every respect. This means that however related the Absolute Being is to time, the vagaries and influences of the temporal process cannot contribute to, or take away from, the self-sufficiency of this Ultimate Being.

There are, of course, independent theoretical arguments, such as those advanced by Sankara, Spinoza, Hegel, and Bradley, which conclude that the notions of change and time, and of externally related monadistic entities influencing each other, are riddled with contradictions. These arguments have impressed great minds too much to be considered less than formidable. At root one wonders whether they are not in the last analysis different ways of stating a hoary, haunting question: How can that which is ever become what it is not? How can one add to all that is, as creationism seems to require? Whence could such addition be acquired? Can any of the changes which would then result be intelligibly conceived unless there were a pervasive, unchanging Being to support, direct, and sustain the Process? Nay, whatever importance we give to time or to changes in time, we make time itself unintelligible and we lose any rational ground for trust in what happens in time unless time is undergirded by Eternity. Better to hold to some inscrutable fact about Being which, while recognizing time, keeps it from infecting Reality, than to lose all constancy and direction.

In this context one can see why some doctrine of *Māyā* must continue to be a persistent alternative for acute minds. To render our discussion concrete it will be especially appropriate if we note how Mahadevan grapples with this problem⁵. It is also instructive to see what happens when this creative expositor of Gaudapada and Sankara gives his own interpretation of the relation of time and the timeless.

Mahadevan is impressed by the logical absurdities (made graphic recently by F.H. Bradley and McTaggart), with which we are faced when we try to think of the temporal world as an independently real, a self-sufficing, process. For example: "If the whole of time flows, then past, present, and future, which

are parts of time, must be simultaneous, which is absurd. The same absurdity persists if we say that the parts of time flow."⁶ Again, it is a contradiction to think of time, as we have been forced to do, as both a relation and not a relation. As Bradley says: 'If you take time as a relation between units without relation, then the whole time has no duration, and is not time at all. But, if you give duration to the whole of time, then at once the units themselves are forced to possess it; and they thus cease to be units.'⁷ Mahadevan holds: "In the plenary experience, *Brahmānubhava*, then, time cannot be, even as in perfection imperfection cannot be." Better then, to remain in the conclusion that, intellectually, time is "a perpetual puzzle," and, "like *māyā*, indeterminable."⁸

What does it mean to say that, like *māyā*, time is indeterminable? It is to suggest that time, despite its intellectual contradictions, persists in finite experience, cannot be rejected, and yet must not be allowed to deceive us into acclaiming it as real. To use the old illustration: While the rope does indeed keep appearing to us, in certain situations, like a snake—so that we cannot say that the "snake" is real or unreal—we must not be deluded into thinking of it as "belonging to" the rope. However, we must grant that we should not see "snake" if what we were perceiving was a "stone" or a "cloud." It simply is "indeterminable" what exactly "snake" (*māyā*, time) is! Time exists, but is not real; it is unreal, but it is not a figment of the imagination. Still time is something which, hopelessly puzzling as it is if we try to think of it as real, can nevertheless lead us to deeper appreciation of what the Real is. Mahadevan seems to be striving not "simply to dismiss" time.

Thus, he answers the question: What is the purpose of Time? with the suggestion: Time is "to serve as the gateway to Reality."⁹ Time is not, as McTaggart said, "the last enemy to be overcome," for it "if properly approached, can be our friend inducting us into Eternity." "Time serves as the channel for all the orders of creation to return to their source, which is the eternal Brahman."¹⁰ Indeed, if in meditation we can see it as "one of the principal forms of the supreme, immortal,

disembodied Brahman", as the prominent "subtle image" of Brahman, we shall "cease to be time-bound."¹¹ For we are not in time with its parts, but in "the timeless," partless Brahman, our true Self.

The conception of Reality to which Mahadevan consequently introduces us must be clear if we are to see his alternative to creationism, on the one hand, and to Visishtadvaita, on the other. The important thing is to see that the "created" temporal world of things, animals, and persons are not thrown into the melting pot of the Absolute and dissolved: To say this would be to give their existence more reality than they ever had, for plurality cannot be granted reality. On the other hand, we must not think of the Absolute as a kind of Unity which gives no support at all to the differences between things and orders of being as seen in the temporal world. True, the Absolute is never truly characterised by any part, or by any finite being—it is not this, not that! It is the full, distinctionless, changeless Unity in which all that is differential from "our finite viewpoint," has some foundation. It is not as if the Absolute, assuming that it were to appear to another set of finite beings, could appear as something completely different or "supporting" differences totally unlike what we "know" them to be.

The truth to bear in mind is that the "distinguishing marks" of things, as we see them partially, are not, because we see them partially, to be asserted as true characterizations of Brahman. Again, any description of Brahman, even as Bliss and Consciousness, is not literal but symbolic. But this does not mean that any characterization would be equally supported by the Absolute. The Absolute in its complete being is knowledge *per se* and for this "state" we use the word "bliss," the highest of our value categories. But Brahman "in itself" is one undifferentiated reality surpassing even our highest categories of value, truth, and existence—without at the same time equally supporting all possible descriptions. Thus, to "define Brahman as being, consciousness, bliss, is more adequate than to define it as the cause of the world."¹² Also, to say that Brahman is the originator, sustainer, and destroyer of the world, while

having "no purport of its own," may serve to lead us nearer to Brahman but not as close to pure non-dual "Being, Consciousness, Bliss."

No one can gain any insight into the motives, the reasoning, and the conclusion of such Absolutism without responding sympathetically to a peculiar majesty in the vision, thought, feeling, and actions of its great exponents. Such Absolutism is not a way of "getting away from" the world; it can provide a wiser way of living in the world where time and change corrupt when they are misconceived as real and are allowed to engage final commitments. The difficulties of creationism, the demands of logic, and what are felt to be the revelations of the profoundest spiritual experience, will continue to make Absolutism a persistent alternative for the metaphysical and religious spirit.

But if one is to accept such Absolutism because it corners the mystery of the relation between the Infinite and the finite, one is given pause. There are, indeed, difficulties in creationism. Yet, to introduce *māyā* (or *avidyā*) to account for the fact that the One does appear as many, is to provide a "veil" which, however diaphanous to Brahman, simply does not help us to give any account of what we experience. Because we recognize that at some point the metaphysician must stare at stark mystery, we must not impatiently turn our backs on the hypothesis of *māyā* as an obscuring fact which necessitates the differentiation between time and eternity. But is it possible to accept a principle of obscuration, of nescience, of *avidyā*, in a world whose essence is said to be pure Consciousness? In any case, *māyā* hides the Absolute from us sufficiently to force us to ask: Why, if we can never know the Absolute as it is, should we have confidence in the criterion we have been using to characterize Reality as a timeless, distinctionless, plenary Experience? Why should we trust such a criterion more than any other, if owing to this indeterminable veil of *māyā* the Sun of Being and Becoming is in fact enshrouded by fog? Even to say that the fog gives way in "realization" is to suggest that it disappears when we as subjects and agents disappear,—or that "we" never know that perfection.

The upshot in theory and practice is that we are forced to resolve our problems in the finite world without any real direction "from above," despite promises to the contrary. We are not saying that we have no idea of "perfection," but rather suggesting that the one we have in terms of timeless Unity may be challenged. In any case, as long as we introduce an obscuring factor to account for the limitations of time and change, we seem to be introducing a metaphysical "power" which spells doom for both the trustworthiness of our notions of time and of the timeless. For us *māyā* or *avidyā* obscures both the Absolute and the finite. Indeed, it gives us no legitimate light at all by which to define the obscurity. It may be well, then, to look farther before making up our minds.

III

Ramanuja, the great critic of Sankara and exponent of Visishtadvaita, is especially interesting for a western creationist theist. For he rejects *creatio ex nihilo*, on the one hand, and the impersonal, distinctionless Brahman, on the other; against each perspective his line of argument is not dissimilar to what was suggested above. He will not yield the unity of the Absolute : he insists that finite persons and biological and physical beings are inseparable from the Person, God; and that God, indeed, is the substance of every being without being exhausted in any of them; "creation" and "destruction" are not ultimate but are differentiating states of the immanent Person without whom no finite being can be or become.¹³ The world of distinctions is not due to *māyā*, but, far from being independent of, actually constitutes the body of, God who includes it within his transcendent Unity. He agrees with the Advaitin that God is not this and not that, but holds that "*neti, neti*" does "not deny the finite, but denies only the finitude of Brahman."¹⁴ Srinivasachari quotes Ramanuja :

But, according to our views, Brahman has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings in the subtle and in the

gross state. In the effected as well as in the causal condition, it is free from all shadow of imperfection, and is an infinity of perfections. All imperfections and suffering and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings which are its modes. This view removes all difficulties. [And Srinivasachari continues :] How the absolute divides itself [*Sic* !] into finite centers may be a riddle of thought or a mystery, but that it does so is a fact to the *mumukṣu*.¹⁵

Expatriating, Srinivasachari says :

Brahman with the creative urge wills the many and becomes manifold. It is the absolute that externalizes itself into the endless variations of space-time and embodied beings by entering into matter with the living self and energizing it. . . . Effectuation is not an illusion or a self-enveloping process of reality, but it reveals the inner purpose of divine nature and enriches spiritual life. . . . The essential nature of Brahman is, however, pure and perfect, and is not affected by these changes.¹⁶

Finally :

Brahman is not the "infinite" in the sense that it is quantitative endlessness or the infinite that is conditioned by the finite, and is therefore, finite, but it is the infinite that dwells in the finite with a view to infinitizing the self. . . and giving it the eternal value of *mukti*.¹⁷

Clearly, Ramanuja is attempting a philosophical synthesis which will save both the Appearances and the Absolute. With the creationist he would protect moral freedom and individuality, and with the Absolutist he would defend the immanence of the Infinite and its changeless perfection in the name of both logic and religious experience. Moral evil in the world is the product of finite freedom which is not to be dissolved in any

doctrine of *karma*; natural evil would be seen as good if we knew enough.¹⁸

The very essence of Ramanuja's thought, and the problem, is the insistence that there is nothing wrong with saying that the finite self is a "substantial mode having focalized being or uniqueness,"¹⁹ that "Brahman is self-related and is at the same time the Inner Self of finite beings without being affected by those imperfections."²⁰ His point is that "otherness" of beings does not have to mean hostility; and that distinction does not necessitate externality and exclusiveness. To say that "the absolute exists in the finite centers of experience as their ground and ultimate meaning"²¹ is not to forsake "differentness," for "the infinite is itself and not its opposite. It excludes the other and is yet invaded by it."²²

We must simply confess that our own lack of insight, no doubt, makes it impossible for us to treat such statements as more than a juxtaposition of ideas. We refer specifically to the contention that the individuals can be foci or differentiations of the Ultimate and yet have independence and freedom. We also have in mind what seems to be the mystery of mysteries, that the Infinite is finite and yet infinitizes the finite "within" him. The Visishtadvaitin, seeking to avoid the non-difference of the finite and the Infinite, must mean by finitude something different from infinitude. If he does, then, whether he starts from the finite side or from the Infinite, to be finite must involve something other than the Infinite. On the other hand, moving from the Infinite perspective to the finite, something radically new, some novelty, not intrinsic to the meaning of Infinite (in the sense of completeness) is involved.

Yet this sheer novelty is what the abhorrent idea of creation, for all its difficulties, does bring into prominence ! The doctrine of creation, despite the attempts of some adherents to move toward Advaita and Visishtadvaita perspectives in order to soften the mystery of "coming into being," does involve the mystery of the *how*, as we have said. But the doctrine of a Creator who transcends and yet sustains, preserves, and yet guides (consistent with free-will), the finite persons he has

created, does "save" both the Infinite and the finite persons, and it does allow for interaction at many levels of intimacy. But there is still another problem which haunts all three perspectives which we must articulate.

IV

Creationists, Advaitins, and Visishtadvaitins make one assumption that remains unquestioned, and which they protect at a price so costly that it may be time to question it. The assumption is that, whatever else may be involved, we must recognize that the eternal perfection of the Absolute Experience, or of the Personal Brahman, however intimately related to the waxing and waning of the temporal process, must not be infected by its imperfections. We have already suggested that even when a thinker comes to the brink of introducing any change into the Ultimate, he may well be driven back by the question: Whence would a change in the Ultimate come? "*Ex nihilo, nihil fit*" he exclaims. Furthermore, if the Ultimate is ultimate, there is no other being from which change in its own being could be initiated, no other being to which we can look for addition to, or subtraction from, what is.

Let us agree that insecurity would haunt the human spirit if some coming into being and going out of being is allowed into the Ultimate. Nobody can glibly turn aside this gnawing doubt. Therefore, such attempts as we have outlined must be made before considering an alternative. Nevertheless, even granting that creationism "saves the appearances" or "corners the mystery" better than the other alternatives, it joins the other alternatives in operating from such a fixed notion of what a Perfect Being or an Absolute Experience must be, that no other alternative is taken seriously.

However, as it seems to us at this stage, a Creator in no way affected by his creation, an Eternity unaffected by the time that somehow manifests it, involves such difficulty that we are willing tentatively, at any rate, to consider an alternative set of propositions.

First, then, we set aside, for reasons given above, the view that perfection must involve changelessness and timelessness. We suggest that Reality can be the kind of dynamic, active, changing-and-yet-continuing Unity whose nature it is to be creative and continuing. We shall not argue this thesis here, for the position needs the kind of elaboration given by the outstanding recent exponent of idealistic Personalism, E.S. Brightman, in *Person and Reality*.²³

Second, we can find a limited model for this complex-unity-in-continuity in the experience of the finite person. It has been said, of course, by eastern and western philosophers, that the person's experience of succession is impossible without a permanent underlying soul-substance. It is this model of the person that has been the microcosm for the macrocosm. But our suggestion is that we do not need an underlying soul-substance to "hold experience together."

We actually experience ourselves as dynamic activities-in-unity. Each of us is not a mathematically discrete point. Our present, immediately experienced "saddle-back" of *durée* is in its unity the very interpenetration of sensing, wanting, feeling, remembering, thinking, oughting, aesthetic and religious sensitivity which analysis abstracts out. But each of us is the unity of his activities. Instead of being nontemporal, the "I" is omnitemporal. We point to it as an experienced temporal unity which is never beyond time, but actually has the ability to maintain its unity, according to the "laws" or "order" of its own nature, as it selectively interacts with its environment. Again, the fact of finite experience is that "I" am able to be continuous in my conscious and self-conscious activities. Deep sleep, dream-experience, the unconscious, need further exposition, of course, but without leaving the realm of concrete experience, we can hold firmly to the fact that "I" is not a collection of experiential items, but a unity of varied activities which does maintain continuity ontologically and psychologically in the midst of its world. The metaphysical contention is that it is so created and sustained.

Third, if we use this model of the person—not an

unchanging soul which, like a string, holds together the flowers of experience, but—an enduring active unity whose very nature it is “to affect and be affected”, and yet not lose its obvious capacity to stay unified within its environment, we may have a better model for the Universal Being than the eternalistic one. The model is an Omnitemporal Creator.

Fourth, “perfection” would now not mean completeness of the sort that leaves no room for change; nor would it mean sheer alteration, a maze-like going on and on without any controlling direction. It would involve comprehensive unity and growth, the kind of creativity which continually recreates the world consistent with the past creation but not victimized by it. The mystery of *how* remains, but as we have suggested, this is a legitimate mystery. God, on this view, would be the Creator-Sufferer-Lover, persuading, in many ways, finite persons to enter, as completely as their natures allow, into the magic-joys of compassionate creativity. Much more, of course, could need to be said to make this view more intelligible, as well as to substantiate it in the light of observable facts of natural and human history, but we must move on to what may be the most difficult suggestion, which is at the heart of all the rest.

We must make a right-about-face on the matter of coming-into-being and going-out-of-being; and we must stop the saw of reducing one to the other. Why not take seriously the possibility that, in the world as we observe it, there is both continuity-in-being and going-out-of-being? Is it mere naïveté to say that when, for example, I press the switch and the electric light goes off, *that light*, just gone off, is no longer existent *that light*? True, electrical energy, luminosity may continue to exist, but, to repeat, does it make any sense, logically otherwise, to deny that the particular light that went out, *really did go out of its being as that light*? It is a fact that after press of the switch and the light will go on, but not *that light* of a moment ago.

To generalize, the world, including our experience as persons, seems to exist with much going-out-of-being and much coming-into-being, “within” a larger context of conti-

nuing-being. Why *must* we say that the continuing omnitemporal Being is timeless or unchanging—especially if we then must face the problem all over again of understanding how the timeless and unchanging can affect or effect change and yet be unaffected by it? What seems to be clear is that the essential problem in creativity, coming-into-being-along-with-continuity, is a “problem” if we start with certain presuppositions about what Reality and God *must* be! If we are willing to consider a model of reality which, if you please, accepts creative-change-in-continuity as the pervasive fact not only of existence but, with proper allowances, of Reality, a new metaphysical vista opens before us.

NOTES

¹ See P. N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Viṣiṣṭādvaita*, second edition. Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1946, p. 203. See also A. C. Das, *A Modern Incarnation of God*, Chapter VIII. Calcutta: General Printers and Publishers, 1958.

² Srinivasachari, *ibid.*, p. 268.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 301.

⁴ Cf. T.M.P. Mahadevan's critique in *Time and the Timeless* (Madras: Upanishad Vihar, 1953), pp. 63-66.

⁵ See *Time and the Timeless*.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹³ See Paul D. Devanandam, *The Concept of Māyā* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1950), p. 124.

¹⁴ Srinivasachari, *ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81. Note: This is the same recourse an Advaitin has for accepting the mystery of a distinctionless Absolute.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

¹⁸ Cf. Srinivasachari, *ibid.*, pp. 168-180.

¹⁹ Srinivasachari, *ibid.*, p. 75.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

²³ This book, edited by Peter A. Bertocci, in collaboration with Dr. Jannette Newhall and Robert S. Brightman (New York: Ronald Press, 1957) argues the thesis that all reality is of the nature of persons, the temporal unified person, who energizes in Nature, and finite persons created with limited autonomy by Him. This view strengthens basic contentions of Bergson and Whitehead.

5

THEOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS

JAMES H. K. NORTON

RELIGIOUS philosophy is a philosophy of the *a priori*. It always does, and in fact must, begin with the presupposition of the reality of God. Herein, admittedly, lies its limitation as a philosophy. But in this fact also becomes evident its hallowed function in the religious life of those who use it. For with the very acceptance of such a vast presupposition, there arise deeply challenging problems concerning the meaning of this reality which we presuppose of God, and the ways that we can know and experience it. In so far as one seeks to find adequate answers to these questions, one is not only pursuing the philosophical endeavour to its most extreme limits, but one is also bringing to human understanding glimmerings of the profound truth which results from any encounter with the infinite. For these faint flashes of the divine, illumined by the very truth of the reality which is presupposed of God, are far brighter than the dim glow afforded by human reason.

In the West, this presupposition has traditionally taken the form of the ontological argument, presented first by St. Anselm, and to return in many different forms, in Descartes, in Berkeley, and even in our own day. This argument, as St. Anselm himself was forced to admit, presupposes that God, as a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, cannot be conceived not to be, and therefore must exist.¹ And the fact that this argument has been refuted not only by Gaunilo in St. Anselm's day, but by St. Thomas Aquinas, and more recently by Immanuel Kant, is only to emphasize that the argument is based not upon rational demonstration or empirical proof, but upon a religious presupposition.

The persistent nature of this presupposition of the existence of God in Western thought, in spite of its many refutations, finds contemporary expression in the recent work of Dr. J.V.L. Casserley, *The Christian in Philosophy*. In this book, he not only himself presupposes the ontological argument, but also finds it inevitable in the role which has been created for the philosophically minded Christian by recent biblical criticism.

The Christian philosopher, as we have seen, begins with some form of the ontological argument, with the vindication of the native bias of his interest, and the justification of his choice of analogies. The value of cosmological thought is thus for him an experimental area among many in which he seeks to verify his hypothesis of the universal applicability of ideas adopted upon other and profounder grounds.²

In India, also, philosophy is based upon the religious presupposition of the reality of Brahman. And, as in the West, there have been some philosophers who have attempted to prove it. Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is a good example of such an attempt, generally proposed by the Naiyayika, or logical, school as a whole. But in India, the primary emphasis of the traditional schools has been to prove that the reality of God, though affirmed, lies well beyond any possibility of philosophical demonstration. The very attempt implies a limitation of the transcendent reality which Brahman is, and, therefore has been rejected.

The most prominent expression of this assertion is found in the most prominent school of Indian thought, the Advaita Vedanta of Sankara. For the Advaitins are, philosophically, those who are never to relinquish their vision of the unique and transcendent Reality of Brahman. It is completely beyond thought and measure. They are thus diametrically opposed to any attempt either to define or limit its reality by an appeal to any form of order in the world. Its transcendence is rather preserved by the inadequacy of any demonstration based upon

our experience of the world to comprehend or express it. Philosophy, by its very inability to verify the existence of Brahman, demonstrates the transcendence of the reality which is presupposed of it.

These two positions represent two extremes of theistic thought within the Indian philosophical panoply. And, although it may seem that there could be no alternative other than these two—one can either prove the existence of God, or one cannot—the Visishtadvaita Vedanta School of Ramanuja represents a position between the two. This position, briefly stated, is that the reality of Brahman cannot be demonstrated by logical proof. But on the basis of the presupposition of His reality, He can be seen as the basis of our experience of the world we live in. Thus, although transcendent, Visishtadvaita thought has an immanent dimension which gives to philosophy a positive function in the realization of the divine truth. The presupposition of the reality of Brahman can be verified through our knowledge of the world. Or, as Ramanuja himself affirms: "The lower knowledge. (i.e. of the world, as described in the *Mundaka Upaniṣad*, I.1.5) is the means toward the intuition of Brahman." (*S'ribhāṣya*, I.2.23).

This divine function of philosophy can be seen within the development of the Visishtadvaita tradition itself. In fact, it is the basis for the many treatises on numerous philosophical subjects which followed in the wake of Ramanuja's great *S'ribhāṣya*. But it has been no more explicitly stated or positively demonstrated than by Atreya Ramanuja, a fourth generation disciple of Ramanuja, in his only surviving work, *Nyāyakulīśa*, *The Sharp Spear of Reason*.³

This text, remarkable in many ways, is a comprehensive attempt to present a consistent philosophical statement of the Visishtadvaita religious tradition. Always dialectical, rather than inductive, in approach, Atreya Ramanuja achieves this statement through a discussion of several, specific philosophical problems. In thirteen separate chapters, he handles such problems as the validity of knowledge, causality, generality, negation, and language. Thus only when taken together do they represent

a complete and impressive system of religious thought.

It will not be possible for us to summarize here the whole text, as we are concerned only with the philosophical presupposition of the reality of God. We will, in fact, concentrate primarily on only two chapters of the text. First we will consider Chapter V, "Refutation of the proof of God," which deals with logical demonstrations of the existence of God. And secondly we will consider Chapter I, "Scripture as the source of the knowledge of God," which will attempt to demonstrate how we do know that God exists. By the very titles of the chapters themselves, we can see that Atreya Ramanuja is concerned first of all to preserve the transcendence of God, and yet to allow an immanent dimension through which we can know Him in this world.

In his argument to refute the logical proof of the existence of God, Atreya Ramanuja follows closely the argument of Ramanuja in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* I.1.3. Only he gives to it greater content and a more developed logical analysis. His originality lies more in his precision than in his intent. To both, it is the transcendence of God, and therefore a distinct difference in our way of knowing Him, which is at stake. In the words of Ramanuja, their concern is to "eliminate the barest possibility that God could be established in knowledge in the same way that other objects are known." (*Sribhāṣya* I.1.3).

The logical demonstration which both discredit is the second of the five cosmological arguments, the argument from efficient causality. "The world has a creator because it is of the nature of an effect." (Nyk, V). This argument is further developed by Atreya Ramanuja's opponent: Because our world has been created, and because of its manifold nature, there must be a supreme agent who is adequate to its creation. He must be its first cause, and he must be omniscient. "For, since purpose and will are identical with the content of his knowledge, the creator of all things, because he has that perception which knows everything, is established equally as the knower of all, as well as the basis of all. And such is the descrip-

tion of the nature of God." (Nyk, V).

In dealing with this argument, Atreya Ramanuja is careful to avoid the contention that it is contradictory. For a contradiction would establish its opposite, that the world does not have a creator. He is rather to point out that the argument is inconclusive. It asserts the existence of a creator, or creators, but not the kind of transcendent creator whom we can call God. Based upon our knowledge of the world, we can only arrive at four very different conclusions about its creator. "If the world has a creator, it must be a creator who has a body, a creator who has temporary knowledge, a creator who creates like we do, and a creator who is, therefore, not omniscient." (Nyk, V). The divine nature of the creator, in so far as it exists, must be presupposed of the argument.

The proof of these conclusions is based mostly upon a very technical discussion of the syllogism, dealing primarily with the presence of a limiting condition (*upādhi*) to the middle term (*sādhana*). Atreya Ramanuja's contention is that the fact of an effect, which the world is seen to be, can only establish the existence of causality in general, and not that specific kind of causality which involves an agent. To be a creator is not just to be a cause, but to be a cause who acts, and therefore some further stipulation is needed to bring the fact of creative motion into the argument. This further stipulation is the limiting condition, which was present in the argument all the time, although not seen by its proponent, and which makes the argument inconclusive rather than contradictory. For the argument remains valid if the creator does have creative motion, and only becomes invalid if it is stated or proved that the creator does not.

Atreya Ramanuja now contends that the source of this motion is found in the body of a creator, and not in the soul. For only in so far as a soul has a body is any action visible. And because this activity arises out of the body, it must have been produced by it. The body is, therefore, the immediate basis of all purposeful activity in the world. "Therefore, the motion of the body is the first thing that can establish this

basis of creative activity as belonging to the nature of a creator." (Nyk, V).

It is thus apparent that, on the basis of our experience of creative activity, ■ disembodied soul cannot be ■ creator. And this assertion is to have several consequences. First of all, it implies that the embodiment of the soul is the basis of its involvement in creation itself, the unending activity of this world called *samsāra*. Atreya Ramanuja bears out this implication when, in Chapter VI, he argues that good and evil, and their consequences, pleasure and pain, are directly attributable to the individual souls, and not to God. For each, both through and because of its separate embodiment, is individually involved in the activity of the world and the realization of its effects. It is, in fact, that very activity which is the first fruit of the combination of a soul with its body which is the basis of the pleasure and pain which it experiences.

Furthermore, if the embodiment of the soul is essential to its involvement in the creative process, it is also essential to the acquisition of that knowledge which leads to its release. Once created, this activity is equally necessary to attain *mokṣa*, or salvation.

The soul which exists in a certain body is not properly the support of that knowledge which does not require a body. For otherwise, we would have to accept that that knowledge of a soul which is existing somewhere is produced on the basis of what is not seen. And in this way the intermediate activity of the body (in the acquisition of knowledge) would be destroyed. It is not correct that a body which is controlled does not have this intermediate function, because then the significance of the connection of a soul to the body would be lost. (Nyk. XII).

Thirdly, the assertion that motion has its first cause in the body of the creator implies that, in so far as the argument from efficient causality can establish the reality of God, He, as

the Supreme Soul, must be embodied. It must be stated right away that Atreya Ramanuja accepts this consequence. He does not force himself into the position of conceding that the argument may be invalid. He is rather concerned to point out that this argument is in itself not sufficient to prove that God is embodied. The proof for this assertion rather lies in the presupposition that God is the Immutable and Imperishable One, the transcendent and absolute basis of order. There can, therefore, be nothing of motion in Him. For to involve God in motion would be to destroy His transcendence. Creative activity, then, does not have its source in His divine essence in so far as He is the efficient cause of the universe. It rather is found in the substantial cause, which is His body. For His body is composed of the material and intellectual substances which are His attributes and, therefore, exist only in so far as they are completely dependent upon Him. "For we accept that the individual souls, as well as their bodies, are the body of the Supreme." (Nyk., XII)

Our knowledge of God is thus not based upon rational demonstration, as are other things, but rather on presuppositions which have their source in a separate way of knowing. And Atreya Ramanuja now contends that these presuppositions are based only upon that knowledge of God which is revealed in the sacred writings, the Vedas. "For we have not indicated here any new definition which is to be established on its own strength. Then what have we done? We have merely repeated the definition established in Scripture." (Nyk., XII). The logical transcendence of God is thus preserved for the Visishtadvaita school, as it is for the Advaita school of Vedanta.

But now that the Vedas are determined to be the unique basis of our presuppositions about God, philosophy is not to be ruled out. For Atreya Ramanuja is still to use it, and in two significant ways. The first, which he holds in common with the Advaitins, is an apologetic function. Because rational demonstrations do not contradict the evidence of scripture, they can be used to interpret it. Ramanuja himself is to emphasize this important role of reason when he boldly asserts that "not even

for the sake of making sense of scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory." (*Śrībhāṣya* I.1.13). Philosophy can thus be used to make our statements about the reality of God, which we know on the basis of other experience, both consistent and manageable.⁴

But if philosophy is to explore the immanent dimension of this reality, it must have a more positive function. And Atreya Ramanuja, alive to this possibility, goes on to affirm that philosophy is capable of demonstrating the validity of scripture on the basis of our experience. If it cannot tell us directly about God, it can tell us that what we know is true. Thus, in so far as he can demonstrate that what the Vedas tell us is valid, philosophy can provide us with a rational basis for accepting its presuppositions about the reality of God.

Atreya Ramanuja begins the first chapter of the *Nyāya-kūṭiśa*, with a consideration of this possibility. He is obviously aware that the positive role of the philosopher depends upon just such a rational demonstration of the validity of the statements of scripture. And he pursues it through an analysis of language as a source of knowledge :

For the sake of proving that the statements of the Upanishads concerning the established truth (about Brahman) are valid, we here demonstrate that words are capable of giving rise to understanding. (Nyk., I).

The problem of the expressive power of language is not new to Atreya Ramanuja. It had long been a source of concern to the grammarians. And the problem was that there is no obvious relation between the sound of a word and its meaning which could explain why a word is consistently able to convey the meaning of an object when the object is not visible. Mlle. Biarreau, in her introduction to the *Tattvabindu*, points out that this concern led the grammarians to a need for an ontological basis for the consistency found between words and their meaning. "They have taken their start from the experience of the power of speech which gives us the cognition of an object and of a

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meaning (*artha*) in the absence of a thing (*vastu*), and they have had to give an ontological substratum to the concrete speech of daily use, so that it could have a reality of its own on the *tāttvika* plane, and not only on the *vyāvahārika* one."⁵

Atreya Ramanuja's immediate solution to the problem of the relation of words to meaning is, empirically in any case, much more satisfactory.⁶ He finds that a convention, or a common understanding between people, can establish the meaning of individual words, just as it can a relation between gestures and meaning, or a script and the sounds of letters. But it does not totally explain the phenomenon of language itself.

Because it is possible to establish a major premise of anything whatsoever by any method one likes, men devise signs for ideas which are practicable whenever (there is a previous understanding) of the method (used for combining). For the activity (which is intended) is understood by any others who are aware of what is intended by such combinations. Even if these others do not see the intention in the combination itself, because it has been established for a long time, and because of the common basis (in understanding) of their relation, the practical activity (intended) is still achieved; for it is indicated by the normal function of the combination alone. In this same way there is the practical function of various languages, only in this case there is a difference. (Nyk., I).

The difference about which Atreya Ramanuja is concerned, and which makes the use of convention inadequate, is the meaning which, when conveyed, establishes the existence of a sentence.⁷ For this meaning, he contends, is distinct from the meaning of the words, and therefore cannot have its immediate source in the individual words themselves, no matter how achieved. It is rather dependent upon the memory of the meaning of the words which, when combined as memory

impressions, compose the sentence. "That knowledge which is in the form of a memory in the function of an individual word (in a sentence) is to be understood as the cause of the knowledge of the relation of these words (which constitutes the meaning of a sentence)." (Nyk., I). Thus each word must be able to express the memory of its own meaning. And each is therefore a designator of meaning, not because a specific meaning has been attached to the word, but by the mere fact that it is a word.

But now the mere fact that a word is a designator of meaning in the context of a sentence does not itself account for the fact that a sentence is able to convey a specific meaning which makes it a source of knowledge. Nor, because of the existence of conventional uses of language, where meanings of words change, can all words be said to express a meaning which can consistently be the source of a distinct memory impression capable of giving precise meaning to a sentence. There must be, at least on the part of some words, an ability to express a distinct meaning which is unique to them within the context of a sentence to make the development of sentences as means of communication possible.

The development of language as a way of communicating knowledge must therefore presuppose a prototype language composed of words which always give rise to the memory of precisely the same meaning when used in a sentence. And in order that such should happen, these words must fulfil two conditions. First of all, the words must have in their own nature as words the power to designate their own precise meaning. The power of designation of a word does not, therefore, depend upon its statement, but rather is only recognised by the continuous use of the word in context. In origin, the designation depends only upon its identity with the word itself. Atreya Ramanuja now concludes that, because there could be no time when a word as a designator could not be capable of causing the memory of its own meaning, such words must never have been created. "These words alone of which (the meaning) is protected by its consistent memory, and the creation

of which, though possible, is not apprehended, are beginning-less." (Nyk. I).

The second condition of these words follows from the first. If the meaning of such a word is constant, and dependent only upon itself as a word capable of expressing knowledge, then it must be the source of its own validity. The very use of the word must carry with it the self-evident conviction that what it is saying is true. "Intrinsic validity is necessary for those who maintain that words are a means to valid knowledge, and this intrinsic validity is established only because (designative) words are eternal." (Nyk. I).

Thus we have, on the basis of our experience of language and its ability to convey meaning in thoughts and ideas expressed as sentences, the need for an eternal, prototype language which will provide the ontological basis for the development of all language as a consistent and valid source of knowledge. And it perhaps goes without saying that Atreya Ramanuja has such a language in mind as he proceeds with his demonstration. The Vedas are for him the collection of statements of eternal truths about the nature of God, which are both changeless and immediately valid to all who understand them. It is the existence of this sacred language of revelation in the world which serves as the basis for the function of all language as a means of communicating valid knowledge through words.

And this language of the Vedas, because of what it expresses by its own power, requires an eternal relationship between words and meaning, which has its basis not in the fact of language itself, but in the transcendent reality of God. Our argument leaves us no other alternative. "What happens is that, in order and according to their own (expressive) power, God causes common words, as well as Vedic words, to be used just as they were in previous cons." (Nyk, I). For "He remains eternally the suggestor of syllables which are employed according to their own power and in the expectation of an ordered use; for even this order depends on Him." (Nyk. I).

There are many implications of this argument, some of which Atreya Ramanuja pursues throughout the course of the

Nyāyakulīśa. But the consequences for our purposes are clear. In the first place, because the analysis of language leads to a transcendent basis for its order, it is evident that the argument ultimately leads to the proof of God as the source of order in all things. We have already seen how this basis of order is presupposed of the argument that God is the creator of the universe. And Atreya Ramanuja is to rely upon this same argument in the discussion of causality and generality. For the proof of a basic substance which progresses through an ordered succession of states, where each preceding state becomes the substantial cause of the succeeding one, its effect, depends upon that order which is observed between causes and effects, but which does not have its source in them. And similarly, generality is based upon a common universal which is identified through the order of our knowledge. Our experience of order in the world thus leads us to the transcendent source of order which is presupposed of our very existence as rational creatures in it.

But it is also evident that this transcendent source of order which God is revealed to be in the Vedas, and which is presupposed of our experience of the world, is also presupposed of the very argument which attempts to demonstrate it. For scripture, as that which reveals God to be the source of order, does so only in that language is a distinct and self-evidently valid source of knowledge. And such is the case only because God is assumed to be the source of its order.

The consequence of this conclusion is not to say that Atreya Ramanuja is wrong, any more than we can say that St. Anselm is wrong in his assertion that God must exist. It is rather to recognize that he has a religious presupposition of his thought which cannot be based upon either rational demonstration or empirical proof. Its contribution to philosophy is, therefore, not that it has done more than the ontological argument has done in the West. But I think we can affirm that it has done as much. It has brought philosophy to a place where it can view the transcendence of God without either diminishing His transcendence or negating itself. Thus, allowed to

function in the immanent dimension of God's eternal reality, philosophy has a role within the Visishtadvaita tradition which is both inspired by the truth of the reality of God it is talking about, and vital to the realization of this truth in the experience of those who would pursue it.

NOTES

¹ St. Anselm's reply to Gaunilo, trans. Sidney Dean, A. Fremantle, *The Age of Belief*, Boston, 1955, p. 95.

² J. V. L. Casserley, *The Christian in Philosophy*, New York, 1955, p. 255.

³ *Nyāyakullīa* or *The Lightning-Shaft of Reason* by Atreya Ramanuja, ed. R. Ramanujachari and K. Srinivasacharya, Annamalai University, 1938. The passages quoted from this text are from my own translation, to be published in the near future.

⁴ For the role of reason in Advaita philosophy, see Professor T.M.P. Mahadevan's *The Philosophy of Advaita*, (Madras, 1957), p. 63.

⁵ Madeleine Biardeau, *Le Tattvabindu* de Vacaspatimisra, Pondicherry, 1956, p. xxvi.

⁶ The grammarians assumed a theory of a word-entity, or word form, which is made evident, but not created by, the sound of the word. This theory, called *śphoṭavāda*, although accepted by earlier philosophers, was refuted by two important later ones, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Vacaspatimisra. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in particular, exerted a great deal of influence on Atreya Ramanuja's thought. Atreya Ramanuja himself never mentions the word *śphoṭa*, although, as we will see below, he adopts a form of the *vākya śphoṭa*.

⁷ Atreya Ramanuja accepts the *avīṭābhūdāna-vāda* of the Prabhakaras in this chapter, but not without giving it rather special significance. Following the interpretation of Bhartṛhari, he reasserts the difference between the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyaśphoṭa*, suppressed by Mandana Misra and the Mimamsakas, and works through the latter, not to the *Sadbrahman* of Bhartṛhari, but to the necessity for the sustaining power of *Īvara*. Thus an old argument of the grammarians is to be given a new garb in the epistemological and religious teaching of the Visishtadvaita school. See Mlle. Biardeau, *Sphoṭa Siddhi* par Mandana Misra, (Pondicherry, 1958), Introduction, pp. 4 ff.

THE ABSOLUTE IN BUDDHIST THOUGHT

J. W. DE JONG

THE Absolute has been the ultimate goal of mystics and philosophers throughout the ages. But perhaps no religion has been more preoccupied with this subject than Buddhism. Herein lies one of its most important contributions to philosophic thought and for this reason I believe that it will be not without interest to consider the Buddhist attitude with regard to the Absolute.

Buddhist thought is not mere speculation for the sake of knowledge only. Right knowledge is highly valued by the Buddhists, however, not as an aim in itself, but as a means to obtain deliverance. Scholars have often gone astray by trying to reduce Buddhist teaching to a coherent philosophical system. Consequently they have met great difficulties in understanding Nirvana, the fundamental concept of Buddhism. Misled by many utterances in the scriptures they have been tempted to consider Nirvana as a negative entity. A right understanding of Nirvana, however, teaches us that it is not a metaphysical concept, but a soteriological Absolute, the final aim for him who wants to obtain deliverance from this world. Nirvana cannot be understood by reasoning but must be experienced. Strictly speaking this experience of Nirvana cannot be communicated to others because no language can describe the merging of the individual into the Absolute. However, like all mystics the Buddhists have not abstained from speaking about the Absolute. Often Nirvana is being described in positive terms and this has been the cause of a wrong interpretation, directly contrary to the one above mentioned. For these positive terms are not meant to indicate that Nirvana is an ontological reality or even a kind of paradise as has been asserted sometimes.

In order to understand such terms as "highest bliss", "the other shore", "the refuge", "the goal", which terms with many others have been used to indicate Nirvana, one has to realize the problem which the mystic has to face when desiring to speak of the Absolute. His experience is of such an overwhelming intensity that he feels himself completely transformed by it. In comparison everything else dwindles to nothing. He cannot but remember continually this supreme moment. How great is his desire to tell others of the felicity which he has felt ! He knows that no words are capable of describing the ineffable content of his experience, for language is bound to the earth, to human existence. Therefore the mystic makes use of an indirect way of expression. He cannot say what the Absolute is, but he can say what it is not. Its most essential characteristic is its fundamental difference from all things mundane. In this world everybody is subject to death : Nirvana, however, is said to be the immortal place (*amatapadam* or *amatam padam*, Dhammapada 21, Udanavarga IV.1, etc.). From birth to death life is suffering (*dukkha*) ; Nirvana on the contrary is supreme bliss (*paramam sukham*, Majj. Nik. I.508, Dhammapada 203-204, Udanavarga XXVI, 6-7), free from birth and becoming (*ajāta*, *abhūta*, Ud. 80, Itiv. 37). Empirical life offers no shelter, no refuge ; Nirvana is called the island (*dīpa*, Samy. Nik. IV, 372), the shelter (*leṇa*, *ibid.*), the protection (*tāṇa*, *ibid.*), the refuge (*saraṇa*, *ibid.*) and the goal (*parāyana*, Samy. Nik. IV, 373). Life is impurity ; Nirvana is purity (*suddhi*, Samy. Nik. IV, 372). Many other terms are used in connection with Nirvana, but not one of these words contains a description or definition of Nirvana. They only point to the other shore (*pāra*, Samy. Nik. IV, 369). If we subject these terms to a careful examination, we see that they convey either an antithesis to the conditions of *saṃsāra* or a negation of these. For instance, bliss is the antithesis of suffering. In human life or even in a heavenly paradise no bliss exists, because in these states no everlasting bliss is possible and according to the Buddhists everything that has an end is suffering. On earth the immortal and the unborn are unthinkable because here below one perceives the universality

of birth and death. Bliss, immortality and the unborn are words that do not correspond to real things which a human being can know or see. The mystic who has experienced the state of Nirvana makes use of these words exactly for this reason. However inadequate they may be, they are the only means which language can offer him to express that which essentially cannot be put into words because words are only capable of denoting the realities of empirical life.

Scholars have noticed the fact that Nirvana is often called a place or a sphere (*dhātu*). The Dhammapada (225) speaks of the unchangeable place (*accutam hānam*) and the Suttanipata (204) of the unchangeable place of Nirvana (*nibbānapadam accutam*). Also in several places Nirvana is said to be the stable (*dhuva*, Samy. Nik. IV, 370). These texts have been put forward as an argument to support the theory that the Buddhists consider Nirvana to be a place or an abode of bliss. But words like *pada* and *thāna* do not have such definite a meaning that they have to be understood as indicating a place or an abode in which the mystic resides. *Nibbānapadam* is undoubtedly used as a synonym of Nirvana and *nibbānadhātu* is clearly a term coined with the object of distinguishing Nirvana as a fourth sphere from the three spheres of desire, form and formlessness (*kāmādhātu*, *rūpadhātu* and *arūpadhātu*) of which the world consists. To the Buddhist the sphere of Nirvana never had the slightest resemblance to the three others. As in all the preceding examples this term only denotes the fact that Nirvana does not belong to our world and lies absolutely outside the field of ordinary experience.

Human language is unfit to describe the content of mystical experience; the conditions necessary to attain the desired goal, on the contrary, are much more easily susceptible to linguistic expression. This is the principal reason why mystics always deal at greater length with the *via mystica* than with the *unio mystica*. Therefore the specific nature of Buddhism can only become clear through an examination of its mystic way. During the whole history of Buddhism the way to Nirvana has been the core of the doctrine. Progress on the Way is to be brought about

through a special technique. Every school of mysticism has developed a technique which enables the mystic to attain his final goal. At the time of the Buddha the technique of yoga was practised by many recluses who devoted themselves to yoga exercises in solitary retirement. Not much is known about their doctrines and the goal towards which they directed their efforts. Most probably at that time yoga was nothing more than a technique and many centuries had still to elapse before it grew into a philosophical system. This untheoretical character of yoga made its adaptation to many different purposes possible. After repudiation of mortification the Buddha applied the technique of yoga and with its help succeeded in attaining the Awakening. Many texts tell us how the Buddha passed through many stages of meditation before reaching the final insight. With the example of the Buddha before their eyes his followers could not but be always aware of the primary importance of yoga. Buddhist literature treats yoga technique at great length and manifests clearly the tendency to an increasing systematization and refinement of yoga exercises. It is impossible to decide which was the original form of yoga adopted by primitive Buddhism, but the description of it in the oldest texts makes it probable that the goal of non-Buddhist yoga must have been the attainment of a state of absolute unconsciousness. Many texts describe a series of nine consecutive stages of contemplation. According to the Buddhists the heretics knew the eighth stage, the stage of neither consciousness nor unconsciousness (*naivasamjñānāsam-jñāyatana*) but did not know the ninth stage in which consciousness and sensation are abolished (*samjñāvedayitanirodha*, or *nirodhasamāpatti*, the attainment of cessation). The Buddhists carefully distinguished this stage from the attainment of unconsciousness (*asamjñīsamāpatti*) which the heretics took as their final goal. It seems clear, however, that the attainment of cessation does not differ much from the methods of concentration used by the yogins. But the Buddhists could not content themselves with a mere cessation of consciousness and this accounts for the many theories which Buddhist scholasticism developed in order to incorporate the attainment of cessation

into their soteriological system. According to the Theravadins, in the *nirodhasamāpatti* one touches Nirvana with one's body and in this way one comes to enjoy Nirvana in this world (*dr̥ṣṭa-dharmanirvāṇa*). The Sarvastivada school considered it as an entity similar to Nirvana. But both schools believed that for the final attainment of Nirvana an intuitive knowledge was required. Other schools claimed that in the state of the attainment of cessation some sort of consciousness continued to exist. Their opinions are discussed at great length by Vasubandhu in his *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*.¹ These different theories about the attainment of cessation show clearly that the Buddhists specifically avoided to confuse Nirvana with a state of unconsciousness. From the outset Buddhism has been considered to consist of three parts : rules of conduct (*śīla*), concentration (*saṃādhi*) and insight (*prajñā*). The highest insight is the intuitive insight (*bhāvanāmāyī*) which is produced by concentration. The importance which the Buddhists attached to insight can only be understood if we call to mind the nature of the Buddhist experience of Nirvana. We have tried to make it clear that the main characteristic of this experience was its complete otherness in regard to all the experiences of empirical life. In order to realize fully this otherness it is of essential importance to understand the nature of our world. The discovery that our world is suffering, evanescent and subject to dependent origination is inseparably bound up with the experience of Nirvana. If Nirvana only meant a state of unconsciousness as it was assumed by the yogins, it would not be necessary to analyse the laws which govern the world.

In later scholasticism Buddhism advocated the theory of the two ways, the way of vision (*darśanamārga*) and the way of meditation (*bhāvanāmārga*). The first way caused the destruction of the false views and the second that of the passions. But the germ of this theory can already be seen in primitive Buddhism. Vision of the supreme truth and eradication of the passions are both essential for attaining Nirvana. The history of Buddhist thought is closely interwoven with the interplay of these two elements. Never Buddhism has

transformed itself either into a mere philosophical system or into a technique to attain a trance-like state of unconsciousness. This accounts for the great richness of Buddhist teaching which avoids both extremes. Knowledge may be stressed more than meditation and conversely; still, never one element succeeds in wholly supplanting the other. For knowledge is no theoretical knowledge, but intuitive knowledge born out of meditation. Consequently, it is not the opposite of meditation, but to the contrary coexistent with it. To a certain extent it may seem that in the schools, in which the *abhidharma*, the analysis of the elements of existence, plays a preponderant part, the mystic element has disappeared. But, nevertheless, these elaborate scholastic systems culminate in the attainment of Nirvana. They closely examine the elements produced by causes (*samskṛtadharma*) in order to obtain a clearer insight into the elements not produced by causes (*asamskṛtadharma*) to which latter Nirvana belongs.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to an examination of Hinayana Buddhism, and we have tried to point out the nature of the experience of Nirvana and of the way leading up to it. In the schools of Mahayana Buddhism the same themes have absorbed the interest of the Buddhists. However much their concepts may seem to be different from those current in the Hinayana schools, the main lines of thought show a remarkable affinity between both Vehicles. The doctrines of the Mahayana schools are foreshadowed in the texts of primitive Buddhism and they carry to a logical fulfilment ideas the germ of which is already clearly visible in the oldest texts. Among the Mahayana schools those most important from the point of view of philosophic thought are the Yogacara and the Madhyamika. The former advocates the theory of mind-only (*cittamātram*), and maintains that the Absolute is thought. In tracing back the origin of this theory many scholars among whom one must mention La Vallée Poussin², Sachayer³, Frauwallner⁴, and the Japanese scholars Kimura⁵, Akanuma⁶, Nishi⁷ and Sakamoto⁸ have drawn the attention to a passage in the Anguttara Nikaya (vol. I, p. 10) and in Vasumitra's Treatise

on the Buddhist schools (cf. A. Bareau, *Journal Asiatique*, 1954, p. 244) saying: "Luminous is that thought, but it is defiled by adventitious defilements" (*pabhassaram idaṃ cittaṃ taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham*). Vidushekhara Bhattacharya has discovered in Jayaratha's commentary of Abhinavagupta's *Tantraloka* a verse which uses almost the same words in presenting the views of the Yogacaras: *prabhā-svaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ, teṣāṃ apāye sar-vārtham taj jyotir avinaśvaram*⁹. How did the Yogacaras arrive at this concept of luminous thought being the true reality? The text of the Anguttara Nikaya clearly refers to the way of the mystic who purifies himself from the defilements caused by the passions and the false views. The Yogacaras transferred to the Absolute this concept of a pure mind realized in the the course of the mystic way. The transition from the one concept to the other may probably be seen in the speculations of the Hinayana schools on the persistence of some kind of consciousness in the state of attainment of cessation to which we have referred. On the other hand already in the oldest texts there is mention of an invisible infinite consciousness radiating in all directions (*viññāṇam anidassanam anantam sab-bato pabham*, Digha Nik. I, 223; Majjh. Nik. I, 329)¹⁰. It is clear that the Yogacaras, and already some of the later schools of Hinayana, have taken up again trends of speculation already existent though not preponderant in primitive Buddhism, and even earlier in Upanishadic speculations because this idea of an infinite consciousness reminds us of several passages in the Upanishads¹¹. In a certain sense one can say that the Yogacaras with their theory of mind-only have done nothing else than develop the idea of the purification of mind which plays such an important role in early Buddhism as is testified by the well-known verse: "To abstain from all evil, to do good, and to purify one's mind, that is the teaching of the Buddhas" (*sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ kusalassa upasampadā sacittapariyodapanam etaṃ buddhāna sāsanaṃ*, Dhammapada 183, Udanavarga XXVIII, 1, Digha Nik. II, 49, Mahavastu III, 420).

The doctrine of the Madhyamikas has often been mis-

interpreted as an absolute nihilism. But all the negative arguments in their texts only serve to make clear that the Absolute is ineffable and cannot be described by words. According to the Madhyamikas the highest reality can only be realized by silence. A famous aphorism says that from the night of Awakening till the night of his entrance into Nirvana everything spoken by the Buddha is true (*yañ ca rattim tathāgato anuttaram sammasambodhim abhisambujjhat, yañ ca rattim anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyati, yañ etasimim antare bhāsati lapati niddisati, sabbam tañ tath'eva hoti no aññathā*, Digha Nik. III, 135; Ang. Nik. II, 24; Itiv. 121). The Madhyamikas have changed this aphorism to the effect that between these two nights nothing has been spoken by the Buddha because he was constantly plunged in meditation (*yāñ ca sāntamate rātrim tathāgato 'nuttarām samyakasambodhim abhisambuddho yāñ ca rātrim anupādāya parinirvāsyati, asmin antare tathāgatenaikākṣaram api nodāhṛtañ na pravayāhṛtañ nāpi pravayāhṛīsyati*, Prasannapadā p. 366)¹² The Lankavatarasutra, a text quoted often by both the Madhyamikas and the the Yogacaras, explains that the word of the Buddha is wordless (*avacanam buddhavacanam*) because on the one hand his mystic vision belongs to his own personal experience and is beyond words and concepts (*svapratyātmagatigocaram vāgvikalparahitam*) whilst on the other hand his mystic experience deals with the unchangeable nature of things (*dharma-tā dharmasthititā dharma-niyāmatā tathatā bhūtata satyatā*)¹³ Lank. 142-144). This explanation shows clearly that the mystic experience is by its very nature ineffable because it is a personal experience and its aim the absolute nature of things. The importance the Madhyamikas attach to silence is sufficient evidence of the fact that their seemingly nihilistic reasonings are only meant to clear the way for their mystic experience.

La Vallée Poussin has defined Buddhism as Nirvanamysticism. No better definition can be given. The foregoing remarks try to illustrate some aspects of Buddhism from this point of view which, I believe, can help us greatly to understand the true nature of the teachings of the Buddha,

NOTES

- ¹ French translation by Et. Lamotte, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, IV, 1936, pp. 151-263; Japanese translation by S. Yamaguchi, *Seshin no jogoron*, Kyoto, 1951.
- ² *Nirvana*, Paris, 1925, p.64; *l'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu*, chap. VI, Paris—Louvain, 1925, p.299; *Vijnaptimatratasiddhi*, Paris, 1928-1929, pp. 109-113, 215, 530.
- ³ *Precanonical Buddhism*, *Archiv Orientalni*, VII, 1935, p.131.
- ⁴ *Beitrage zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, Hamburg, 1951, p.152.
- ⁵ *Shojo Bukkyo Shisoron*, Tokyo, 1937, p.400.
- ⁶ *Bukkyo Kyori no Kenkyu*, Nagoya, 1939, p.210.
- ⁷ *Bukkyo Kenkyu*, V, 2, 1941, p.20; *Genshi Bukkyo ni okeru Hannya no Kenkyu*, Yokohama, 1953, p.347.
- ⁸ *Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu*, II, 1, 1953, p. 20.
- ⁹ *The Agamasastra of Gaudapada*, Calcutta, 1943, p.70.
- ¹⁰ Cf. N.Dutt, *Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism*, London, 1930, p.148; Schayer, *op. cit.*, p.131; C.Regamey, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, XXI, 1957, p.48.
- ¹¹ Cf. H.Nakamura, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XVIII, 1955, pp. 78-79 and *Chand. Up.* VIII.4.2: *sakyaśribhāto hy evaiśa brahmalokaḥ*.
- ¹² Cf. Et. Lamotte, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, I, Louvain, 1944, p.30, n.2.
- ¹³ For this often recurring formula see La Vallée Poussin, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, V, 1937, p.207, n.3.

BUDDHIST RATIONALISM AND ITS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN COMPARATIVE LIGHT

Hajime Nakamura

I. RATIONALISTIC CHARACTER

BOTH Buddhism and Jainism belonged to the movement of heterodoxy (*nāstika*) : both were originated not by the Brahmin priests but by members of the warrior and merchant classes, in a reaction against sacerdotal ceremonialism and theology ; they aimed at establishing their religions by means of free thinking independent of the Brahmanistic tradition.

The attitude to esteem universal norms was the heart and essence of the Buddhist reformation in the religion and philosophy of India. Its central tenets are all drawn up so as to exclude any reference to gods or souls in their strictest application. Buddhists asserted that even the existence of Brahma, the greatest god esteemed in those days, could not be proved. Buddhists assumed no Creator.

In the Scripture there is a dialogue to this effect :—

Two young Brahmins, Vasettha and Bharadvaja were staying at a pleasant spot on the banks of a river. After learning by heart and repeating some Vedic scriptures all day long, they went down in the evening to the riverside to bathe, and then walked up and down on the sandy beach. Then a conversation sprang up between them as to the true path. As neither of them was able to convince the other, they went to the place where the Buddha was, and asked him to decide which was the true one.

They said to Gotama : "Just, Gotama, as near a village or a town there are many and various paths, yet they all meet

together in the village; just in that way all the various paths are taught by various Brahmins,—are all these saving paths? Are they all paths which will lead him who acts according to them into a state of union with Brahma?

"Do you say that they all lead aright, Vasettha?"

"I say so, Gotama."

"Do you really say that they all lead aright, Vasettha?"

"So I say, Gotama."

"But then, Vasettha, is there a single one of the Brahmins versed in the three Vedas, or of their pupils, or of their teachers, or of their forerunners up to the seventh generation, who has ever seen Brahma face to face?" To each of these questions, Vasettha answers "No."

"Well, then, did they say, 'We know it, we have seen it,' where Brahma is, whence Brahma is, whither Brahma is?"

"Not so, Gotama."

"Then you say, Vasettha, that not one of the Brahmins, even up to the seventh generation, has ever seen Brahma face to face. Even they did not pretend to know, or to have seen where or whence or whither Brahma is. Then, the talk of these Brahmins, versed in their three Vedas, turns out to be ridiculous, mere words, a vain and empty thing."

The Buddha introduced another parable.—

Suppose a man should say so, 'How I long for, how I love, the most beautiful woman in this land!' And people should ask him, 'Well, good friend! this most beautiful woman in the land, whom you thus love and long for, do you know whether that beautiful woman is a noble lady, or a Brahmin woman, or of the trader class, or a slave?'

And when so asked, he should answer, 'No!'

And when people should ask him, 'Well, good friend! this most beautiful woman in all the land, whom you so love and long for, do you know what her name is, or her family name; whether she be tall or short, dark or of medium complexion, black or fair; or in what village or town or city she dwells?'

But when so asked, he should answer, 'No!'

Now what do you think of him? Would it not turn out

that the talk of that man was foolish talk ?

Just in the same way, Brahma, the highest god, cannot be seen. Therefore he must not be believed in.¹

Magical power in the command of the Brahmins also was refuted by the Buddha in the same way. "If a great river were full of water, and overflowing and a man with business for the other side, bound for the other side, should come up and want to cross over, and he, standing on this bank, were to invoke the further bank, and say, 'Come hither, further bank! Come over to this side !' Now what do you think of him ? Would the further bank of the river, by means of that man's invoking, and praying, come over to this side ?"

"Certainly not, Gotama !"

"In just the same way, Vasettha, the Brahmins versed in the Vedas say thus : 'Indra we call upon : Soma we call upon : Varuna we call upon, and so on.'

By reason of their invoking and praying such a condition of things will never happen !" So invocation is of no use.

His conception of religion was purely ethical; he cared everything about conduct, nothing about ritual or worship, metaphysics or theology. When a Brahmin proposed to purify himself of his sins by bathing at Gaya, the holy place, the Buddha said to him : "Have your bath here, even here, O Brahmin. Be kind to all beings. If you don't speak false, if you don't kill life, if you don't take what is not given to you, secure in self-denial, what would you gain by going to Gaya ? Any water is Gaya to you."²

The Buddha rejects outward signs of asceticism as they do not purify our personal existence. "Not nakedness, not matted-hair, not dirt, not fasting, not lying on the ground, not rubbing with ashes, not sitting motionless purify a mortal who is not free from doubt."³ We hear the same echo in the West also. "I desire steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God, rather than burnt offerings."⁴

"If a man month after month for 100 hundred years should sacrifice with a thousand sacrifices, and if he but for one moment pay homage to a man whose self is grounded in knowledge, better

is that homage than what is sacrificed for a hundred years."⁵ In the West also : "To obey is better than sacrifice".⁶

The Buddha repudiated all religious customs that were observed only conventionally. "What is the use of matted hair, O fool, what of the raiment of goat-skins ? Your inward nature is full of wickedness; the outside you make clean."⁷ Jesus also cried to the same effect : "Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! for you are like white-washed tombs, which outwardly appear beautiful, but within they are full of dead men's bones and all uncleanness. So you also outwardly appear righteous to men, but within you are full of hypocrisy and iniquity."⁸

In Greece Theodorus taught that all ethical and legal prescriptions were ultimately merely institutions that were valid for the mass of men; he bore the surname "the atheist", and put aside all religious scruples which are opposed to devotion to sensuous enjoyment.

Epicurus whose ethics had so many features in common with Buddhist one, also was exceptionally hostile to traditional religion.

Considering these assertions we may say that the attitude of Early Buddhists was highly positivistic. But it does not mean that the scriptures of Early Buddhism does not contain anything miraculous or supernatural. In order to edify the common people they resorted very often to various forms of popular faith. Miracle stories and legends of the Buddha and the saints are very often mentioned, but they are not essential to Buddhism.

According to Buddhism, faith becomes superstition when it is not examined by reason. Gotama was described as one who reasons according to the truth rather than on the basis of the authority of the Vedas or tradition. He claimed "enlightenment", but not inspiration. How much less of revelation !

Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism have accepted two standards for the truth of a statement : it must be in accord with the scriptures and must be proved true by reasoning. No Buddhist is expected to believe anything which does not meet these two tests. There has been set forth no phrase like "credo quia absurdum" in Buddhism.

For the first time in the history of the world, it proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself, and by himself, in this world, during this life, without the least reference to God, or to gods, either great or small, although this feature greatly changed in later days. Concerning this feature, F. Nietzsche said : "Buddhism is a hundred times more realistic than Christianity : posing problems objectively and coolly is part of its inheritance, for Buddhism comes after a philosophic movement which spanned centuries. The concept of "God" had long been disposed of when it arrived. Buddhism is the only genuinely positivistic religion in history."⁹

2. UNIVERSAL NORMS (DHARMA)

The Buddha is said to have been silent on metaphysical problems, and to have asserted partial veracity of all philosophical thoughts. This does not mean that he refrained from philosophical thinking as such, but he admitted the validity of universal norms concerning human existence.

The teaching of the partial veracity of various thoughts presupposes the universal law of human existence. However sceptical a man may be about everything, the phenomenon of sceptical thinking itself argues the existence of some kind of universal law, although it may be very difficult to grasp it. Without admitting it men cannot engage in consecutive thinking. Buddhists thought that in our human existence there work many universal and consecutive norms, which they named *dharma*s (*dhammas*). The word 'dharma' etymologically means 'that which keeps'. Gotama was called *dhamma-vadi*, one who reasons according to the truth, (that is, not on the basis of the authority of the Vedas, or of tradition). On this point we can call his standpoint extremely rationalistic, or normalistic. He did not claim any sanctity of his own upon any traditional authority. His greatness lies in that he has seen the truth and nothing more. The Buddha said : 'He who sees not the dharma (truth or doctrine) sees not me—He who sees dharma sees me'.¹⁰

In the Bible also we can find a similar teaching. Jesus said :

"I am not speaking of you all; I know whom I have chosen : it is that the scripture may be fulfilled. 'He who ate my bread has lifted his heel against me'. I tell you this now before it takes place, that when it does take place you may believe that I am he. Truly, truly, I say to you, he who receives anyone whom I send receives me; and he who receives me receives him who sent me."¹¹

But here Christ stressed rather personal relationship to him, while the Buddha stressed rather the universal validity of the truth. The saying of Christ here is rather irrational and personal, while that of the Buddha is rather rationalistic. Man is accountable to Law and not to a more or less arbitrary and capricious divine will.

According to the Buddha, personal relations should be brought into harmony with the universal norms. When the Buddha was going to die, he admonished his attendant Ananda, saying that it is the norms (dharma) that the brethren should rely upon.—"It may be, Ananda, that in some of you the thought may arise, 'The word of the master is ended, we have no teacher more !' But it is not thus, that you should regard it. The Truths (Dhamma), and the Rules of the Order (Vinaya), which I have set forth and laid down for you all, let them, after I am gone, be the Teacher to you."¹² It is the norms (dhamma) that the brethren should rely upon. "In whatever doctrine and discipline the Noble Eightfold Path is not found, neither in it is there found a man of true saintliness."¹³

All schools of Buddhism have presupposed universal laws, called dharmas, which govern human existence, and may be known by reason. The universal laws apply to all existence, in conformity to the nature of the universe. (*cf. Tout ce qui n'est naturel est imparfait*, as Napoleon said.)

The word dharma is often used as meaning the doctrine of the Buddha. In this sense, the Dharma is not really a dogma, but it is rather a path, which was regarded as the universal norm for mankind. On this point we find extreme similarity to the assertion of Confucius and Mencius. "The master said, Heaven begat the power (tê) that is in me. What have I to

fear from such a one as Huan T'ui?"¹⁴,¹⁵ "Constantly strive to be in harmony with the (divine) will and thereby get for yourself much happiness".¹⁶ The Buddha affirms that dharma or righteousness is the only way to welfare on earth as in heaven. On this point we find extreme similarity to the assertions of Chinese thinkers also. Confucius proclaims that the will of Heaven shall prevail; Lao Tzu declares that there is no getting past the Tao. They all mean that against the rock of moral law the world's exploiters hurl themselves eventually to their own destruction.

The Western counterpart of the concept of *dharma* can be said to be *logos*, although it in the sense of 'word' occasionally corresponds with Indian *śabda* or *vāk*. The rhythm of events of the universe or the uniformity of Nature under law, which is the only permanent, was termed by Heraclitus the destiny (*heimarmene*), the order (*dike*), the reason (*logos*) of the world.¹⁷

In the philosophy of Plato, the idea of the Good, which is the source of all the ideas, is supreme. The truly real and the truly good are identical; the idea of the Good is the *logos*, the cosmic purpose. The universe is conceived by him as a logical system of ideas, an organic unity, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the Good. It is the function of philosophy, by the exercise of the reason, to understand the inner order and connections of the universe, and to conceive its essence by logical thought.¹⁸

The *logos* doctrine of Heraclitus seemed to present itself the central point of the Stoic metaphysics. The Stoics said : all life and movement have their source in the *logos* : it is god; it contains the germs or seeds (*spermata*) of life; in it the whole cosmos lies potential as the plant in the seed. The entire universe forms a single, unitary, living, connected whole, and that all particular things are the determinate forms assumed by a divine primitive power which is in a state of eternal activity. As actively productive and formative power, the deity is the *logos spermatikos*, the *vital principle* or creative reason, which unfolds itself in the multitude of phenomena as their peculiar, particular *logoi spermatikoi* or formative forces.¹⁹

The sum-total of the divine activity in the world, Philo

designates by the Stoic conception of the Logos. The Logos is, on the one hand, the divine wisdom, resting within itself, and the producing rational power of the Supreme Being; it is, on the other hand, Reason as coming forth from the deity, the self-subsistent image, the first-born son, who is not, as is God, without origin, nor yet has he arisen, as have we men; he is the *second God*.²⁰

The concept of logos was early introduced into Christianity, as is noticed in the Gospel of St. John.

Christian Neoplatonism tended by its principle of emanation to make the *Logos*, identified with Christ, a kind of secondary deity, intermediate between a transcendent God and the world of sensible things. Origen thought of Christ as the Logos, or the hypostatized Divine Wisdom of the transcendent deity.²¹ Justin said : God has indeed revealed himself internally through the rational nature (*sperma logon emphyton*) of man who is created in his image, as he has revealed himself externally through the perfection of his creation.²²

In spite of so many similarities which we find between the concept of *dharma* and that of *logos*, we are inclined to think that the former concept of the East tended to be subjective, controlling human behavior, whereas the latter concept of the West tended to be rather objective, controlling the world or natural surroundings in which human beings live.

3. TOLERANCE

Tolerance has been an outstanding characteristic of Buddhism from earliest times. The thought that in spiritual matters we are at least blind beggars fighting with one another in our native darkness is not conducive to a narrow and fanatical bigotry. Early Buddhism was filled with the spirit of tolerance. Babbitt alleges that the Far Eastern doctrine that is probably freest from undesirable elements is the authentic teaching of the Buddha.²³ Buddhism has attempted to arrive at the truth, not by excluding its opposites as falsehood, but by including them as another form of the same truth. The Enlightened

One insisted upon no mythological vision, either of the present world or of a world beyond, and no fixed or tangible dogma.

The attitude of tolerance is quite clear in his sayings. The Buddha taught his disciples to think over the matters in the calm state of mind. He told his disciples: "Brethren, if outsiders should speak against me, or against the Doctrine, or against the Order, you should not on that account either bear malice, or suffer heart-burning, or feel ill-will. If you, on that account, should be angry and hurt, that would stand in the way of your own self-conquest. If, when others speak against us, you feel angry at that, and displeased, would you then be able to judge how far that speech of theirs is well said or ill?" "That would not be so, Sir." "But when outsiders speak in dispraise of me, or of the Doctrine, or of the Order, you should unravel what is false and point it out as wrong, saying: 'For this or that reason this is not the fact, that is not so, such a thing is not found among us, is not in us.'²⁴ The Buddha's admonition is marvellous, but we can find still more deep introspective reflection upon himself. "But also, brethren, if outsiders should speak in praise of me, in praise of the Doctrine, in praise of the Order, you should not, on that account, be filled with pleasure or gladness, or be lifted up in heart. Were you to be so, that also would stand in the way of your self-conquest. When outsiders speak in praise of me, or of the Doctrine, or of the Order, you should acknowledge what is right to be the fact, saying: 'For this or that reason this is the fact, that is so, such a thing is found among us, is in us.'²⁵

"It is in respect only of trifling things, of matter of little value, of mere morality (*silamattaka*), that an unconverted man, when praising the Perfect One (=the Buddha), would speak."²⁶

The Buddha's way of preaching is not protesting, not attacking, not proselytizing, but rather inculcating the teaching in a humorous way.

In many of the discourses of the Buddha he is represented as arguing with his interlocutors in a more or less Socratic manner. In the first place he admits the assertion or position of the interlocutors, and then he persuades them insensibly to

accept positions different from those from which they started. With regard to this fact, Dr. Radhakrishnan says : "As a matter of fact, the Buddha was more definitely opposed to Vedic orthodoxy and ceremonialism than was Socrates to the State religion of Athens, or Jesus to Judaism, and yet he lived till eighty, gathered a large number of disciples, and founded a religious order in his own lifetime. Perhaps the Indian temper of religion is responsible for the difference in the treatment of unorthodoxies." ■

However, the most important reason for the above-mentioned fact seems to be the Buddha's attitude that the Buddha objected to the assertion of the opponents, not obviously and directly, but euphemistically. "Buddha was more prone to humour than most religious teachers. The contrast in this respect between certain portions of the Pali canon and the Christian Bible is striking." ²⁸ To the believers of Brahmanism who observed sacrifices the Buddha said : "It is all right to observe sacrifices. But the true sacrifice consists not in the act of killing and offering beasts to gods, but in purifying one's mind to do good."

Buddhism has always respected other faiths and never tried to supplant them by force. The Buddha condemned the tendency prevalent among the religious disputants of his day to make a display of their own doctrines and damn those of others.²⁹ The Buddha encourages gifts by Buddhists to non-Buddhists as well. ³⁰ He admits the right of non-Buddhists to heaven. He mentions that a particular Ajivaka gained heaven by virtue of his being a believer in karma. ³¹ The Buddha held in high respect the Brahmins who led the truly moral life.

The attitude of liberty and toleration was held by the early Buddhists. Respect for the opinions of others was also held generally by them, two thousand years before religious liberty was advocated by isolated thinkers in Europe. T.W.Rhys Davids said : "The idea of religious freedom, or even of religious toleration, was almost unknown among Christians. Complete toleration, as is well known, is one of the most fundamental teachings of Buddhism." ³²

The tolerant spirit is displayed in the edicts of Emperor Asoka (two centuries and a half before the birth of Christ); these also reflect simply the spirit of the Founder of Buddhism. Although Buddhism was predominant in many Asiatic countries, there is no record of any persecution by the Buddhists of the followers of any other faith. They waged no religious war. Buddhism is probably the only world religion which has spread by persuasion, not by resorting to force. It is very difficult to have a firm conviction and at the same time to be tolerant. Many have deemed it almost impossible. Yet not only the Buddha himself but many of his followers achieved such tolerance.

The parable of the blind men and the elephant which has been widely popular in both East and West, is relevant to the topic of tolerance also, because the Buddha is the man who comprehended the whole as the whole, which does not conflict with the parts.

Babbitt says: "On the basis then of evidence, both psychological and historical, one must conclude that if the Far East has been comparatively free from casuistry, obscurantism, and intolerance, the credit is due in no small measure to Buddha." ³³ It makes a contrast to the fact that in the West and Near East religious intolerance was especially conspicuous.

It would be very interesting to compare the attitude of Early Buddhism with the Maitreyan Way advocated by Prof. Charles Morris of the University of Florida. He says: "Men have long pondered on the question of how to live. For ages they have asked themselves what they should become and how they might become what they choose to be." ³⁴ He mentions thirteen ways to live, some of which various persons at various times have advocated and followed. And he asked many American college students to indicate by numbers which they like most. He wanted to see how Americans would like to live. He considered the reactions of almost a thousand young people in colleges throughout the country—colleges in New York, Minnesota, Chicago, Alabama, and California. The number of them per hundred that gave first choice to each of the thirteen alternatives is as follows:

Way 1—17 ("nothing in excess")

Way 2—1 ("independent of persons and things")

Way 3—4 ("sympathetic concern for others")

Way 4—3 1/2 ("festivity and solitude in alteration")

Way 5—5 ("group activity, group enjoyment")

Way 6—7 ("man the eternal maker and re-maker")

Way 7—40 ("dynamic integration of diversity")

Way 8—10 ("carefree wholesome enjoyment")

Way 9—1 ("wait in quiet receptivity")

Way 10—4 ("vigilant manly self-control")

Way 11—1 ("meditation on the inner self")

Way 12—5 ("active, daring, adventuresome deeds")

Way 13—11 1/2 ("let yourself be used")

The seventh way is most popular among them. Forty out of every hundred of them gave it first choice, a higher number than any other way. This seventh way is, just as the other ways, described in full detail on the questionnaire as follows: "We should at various times and in various ways accept something from all other paths of life, but give no one our exclusive allegiance. At one moment one of them is the more appropriate; at another moment another is the most appropriate. Life should contain enjoyment and action and contemplation in about equal amounts. When either is carried to extremes we lose something important for our life. So we must cultivate flexibility, admit diversity in ourselves, accept the tension which this diversity produces, find a place for detachment in the midst of enjoyment and activity. The goal of life is found in the dynamic integration of enjoyment, action, and contemplation, and so in the dynamic interaction of the various paths of life. One should use all of them in building a life, and no one alone." 35

In thirteen Paths of Life Way 7 was called the Maitreya Path. Maitreya was in India's history the name of an enlightened friendly sage, a future Buddha who would one day appear on the earth to save suffering human beings. This name of one-yet-to-come was borrowed by Prof. Morris "because it seemed a fitting symbol for a way of life still struggling for birth, a way of life friendly to personal diversity under which Orient and Occi-

dent might find kinship."³⁶ The data offered protection for whatever potentialities a person has, and so evokes diversified allegiance. And it protects the elasticity of man, also.³⁷ Buddhism is well known for its elasticity. In this manner the Maitreyan personality ideal points to the ideal of a society abundant in contrasting personalities, unified in its acceptance and support of diversity. Here we can find an example of the Buddhist ideal working in one of eminent American philosophers.

Buddhists are generally noted for their liberal attitude toward other religions, whether polytheistic, monotheistic, or pantheistic. This feature is found in all Buddhist countries. Buddhists admit the truth of any moral and philosophical system, whether primitive or developed, provided only that it is capable of leading men at least partway toward their final goal. That is why other religions are not so seriously attacked by Buddhists.

Buddhism has tolerated the various primitive faiths native to the various countries in Asia. A clear notion of paganism was absent in Buddhism. The amalgamation of popular native beliefs is very strong in Southern (Theravada) countries. Over there many Hindu gods and goddesses have been included in the religious ceremonies of the Buddhist community, and many Buddhists still observe festivals and customs associated with the nats and other nature spirits of each country. These spirits are known as *nats* in Burma and as *phis* in this land. Some are the spirits dwelling in trees and houses, others are heroes who have passed away and live on a higher plane. Although the canons do not exhort such a form of popular belief, they have been amalgamated with Hindu beliefs and the worship of the nats. The Southern Buddhists have never opposed the introduction of the Hindu gods for worldly purposes. So, one finds worship of nats and stars even in Pagodas. This feature has been more conspicuous among Mahayana Buddhists.

NOTES

- ¹ Tevijja-sutta. T.W.Rhys Davids : *Indian Buddhism*, pp. 56-60.
- ² S. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, op. cit. p. 421.
- ³ *Dhammapada*, 141. Even in the days of the Veda there were protests against all sacrifices.
- ⁴ "O, Ye Gods! We use no sacrificial stake. We slay no victim. We worship entirely by the repetition of the sacred verses." (*S. Br.*, i, ii, 9,2) The cry of revolt was taken up by the Upanishadic thinkers.
- ⁵ Hosea VI,6 (The passages have been cited from *The Holy Bible*, Revised Standard Version. New York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1953.)
- ⁶ *Dhammapada* 106.
- ⁷ I Samuel XV, 22.
- ⁸ *Dhammapada* 394.
- ⁹ Mathew XXIII, 27-28. cf. Luke XI, 39.
- ¹⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche : *The Antichrist. The Portable Nietzsche: Selected and Translated by Walter Kaufmann*. New York, the Viking Press, 1954, pp. 586-587.
- ¹¹ *Iticuttaka*, 92.
- ¹² St. John, XIII, 18-20.
- ¹³ *Mahāparimibbāna-suttānta*, 6,1. *Dīgha-Nikāya*, vol. II, p. 154.
- ¹⁴ *ibid*, 5, 27. *Dīgha-Nikāya* II, p. 151.
- ¹⁵ Minister of War in Sung. Cf. Tao Chuan, Duke Ai fourteenth year.
- ¹⁶ *Analects*, VII, 22, tr. by A. Waley.
- ¹⁷ *Mencius* II, 1; IV, 5,6.
- ¹⁸ W. Windelband : *A History of Philosophy*. Tr. by James H. Tufts, New York, Macmillan, 1914, p. 36.
- ¹⁹ Frank Thilly : *A History of Philosophy*, revised by Ledger Wood, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1952, p. 81.
- ²⁰ W. Windelband : op. cit, pp. 180-181; 186.
- ²¹ op. cit. pp. 241-242.
- ²² Thilly : op. cit. pp. 162; 176.
- ²³ W. Windelband : op. cit. p. 223.
- ²⁴ Irving Babbitt : Buddha and the Occident, an appendix to his work: *The Dhammapada*, Oxford University Press, New York, London, 1936, p. 69.
- ²⁵ *Dīgha-Nikāya*, I, 1,5. vol. I, pp. 2-3.
- ²⁶ *ibid*, I, 6. vol. I, p. 3.
- ²⁷ *ibid*, I, 7. vol. I, p. 3.
- ²⁸ S. Radhakrishnan : *The Dhammapada*, p. 15.
- ²⁹ *ibid*, p. 71.
- ³⁰ *Suttanipāṭa*, v. 782.
- ³¹ *Anguttara-Nikāya*, III, 571.
- ³² *Majjhima-Nikāya* I, p. 483.
- ³³ T.W.Rhys Davids : *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism*, second edition, London, Williams and Norgate, 1891, p. 4.
- ³⁴ Babbitt : op. cit. p. 70.
- ³⁵ Charles Morris : *The Open Self*, New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1948, p. 73 ff.
- ³⁶ *ibid*, p. 77.
- ³⁷ *ibid*, p. 84.
- ³⁸ *ibid*, pp. 119-120. Professor Morris recently developed his study in the scientific examination of man's varied beliefs concerning the good life in his work : *Varieties of Human Value*, the University of Chicago Press, 1956. This is a further development of *The Open Self*.)

The Pali texts were all cited from the critical editions published by the Pali Text Society, London.

STANDPOINTS IN PHILOSOPHY

QUENTIN GIBSON

NOTHING is more common than to speak of people who join in a philosophical discussion adopting different points of view, or standpoints. Thus we may speak of the realist and the idealist views in philosophy—or again of the standpoints of Sankara and of Ramanuja. I do not wish to suggest that we should reject these ways of speaking. But it is clear that they contain a strong element of metaphor, and confusion may well arise through such metaphors being taken too literally. I propose therefore to submit the notion of a “philosophical standpoint” to examination.

Thoughts on this question are immediately aroused in the mind of a philosophical visitor to India. He is confronted with a long tradition in which there are many different schools of thought which have diverged on major philosophical issues. There is, for example, the Advaita Vedanta, of which Dr. Mahadevan has been such a distinguished exponent, there is the Nyaya system, and so on. Yet such a visitor is also often confronted with an unwillingness to admit that on these issues one of the schools is right and another is wrong. It is suggested to him that each of these schools has provided an approach to the truth from its own standpoint. All, it is said, are really different paths to the one truth. Each may defend his own standpoint as the most adequate, but this should not make him ignore the legitimacy of others. This attitude suggests a real problem about the general character of philosophical disputes. And this is perhaps why a good bit of recent thinking in India has been centred, as it seems to me, around this problem.

It will be clear that when we refer to standpoints or to paths, we are making use of a spatial metaphor. The simple case of

adopting different standpoints is that of visual perception. Different people may look at a table from different points of view, one being on one side of it and one on another. In each case it will appear differently, but each will be seeing the same table. The metaphor of paths is only different in that we have in mind practical movement in space instead of perception in space. Different people may reach a mountain top by different paths, but they will all meet at the top. In the case of vision we may of course prefer one standpoint to another, because we get from it a better view of the table; and similarly we may prefer one path to another, because it provides easier access to the summit. No one can adopt two different standpoints at the same time, or ascend by two different paths at the same time, but different standpoints and different paths are in no sense inconsistent with one another. It is logically possible for two different people to see the same object from different standpoints, or reach the same destination by two different paths.

The same point may be made in connection with appearances. The same material thing may appear differently from two different spatial standpoints. This leads us to distinguish in quite a natural way between the appearances and the reality which appears.

Difficulties immediately begin to arise, however, when we apply this natural way of speaking about spatial perception and movement to philosophical theories. To hold a theory, we commonly suppose, is to believe it to be true. And to say that it is true is to say that the world is such as is described in the theory. If it is not like this, the theory must be admitted to be false. How then can we find any room here for an analogy between different theories and different spatial standpoints each providing a view of the same reality?

It should be observed that when we speak of people holding different theories on the same subject, we do not mean merely that the theories are different; we imply also that they are inconsistent. If one person maintains the independent existence of a material world and another denies it, or if one

says there is a personal God and another says there is not, we say that such people are holding different theories about the material world or about God. But we assume that this difference implies controversy. There is an issue to be resolved. Our hope is that one 'view' or the other can be successfully defended, but we do not suppose that *both* can be successfully defended, nor do we suppose that both can be successfully refuted. Thus, such differing views are unlike spatial standpoints in a fundamental respect. It is not merely that the same person cannot hold two such views at the same time, for this is also the case with standpoints. It is rather that there is an inconsistency, as there is not with standpoints, between the theories themselves.

Faced with this obvious difficulty, we may, it is true, proceed to justify our common reference to philosophical standpoints on lines which do not depart from common sense. I will start by indicating some of the ways in which this can be done.

In the first place, it may be pointed out that we often use this spatial metaphor simply as a device for avoiding dogmatism. To say, in a philosophical argument, "This is my point of view", is to concede to one's opponent the right to differ. In this case, the point of the metaphor is not to admit that both parties may be right, it is rather to admit that the other party may be right. But even here there is a suggestion that, supposing your opponent is right, you are nevertheless defending yourself somehow or other against refutation, and this is precisely where the metaphor begins to mislead.

Secondly, it may be said that theories need not be taken as wholes, to be accepted or rejected in toto. Where there are opposed theories, there may well be, as we commonly express it, "some truth" in each. There is a tendency in argument for opponents to concentrate on their differences and neglect the points which they have in common. One point in referring to the different theories as standpoints may be to draw attention to their similarities. Thus the person who says that the different systems of Indian philosophy are all approaches to the same truth may be wishing to point to their agreement on certain fundamental doctrines—e.g., about the self and the manner of

its liberation. Further the process of philosophical argument rarely takes the form of the total acceptance or rejection of theories; it is rather a matter of piecemeal readjustment, one party modifying one statement and the other another. This is an obvious sense in which there can be a reconciliation of opposed standpoints.

If this is all that is meant, however, it is important that it should be made clear. It is all too easy to slip over from emphasising points of agreement to assuming that matters in dispute are not in genuine dispute but merely provide the variety of "points of view". And it is all too easy to misinterpret the natural dialectic by which we seek to resolve disputes as a challenge to the law of contradiction. This is where the danger of the 'standpoint' metaphor lies.

We now come to a third point. The metaphor of different paths must be admitted to be apt when we are speaking of any practical activity—for example religions in their practical aspect or ways of life. For just as there can be different paths to the one destination, there can be different means for attaining any end. Such means need be in no way inconsistent with one another, though the same person cannot adopt both. It is in this sense, e.g., that people have spoken of the goal of liberation as being attainable in different ways—through action, through devotion or through contemplation. And in so far as different philosophical theories are all associated with the practical task of achieving some given end,—e.g., the end of liberation, and the holding of each of them does in fact guide people towards this end, they may be spoken of quite intelligibly as different ways of achieving this end. This is perfectly compatible with the different theories being inconsistent with one another.

The trouble here, of course, is that people do not normally accept that a theory can be useful as a means to an end unless it is true. In this they have some justification. It is not usual for a true theory and a false one which contradicts it to have the same practical effect. Hence if we start with the idea that different theories guide to the same practical goal, we easily pass over to saying that they are different paths to the same

truth. And this is where the difficulty arises. Once we speak of the attainment of truth, the inconsistency of the theories is something to be reckoned with. Of two inconsistent theories, one must be false, and how can the holding of a false theory be a path to the truth?

Finally we must recognise that there are different ways of expressing the same truth, and it is this that people may refer to when they speak of approaching the same truth from different standpoints. In particular, when philosophers attempt to convey something about the nature of the world, they are apt to use different symbols and work with different analogies. And they may do this without disagreeing at all about the reality. As theories, monotheism and polytheism, for example, seem inconsistent, but it may be argued that the difference is really one of terminology. God is one, it has been said, but men call him by many names. If this is so, the different standpoints may be accepted without trouble, since no genuine dispute is involved. The difficulty I have mentioned does not arise, because there is no more than a verbal difference between the theories which different people hold.

I have made these points in order to show that our ordinary talk about standpoints, paths, and so on, may often be reconciled with the simple notion that two inconsistent theories cannot both be true. But the metaphor inevitably suggests more, and there is no doubt that those who use it are sometimes led into interpreting it in a more radical way. They seem involved in saying that two incompatible theories are after all in some way compatible—like the different perspective views of a material thing. How can one justify the adoption of this apparently impossible conclusion?

One obvious solution to this problem is to deny the absoluteness of the principle of contradiction. If we neglect subtleties, we may identify this as the solution of Hegel and his followers. For F.H. Bradley, for example, no judgment was absolutely true or absolutely false—there were degrees of truth, and the degree of truth which could be assigned to any theory was dependent on its comprehensiveness and harmony. If there

were opposed "views of the world" therefore, we could say that one was truer than another, but could not say simply that if one was true the other was false. They were, in fact, to be regarded as different "appearances" of the one reality, this reality being an absolute in which the contradictions between the appearances were somehow reconciled.

As we know, doctrines of this kind proved very attractive, and have been very influential. Among other things, they have had the peculiar merit of allowing a philosopher to have the best of both worlds. He may continue to argue for his point of view as against others, and he may at the same time admit that these others are to a certain degree legitimate. In this respect the doctrine fits in excellently with the 'standpoint' metaphor. It is thus not surprising that Bradley makes so much use of the terminology of 'appearances'. Only one modification is required. In seeing a table, we say that one standpoint is better than another, but not that it is more comprehensive, harmonious or inclusive. If we speak of inclusiveness we should really be speaking of *numbers* of standpoints, not single ones. But so common has the metaphor become that this minor difference frequently passes unnoticed.¹

Now, attractive though it is, this solution to the problem is one which it is very difficult to uphold. For one thing, it seems impossible for those who put it forward not to presuppose the very thing which they deny—the absoluteness of the principle of contradiction. For this principle is used as the criterion for distinguishing between the comparative truth of different theories; a completely true theory would be that in which all inconsistencies between the different appearances of things had been eliminated. Must not then the principle itself be true, and moreover, completely true? And must not the appearances which fall foul of the principle be simply rejected as false? We may put this another way by asking point-blank whether the contradictions between the different standpoints are all included in the all-inclusive view of reality. If they are not, this view cannot be all-inclusive. If they are, the contradictions remain intact, and each of the opposed standpoints

remains true, and moreover completely true.

Criticisms such as this are familiar enough. I do not see how they are to be overcome. I bring them forward simply to make clear that intellectually we cannot rest content with this happy solution to the 'standpoint' problem. If we are to take the standpoint metaphor seriously, we are driven on to look for other solutions.

One such solution might be simply to embrace one of the horns of the dilemma into which the Hegelian doctrine leads us. Why not admit that two opposed theories may both be true of the reality, without the contradictions between them being mysteriously eliminated in an all-inclusive synthesis? If we say of both of them simply that they *are* true, we avoid the difficulties involved in speaking of degrees of truth. This would at least stop us from playing fast and loose with the principle of contradiction as the Hegelians seem to do.

As it stands, however, this remedy would be extremely drastic, and it is doubtful whether anyone would be prepared to accept it. For it would mean abandoning the principle of contradiction entirely in our search for philosophical conclusions. It is quite understandable that this is something before which even the Hegelians quailed. Is there then any way in which it could be modified so as to avoid this alarming consequence?

One suggestion here is that we might say that the opposed theories are both true, but only *alternatively*. To admit a statement of the form "p and not-p" would be strictly self-contradictory, but to admit one of the form "p or not-p" would not. We come to a point, it may be said, when all we can do is to bracket different views of the world together as ultimate alternatives. If we had to accept one of these alternatives, this could only be a matter of decision on grounds of individual preference. But if our concern is with the truth, why should we have to do this? Why not rather admit that reality itself is disjunctive and not conjunctive in nature?

If I understand him rightly, a solution of this kind has had a distinguished proponent in K.C. Bhattacharya.² And it appears to have been adopted once again, in a different form, by

Kalidas Bhattacharya in his "Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy".³ It has also been suggested that it is implicit in the Jaina doctrine of the "seven ways of predication"—a doctrine which is also, significantly enough, referred to as the "doctrine of standpoints".⁴ Who exactly has held this theory, I would prefer to leave it to others to judge. But it can be seen how anyone might come to hold it as a solution of the "standpoint" problem. It does, admittedly, involve a further departure from strict analogy with the standpoints of visual perception. For we can here no longer defend one standpoint against another as giving a better view of the reality. In the ultimate disjunctive truth about the world, the views obtained from each of the alternative standpoints must be on a level.

This solution, it must be confessed, is an intriguing one. When we reflect, however, we come to realise that it is hardly more defensible than that of Hegel or of Bradley. There are difficulties about disjunction which are quite as great as those we have already brought out about contradiction. Let us confine ourselves to a simple point. To say that the world consists of a disjunction of alternatives is to say, surely, that it is either of some given nature or of some other nature (not both)—for example, that it is either entirely spatio-temporal or includes at least some eternal element. But we cannot say such things without inviting the question—which of these alternatives is true,—what is the nature of the world? We could not, that is to say, ever make a disjunctive statement without presupposing the possibility of making a categorical one about one of the alternatives. In that sense an ultimate disjunction is impossible. If we rest content with a set of alternatives, and fail to follow up the question which of them is true, this will presumably not be because the question cannot be asked but because we do not *know* which of them is true.

We are thus led on inevitably to a much simpler and more familiar justification which may be given for using the terminology of "standpoints" in philosophy. To speak of each having his own standpoint, it will be said, is not to suggest that their incompatible views of the world can in some way be shown to be

compatible; it is rather to suggest that, incompatible though they are, there are no grounds for deciding between them. Where there are no such grounds we might do one or other of two things. We might withhold judgment, refraining from adopting any theory at all, and content ourselves perhaps with the presentation of the alternatives. Or we might accept one theory, while recognising that we had no way of arguing for it against others who held different and opposed ones. The adoption in this way of some "point of view" might well be said to be unjustified, since we have no grounds for it. But it will in any case be very difficult to avoid, since such philosophical positions are generally inextricably bound up with our whole body of beliefs. Their acceptance is not usually due to arbitrary decision to suit our present fancy, but is part and parcel of our whole cultural background. A *Weltanschauung* is something to which we are generally committed, whether or not we can provide it with a theoretical justification.

Theories of this kind, at least about our metaphysical commitments, are common enough, and have become increasingly common in modern times. They have come to take a variety of forms. The simplest form is that in which it is assumed that one or other of the opposed theories is true, but because of some general limitation of our knowledge we cannot know which. Sometimes, however, people introduce a shift in the meaning of the word "true", and prefer to say that each theory is true in its own way,—relatively, that is to say, to the standpoint of the person who holds it. And finally it may be said that it is misleading to call such theories true or false at all, since they are rather of the nature of prescriptions or recommendations about what to think, than attempts to give a description of the world.

It must be recognised that the standpoint metaphor is commonly used in the expression of such ideas. It should be pointed out, however, that whichever form they take the central point of the metaphor is lost. It is now not merely that all theories are on an equal footing, in the sense that we have no way of arguing for one against another, and hence the idea that one stand-

point is superior to another must be left out. It is also that we must leave out the idea that from each of the different standpoints we find out something about the object. When we speak of different people each seeing a table from a different angle, we assume throughout that each is gaining some information about the table. Similarly when we speak of different people climbing a mountain by different paths we assume throughout that each path gives access to the summit. We are now, however, presented with a picture of philosophical standpoints, which is such, as it were, that no-one from any standpoint ever *sees* the table—or that no-one who climbs by any path ever reaches the summit. In the terms of the visual analogy, we might say that what each person sees is now his own sense-data. The sense-data may be said to be *of* the table, just as the metaphysical theories may be said to be *about* the world. But to call them views of the table or views of the world is apt to be misleading.

Though misleading, however, it is apt to be consoling. To speak of a belief which you hold without justification as a view of the world is inevitably to raise its status by suggesting, albeit vaguely, that it is a view of something. This suggestion, it should be noticed, is greatly enhanced when the word "true" is given a relational meaning, and one can say of one's theory that it is true from one's own viewpoint. For we start with the assumption that we are concerned to find out the truth, and this is a verbal device for giving the impression that we have done it, that our view really is (in a sense) a view of the world.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the whole question about the possibility of metaphysics. But I do wish to suggest that if we deny this possibility, we make clear where we stand, and do not smuggle our own theory back under the heading of a *Weltanschauung* or a relative truth. It is very tempting to do this because we are often deeply committed to our own system of thought. But this should rather be a reason for looking carefully to see whether we can justify it, not as a standpoint, but as a true theory, and can criticise that of its opponents as false.

Before closing with this simple conclusion let us revert

to our question and ask whether there is any other way of bringing together opposed theories as the reference to them as standpoints seems to require. We started by suggesting that we might challenge the absoluteness of the principle of contradiction and found that this did not produce a happy result. But might we not rather challenge the absoluteness of the principle of excluded middle? This is the final suggestion I would like to consider.

If we take two assertions such as that the self is an enduring entity and that it is momentary—or that the world has a beginning in time and that it has no beginning—we may admit that both cannot be true. But might we not be able to show that both are false—for example, by showing that each alternative itself leads to a self-contradictory conclusion? If so, there will be no point in defending one against the other; the opposed views will be brought together in their common downfall. They will not be reconciled, but if we are to have any theory at all they must be superseded.

It has been pointed out by T.R.V. Murti that this is the way in which the Madhyamika dealt with the opposed doctrines of the different schools.⁶ It is likewise the procedure of the antinomies of Kant. And it may be argued that it does not fall into the same difficulties as does the challenge to the principle of contradiction. For every opposition presupposes some universe of discourse. If one person says that surface is green, and another denies it, they cannot both be right, but both views will be superseded if surfaces are not coloured. There is a question, admittedly, whether in these circumstances we should say that both views are false. We might rather say that with the denial of the presupposition which determines the universe of discourse, the issue whether they are true or false does not arise and they should be called neither true nor false.⁶ But even if we make this modification, it is still the case that the two alternatives can be superseded by a third, and in a way which does not challenge the principle of excluded middle as rightly understood.⁷

Now if all theories could be rejected in this way, we would

be left with a very conclusive and annihilating form of scepticism. But since each rejection depends on a further and more general theory in which a presupposition is denied, such a universal rejection, we may suppose, *could never occur*. Two opposed doctrines cannot be barely denied but may be superseded when a wider one is put forward. The trouble is that when we come to very general oppositions such as those about the self and about time, we can no longer say what the presupposition is, or what the theory is which is to supersede the opposed views. The only rejectable presupposition we can find is that the truth can be found out by reason. Hence the positive outcome of such a destructive dialectic might well be, as with the Madhyamika, to open the way for the understanding of the world through some form of supra-rational experience. What this experience revealed, could not of course be expressed in the form of a theory. As Buddha did not actually say, though he might well have done,—“Thereof one must be silent.”⁸

Whether all theories can be dismissed in this way seems to me to be a matter of some doubt. But even if we suppose they could be, it would once again be most unsuitable to refer to them as standpoints. Admittedly they are brought together, neither being rejected in favour of the other, but they are only brought together as equally condemned. The analogies with seeing tables and following paths are thus even poorer than they would be if the holders of opposed views had neither of them any ground for their beliefs. We would hardly say that two people were seeing a table from two different points of view if the experiences of both were illusory and there was no table there at all; and yet this would be the parallel case. Likewise, we could hardly speak of the opposed theories as paths to the one truth; they are rather paths which lead nowhere at all.

My general conclusion then is that if the standpoint metaphor is taken seriously, it is unsuitable in philosophy. Those ideas about the relation between theories to which it most directly points—the idea of the reconciliation of opposed theories and the idea of their alternative truth—I have claimed to be untenable. In the case of other ideas about this relation, such as

those which are implied in positivism and in the negative dialectic, the metaphor becomes seriously misleading. We should keep in mind that philosophical theories *are* opposed to one another and that it is our business to decide between them if we can. The last position I have discussed does in fact accept this principle. Though it rejects all opposed theories, it rejects them unequivocally, and on the positive side presents us instead with a straightforward assertion of a supra-rational truth. In this respect it resembles the position of other defenders of supra-rational understanding, such as the Advaitin seems to be, who are prepared to dismiss opposed "views of the world" as illusory rather than reinstate them as appearances—though in this case without the same destructive criticism of the use of reason. But whether we accept the suprarational or not, let us be tough-minded about our disagreements, treating our opponents as people to be won over where possible by argument, rather than leaving them to get at the truth in their own way from their own "standpoint".

NOTES

¹ See, e.g. P.J. Chaudhury—"Describing and Prescribing", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1959, p.58, where in discussing philosophical controversies he says that people "distinguish between a less and a more inclusive standpoint, which points to their having a vague notion of an ideal philosophical standpoint from which all the diverse philosophies might appear to be but so many perspectives or determinations, some wider while others narrower". Professor Chaudhury may be said here to be giving an account of a typically Hegelian attitude towards philosophical disputes.

² See K.C. Bhattacharya—"The Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms" in *Studies in Philosophy* (Progressive Publishers, Calcutta), Vol. II.

³ See Kalidas Bhattacharya—"Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy". (Das Gupta & Co., Calcutta, 1953).

⁴ See T.R.V. Murti—"The Central Philosophy of Buddhism" (George Allen & Unwin, 1955), p.127.

⁵ See T.R.V. Murti—"The Central Philosophy of Buddhism", Chs. 5 & 6. On the law of excluded middle, see in particular pp. 146-8.

⁶ In Russell's logic, it is assumed that the presupposition is to be included in each assertion.—hence each assertion is false when the presupposition is denied. Strawson, "Introduction to Logical Theory", disputes the legitimacy of this, hence takes the second type of view. See especially pp. 18 and 175.

⁷ For a discussion of this question see D.M. Datta "Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle" in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, January 1959, pp. 14-15. There does not seem to be basic disagreement between Datta and Murti.

⁸ The quotation is from the last sentence of Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus".

SOCRATES, KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE

ELIZABETH RANKIN

KIERKEGAARD said of himself, "Like a lonely fir tree, egoistically isolated, looking toward something higher, I stand there, throwing no shadow, only the wood dove building its nest in my branches." Nietzsche also compared himself to a fir tree, a fir tree on the heights overlooking an abyss: "Lonely! who dares to be a guest here? Perhaps a bird of prey, gloating in the air of the branches..."¹ Much alike in their loneliness and in the humanizing basis of their philosophies, the differences in these two visions remain enormous. Both were striving philosophically for the same thing, one alone in his Christianity, the other alone in his atheism; but psychologically, artistically and methodologically they took different paths. The fir trees, although born of the same kind of cone, did not grow in the same spot nor in the same way: one looked upward, the other downward. And each beheld a different view, true to the individuality which they both proclaimed.

Both philosophers brought man back to the center of the world, so to speak, finding value and significance there with the eyes and the heart as well as with the intellect. Both were interested in human history as the history of individuals—and both were interested in Socrates as a turning point in that history. SK (Kierkegaard will be referred to by his initials) viewed Socrates as the first man to realize that a thinking person is an existing subject, a being who lives and experiences. He saw Socrates as the first person to separate man from the rest of the world and study him through this separation. Nietzsche saw Socrates as the embodiment of the end of a vital culture,

as the first "theoretic man," as the beginning of a decadent era in which man's instinctual nature is valued less than his conscious rational nature. He saw Socrates as the end of tragedy and the beginning of optimism.

The use of the symbolic fir tree reveals important similarities between SK and Nietzsche; it also points to many differences in the atmosphere and direction of their respective philosophies. The same holds true for their interpretation of the historical and philosophical significance of Socrates: both men believed Socrates was vitally important, but in a very different way. Their interpretation of Socrates can be used as a tool by which we can understand some of the basic elements of their total visions. The messages of both these men grew and changed as the men changed, yet their attitudes toward Socrates—one toward the great teacher, the other toward the great decadent—remained virtually the same. To a certain extent SK identifies himself with Socrates, that "master of Irony"², whereas Nietzsche rejects him as the destroyer of Dionysus, with whom he is wont to identify himself.

Kierkegaard's view of man is basically an ethico-religious view: his conception of the esthetic life takes on meaning only when thrown against the background of the ethical and religious lives. He feels that, with this ethico-religious standpoint, he starts with Socrates and experimentally goes beyond him through an understanding of what he called the "Moment" or the "Miracle of God as Jesus." Nietzsche's view of man is basically an ethico-esthetic view: in *The Birth of Tragedy* and occasionally elsewhere he gives to art the highest importance; after, although the "Superman" realizes the greatest virtue, i.e. power (or authenticity), the values that come to triumph have an esthetic hue as well as a moral one. The "herd" values disgust Nietzsche esthetically as much as ethically. The use here however of such categorizing does not present the picture completely, in all its complexities, some of which are not relevant to the Socratic relationship. Both SK and Nietzsche believed that man had numerous unfulfilled potentialities. They both urged man to create new values for himself, not to accept

ideas and values which were ready-made (in other words, to live authentically)—for and this reason, both were moral philosophers. They were moral philosophers in another sense too, namely, that they were devoted to and involved in the message they had to give, and both sacrificed themselves to what they felt to be the truth and importance of that message.

Like Socrates, SK starts from himself, with a self-examination. But Nietzsche starts with the world around him (although unconsciously that world was probably a wish-fulfilment or satisfying projection on his part) and makes the world acceptable to him, both esthetically and morally. In his earlier works, the artist is the superman, he who has and imparts knowledge of the wild suffering and change found in the world. Later his conception of the superman is widened to include more than the artist; he becomes the being who creates new values and rejects the old. Not only are the values completely opposed to those which Socrates emphasized, but the search and the goal are also quite different. Socrates wished men to find values already existent, he urged men to know themselves so that they could recognize those values and become virtuous through knowledge. Nietzsche's conscious goal is to see a small number of men pass beyond the average man to the superman—and then what? Then perhaps life is both esthetically and morally acceptable, for all worthwhile values are realized in a single being who can use the rest of the world for furthering his self (and perhaps his kind). Suffering for Nietzsche becomes a means to a goal that makes suffering not only acceptable but also very valuable. So while both philosophers emphasize the importance and results of a search for new values, one passes on to the religious aspect while the other insists upon the esthetic aspect.

SK, like Socrates, was a sceptic, during *at least* one of the stages of his life. He believed in his own ignorance as a real limitation and as an important element of his knowledge. And his writings come to us in the form of a self-examination, as an attempt at self-understanding in order that he may realize his potentialities fully and sincerely. But Nietzsche never consciously doubted his own wisdom. He was more like Heracleitus

than Socrates in his arrogance. Out of Socrates' humility grew the overtone of arrogance; but out of Nietzsche's self-assurance grew the prophet-like style of his writings and the conviction that he had written the truest and wisest of all books. Rather than a conscious self-doubter he proclaims himself a prophet in the ancient sense of the word and builds himself up through his philosophy so that he never consciously doubts the truth of what he is saying. Perhaps self-questioning would have destroyed Nietzsche; it was what gave wisdom to Socrates and SK. Nietzsche projected himself wholly as he wished to be into his thought. SK divided up his personality into various parts, embodying each of these parts by a pseudonym, treating each part as a separate force in his personality. Like Socrates, SK strove toward complete sincerity and openness of character (through the very device of pseudonyms). But Nietzsche, while he sees the rest of the world stripped by the honesty of his vision down to its chaotic and torturing irrationality, never sees himself stripped by honesty. SK, like Socrates, infused his vision with irony and a biting wit, toward both himself and others. But Nietzsche, although he says in *Ecco Homo* that he loves irony, "even the irony of world history," shows little trace of humour in his works, but rather is so sincere in his vehement and hateful appraisal of the situation into which he believed man had fallen that outrage and sorrow wipe out humour, which tends to flourish in a more reflective and leisurely style.

With these similarities and differences in mind it is easier to understand the affinity which SK felt with Socrates, the antagonism which Nietzsche felt toward him, and their conceptions of Socrates both as a person and as a force in man's history, and of the different values he embodied for each of them.



Nietzsche, infatuated with the early Greeks, saw in their culture the barbaric and aristocratic qualities which the Greeks themselves were later to attribute to all non-Greeks. Nietzsche believed that through the origins and birth of Greek tragedy

man's unconscious and instinctual nature, fused through Apollonian and Dionysian expressions, is elevated and accepted. The freedom of the "wilder emotions" and the tragic spirit, the full life in all its cruelty and esthetic force is opposed by and through Socrates with the birth of philosophy and conscious thought. The strength of the Olympian gods is rejected, and the power of reason, Socrates' rational search for virtue, represents for Nietzsche the exhaustion of a vital period. Later Nietzsche saw such an exhaustion or decadence as a biological reaction, arising from old age or some other form of physical weakening. It has as an effect, not as a cause, scepticism and corruption of morals, a self-questioning and a rejection of the (irrational) strength which preceded it. Nietzsche believed that decadence is the attempt of reason to assert itself and probe the irrational or unconscious values which enhances the period that inevitably produces it. In *The Birth of Tragedy* where Nietzsche treats of Socrates (along with Euripides) as the thinker—and therefore the decadent—par excellence, he sees his effeminate and nihilistic culture as inevitable, just as the exhaustion which follows a period of extreme physical exertion is inevitable. In *The Will to Power* he speaks at length of disease and decay, and, while Socrates is not discussed as he is in the earlier work, the descriptions are basically the same, although the cause of the decay is spiritual in the former case, physical in the latter. Symbolically as well as literally Socrates represents this exhaustion for Nietzsche, its consequent nihilism (which Nietzsche equates with refined questioning) and its rejection of instinctual values in both cases. And in both cases such a decay is necessary and/or beneficial, for Nietzsche sees arising out of it a renewal of strength. "Falling off, decay, refuse, is nothing to be condemned in itself; it is a necessary consequence of the increase of life. The appearance of decadence is as necessary as the beginning and progress of life: it does not lie in our choice to set it aside. On the contrary, reason wishes that it may get its rights."³ In the culture that preceded Socrates' there was an overflow of life, an exuberant triumph of manly values. Socrates represents for Nietzsche—on one level spiritually, on another

physically—the dying of such a culture through the destruction of those values. “He who approaches these Olympians with another religion in his heart, seeking among them for moral elevation, even for sanctity, for disincarnate spirituality, for clarity and benevolence, will soon be forced to turn his back on them, discouraged and disappointed.”¹ The growth of a culture in which theory predominates gives birth to opera in which the words, as representing a man-made structure, must be understood before the music can be felt.

Socrates was the representative of this culture for Nietzsche, for he believed that Socrates’ message grew out of the words he spoke rather than the art he created or the emotions he felt. He was a bystander, a spectator of life rather than a participant. He tried to understand, not to live. This again is an example of the exhaustion of the period, when men have worn themselves out through excess and deification of life itself; now man can only watch and question what he sees instead of unconsciously and wholly experiencing. Socrates’ sober opposition to (or isolation from) the drunken Dionysus is embodied in his moral principle that knowledge is virtue, that man sins only from ignorance. Nietzsche believed that Socrates rejected any virtue that may come naturally to man, that may come through insight and instinct; rather, Socrates will accept only those virtues which are discovered through rational inquiry. Because Socrates has discovered that no man, not even himself, knows rationally and explicitly what is good, he sets out to correct existence with “an air of irreverence and superiority,” to destroy the old idols and the old culture whose life-imbuing values Nietzsche felt the men of his day needed so desperately. Socrates’ “inner voice” or daemon Nietzsche sees as the voice of his instinct and creative aspect, but this voice always says “Nay,” it always dissuades and hinders. In the preceding period this voice shouted “Yea” and dissuaded the conscious element from questioning its activities. In Socrates “it is instinct that becomes critic, and consciousness that becomes creator—a perfect monstrosity *per defectum* !” Through his exaggerated consciousness Socrates is the non-mystic in whom logic is the most developed organ.

Nietzsche also saw the death of Socrates as a kind of suicide through which he became the new ideal.

The profound illusion—that reason is omnipotent—first appeared with Socrates, Nietzsche believed. With it comes the birth of optimism, for man will now think that knowledge will cure the world of its sin and suffering, that rationality can not only completely explain existence but also alter it. Optimism gives to man the delusion of limitless power through the use of his intellect. Sin becomes simply ignorance which can easily be corrected by the power of reason. The *deus ex machina* of “poetic justice” takes the place of a “transcendental justice”, the irrational justice of Dionysus. And in this optimism lies the death of tragedy, necessary though this death may be. “Optimistic dialectic drives music out of tragedy with the scourge of its syllogisms: that is, it destroys the essence of tragedy, which can be interpreted only as a manifestation and illustration of Dionysian states, as the visible symbolizing of music, as the dream-world of Dionysian ecstasy.”⁵

For Nietzsche the influence of Socrates “has spread over posterity like an ever-increasing shadow in the evening sun,” and although he never discusses Socrates as explicitly as he does in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche, in his later works, tries to understand and explain the birth and influence of this shadow, the prevalence of which in his own day he saw as the most consuming evil. Beginning with Anaxagoras’ claim that the world is infused with *nous* or mind, the philosopher or theoretic man wills the world to be rational so that he can understand it. Nietzsche believed that Socrates, although a bit more complicated than most other philosophers in his daemoniacal doubting of what was intelligible, nevertheless began the diseased age in which reason claims omnipotent rights and rejects the more life-accepting and “Yea-saying” values of a healthier age.

In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche is a little horrified at the violence of early Greek culture, but it is a joyous and admiring horror. In *Genealogy of Morals* and afterwards, the horror is completely gone, and his attitude is one of complete approval

and admiration. Unlike Socrates, Nietzsche wanted to have nothing to do with the weaklings of the world : he went further and further from the masses of men to the individual through the ideas of self-mastery and fulfilment of the select few : "It is ■ consolation to me to know that over the smoke and dirt of the hollows where men live, there is a higher, clearer humanity, which will always be very small in nature (for everything outstanding is in its essence rare)..."⁶ Socrates moved among the dirt and clamour of the marketplace in order to clean it and replace its chaos with order; Nietzsche sees the marketplace as necessary, just as Zarathustra's downgoing is necessary, but afterwards one should return to the mountain top, away from the crowd. Socrates remained among the crowd—and, unlike Nietzsche, had little hope for future improvement. Values are reversed : Socrates is actually the pessimist, Nietzsche the pessimist who, in order to hope, looks toward a future salvation.

At the end of his life Nietzsche returned to a position similar to the one held in *The Birth of Tragedy*; he insists, unlike Socrates, that the world is "false, cruel, contradictory, misleading, senseless." Art gives man direct communication with this world, transforming it so that he has power over it. Socrates, whose message, Nietzsche feels, is the contrary, whose vision arises out of an attempt to make the world rational, thereby falsifies the contradictions of experience by imposing logic upon them and trying to give the artificial sense of rationality to what is irrational. From such refinement and questioning ("nihilism", according to Nietzsche) spring religion, morals and philosophy, which are "decadent forms of man. The countermovement—art." And Socrates, whose optimism (i.e. belief in the power of reason and the order of the universe) killed real art, is for Nietzsche like the dwarf that weighs so heavily on the back of the mountain-climbing Zarathustra. He is a necessary burden, that which leads to the surpassing of his own values : "For must there not be that which is danced over, danced beyond ? Must there not, for the sake of the nimble, the nimblest,—be moles and clumsy dwarfs ?"

SK sees embodied by Socrates the recognition of the individual, the creation of a unique relationship between unique subjects, a relationship which SK felt the men of his day needed so desperately. Instead of placing Socrates at the end of a culture, as does Nietzsche, SK places him at the beginning of a vital philosophical process.

Often, when speaking of himself, SK could well be speaking of Socrates: "...this very work of mine as an author was the prompting of an irresistible inner impulse, a melancholy man's only possibility, the honest effort on the part of a soul deeply humbled and penitent to do something by way of compensation, without shunning any sacrifice of labour in the service of truth."⁷ He compares the misunderstanding he has suffered with that of Socrates, a misunderstanding which results from serving the truth "in self-denial" and doing everything in his power to prevent himself from becoming "esteemed and idolized." In *The Point of View*, where SK explains himself as an author, there is constant comparison and identification between Socrates and himself. He insists that Socrates' most important contribution was his concept of the individual; he was the first to use it "with decisive dialectical force." A profound understanding of Socrates himself as an individual as well as of the author is shown through the use and discussion of irony:

When some day my lover comes, he will easily perceive that at the time I was regarded as ironical the irony was by no means to be found where 'the highly esteemed public' thought. It was to be found—and this goes without saying, for my lover cannot possibly be so foolish as to assume that a public can understand irony, which is just as impossible as to be an individual *en masse*—he will perceive that the irony lay precisely in the fact that within this aesthetic author, under this worldly appearance, was *concealed the religious author*, who just at that time was consuming quite as much religiousness as commonly suffices for the provision of an entire household.⁸

The only thing to do, says SK, is to invert the relationship

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"and himself become the target for the irony of all men."

SK calls Socrates his teacher in a formal sense because Socrates was a dialectician: he saw more than one side to everything, and in conceiving of things in terms of reflection he used reflection as a mirror, revealing many aspects to every issue. Socrates used such concrete (or ordinary) language that he tricked everyone into talking about himself and into (unconsciously for the most part) trying to understand himself and his beliefs, "revealing whether he knew something or didn't know anything."⁹ SK felt that this concrete language was needed again, that philosophy must humble itself, shun abstractions and speak of everyday affairs, of people and their problems, as it did through Socrates.

However, SK believed that one of the distinctions Socrates failed to realize was that between not being able to understand and not willing to understand. Because ignorance was sin for Socrates, and no one would do evil if he had knowledge of what was good, sin could never be willed; one who does the wrong thing does it out of lack of understanding. But for Christianity, as SK sees it, sin is something a person wills; it results from a corruption of the will, not of the understanding.

The student here believed that he had gone further than his teacher, and with Socrates as a starting-point SK felt he had advanced beyond Socrates. Whether this advance constituted discovering (or creating) new truths SK did not say explicitly, but he did say that it was the advance of Christianity over paganism. The *Philosophical Fragments* tell how Socrates taught SK and how SK advanced beyond that teaching. Socrates, he says, always remained true to himself, for his very life was an artistic expression of his message. His method of question and answer with specific individuals gave importance to each individual and revealed a unique aspect of the truths Socrates was trying to discover (or uncover). "In the Socratic view each individual is his own center, and the entire world centers in him, because his self-knowledge is a knowledge of God. It was thus Socrates understood himself, and thus he thought that everyone must understand himself, in the light of this understanding inter-

preting his relationship to each individual with equal humility and with equal pride."¹⁰

Socrates' principle "Know thyself" actually is interpreted to mean "Know truth", for truth, according to SK, is (in) the individual, and by means of a Socratic mid-wifery it can be recollected. Socrates, as the teacher, first makes his student realize that he is in a state of error (or sin); thus he thrusts his student from him and makes him fall back on himself in order to discover the truth that is inherent in him. The truth comes from within the individual himself, not from the teacher—and can therefore be discovered only by the student.

But, according to SK, Socrates neither created the truth historically nor did he reveal it to his student; for truth was an eternal thing for him, simply made explicit by the teacher through the maieutic process. SK's "advance" upon Socrates was that SK saw the teacher as he who creates the condition for understanding the truth and gives truth existence in the "moment". Because of the "moment"—that is, because the eternal truth has become historical, temporary—there is the "Paradox," the eternal in the moment, the eternal in time. Truth, as such, as understood by SK, can never be explained but only realized through passionate acceptance on the part of the individual. For both Socrates and SK, truth is eternal; for SK—not for Socrates—truth is also born in the "Moment," it comes into being at the same time as it remains eternal. SK, going one step further, says that it is the passionate acceptance (the acceptance of course can never be based upon reason) of this paradox that brings man into relation with God. Between man and man Socratic midwifery is the highest possible relationship. But between man and God the relationship is a creative one, creating, so to speak, eternal truth. This kind of relationship goes beyond reason into the unknown, to discover "something that thought cannot think"—through passion man "transcends himself," not through reason.

In the man-God relationship the temporal "Teacher" is all-important, and man must know *the* "Teacher"; in the Socratic relationship the historical teacher is unimportant and

accidental, but man must know the truth. In relation to Socratic truth and method, time is meaningless, and contemporaneity vanishes "as nothing in comparison with the eternal which he discovers within himself." SK believed that because God came into time as Jesus, the moment (when the eternal became historical) of this coming-into-being serves as an occasion for the individual to realize the state of sin that he is in. God, in becoming mortal, in embodying the "Paradox," gives man, in time, the condition for knowing both himself and God. By making truth at once a temporal and an eternal thing, a paradox, SK believed that he had thus gone beyond Socrates with emphasis upon the importance of time to truth. But he maintained the Socratic starting-point and basis that the truth is at least partly within the individual and that the individual is at the center of the universe.

Unlike Socrates, however, and his Socratic method, which cares not who practises it, for the truth is always there to be discovered within the individual, and its historical awakening is simply an accident in comparison to the eternal essence of the truth itself, SK placed importance upon the (Christian) historical embodiment of truth, the historical birth of an eternal truth. And since "Reason" cannot penetrate or understand such a paradox, truth is no longer the object of intellectual inquiry but centers rather in the passion which embraces it. Without the new elements in SK's philosophy—faith, the consciousness of sin, the "Moment," and God in time—he "certainly never would have dared present (himself) for inspection before that master of Irony, admired through the centuries, whom (he) approaches with a palpitating enthusiasm that yields to none."¹¹ After all, Socrates knew men, did not just theorize about them, and, through this knowledge, was in despair over the human condition (a fact of which Nietzsche seemed to be unaware), "spiritually in despair. Why, I wonder, did Socrates love youths—unless it was because he knew men!"

The opposite poles at which SK and Nietzsche placed Socrates reveal much of the essence of their respective philo-

sophies; yet such a summary discussion leaves out many of the subtleties and ramifications which make their philosophies so vital and rich.

Nietzsche's rejection of Socrates is actually a rejection of philosophy as it is usually thought of. It is also a rejection of all values which are accepted (or rejected) as the result of rational inquiry and reflection. Nietzsche believes that only by giving full expression to his *instinctual, irrational and passionate aspects* can man live a worthwhile life. The moment one begins to consciously examine one's beliefs and actions, to look for reasons to justify and understand, one has lost the wisdom which Nietzsche found in what Freud was later to call "*the unconscious.*" Socrates represents this moment for Nietzsche. He represents a fall in human history according to Nietzsche, a loss of the wisdom of living passionately.

For SK an acceptance of Socrates also means a rejection of philosophy as it progressed through Plato to Hegel; for after Socrates, according to SK, philosophy lost the concrete language used by the people in the market-places and tried to remove itself from ordinary conversations, outside the life of the philosopher himself, so that, unlike Socrates and his questioning, the philosopher and his philosophizing had little to do with one another. But because SK believed that reason could not lead wisdom, that is, could not be used to answer questions about how to live, he felt that Socrates' position was a stage to be surpassed. It was however the Socratic position that SK tried to re-establish; only from there did he feel that he could make the advance which had been made possible by the historical event of Christianity.

Nietzsche believed that Socrates brought about the death of the only valuable religion, the Dionysian revelling of the early Greeks, which gave full expression to man's instincts. SK believed that only through Socrates could he be genuinely religious, could he be a "Christian." One saw Socrates as a dying, the other saw in him a beginning. In any case, both understood him as a vitally important moment in the history of human thought.

NOTES

¹ Jaspers, Karl, *Reason and Existenz*. New York : The Noonday Press, 1955, III. 42.

² Kierkegaard, Soren, *Philosophical Fragments*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1936, p. 93.

³ Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Will to Power*, in *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*. New York : The Modern Library, 1927, p.40.

⁴ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, in *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, p.961.

⁵ *ibid*, p. 1025.

⁶ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, p. 993.

⁷ Kierkegaard, *The Point of View*. London : Oxford University Press, 1950, p.7.

⁸ *ibid*, p.62.

⁹ Kierkegaard, *On Authority and Revelation*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1955, p.32.

¹⁰ Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, p.7.

¹¹ *ibid*, p.93. my parentheses.

CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY

ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN

I

THERE was a time when acquaintance with physical science constituted an indispensable ingredient of the mental treasury possessed by any cultured person. A similar situation prevailed prior to the seventeenth century with respect to philosophy. This era, however, is past and we may say, perhaps, definitely past. Physical science has become the pursuit of specialists even in such a way that it has been split into a large number of sections, each of which pertains to different realms of specializations. Why then, many think, should we not make a virtue of necessity? Since specialized knowledge is *ipso facto* not attainable for all, they simply relegate physical science from the realm of man's general cultural possessions or at most admit it in a servile and subordinate position. If this characterization of the attitude many assume toward physical science may sound somewhat exaggerated, we may remind the reader that in Europe men of education would still feel ashamed to admit that they have never read anything of Shakespeare or Goethe but readily and unblushingly confess to their total neglect of Newton's and Einstein's works. There is no need, of course, to mention here others who consider it a badge of their cultural standing that they are unable to read this kind of literature.

The question may be raised whether such an attitude stems perhaps from the conviction that the mathematical language used by scientists is destined for machines rather than for human beings. The motive in question would be very interest-

ing, although we fear that the cultural critics of physical science do not reflect so profoundly upon the basis of their aversion. For otherwise the aversion would very probably have disappeared as soon as they suspected that this mathematical language has something to do with machines and technique. Their suspicion, indeed, would make it very interesting to see to what extent this language is a special form of cultural language, for undoubtedly machines belong to the realm of culture. However, let us be prudent and limit ourselves provisionally to stating that they belong to *technical* culture. In this way we are able to keep the issue open, for the expression allows us later to emphasize either the term *culture* or its qualifier *technical*. Thus two paths will remain open to us, which is extremely convenient.

Apart from being convenient, the ambiguity in question appears to be even necessary. On the one hand, it is possible to present a series of imposing arguments in favor of the thesis that physical science and technology perform only servile functions. On the other, it is rather striking that the evolution of science and its technology has not only profoundly modified the external conditions of human life but also considerably changed our inner attitude toward reality and toward ourselves. This fact points to a function which is dominating rather than servile. If, then, physical science and technology are not to be classified as parts of culture, they somehow manage to exercise a profound influence upon it.

Strictly speaking, this influencing has hardly gone beyond the first initial stage. Man realizes that the rationalization of technique and the technification of society will continue, whether he likes it or not. This point touches one of the most essential characteristics of the influence which technology exercises upon culture. It seems that this influence runs its course almost entirely independently of our will and of the various cultures that have arisen in the course of history. Initiated in the West, technological culture is spreading over the entire world, regardless of the question whether or not the existing cultural patterns are capable of assimilating this technological culture. Through its pursuit of science the cultural attitude of the West appears

to have initiated a process which cannot be stopped. We intentionally say that it is the *cultural* attitude of the West which has originated this process. While it may be true that the evolution of science and technology nowadays takes place under the guidance of specialists, let us not forget that in the seventeenth century the entire cultural West loudly acclaimed the birth of this same physical science as its greatest cultural achievement.

It is, indeed, one of the characteristics of scientific and technological evolution that it makes the impression of running its course, as it were, behind our backs. No one seems to have control over it, no one, not even the specialist in science and technology, appears capable of obtaining a comprehensive view of it. Thus we may legitimately ask whether the appearance of man as an active factor in the process of evolution really means such a fundamental modification. Man's active participation in his evolution does not seem to reveal an essential difference, for plants and animals also collaborate in their evolution, simply by exercising their vital functions. It is only through these functions that natural selection, which is the basis of our present-day theory of evolution, reaches results. Of course, man's active participation takes place on a higher level—but does he really determine the direction in which the evolution of society runs its course? Is not ultimately the whole of man's technology a "dumb natural process"¹, an event in which nature may have integrated higher vital powers, such as man's urge to know and to make things without, however, allowing, technological evolution to become a *free* deliberately chosen development? Technological development does not seem to be a free project, the result of a consciously chosen cultural deed. It seems rather that technical evolution runs its course outside culture. It is not brought about by the segment of the human race constituting the bearers of culture, but by specialists, "acultural barbarians" they have been called, who barely know what they are doing, driven as they are by their utilitarian tendencies.

It appears to us that especially those who wish to retain

freedom as the source of culture must pay great attention to the aspect of *nature* which is present in the development of science and technology and consequently also in the evolution of man insofar as this evolution is the continuation of the evolution of nature. For freedom, as *human* freedom, is very closely tied up with nature. One of the greatest dangers threatening our culture lies perhaps in this that in our theoretical considerations we exaggerate freedom so much that our idea of it becomes false and can no longer serve the reality of life. The consequence would be that life would really run its course beyond the reach of our freedom. Our culture is threatened likewise if we *de facto* pursue technology and at the same time internally reject it as inferior or even unworthy of man.

II

Let us consider, therefore, a few points which can make it evident how very real the basis is of the idea that the entire evolution of man is a "dumb natural process".

1. We may begin by pointing out that the cultural forebears of modern science, the Greeks, deliberately developed science as knowledge for the sake of knowledge, as theory, and explicitly excluded *technè* as being of inferior rank. The arguments presented by the Greeks were very impressive, as may appear from the fact that they have determined the ideal of science until our own time². The pursuit of science is the enrichment of the mind for the sake of this enrichment itself, because through it the human mind gradually "becomes" the whole of reality and acquires also more perfect knowledge of itself. To know, says Aristotle, is to become the other. *Technè* and political skill, as practical sciences, do not exist for their own sake but merely serve to secure the conditions required for the undisturbed contemplation of the truth. Moreover, *technè* is not a universal science, but limits itself to the particular properties of concrete things. Gold, for example, must be treated differently from iron, simply because gold is gold and iron is iron.

Things, however, did not go exactly as the Greeks had

thought and intended. Just the opposite happened. *Epistèmè* and *technè* met in the physical science of the seventeenth century. For this science was a *universal* science of the particular properties of material objects and thus had the power to become normative for their technological transformation.

It is hardly necessary to insist upon the fruitfulness which the Greek's philosophical view of science possessed, even though they themselves did not foresee the consequences of their undertaking and even explicitly rejected them. For it was the Greek concentration on philosophy, logic, astronomy and mathematics which created the climate in which modern physical science could arise at a more mature moment of history. Without the reflection of the Greek philosophers science and technology in the modern sense would not have arisen. Their ingenious intuition put them on the right track but—and this point is important for us—this track led elsewhere than they thought and precisely where they did not want to go. Could any more persuasive argument, we may ask, be found in favor of the thesis that, albeit with our collaboration, human evolution runs its course behind our backs? This is not a rhetorical question. It demands a reply. Before answering, however, we want to consider a few other aspects which likewise plead in favor of viewing the historical process of development as a natural process.

2. Human purposes embodied in matter guide the technical transformation of the world to make material reality work for man. Yet it is precisely here that lies the reason why we sometimes justly feel as if the whole developmental process takes place behind our backs. For nature, as technically organized and transformed, never works directly in accord with our intention, but operates by virtue of its inherent natural tendencies and of patterns which are *de facto* introduced into it. The place which the arrow will reach after it has left the bow or the rocket once it has been fired, is not determined by the purpose man has in mind but by the *material* situation, the arrangement of natural factors that is *de facto* made in matter. Consequently, although the technological order has been created by man, it leads a life of its own. The ignorance, the mistakes and, let's not

forget, the wickedness also which ever have been embodied into the order continue to operate, as it were, in an autonomous fashion. Thus it should not be a matter of surprise, that we, as individual human beings at least, have the feeling of being utterly powerless with respect to the technological order and its development.

3. Moreover, human knowledge, and consequently also human power, is abstract, i.e., man's grip on reality is merely partial. In direct ratio to the development of science, this abstractness of our knowledge reveals itself more strikingly because it is pursued in a constantly more systematic fashion. Through the "scientification" of technique, the partial character of our cognitive grip on reality is communicated to our technical grasp of matter. The result of this situation is that any interference in the technical order will be concerned only with a certain aspect and will be unable to foresee what its consequences will be for the totality of reality, because these consequences simply lie beyond the vision leading to the interference in question. It is for this reason that the evolution of the technological order proceeds in a spasmodic fashion. The invention, for instance, of the steam engine in itself was a scientific and technological problem, but it disrupted the entire traditional social structure. Man's desire to understand more about the structure of the atom, purely for the sake of understanding, resulted in nuclear energy and led to unimaginable consequences for all earthly life. The abstract nature of our knowledge makes it extremely difficult to foresee the consequences of any scientific discovery or technical invention even with respect to the proper realm to which they belong. *A fortiori*, then, the same is true for the whole of reality. For its interconnection is concealed from the one-sided human glance, although it manifests itself subsequently in the actual results flowing from any interference with the existing order.

The abstractness of physical science and technology, moreover, has a special character. It reveals itself when we pay attention to the fact that this science is a positive, i.e., a non-reflective, science and therefore bereft of self-knowledge. Tech-

nology shares in this positive character. Thus we can easily see why the specialist in physical science or technology is likely to impress us as an acultural being, who does not even worry about his acultural status.

In this connection it may be useful to revert briefly to the question why seventeenth century physical science presented such an entirely different cultural aspect from contemporary science. The difference cannot be accounted for by simply referring to the fact that the old science was so much more "simple" and still subject to a comprehensive grasp, for there was another and more important reason. In the seventeenth century the aphiosophical and non-reflective character of physical science did not yet sufficiently manifest itself. The new science impressed man as the legitimate sole heir of ancient philosophy, a heir which finally would make the old inheritance bear fruit.

4. Finally we may emphasize here the empirical and experimental character of scientific knowledge and technical ability. Only experience shows whether or not our scientific knowledge is true. So far as laboratory experiments are concerned, this aspect hardly gives rise to any difficulties, for as a rule we are able to control the experiment, we know what is going on and can immediately interfere when something goes wrong. If necessary, we are able to modify the experimental procedure. In the technological order, however, the situation is different. When this order confronts us with failures or unexpected repercussions, its consequences are already so profoundly anchored in the reality of this order that we cannot make them undone. At most we may be able to use these consequences for a new effort to interfere in the existing order.

Accordingly, there are numerous impressive reasons to view the evolution caused by science and its technology as a "natural process" over which man exercises hardly any control. It seems to be a process which runs its course in accord with inherent laws, a process in whose realization man plays a role, but a role that is willy-nilly limited to a purely executive function as an instrumental cause and not as a principal cause.

All this seems to lead to the inevitable conclusion that the

technological evolution is an acultural event, a continuation of biological and chemical evolution on a new level. At the same time this conclusion seems to confirm the view that, strictly speaking, physical science and technology have very little to do with culture. For there can be question of culture only when man expresses and develops himself and his world in freedom.

III

We must confess, however, that we do not feel too happy with the suggested conclusion, for we know only too well that for the spiritual-material being which man is there is no possibility of culture without reworking material nature. There must, therefore, exist a relationship between technique and culture, for technique is concerned with the reworking of nature. Could the difference, we may ask, be characterized perhaps in this fashion, technology aims at the control of matter, while culture uses matter merely as a means of expression, more or less in the same fashion as the mathematician who needs chalk, the philosopher or man of letters who uses a pen, or the painter who cannot do without brushes and paint, without letting these means enter intrinsically into the things to which they are subservient? It is striking, indeed, that the old sciences, such as philosophy and mathematics, made use only of a minimum of material reality, while modern physical science endeavors to use matter to the fullest extent.

It will be worth-while to reflect briefly upon this typical difference and to ask ourselves why man in his desire to know has increasingly appealed more and more to matter. Although the answer is rather simple, its importance is exceedingly great. Man has done so because he gradually came to realize that the search for truth was doomed to sterility if he did not make intensive use of his senses. This realization meant a shift from contemplative to empirical science. At the same time it became evident that the appeal to the senses demanded instruments and experiments, i.e., man had to interfere actively with his hands in material reality to make instruments and to pro-

duce experimental situations. Thus it dawned upon him that matter was not so much an impediment of knowledge as an indispensable means to acquire knowledge, provided, of course, matter was handled properly.

This new insight is extremely important. Even if under the threat of technological dangers or the supposedly inhuman character of the technological order we would be inclined to banish technology as much as possible, it would still remain true that this same technology cannot be dispensed with for the sake of pure and disinterested knowledge. Let us beware of thinking that it is only physical science which needs technical means because its interest lies in matter. Anyone who is acquainted with the history of philosophy knows to what extent philosophical reflection is codetermined by the progress of physical science and technology. The very possibilities revealed by science and technology have made man understand something more of himself, because he has learned to look at nature in a different way. We realize now that nature ultimately is not so much the *formed* nature which surrounds us as an infinite realm of possibilities. This realization throws a new light upon man himself. Man is not a being whose only task it is to cultivate himself within the limited elbow room spontaneously offered by nature around him. His task is likewise to reveal the possibilities of nature and to bring them to realization. In this way Aristotle's old characterization of knowledge as "becoming the other" receives an unexpected dimension. When through knowledge we "become the other" and make nature our own, we discover at the same time the possibilities of unfolding this nature not merely by adding superstructures to its existing forms but by rearranging its most fundamental structures.

While our thinking about nature must be, as it were, from the viewpoint and on behalf of things, it has to be at the same time a thinking toward man. For man unfolds nature for the sake of himself. Viewed in this light, scientific technique reveals itself as genuine culture: it is human thinking for nature and human working of nature down to a depth which

formerly seemed to lie beyond man's grasp, but which after man's penetration into it appeared to contain unexpected possibilities for man himself. For it is always man himself who is the ultimate concern of man's endeavors. Our entire cognitive and operative contact with matter is governed by man's self-knowledge, man's desire to find new possibilities of self-expression and self-realization.

It should be clearer to us now what is meant by man as spirit-in-matter. It means control of matter by the human spirit. There was a time when the only possibility to express the control of the spirit over matter seemed to lie in the greatest possible detachment from matter, in asceticism and in the contemplation of spiritual realities. Matter, so it was thought, could only vilify the spirit. The cultures of the past were built upon this viewpoint. Nowadays we suspect that our task is different. The spirit has to carry matter along in its soaring flight. Now that this possibility has revealed itself to man, he is no longer permanently resigned to anything, whether it be ignorance or powerlessness with respect to nature or the actual structures embodied in the technological order and society either through his own interference or independently of it. We add "society" here, for what we have said about nature applies also to society, it is a realm of possibilities rather than a structure which has been fixed for once and for all. The possibilities in question are of a very special kind. They cannot lie, as it were, idle as pure possibilities. Just as is the case with nature, if we do not cultivate these possibilities, some of them develop spontaneously in an autonomous fashion.

Our considerations started by placing technology and culture in opposition, as competing currents. This opposition, however, is not correct, for the two belong intrinsically together. As thinking from the "viewpoint" of matter toward man, technology demands human self-consciousness, i.e., it demands the old forms of contemplative science and culture. These forms, in their turn, demand technology and science of matter if their highest ideals and desires are to be attained. Properly understood, therefore, it is true that human culture must be

■ technological culture because man is ■ spirit-in-matter.

The unity of culture and technology expresses itself fully in the modern world in which technologists are constantly confronted with cultural problems because of their concern with man. The fact that they do so does not at all contradict the above-mentioned abstract character of physical science and technology, but merely shows that in the pursuit of any science man is aware of sharing in the all-embracing human tendency toward truth and toward love. Abstract science never stands on its own. It is embedded in a realm of problems which extends far beyond its own abstract and limited concern. It can even be said that the ultimate sense of technology has not to be sought in its practical applicability as such but in what it reveals about man, his nature and his destiny. For man, being what he is, i.e. spirit-in-matter, scientific knowledge about matter and technological transformation of nature form an intrinsic part of his self-realization. Man has also discovered that effective love for his fellow-men in need of help is not possible without science and technology.

For this reason it is not correct to see the technological evolution as a "dumb natural process". While this evolution really is a natural process, it is not at all a "dumb" natural process. The evolution is not brought about solely by the technical *ratio* of *homo faber*, but is guided also by man's self-knowledge. Or rather, it has to be guided by this self-knowledge. This guidance is not a mere pious wish but a reality, as may appear from the following two facts. First of all, it was only in the cultural climate of Greek and Christian thought that technological thinking found its source. Secondly, there exists a constant concern about man, which finds its perpetual source in man's reflection upon himself and his destiny. Technological work and this reflection are not independent but call for each other because man is a spirit-in-matter.

There are no easy solutions which settle everything for once and for all. Here, too, the abstractness of all our knowledge and powers makes itself felt. Only in a very gradual fashion we discover whereto the road leads on which we are travelling.

All science and all activity inspired by science will always remain limited and abstract. In this respect the time has passed when man could speak about a single science as science unqualified. On the other hand, because of their greater effectiveness, the mutual points of contact of all sciences will become greater. This increased contact will lead to awareness of the limitation inherent in the viewpoint of one's own speciality and consequently also to a realization of the necessity of situating this viewpoint properly in relation to other viewpoints and in the perspective of the whole which is never reached by any of these standpoints.

II

THE NATURE OF TIME

M. M. SHARIF

I

WHAT is the nature of time ? is one of those knotty questions which have troubled the philosophical mind throughout the ages. It was hotly discussed by the ancients and the medievals and the same is the case to-day.

Common sense takes time vaguely to be something like a stream moving towards the future from one moment to the next—something in which events float down to the past. This is very much like saying that the stream flows in one direction, and its flow carries the floating logs of wood in the opposite direction—a palpable contradiction. This is, however, one of the many contradictions which the common-sense view involves and which the philosophers have tried to remove throughout history.

The flow of time involves change and more than three thousand years ago the Vedic writers vaguely felt the difficulties involved in the idea of change and declared that the world of experience is a mere appearance of Reality and Reality itself always remains unchanged. The first great thinker who philosophised on this problem came to the same conclusion, but on purely logical grounds. It was Parmenides of Elea (a Greek colony in the south of Italy) who was in the prime of his life in about 500 B.C. According to him, a thing either *is* or *is not*. Whatever is not, i.e. has no being, cannot be thought or spoken of, for that is logically impossible. As the past can be thought or spoken of, it has not passed away into non-being, but still

is. As the future also can be thought or spoken of, it already *is* and cannot be said to be *going to be*. Since whatever is in the past, present and future is, there is no coming into being or ceasing to be, no becoming and no passing away. In other words, there is no change in time. There being no change in time, Reality is eternal and unchanging.

This argument is really fallacious. A past event when it was present was thought and spoken of because it was known in experience by direct acquaintance; when it is past, not it but its memory-image or its record is known, thought or spoken of, and that not by acquaintance but only by description. There is no contradiction in believing that although the memory-image or description of a past event *is*—does exist, the past event itself may or may not exist. As the idea of change involves no contradiction, change is real. Parmenides could not see the distinction between our thinking and speaking of an event known to us by direct acquaintance and our thinking and speaking of an event known to us only by description—a distinction which was made for the first time in human history by Bertrand Russell in the beginning of this century.

Parmenides found a strong supporter in Zeno of Elea who was at the prime of his life in 450 B.C. He advanced four arguments against the possibility of change in time. These arguments are as follows :

1. You traverse a given length of time, but reason tells us that you cannot do so. You cannot traverse ■ given length because your length is divisible into two and you must reach the half-way position before you reach the end. Thus you are left with another length also divisible into two and must reach the half of that first, and so on till infinity. A line being composed of points having no extension is infinitely divisible. It can be infinitely halved. You can, therefore, never reach its end. Thus, the change of position in time that we experience contradicts reason and is, therefore, an illusion.

2. If a tortoise be given a start, then Achilles, the

invulnerable hero of Troy, despite his great speed, cannot catch up with it, for when he runs that distance, the tortoise will have got further and so on till infinity. Our experience of catching up one another in races is, therefore, an illusion. There is really no motion.

3. An arrow which appears to reach the target is at any one moment in a definite position in space, i.e., is at that moment at rest or has 0 motion. Its motion at every other point in space is likewise 0. The total of these 0 motions is also 0. Hence nothing can get anywhere and our experience of motion from one place to another is an illusion.

This argument may be put in another way. Rest or absence of motion in an arrow would be its both ends lying between two points in space. In its supposed flight at each instant its ends are lying between two points. Therefore at every instant it is at rest, and so it is all along at rest. Its motion is, therefore, an illusion.

4. If we have three rows of solid objects, the middle one stationary, and the other two moving in opposite direction at equal speed, the solids in one moving row will pass those which correspond to them in the other moving row twice as quickly as they will pass those in the stationary one; or in the same time they will pass twice as many solids in the former case as in the latter. Therefore the passage of an object from one point to the next does not correspond with any given instant in time; nor does its passage in one instant of time correspond with any given length of space. Therefore the evidence of the senses regarding change, time and space is not reliable. There is no change and no absolute time.

It is easy to see that the last argument does not lead to the conclusion which Zeno has drawn from it. It aims at proving that motion is impossible by demonstrating that it involves the conclusion that half a given time is equal to double that time. But this conclusion would follow on the wrong assumption

that a body takes an equal time in passing a stationary object as it would in passing an object of the same size in motion. The right conclusion from the arguments would be that both time and motion are relative.

These paradoxes of Zeno made his successors down to the present day realise that it was necessary to make a closer study of time. This closer study took three distinct lines. The first line of thought resolved Zeno's paradoxes like Zeno himself by denying the reality of change, space and time; the second by admitting his presupposition that space and time are infinitely divisible, but denying the validity of his arguments; and the third by rejecting this presupposition itself and by denying rest altogether. To the group of thinkers who adopted the first line of thought belong Eudemus, al-Ghazali, Leibnitz and McTaggart. Under the last of them I studied philosophy at Cambridge. Those who followed the second line are Aristotle, Ibn Rushd, Newton, Cantor, Bertrand Russell and Einstein. The third line was followed by Bergson.

Let us trace these three modes of thought regarding the nature of time in these various thinkers.

II

Eudemus answered Zeno's dilemma by denying the independent existence of space. Space, according to him, is used by Zeno in the sense of place and the place of a body is simply the limits of the body. Place is not a thing in itself, nor is it nothing. It is an attribute of the body and, therefore, relative to the body. Body is not in space as one box is in another. It is just the other boundary of the body. Space *per se* can be expressed only in relation to the solid of which it is the plane boundary. You can speak of space or body in terms of the other, but not by itself alone (Kathleen Freeman, *Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, p. 160).

This argument about space is accepted by al-Ghazzali but he does not, like Eudemus, regard space as an attribute of the body, but admits, besides substance and attribute, a new

category, the category of relations, and space relations fall into that category.

Besides, he extends this relativity further to time. According to him, extension in time follows motion. Just as the demonstration of the limits of the sides of the body prevents one from affirming spatial extension beyond it, so should the limits of motion from one point A to another point B prevent one from supposing temporal extension beyond A and B. Before and after are related to the body that moves. The beginning and the ending of a body are related to the limits of that body. Considered without the body they have no existence. Before is the beginning of the movement by which it is limited. It has nothing external to it which may be called the before of the before.

Similarly, *time of movement* has its meaning only in relation to the limits of that movement and no existence without reference to it. Just as a body has no outside beyond its outer limits, similarly time has no limits beyond the point where it begins and the point where it ends. Every timed object has its own time, its own beginning and end, and time without relation to these limits has no meaning. The beginning of the world has meaning, but to speak of what was before the beginning of the world is to talk nonsense. Before its beginning the world was not and what was not could not be said to be in time.

Besides being relative to the body, time is also relative to us. The future may itself become the past and may consequently be spoken of in the past tense. It is, therefore, untrue of reality. It is a subjective element added to reality to create the phenomenal world (*Tahafut al-Falasifah*, English translation by S.A. Kamali, 1958, pp. 35 ff).

Leibnitz has exactly the same position as al-Ghazzali regarding the nature of time. Time, he says, is not a real substance, nor an attribute, but it is the indefinitely applicable relation of succession. It does not belong to the essence of things. The mathematical conception of time (as of space) is a mere abstraction expressing (as number does) only possi-

bilities. It is nothing distinct from the things existing. Instance considered without the things are nothing at all. Space and time are not aspects of reality, the essence of which is not quantitative and consequently not material. They are only relations between phenomena and without the phenomena they are mere abstractions. As abstractions from phenomena they are twice removed from reality (Leibnitz, *The Monadology*, etc., English translation by Robert Latta, Second Edition, 1929, pp. 102 ff).

McTaggart further elaborates the relativistic theory of time. According to him, there is no perception of time without the distinctions of past, present and future. Past, present and future are mere relations. They do not belong to time *per se*, but only in relation to a knowing subject. If there were no knowing subjects, nothing would be in any sense past, present or future. Again, the same event with me at this moment has the relation present, with me of a moment ago the relation future and with me of a moment hence the relation past. Without the awareness of past, present and future we may still have the perception of events as earlier and later, but to know of them as earlier and later is not essentially to know them in time. If events M, N and O are in a series, we know that N occupies a later position than M and earlier than O, and it is between M and O. But knowing this much is not knowing M, N and O in time. Similarly, one is before two, three is after two and two is between one and three. But this before and after are not temporal before and after. They are before and after in essence, not in time. They are in a series, but not in a temporal series. Past, present and future are, therefore, the characteristics of appearances, not of reality. Consequently, time is a characteristic of appearances and not of reality. In reality there is no temporal change (McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, 1927. chap. XXXIII).

III

The second line of thought was taken up by Aristotle, Ibn Rushd and in modern times by Cantor, Bertrand Russell and Einstein.

Aristotle and, following him, Ibn Rushd have resolved Zeno's paradoxes in this way :

The points of a line which a moving body has to traverse are not consecutive, i.e. they do not come *one by one*, one and the next for between every point and the next there are infinite points. Its points being non-consecutive, the line is continuous. So is motion continuous, and so is time, for each is infinitely divisible. Therefore a finite line can be traversed by a moving body, and its motion can be measured by time, all three, line, motion and time sharing the character of infinite divisibility. A finite line, though infinitely divisible is not for that reason an unending line. Nor is motion of a body for a limited duration, *though infinitely divisible, for that reason unending motion*. Nor indeed time between two moments, though infinitely divisible is for that reason unending. Consequently a limited distance, though infinitely divisible, is not endless. As facts show its end can be reached by a moving body, may it be a bird, an arrow or Achilles catching up tortoise, and its time is measurable. If movement were infinitely divisible and time were not or if time were infinitely divisible and movement were not, it would have been impossible to measure one by the other; but since both are infinitely divisible, one can be measured by the other. Time, however, has priority over movement, for movement takes place in time and not time in movement. Time is the measure or number of movement. Motion in time is, therefore, not an illusion but a reality.

Time is infinite, extending infinitely into the past and infinitely into the future and existing eternally in its own right.

Aristotle was right in saying that what is infinitely divisible is not for that reason unending, but he did not advance any reason for holding that position. Normally one would think that the process of infinite divisibility was really unending and, therefore, the end of a finite line which is infinitely divided as in Zeno's paradoxes can never be reached.

The reason for the view that what is finitely divisible is not on that account unending was first given by George Cantor in 1882 and eighteen years later by Bertrand Russell by recog-

nising infinite numbers and infinite series as different in their characteristics from natural numbers. According to these thinkers many properties which we generally think are inherent in numbers are peculiar only to finite or natural numbers. Natural numbers (1,2,3,4, etc.) are consecutive, and, therefore, countable one by one and can be reached from 0 by the successive addition of 1. In infinite numbers and infinite series no two terms are consecutive. Take fractions of 1 arranged in order to magnitude. Between any two of them, there are other fractions, e.g. the mean of the two. Therefore, no two of them are consecutive and their total number is infinite.

Now, such infinite number of terms in an infinite series of finite or natural numbers (not being consecutive) cannot be counted or traversed *one by one*. A person will travel the whole of Zeno's infinite series of $1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16 \dots n$ before he reaches his goal. The goal is not within the infinite series. It is not the last term of the infinite series for there is no last term. Beyond the whole of the infinite series is the moment when he would reach the goal.

This follows from the nature of infinite numbers and infinite series. The infinite numbers or infinite series are those numbers and series which cannot be reached by adding 1 to 0 and they cannot be increased by adding or by taking away 1 or even a whole infinite series. Take the infinite series $1, 2, 3, 4, \dots n$, add another term (0) and you get $0, 1, 2, 3, 4, \dots n$, i.e. the same number of terms in the series as before. Both are infinite series and although one more term has been added to the second series, the number of terms remains the same, i.e. infinite.

Take the infinite series $1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 \dots n$ and the infinite series of the even numbers $2, 4, 8, 10 \dots n$. Now, the number of terms in the second series remains the same as in the first series, although the infinite series of odd numbers has been taken away from it. Similarly, add the infinite series of odd numbers to the infinite series of even numbers, the total number of terms in the infinite series thus obtained does not thereby increase.

It is wrong to think that an infinite series is endless in

the sense that there cannot be anything beyond the series. 1 is, for example, beyond the whole infinite series $1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, \dots, n$. The view that an infinite number of instants make up an infinitely long time is, therefore, not true and the conclusion that Achilles will never overtake the tortoise does not follow. If half a distance is covered in half an hour, half of the remaining half in $1/4$ hour, speed remaining the same, the whole distance will be covered in one hour.

Such infinite series in Zeno's paradoxes are, therefore, traversable in time not by touching consecutive points or moments (for there are no consecutive points or moments and the addition to or reduction from such points or moments makes no difference to the infinite number of these terms in the series) but by the continuity of movement to the goal which does not fall anywhere within the infinite series, but just outside the series. Change, movement, time and space are, therefore, real and not illusory (Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, Lectures V and VI).

Although Bertrand Russell relates space, time and motion to the mathematical theory of numbers, yet he considers time and space as relations, just as much as the groups of philosophers who take the second line. But the difference is that he takes relations as real and not like them as phenomenal.

Since Einstein, space and time have been viewed as relative even to each other, so much so that one cannot be considered apart from the other. Now, the three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time are treated as four-dimensional space-time which are relative to the observer. "If two observers in uniform relative motion are each supplied with a rule and a clock, the two rules and two clocks being of identical construction, each of the observers finds that the rule of the other is shorter and the clock of the other is slower than his." There is no absolute space composed of points and no absolute time composed of instants existing independently of the bodies and events that occupy them, but there is space-time composed of events.

The mass, space and size of an object change as the points and speed of the observer or the observing apparatus changes.

Movement and rest too are relative to the observer or observing apparatus. Therefore, there is no such thing as self-subsistent mass, space, size, movement or duration. This is how the two lines of thought—Ghazzalian-McTaggartian and Aristotelio-Einsteinian—have come closer to each other and the concept of relativity has become deeper and deeper.

IV

The third line of thought which resolved Zeno's arguments was taken by Bergson. Bergson wrote philosophy in exquisite prose. He demolished Zeno's arguments by destroying their foundation, that is to say, by denying the premise that time is infinitely divisible and can be cut into moments. Bergson drew his inspiration from Heraclitus (500 B.C.) who denied permanence altogether and held that reality is every-changing and always in motion. Nothing is constant. "It is not possible to step twice in the same river." The waters of the river have already changed when you plunge into it a second time. The fact that the stone on which drops of water fall for years wears off at the point of contact, shows that a change was effected in it with the fall of each drop. In fact, it ever changes by friction of one sort or another and is never the same. It is impossible to touch the same substance twice, for it is no longer the same after the first touch, even though the change is imperceptible. There is no rest; everything is continually in motion and in the process of transformation. This perpetual change of things is effected through struggle against each other. The struggle of the forces inside the drop and the stone transforms both.

Bergson accepts Heraclitus' theory of continual change. According to Bergson, the parts of a complex whole would not appear as they really are in the whole, if they are separated by analysis. Analysis always falsifies. Motion is something indivisible and cannot be validly analysed into a series of states. All our experiences are in duration and they succeed one another in such a way that one cannot at a given moment perceive a number of them simultaneously and yet distinctly. Duration of the ego is an experience without moments external to one

another, without any relation to number. In duration there is succession without parts being external to one another. It is immediate intuition which shows us motion within duration, and duration without the help of space.

We can picture duration by the help of our perception of space, but only by putting side by side and viewing simultaneously our memory of our past experiences with our present experience of duration. Experience of space is the experience of side-by-sidedness, of simultaneity. But though we can place in imagination our *memory* of past experiences of duration side by side, as if in a line, with the present experience of duration, we cannot place the parts of duration as *experienced* side by side, for they are essentially in succession. The line does not represent time as it is passing, but only after it has passed. It can represent the stereotyped memories of duration as already experienced and then, like things, set them side by side in a line in space. Memory on one side and the nature of space on the other makes this pictured simultaneity of successive states and their mathematical treatment possible. When I follow the movements of the hands of a clock, I do not measure duration—I cannot—but only place the memory pictures of the past movements alongside the present position of the hands as if in a line and count the moments of this *spurious* duration, but it is not the measurement of the real lived duration. If you consider the experience of lived duration in consciousness, it is different from its memory and totally different from a line. Duration is not a line on which we can pass again. You can, of course, picture again and again and view from whichever end you like, its memories as successive moments external to one another, placed in a line traversing space, and flatter yourself that you have measured duration by number, but it is far from the measurement of real duration. Real duration is lived in consciousness, is different from its memory and totally different from a line. Its parts are successive, interpenetrate, and can never be simultaneous or side by side, and, therefore, always elude the grasp of mathematics. Real duration is indivisible and immeasurable.

The relation between the self and pure duration is not clear in Bergson. Sometimes he seems to consider pure duration as an *activity*, « grasping by the self of past states by entering each of them as a whole and rolling them into the present state in such « form that each interpenetrates the other and all organise themselves like the notes of a tune forming « qualitative multiplicity. Sometimes he seems to regard it as this form of interpenetrating states itself. Sometimes it is made identical with the self. Since the self enters each state as a whole and all states interpenetrate and this whole is pure duration, they all seem to get mingled into one. The unity of the real self knowable only through intuition is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its ancestors exist not as a plurality but as « unity of free movement in which every experience permeates the whole. This organisation of the facts of consciousness is the work of pure duration. Rather it is pure duration itself.

Thus, questions whether time is an activity of the self or « form of its conscious states or it is identical with it remains undecided.

Bergson distinguishes this *fundamental* self from the same self as viewed by the analysing intellect in spatial terms in which different states succeed one another in serial time and can be quantitatively measured and taken as determined. He calls this aspect of the self as social self. The time of the social self is conceived of as a straight line composed of points which are external to one another and are traversible in successive moments.

Zeno's argument regarding the arrow is refuted by Bergson by saying something like this : You assume that the arrow reaches « certain point in its course of movement, but there are no points in the course of its movement, for movement is indivisible into points. Zeno was right in thinking that the arrow could not go from A to B, if it could ever be in a point of its course. But the arrow never is in any point of its course. It is true that it passes « point and it could be there, had it stopped there. But if it had stopped somewhere on the way, its movements would have been two, not one. The arrow, however,

goes from A to B in a single unique stroke with an indivisible movement. Neither its movement, nor its duration are divisible. A single movement is essentially one single bound. Of course in its movement the arrow is creating a motionless line. Once created this line can be thought to have points and instants, but not while it is being created. We can divide into points and distances the track of smoke (and so the mathematical line) more or less at rest which a jet plane leaves behind, but not the movement of the jet plane itself. To make the mobility of the jet coincide with the immobility of the track is a clear absurdity. The jet plane in its movement is not following the line of the track. It is *creating* the line of the track by its flight, not moving on it. If it were moving on the track Zeno's argument would have been valid, for the track is infinitely divisible, but movement is not divisible at all.

When Achilles in Zeno's second argument pursues the tortoise, each of his steps must be treated as indivisible and so must each step of the tortoise. After a certain number of steps Achilles overtakes the tortoise. The two movements are differently articulated, they are at different speeds. If you keep in view this difference of articulation, no difficulty will arise, for you will be following the indications of experience, and you will understand why Achilles overtakes the tortoise.

The other two arguments of Zeno also consist in applying movement to the line traversed and supposing what is true of the line is equally true of the movement, but such is not the case.

V

I accept from Bergson the position that many processes of our minds especially mystical experiences are not amenable to analysis and measurement, but, I think, under certain conditions some experiences at least can be measured through the measurement of their expression in behaviour, for if not so, the science of psychology would become impossible.

Generally speaking, I stand where Aristotelio-Einsteinian

line of thought and Ghazali-MacTaggartan line of thought meet, with my face toward the latter line and my heart intent on seeing how far after this meeting-point the two lines can converge into one. In other words I believe in the relativity of time, and consider time not true of Ultimate Reality, but only of the phenomenal world, which is not a mere illusion but Reality itself at a lower level where it can be contemplated by finite minds. I do not think that the concept of time is applicable to Ultimate Reality in any form. Divine Reality, in my view, is above what we, as finite beings, can comprehend. As we are the highest form of life on this earth, our life-process can be considered to be in harmony with Reality unless we consider Reality to be self-contradictory and self-destructive. It can even be supposed to be the image of Reality, but I cannot bring myself to agreeing to the view that its *essence* is identical with the essence of God. We are in the image of God. But this image is still an image and not a diminutive God itself. God alone knows what God is; we can only guess.

"BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY"

W. H. WERKMEISTER

THE problem with which I am here concerned is not a new one. It arises whenever and wherever the key concept of ethics is taken to be duty or obligation. It thus arises in connection with Kantian ethics no less than with the ethics of the deontologists; and it arises in connection with my own ethical theory. The problem is this: If duty or obligation is the key concept of ethics, what about such ethically significant concepts as neighbourly love, compassion, heroism, and self-sacrifice? What, in brief, about any concepts which ostensibly transcend the "call of duty" but are, nevertheless, regarded as morally significant? Can these terms be so interpreted as to become integral to an ethics of obligation, or are they deprived of their real significance when morality is keyed to the concept of duty?

If it be answered that the difficulties disappear as soon as we abandon the attempt to key the whole of morality to the idea of obligation and that this in itself is sufficient reason for abandoning it, then it must be pointed out that, when we do so, even graver difficulties arise—although difficulties of a different sort—and that the concept of duty now finds no adequate justification; that, in fact, all ethical theories not keyed to the idea of obligation or duty rest upon a hopeless confusion of the moral and the purely axiological *ought*. Ethics and value theory are then not clearly distinguished, and confusion is piled upon confusion.¹ It is simpler and much more illuminating and helpful to make obligation or duty the key concept and to view the rest of morality from its perspective.

In a paper submitted to the Inter-American Congress of Philosophy in Buenos Aires (1959), I have argued that an

obligation is but the analytical implicate of a promise or commitment; that to promise or to make a commitment is to put oneself under an obligation and, at the same time, to create a right for the other party involved—the right, namely, to expect that the obligation will be honored. That we make a commitment at all depends, of course, on value considerations; and whether or not we live up to the obligation which the commitment entails may depend on many factors, psychological as well as circumstantial. But that a commitment entails an obligation is, and remains, unaltered by such facts, for it stems from the very meaning of a commitment.

A commitment, so I have argued in the Buenos Aires paper, may be explicit—as when we take an oath of office; or it may be implicit—as when we are counted citizens of the country of our birth because we have not declared ourselves otherwise. In either case, however, the obligation entailed by the commitment is binding; and it is a moral obligation. A commitment, moreover, may be to an individual or to a group. But it may also be a commitment to an ideal—personal or social—and, ultimately, to an ideal encompassing the whole of mankind: St. Augustine's "City of God," Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," Royce's "Beloved Community," or the "Brotherhood of Man." Out of such commitments, also, obligations arise which are moral in the profoundest sense of the term.

The point I wish to emphasize is that commitments are made on the basis of value considerations but that obligations or duties are entailed by the commitments as such. The difference between, but interrelation of, value theory and an ethics of obligation is thus quite clear. What is not yet clear, however, is the place of virtues in the scheme of things. And it is this problem of virtues with which I intend to deal in this paper.

By virtue I mean certain character traits or habits which are of value to oneself or to others and which are specifically related to moral actions, i.e., they are traits or habits related to actions which are in line with our commitments. Dependability, trustworthiness, neighbourly love, compassion, nobility, heroism, and self-sacrifice are virtues in this sense; but there are many

others. We shall here examine only a few of the virtues and shall regard these as *representative of all*. Our specific problem, however, is not to show that these character traits or virtues are of value, either to ourselves or to others (to prove this would be simple) but to consider in what sense they belong to the realm of ethics rather than to value theory *per se*.

Let us begin with dependability as a virtue. That dependability is a value is, I believe, obvious. If I promise you something and you can depend upon me to live up to my commitment, then, surely, this trait in my character is of value to you. Note, however, that dependability is here specifically related to the keeping of a promise and, thus, to the moral conception basic to our whole interpretation. As a matter of fact, dependability attains significance only because it is a character trait directly pertaining to the key idea of promise or commitment. That is to say, dependability is a value which, for its value-character, depends upon the key concept of morality.

My thesis is that, in a similar way, all virtues depend upon commitments and, though they are values, they are values of a special kind and may well be called *moral values*.

In order to test this thesis, let us consider honesty as a virtue and a value. It is obvious, I believe, that in this case the thesis fully accounts for the facts involved. As a habitual attitude of a person, honesty is, without doubt, a virtue. Equally without doubt, however, it is also a value—a value, namely for all who, in their decisions and actions, can rely upon the honesty of a person. The only question is: Does honesty ultimately rest upon a commitment which makes it a duty? That the answer to this question must be given in the affirmative requires no lengthy argument. A stable and orderly communal life is possible only if, in their dealings with one another, all members of the group are at least basically honest. The commitment to communal living thus entails honesty as a duty.

It is true, of course, that different communal groups may define honesty in somewhat different ways. Anthropological evidence would indicate that this is indeed so. But this fact does not alter the basic principle here at issue. It pertains only

to the nature and form of communal life to which the individual is committed. The commitment as such always entails a duty; and the habitual performance of this duty is a virtue of him who performs it, and is a value to all who can count on his performance. Honesty is thus clearly a moral value.

Several other virtues—such as truthfulness, courage, and justice—can readily be interpreted in a similar way. That they are values is obvious; and that they presuppose duties which stem from basic commitments is also clear once we analyse the conditions which are indispensable to an orderly and lasting community life.

However, a new dimension of our problem is dimly discernible at this point. How, for example, are we to understand and to evaluate a man's courage in opposing, if need be, certain actions sanctioned by the rest of his community? The difficulty here encountered is not insurmountable. Indeed, it is no difficulty at all once we understand fully the significance of the key phrase in the question. That phrase is, "if need be."

So long as an individual stands firmly committed to his community in its actuality, he will not feel the need to oppose any actions sanctioned by it. He will, instead, fully and completely live the life of his community and will himself sanction its actions. But if the individual has risen to a new vision of communal living, he may stand committed to an ideal which far transcends the actualities in the case, and actions sanctioned by his community may no longer be in harmony with the ideal. In this case—and we assume that he has well considered the value aspects involved here—his commitment to the ideal engenders duties for him which may well be in conflict with actions sanctioned by the actually existing community. Courage in the pursuit of these duties is then a virtue. And it is a value because it contributes to the realization of the ideal.

With the slight modification, therefore, that virtue stems from duties which we have as the result of commitments to an ideal as well as to an actual society, the thesis remains valid and fruitful. It will be well, however, to test the modified thesis still further.

We consider, first, the case of neighbourly love, taking the term in its New Testament meaning of a compassionate and helpful attitude toward all who are in need. That such an attitude is of value to all who benefit from it is obvious. That it is a virtue of him who practises it is also clear. But the question is, How is neighbourly love related to duty and obligation? After what has been said concerning courage, the answer to this question is not difficult to find. Neighbourly love is entailed as a duty in our commitment—and more often in our implicit commitment—to some ideal type of communal living. In actuality we may fall far short of the ideal, or we may even refuse to make the basic commitment. But there can be no doubt that, once the commitment has been made (as, inherently, it is made, for example, when we commit ourselves to membership in a Christian community), then duties entailed by such a commitment may well transcend obligations arising from other commitments (such as being a citizen of a secular state); and one such duty may well be that of neighbourly love. From the point of view of an actually existing society, the duties stemming from our commitment to an ideal may thus appear to be no duties at all. Acts done in conformity with them may seem to lie "beyond the call of duty" and thus to constitute a new dimension of morality. Actually, however, the thesis set forth in these pages completely accounts for them and makes them integral to an ethics of obligation. Acts "beyond the call of duty" at one level of commitment simply are duties at a higher level, where the commitment is to an ideal. Moreover, the higher the ideal to which we stand committed, the more will the duties entailed by this commitment seem to lie "beyond the call of duty" when viewed from any level lower than that of the ideal itself.

As a final example let us consider self-sacrifice. Here, if anywhere, we encounter the crucial case of an action which, seemingly, goes far "beyond the call of duty." The case is complicated by the fact that self-sacrifice may be encountered at various levels and may pertain to our personal as well as to our social life. At the same time, the very complexity of the case may help us to understand what is involved.

An obvious case of self-sacrifice illustrating my thesis is, of course, the soldier who dies on the field of battle in clear response to the duty which is his because of his commitment as a citizen of his country. Tragic as the fate of the individual may be in such a situation, his is a sacrifice in strict conformity with the demands of his duty.

But the case is somewhat different when, in an act of extraordinary heroism—i.e., in an act far “beyond the call of duty”—, that same soldier, understanding fully the facts in the situation, sacrifices himself so that his comrades might safely retreat or might advance to a new position not otherwise attainable. That such acts of heroism are not uncommon will be readily admitted, I am sure; but that, from the point of view of his ideal commitments, the hero himself may regard his act as simply a matter of duty is also a matter of record. His act lies “beyond the call of duty” only from the perspective of the lower-level commitments.

From the example of the heroic soldier to that of a person who sacrifices himself for a cause is only a small step. The commitment to a cause, being a commitment to an ideal, entails its own obligations, and among these may well be the duty to pursue the cause even to the point of self-sacrifice. Jesus dying on the cross is one example of such self-sacrifice; Gandhi in prison and on a hunger-strike is quite clearly another. The history of culture provides us with many illustrations; for the realization of great ideals has at all times and everywhere demanded sacrifices and, above all, the self-sacrifice of the “prophet,” of the champion of the new ideal. What is thus an act “beyond the call of duty” when viewed from the perspective of lower-level commitments may yet be a duty entailed by the commitment to the “cause,” to the ideal. My thesis, therefore, holds even in the crucial case of personal self-sacrifice.

Whether or not the “cause” is worthy of the sacrifice is a different question. It belongs to the field of value theory, not to that of ethics. My purpose here has been to ask whether or not a theory of morality keyed to the idea of obligation or duty is capable of dealing with moral acts which, in a manner of

speaking, are "beyond the call of duty." My illustrations show, I believe, that such an interpretation is indeed possible. And with this fact I rest my case.

NOTE

¹ I have dealt with some of these confusions in my book, *Theories of Ethics*, Johnsen Publishing Company, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT

JOSEPH MITSUO KITAGAWA

ON this happy occasion, celebrating the fiftieth birthday of Professor T. M. P. Mahadevan, it seems appropriate for us to consider some aspects of the methodological problems involved in the study of religions. Those of us who are engaged in the "religio-scientific"—historical, phenomenological, morphological, or comparative—study of religions are aware of the fact that we are greatly indebted to the contributions of those who, like Dr. Mahadevan himself, approach religions "philosophically." Although we are hopeful that the relationship is not one-sided, this paper attempts to examine and clarify the nature of the discipline of *Religionswissenschaft* and its relation to other disciplines, especially the philosophy of religion.¹

That there has been a constant mutual influence between the general science of religions (*Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft*) and the philosophy of religion is widely recognized. However, the necessity as well as the difficulty of maintaining a proper balance and tension between the two has not always been appreciated, for each side has tended to view the other possessively through its own eyes, sometimes going so far as to expropriate the other's property. This presents special problems today when increasing numbers of philosophers and religionists of different backgrounds are conscious of the need for a world perspective. Some of them solicit the cooperation of *Religionswissenschaft* to break down the barriers that exist among various peoples and cultures. How often do we read an assertion to the effect that the comparative study of religions "proves" that all religions are essentially one and the same! On the other hand, there are

also those who are determined to "prove," again using the comparative study of religions, the uniqueness and finality of specific religions. *Religionswissenschaft*, thus wooed from different sides, often finds itself in a flattering, but embarrassing, position.

Ideally, *Religionswissenschaft*, as much as philosophy, is a "universal" discipline, not in the sense of its comprehensiveness, but rather as it intends to be applicable to all kinds of religious phenomena, crossing historical, cultural, and religious boundaries. In reality, however, this intention has been a matter of aspiration rather than achievement. For one thing, *Religionswissenschaft* developed in the Western cultural milieu of the nineteenth century. In so doing, it inevitably accepted certain assumptions that were products of a particular historical and cultural situation. This means that *Religionswissenschaft*, notwithstanding its lofty principles, cannot be "objective" or "scientific" in the common sense of these terms. Moreover, since our world is divided today not only politically, socially, economically, and militarily, but also religiously and culturally, the data that are available for the religio-scientific study of religious phenomena are not "pure" data but rather religiously or culturally "interpreted data."

One may argue, of course, that our age represents, more than ever before, a close inter-penetration and inter-dependence among the diverse cultures and peoples on the globe, and we can cite many examples to support such a contention. This achievement became possible under the impact of modern Western civilization. Even the most bitter critics of Western colonialism would acknowledge that the influence of Western legal, political and constitutional ideas, economic and educational institutions, as well as scientific technology, brought peoples in different parts of the world close together. The impact of the modern West on the rest of the world was, however, a mixed blessing. As Dr. Bozeman has pointed out, the general trend toward uniformity by means of Western values and institutions not only prevented the nations from attaining the full measure of their possible cultural accord but also resulted in

the development of split cultures and sociological neuroses in the non-Western parts of the world. "The effort to unify the world by the propagation of a common vocabulary has thus yielded considerable intellectual confusion both in national and international affairs, for it is becoming increasingly apparent that the various peoples of the world are speaking of different things while uttering the same words."²

This kind of intellectual confusion is not confined to national and international affairs only. In the domains of religion and philosophy we find ourselves speaking of different things while uttering the same words. In fact, the confusion that exists among the various disciplines in the study of religions may be explained to a great extent by the fact that each discipline involved tends to use concepts and categories without always clarifying their intentions and assumptions. For example, the nature and task of *Religionswissenschaft* have been misunderstood by many people because of the ambiguities in such terms as "scientific," "comparative," "historical," and "religious" phenomena. These terms can be, and indeed have been, interpreted in a number of different ways by outsiders and also even by those who are within the discipline itself. Admittedly, there have been legitimate questions concerning the religio-scientific study of religions, but it is equally true that some of the criticisms have been made through misunderstanding the intentions of *Religionswissenschaft*. In this situation, it is the duty of those who are engaged in religio-scientific study to explicate as clearly as possible the assumptions, intentions, and perspectives as well as the scope, methods and aims of the discipline.

Dr. Radhakrishnan once observed that "the development of the science of Comparative Religion is due mainly to two factors:—the publication and study of the Sacred Books of the East, and the growth of anthropology"³. In addition to these factors, we might add the following: (a) The research of Biblical scholars led them to the study of ancient Near Eastern religions and cultures. (b) The development of the science of interpretation (hermeneutics) enabled Schleiermacher and others to articulate hermeneutical theories of the nature of

religion and of religious experience. (c) The discipline of philology and folklore broadened the scope of research regarding religious phenomena. (d) The tradition of German Romanticism, notably the views of Herder, stimulated the historical study of religions. (e) The *Völkerpsychologie* of Wilhelm Wundt influenced religious study so that some scholars applied *Gestalt* psychology to the study of various religious, cultural, and ethnic groups. (f) The discipline of sociology, emancipating itself from social philosophy under the combined inspiration of economics and biology, made scholars of religions conscious of the sociological dimensions of their research. There are also other factors that must be taken into account in reference to the development of *Religionswissenschaft*, but we cannot discuss them within the compass of this short paper. It must be mentioned, however, that *Religionswissenschaft*, influenced by many allied disciplines from the time of Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), accepted implicitly or explicitly certain presuppositions; some of these assumptions may be examined at this time.

First, *Religionswissenschaft* is based on the notion that there is such a thing as "religion" underlying all historical religions. In this sense, *Religionswissenschaft* is a spiritual heir of the Enlightenment, which, in rejecting the authority of revelation, accepted the existence of *religio naturalis*. While the concept of *religio naturalis* was later replaced by the notions of the essence of religion, religiosity, and religious experience, *Religionswissenschaft* has never questioned the assumption that there is a universal religious reality, however it is called, and that all historical religions are to a greater or lesser degree its imperfect manifestations. Parenthetically, we might add that there has never been agreement among scholars as to whether *Religionswissenschaft* is the study of religion or of religions. Some scholars are of the opinion that historical religions are accidental and secondary, and that what is important is "religion" itself, while others are preoccupied with the importance of empirical religions.

Second, *Religionswissenschaft* has assumed that one can understand the nature and structure of religions "scientifically." This notion is based on a definite epistemological tradition to the

effect that *Wissenschaft* is to be conceived of as a unified whole, even though it is actually divided into diverse *Wissenschaften*. Ideally, the subdivisions of *Wissenschaft* are to correspond to the various aspects of the subject matter. In the study of religions, *Religionswissenschaft* has never seriously questioned the adequacy of the "scientific" approach as a way of understanding its subject matter; rather, it has taken the view that inadequate understanding of religions is due to an inadequate theoretical framework and methodology. Thus, *Religionswissenschaft* has encouraged and welcomed the development of psychology of religion, sociology of religion, and history of religion, to cite a few examples as subdivisions of the discipline, with the hope that the study of various aspects of religions would enrich the total understanding of religion itself.

Third, *Religionswissenschaft* has held that its task is to attempt to understand religions analytically, sympathetically, and "philosophically"—the last in its etymological sense. It is well known that the term "philosophia" means love of wisdom, interpreted as rational discourse, discrimination and conceptualization, and that the term "systema" implies putting things together in a rational order. Following these insights, *Religionswissenschaft* has aimed at a systematic analysis, as well as conceptualization of religions, apprehended structurally in terms of doctrinal, cultic, and sociological aspects. The discipline of *Religionswissenschaft* itself is usually understood to have two dimensions—historical (descriptive) and systematic—which together are to be harmonized and synthesized in order to develop an integral comprehension or understanding (*verstehen*) of religion.

Fourth, *Religionswissenschaft*, using the historical religions as the starting point of its research, has held that religio-scientific study should develop, ideally at any rate, a neutral objectivity, and possibly a non-historical and non-cultural vantage point. In practice, a scholar of *Religionswissenschaft* in his research is not free from his subjective ideas, attitudes, and value judgments; moreover, each religion under study reflects its own historically and culturally conditioned factors. Nevertheless,

Religionswissenschaft aims at a non-theological, non-philosophical (in the current use of the term "philosophical") "understanding" of religion, by focussing its research on the patterns, types, and universal features of empirical religions. However, a non-theological, non-philosophical understanding and objectivity, and an attitude of "epoche," do not imply "detachment."⁴ *Religionswissenschaft* demands that each of its scholars must "experience" the religious phenomenon which he studies, so that the phenomenon as such may be "inserted" into his own life.

If we keep in mind these assumptions of *Religionswissenschaft*, we can clarify some of the problems that confront the discipline today. It is significant that G. van der Leeuw, at the Seventh Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (Amsterdam, 1950), stressed the necessity for closer contact between *Religionswissenschaft* and other disciplines, that is, normative disciplines on the one hand, and the descriptive disciplines on the other.⁵ Obviously, *Religionswissenschaft* does not exist in isolation; it has to define its task in relation to other disciplines. Unfortunately, there has been a considerable amount of misunderstanding as between *Religionswissenschaft* and its allied disciplines; hence the need for mutual understanding across disciplinary lines grows more imperative all the time.

In considering this mutual understanding between *Religionswissenschaft* and its allied disciplines, we must first of all recognize the limitations of religio-scientific study and not indulge in the extravagant claims of some scholars of the discipline in the past. For example, certain writers have held that they could prove the superiority of a specific religion, while others have affirmed the unity of all religions. Neither of these views can be verified through the study of *Religionswissenschaft*. Individuals within the discipline may subscribe to either view as a private opinion or personal religious belief, but *Religionswissenschaft* as such lacks the competence to pronounce one way or the other on the subject.

Related to this problem is the oft-repeated criticism that *Religionswissenschaft* in its preoccupation with the universal

features of religions tends to neglect the uniqueness of each religion. There is some truth in this criticism, since maintaining a balance between the uniqueness of each religion and the universal features of religions is not an easy task. While we recognize the importance of the uniqueness of historic religions, we cannot be blind to the general structures of religions. Often the qualities which each religion considers unique from its own point of view are either the result of historic accident or of matters which are not of decisive importance. At the same time, we must recognize that there are dimensions of religion that can be conceived of only from within a given community of faith, and that *Religionswissenschaft* has no vantage point from which to judge whether the deepest dimensions of the various religions are the same or not. *Religionswissenschaft* may safely say that all religions share an ultimate concern for ultimate reality, but the normative inquiry into ultimate reality itself is beyond the scope of the religio-scientific task. Furthermore, we are reminded of the fact that each religion has its world of meaning which provides the basis for its normative quest. Accepting any one of these worlds of meaning makes *Religionswissenschaft de facto* a "religious" or "theological" discipline. On the other hand, any claim to a new world of meaning, over and above those of existing religions, makes *Religionswissenschaft* a new form of religion. Thus, we are compelled to uphold the methodological principle of dealing with all religions as data on the same level, while at the same time recognizing the unique feature of each religion. What is involved here is something like the position of "relative normativeness" or "relative objectivity," to use Joachim Wach's phraseology. This means that in our research on religions we begin with a certain kind of hypothesis as to what religion is, but this hypothesis must be corrected by our empirical study of religions. Eventually, we may develop a workable concept of religion itself, but we cannot affirm or reject the existence of this so-called pure religion, which is an abstraction. In other words, while the ideal of *Religionswissenschaft* is understanding "religion" as such, practically the discipline can competently deal only with "religions."

In the actual study and structuring of religious phenomena, *Religionswissenschaft* confronts much criticism from other disciplines. In view of the necessity for an increasing amount of interdisciplinary cooperation, careful attention must be given to the nature of the relationship that must be upheld by the various disciplines concerned with the study of religions. This is becoming increasingly an urgent issue in today's world, in which the specialization and autonomy in each discipline are greatly emphasized. For example, Indologists and other specialists on various aspects of Indian civilization and culture often do not take seriously the investigation of Hinduism by students of *Religionswissenschaft*. While religio-scientific study claims to be a "descriptive" discipline, the so-called descriptive research of *Religionswissenschaft* is based in many cases on the study of classical texts and researches undertaken by scholars of other disciplines. Thus, we have to admit that religio-scientific scholars must be encouraged to undertake their own first hand research in at least one area of their special concern and competence. At the same time, from the perspective of *Religionswissenschaft*, we must insist that familiarity and acquaintance with one specific religion alone is not sufficient for the scholarship of the discipline. Difficult though it is, what is aimed at by *Religionswissenschaft* is understanding of the general structure of religions, and not necessarily competence in one or more of the historic religions. Field research in one religious field is useful and necessary only if such a study can lead the investigator to develop general and comparative insights into the nature of religion. In other words, his contributions to the study of, say, Hinduism is not that of an Indologist; he should study Hinduism, in this instance, as one significant phenomenon in the religious history of the human race.

The emphasis on the descriptive character of *Religionswissenschaft* is not meant, however, to de-emphasize its theoretical aspect. On the contrary, it is our contention that *Religionswissenschaft* will stand or fall with the systematic structuring of the data, although the systematic task must be preceded by and based on careful historical or descriptive research. Ironically,

in many parts of the world the subject matter of so-called comparative religions is taught by a group of specialists, by Indologists, Buddhologists, and Sinologists, to cite only a few with scant effort made at systematizing the data of the specialization with the concerns of the discipline. On the other hand, there are many books on the comparative study of religions that treat the subject as though it were the study of comparative philosophy, comparative theology, comparative sociology of religions, or comparative psychology of religions. That is to say, some scholars feel that *Religionswissenschaft* is nothing more than a general title for a group of related disciplines—either a composite of specialized studies of specific religions, or a general descriptive study that has to be systematized on the basis of a framework borrowed from philosophical, theological, sociological, or psychological models. Both views are based on the notion that *Religionswissenschaft* as such has no perspective, methodology or theoretical framework of its own.

Why are there such persistent and widespread misunderstandings of the nature of *Religionswissenschaft*? This indeed is a difficult question. The complexity of the problem is indicated by the ambiguity of the very title of the discipline itself, for there is no one single English term that is universally accepted as the designation for *Religionswissenschaft* today. The misleading term, "science of religions," is rarely used in English-speaking countries, but scholars continue to use "comparative religions," "phenomenology of religions," and "history of religions" almost interchangeably. Although the use of "history of religions" is becoming rather widespread, the disadvantage of this term is its erroneous implication that *Religionswissenschaft* is solely a historical discipline of which various religions form its subject matter. Furthermore, the term "history of religions" is often used simultaneously both in the broader sense, referring to *Allgemeine Religionswissenschaft*, and in the narrower sense, referring to one aspect of the discipline, namely, the historical study of religions. Inevitably, on the one hand, semantic confusion exists in relating "history of religions," in the broader sense, to philosophy, history, psychology, and other disciplines that are

concerned with the study of some aspects of religions, and on the other hand, in relating "history of religions" in the narrower sense to the systematic task of the discipline with its several accents: philosophical, sociological, and psychological. For clarity, it might be mentioned that in this article the term *Religionswissenschaft* is used to refer to "history of religions" in the broader sense.

It is evident that *Religionswissenschaft* has no monopoly on the study of religions. We must re-emphasize, at the expense of repetition, that while it has many subdivisions and accents within it, such as the historical, sociological, psychological, etc., *Religionswissenschaft* considers itself as one among many disciplines—history, philosophy, theology, sociology, anthropology, and psychology—that are concerned with various aspects of religious concern. This does not mean, however, that the task of *Religionswissenschaft* is the gathering of data for the benefit of such normative disciplines as philosophy and theology. Philosophers and theologians are at their liberty to utilize the research of *Religionswissenschaft*, but their interpretations remain within the philosophical or theological disciplines, respectively, and do not become religio-scientific, any more than the use of philosophical or theological data by *Religionswissenschaft* causes it to become either philosophy or theology. The difficulty involved in the relation between *Religionswissenschaft* and other disciplines, especially philosophy of religion, is derived in part from the fact that the former cannot become solely "scientific" in its endeavour to structure its data religio-scientifically.

The intricate relationship that has existed between *Religionswissenschaft* and philosophy of religion may be discussed in terms of several stages or epochs.⁶ It must be recalled that during the nineteenth century *Religionswissenschaft*, like other humanistic disciplines (*Geisteswissenschaften*), broke away from the domain of philosophy, even though the parting was not abrupt nor altogether clear-cut. Joachim Wach suggests that the relationship between *Religionswissenschaft* and philosophy of religion is somewhat analogous to the relationship between the history of art and the philosophy of art, or between juris-

prudence and the philosophy of law. The positivistic mood of these "sciences" in those days rejected the speculative interests of professional philosophies (*Fachphilosophie*). Thus, Max Müller, who is considered by many as a founder of *Religionswissenschaft*, in reacting against speculative philosophy, depended heavily on philology as the scaffolder for the new "science." Van der Leeuw astutely observes that Max Müller and his friends were *romantic* philologists, for while they reacted against romanticism in the sense that they substituted precise study of the sources for unfettered speculation, they remained romantic in their desire, "to comprehend religion as the expression of a universal mode of human thinking."⁷

Following the period of Max Müller, scholars of *Religionswissenschaft* became fascinated by folkloristic, archaeological, and ethnological problems in addition to philological ones. Nevertheless, C.P. Tiele, who rejected a metaphysically or religiously coloured philosophy, still regarded *Religionswissenschaft* as a "philosophic" part of the inquiry into religious phenomena. In his attempt to differentiate *Religionswissenschaft* from a general historic knowledge of religion (*Religionskunde*), Tiele tried to characterize the former as an empirical science that, however, was philosophical to the extent of being based on the deductive method. In his view, the deductive inference in *Religionswissenschaft* must proceed from that which is constituted through induction, through the empirical, historical, and comparative method. Thus, while Tiele reacted against general philosophy, his *Religionswissenschaft* remained a philosophical inquiry into the universally human phenomenon called religion.⁸

After the turn of the century, scholars of *Religionswissenschaft*, partly under the influence of Emile Durkheim and Wilhelm Wundt, began to apply evolutionary theory in their study of religions. The importance of modern historical consciousness for understanding religions and cultures was stressed. "Description was to take the place of evaluation. Norms and values were to be 'explained' historically, psychologically, and sociologically....Specialization was highly developed and 'objectivity' was the supreme demand. Great interest prevailed in the study

of origins."⁹ Ernst Troeltsch, the exponent of the *religions-geschichte Schule*, tried to hold simultaneously the notion of the religious *a priori* and the concept of history as individuality and unique development. However, Troeltsch considered *Religionswissenschaft* as a normative discipline, a synthesis of psychology, epistemology, the philosophy of history, and the metaphysics of religion. It is called "scientific" only because it has developed from a branch of metaphysics into an independent inquiry into the world of the reality of religious consciousness.¹⁰

According to Wach's observation, Max Scheler was probably the first scholar who articulated a place for the religio-scientific discipline, called the "concrete phenomenology of religious objects and acts," between the "positive science of religion" on the one side and the "essential phenomenology of religion" on the other. The task of this discipline was not to view religious phenomena "philosophically" or "scientifically" but "religio-scientifically," aiming at the fullest possible understanding of the intellectual content of one or more religious forms and also at the understanding of consummate acts in which these intellectual contents were given.¹¹ Likewise, Wach defined the scope of *Religionswissenschaft* as follows: (a) In sharp contrast to the philosophy of religion which has to begin with the *a priori* method, the point of departure for *Religionswissenschaft* is the empirical study of the historically given religions. (b) *Religionswissenschaft* may be called a "historical" study, not in the sense of a genetic analysis, but in the sense of an inquiry into the objectification of the spirit. In this sense, the "historical" is the opposite of "normative," whereas it is not opposed to "systematic." (c) *Religionswissenschaft* has no speculative purpose. While its aim is more than a sheer descriptive study, it is not competent to go beyond the understanding of the meaning of religious phenomena. (d) Religio-scientific inquiry into the meaning leads one to questions of a philosophical and metaphysical nature, but *Religionswissenschaft* as such cannot ask these questions nor deal with them. The difficulty that confronts a religio-scientific inquirer in this regard has some affinities with

the difficulty that confronts the scholar of the arts, but the objectification of the spirit in artistic creativity is more easily apprehensible than the similar process in religious manifestations. (e) While the philosophy of religion has to apply an abstract philosophical idea of what religion is to the data of empirical-historical religions, *Religionswissenschaft* must begin with the investigation of religious phenomena from which the structure and pattern of meaning must emerge. In other words, the methods and procedures of *Religionswissenschaft* must be constructed to achieve understanding of the meaning of the historical data, but what to do with the result of the understanding is beyond the scope of the discipline. In this sense, the mistake of the *religionsgeschichte Schule* was its mixing of religio-philosophic questions with the religio-scientific inquiry. (f) *Religionswissenschaft*, unlike theology and the philosophy of religion, cannot indulge in value judgments, nor does it have any practically religious or apologetic concerns. (g) *Religionswissenschaft*, however, must depend on the philosophy of religion: (i) for the logical articulation of the religio-scientific method, (ii) for the measure of the essential inquiry and determination of philosophical aspects of religious phenomena, and (iii) for the systematic ordering of phenomena in the totality of human knowledge.¹²

Religionswissenschaft, thus conceived, has been criticized rightly and wrongly from various quarters. Many scholars in the social sciences seem to feel that *Religionswissenschaft* falls short in its empirical, descriptive research over religious phenomena, and suggest that religio-scientific methods are too "philosophical." On the other hand, many philosophers of religion criticize the systematic effort of *Religionswissenschaft* for not being based on well worked out philosophical criteria.¹³ Apologists of specific religions complain that *Religionswissenschaft* treats all religious phenomena on the same level, while advocates of a world faith are unhappy because *Religionswissenschaft* does not promote their lofty ideal. Some of the criticisms addressed to *Religionswissenschaft* are legitimate, but many are based on a lack of familiarity with the nature, scope, and aim of the discipline. The scholar engaged in religio-scientific inquiry may be

well versed in philosophy, theology, and some of the social sciences; he may be a Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, or a believer in a world faith; and he may be interested in mutual understanding among religions of the world, world peace, and the brotherhood of man. All these are salutary qualities but not primary prerequisites for the religio-scientific discipline. This does not mean that the students of *Religionswissenschaft* should not try to serve worthy causes as human beings and as citizens. And certainly religio-scientific study will broaden one's vista and make one conscious of the issues that confront peoples and cultures of the world. However, as Professor Werblowsky reminds us, "it is a result, though not of the essence, of such study of religious phenomena to make the student himself more fit for *mutual* understanding on the interhuman level."¹⁴

In any field, the most important thing for a student is to abide by the canons of his scholarly pursuit, and this is also true of *Religionswissenschaft*. To be sure, *Religionswissenschaft* involves many problems and ambiguities. Those of us who are in the discipline must strive for closer cooperation with scholars in other disciplines and must be sensitive to constructive criticism from others. We are keenly aware of the provincial character of the intellectual heritage of *Religionswissenschaft*, as illustrated by some of the assumptions that have been handed down to us from our forefathers in the discipline. But, the problems of *Religionswissenschaft* will find their solution, to the extent that any problems are ever solved, not by allying the discipline with other worthy causes or through depending on the principles and methods of other disciplines, but by asking important religio-scientific questions and by following the basic principles and methods of the discipline itself. This means, of course, that we must study a religious phenomenon as something religious. In the words of Professor Eliade, "To try to grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique and irreducible element in it—the element of the sacred."¹⁵ On the other hand, *Religionswissenschaft* is not a philosophical, theo-

logical or religious discipline, and thus cannot approach a religious phenomenon—the objectification of the sacred—philosophically, theologically or even religiously.

The new discipline of *Religionswissenschaft* from its inception has been under pressure to submit itself as a servant and tool for other academic or humanitarian objectives. In this connection, Dr. Radhakrishnan rightly observes that "when we speak of Comparative Religion we do not mean that it is a special kind of religion; it is only a particular method of treating religion."¹⁶ To be sure, the research and scholarship of *Religionswissenschaft* have important philosophical, theological, and religious implications. But we can ill afford to confuse the main task with its by-products. "The task of *Religionswissenschaft*," says Joachim Wach, "is the study and description of the empirical religions. It is a descriptive-understanding, and not a normative discipline. With the historical and systematic study of the concrete religious configurations, its task is fulfilled."¹⁷ We can do nothing more or nothing less than this!

NOTES

¹ A substantial portion of this article is based on the writer's Joachim Wach—Vorlesungen at the University of Marburg (May 6, 1959) under the title, "Gibt es ein Verstehen fremder Religionen?" and also the writer's articles, "Beikoku Shukuyogaku no Tembo," *Shukyo Kenkyu*, XXXII, 158 (March, 1959) pp. 78-109, and *ibid.*, XXXII, 159 (July, 1959), pp. 1-18, Tokyo.

² Bozeman, Adda B., *Politics and Culture in International History*, Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 9.

³ Radhakrishnan, S., *East and West in Religion*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933, p. 13.

⁴ Van der Leeuw, G., *Religion in Essence & Manifestation*, Trans. by J. E. Turner, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1938, p. 683.

⁵ *Proceedings of the 7th Congress for the History of Religions*, Amsterdam. North-Holland Publ. Co., 1951, p. 20.

⁶ Cf. Eliade, Mircea, *The Sacred and the Profane*, Trans. by Willard R. Trask, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959, "The 'History of Religion' as a Branch of Knowledge," pp. 216-232; Wach, Joachim, "On Teaching History of Religions," *Pro Regno Pro Sanctuario*, Nijkerk: G. F. Callenbach N. V. Uitgever, pp. 525-532, Wach, Joachim, *Religionswissenschaft—Prolegomena zu ihrer wissenschaftstheoretischen Grundlegung*, Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1924, iv, "Die Methode der Religionswissenschaft," pp. 113-164.

⁷ Van der Leeuw, op. cit., p. 693.

⁸ Wach, *Religionswissenschaft*, op. cit., pp. 117-119.

* Wach, Joachim, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, Ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa, Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 4.

■ Wach, *Religionswissenschaft*, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-124.

■ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-128.

■ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-136.

■ On this point, see Daniélou, Jean, "Phenomenology of Religions and Philosophy of Religion," *History of Religions: Essays in Method*, Ed. Mircea Eliade and J. M. Kitagawa, The University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 67-85.

■ Werblowsky, R. J. Zwi, "On the Role of Comparative Religion in Promoting Mutual Understanding," *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 58 (1959), 34.

■ Eliade, Mircea, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, Trans. by Rosemary Sheed. Sheed & Ward, 1958, p. xi.

■ Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

■ Wach, *Religionswissenschaft*, *op. cit.*, p. 68: "Die Aufgabe der Religionswissenschaft ist die Erforschung und Darstellung der empirischen Religionen. Sie ist eine beschreibend-verstehende, keine normative Wissenschaft. Mit der historischen und systematischen Bearbeitung der konkreten Religionsbildungen ist ihre Aufgabe erfüllt."

REALITY AND DEPENDENCE IN THE INDIAN DARSHANAS

KARL H. POTTER

My purpose here is to examine in a somewhat summary fashion the meaning of the terms variously translated as "real" or "existent" in the classical Indian philosophies, to try to identify the core meaning of the notion of "reality" as it was used there, and relate this core meaning to the notion of "dependence" which, as I shall suggest, is fundamental to Indian thought.

Many of the terms which parallel our English words "real" and "existent" come from two Sanskrit roots, "*as*" and "*bhū*". Thus, in particular, "*sat*" and "*bhāva*" are frequently used in this sense, as well as extensions such as "*sattā*" and "*bhāvatva*", "*svabhāva*", etc. I do not propose to give an etymological exegesis of these roots. What I wish to do is to suggest the function of these words in philosophical contexts, and to illustrate any suggestion in reference to the major *darśanas*.

My thesis is that the core function of these terms is to identify the stable end of a dependence relation. Two distinct terms *x* and *y* are related by a dependence relation such that *y* depends on *x* if and only if *y* cannot occur without *x* although *x* can occur without *y*. For example, it is natural to suppose that the redness of a given rose cannot occur without the rose's occurring (occupying an adjacent spatio-temporal position), although the rose can occur without the redness occurring (if, say, that particular rose is a yellow one). In Indian parlance, in such cases the rose is termed the "locus" or "substrate" (*āśraya*) of the redness; the relation between them is what I am calling a "dependence" relation.

On the other hand, one might well analyse the case different-

ly. One might say, with equal justice, the red rose cannot occur without its redness occurring, although the redness can occur without the red rose. Here again we have a dependence relation; this time redness is the substrate, the red rose the term which depends upon it.

Different *darśanas* adopt differing ontologies. In this paper I am not concerned to elaborate upon the differences between their ontologies, but to elucidate some very general propositions about reality which seem to me to involve the dependence relation. Then I shall illustrate the force of these propositions by reviewing a few of the ontological assumptions of some of the *darśanas*.

1) What does it mean to say, of a given entity A, that A is real? It means, I submit, that A is the locus (substrate) of some dependence relation or other. Conversely, to say that A is unreal is to say that, though it depends on a locus, it is not itself the locus of any dependence relation—i.e., nothing depends on it.

2) What does it mean to say, of a given entity A, that A is dependent? It means that there is some entity B such that A depends on B. Conversely, to say that A is independent is to say that there is no entity B such that A depends on B.

3) What does it mean to say, of two entities A and B, that they are interdependent? It means that A depends on B and B depends on A. Conversely, to say that two entities A and B are not interdependent is to say that either A does not depend on B or B does not depend on A or both.

With these last three paragraphs in mind, we can now study six quite distinct propositions of a more general character. It will be handy to have a symbolism for conveniently characterizing the logical structure of these six propositions, and I shall utilize the symbolism of *Principia Mathematica*. I shall use the symbol "D" to stand for a two-place predicate (a relation) of "dependence", with the special proviso that this predicate is irreflexive, i.e., that the two places required by the predicate must be filled by non-identical terms (that is, (Dx, x) is precluded, where x stands for any variable).

I. "Everything is real". To hold this proposition to be true is to affirm that for every entity in the universe there is another entity which depends on it. i.e., $(x) (Ey) (Dy, x)$.

II. "Nothing is real". This says that for every entity in the universe it is the case that no other entity depends on it. i.e., $(x) (y) \neg (Dy, x)$

III. "Everything is independent." This says that for every entity in the universe it is the case that it depends on no other entity. $(x) (y) - (Dx, y)$.

IV. "Everything is dependent". This says that for every entity in the universe there is another entity that it depends upon. i.e., $(x) (Ey)(Dx, y)$.

V. "Everything is interdependent". This says that for every entity in the universe there is another such that the first depends on the second and the second on the first. i.e., $(x) (Ey) (Dx, y \cdot Dy, x)$.

VI. "Nothing is interdependent". This says that for every two entities in the universe they are not related in such a way that each depends upon the other. i.e., $(x) (y) - (Dx, y \cdot Dy, x)$.

Each of the above six propositions can be formulated in alternative and equally interesting ways. For example, (I) is equivalent to "Nothing is unreal", (II) to "Everything is unreal", (III) to "Nothing is dependent", (IV) to "Nothing is independent", (V) to "Nothing is non-interdependent" and (VI) to "Everything is non-interdependent". These, each, are derived from the original propositions by the familiar route of obversion.

We may reasonably ask whether the acceptance or rejection of these propositions does not in fact constitute a significant feature of the Indian *darśanas*, one which promises a classification of philosophical views which has the advantage of not making some views overlap others through vagueness in the classificatory terminology.

Let me start by attempting to identify Indian philosophers or theories which seem to me to adopt each of these six propositions.

philosophical Mimamsakas Kumarila and Prabhakara and their followers. This is, I suspect, why they are called "realists" by their English-language expositors, in keeping with my general thesis that the fundamental meaning of "real" is to identify the loci of dependence relations. For these philosophers, everything there is is the locus of a dependence relation. As the Naiyayika puts it, "*astitvam jñeyatvam abhidheyatvam*", "to be is to be knowable and namable". Every entity is, if else, at any rate the locus of an epistemological dependence as well as a denotative dependence for the Naiyayika, and the class of these loci in turn exhausts the range of things which occur ("*astitva*" means to occupy a time, the *Nyāyakośa* tells us).

II and III. These propositions are equivalent in what they positively imply, although they differ in what they deny. They both imply, in effect, that there are no dependence relations at all. But each implies this for different reasons. Of each pair of entities related by dependence, let us call the one on which the other depends the "referent", and the one which depends on the other the "relatum". Then (II) implies that there are no dependence relations on the ground that there are no referents, while (III) implies the same conclusion on the ground that there are no relata. Clearly, it would be odd to affirm either one without affirming the other, unless one made appeal to auxiliary categories such as "possible referents" or "possible relata" and tried to hold, for example, that while (II) denies all referents, actual or possible, it does not imply that there cannot be possible relata which are never actualized because of the lack of referents. I think there are good reasons to resist this introduction of possible entities, at least in this sense, but that is another story. In any case, whether or not (II) and (III) differ substantively or only verbally, it would seem that they are the kind of position(s) that those philosophers whom the Indians call *svabhāva-vādins* are likely to have taken. Unfortunately, we have little way of being really sure of what such schools of thought maintained, since we can only conjecture on the basis of what their opponents imputed to them, a dangerous basis for conjecture at best,

IV. On the other hand, the view that everything is dependent is apparently the kind of view that fatalists might well hold, and may have been the view of the Ajivikas of ancient times. Here again our textual supply is too scanty to decide.

V. The view that everything is interdependent is well-recognized to be that of the Madhyamika Buddhists. Nagarjuna affirms this view as a way out of the dialectical traps that haunt any view which admits dependence relations. On his view, nothing can occur without everything else that in fact does occur occurring. Viewed in the light of our strict definition of "dependence", the Madhyamika position entails that there are no dependence relations and thus that nothing is real. However, viewed in the light of our formulation of (V) above, it entails that everything is the referent of a dependence relation and thus that everything is real. The question is whether we are going to construe interdependence as a kind of dependence or not; it is a logical function of dependence relations, to be sure, but it is not clear whether it is wise to allow all logical functions of dependences to be themselves dependence relations. Perhaps this is the "Middle Path" viewed *sub specie Principiae Mathematicae*!

VI. The view that nothing is interdependent is espoused by anyone who takes wholly seriously the *tarka* fallacy of *anyonyāśraya*. This fallacy is committed precisely when an entity is allowed to depend on a second entity which in turn depends upon it. Most Indian philosophers other than skeptics, fatalists and Madhyamikas (and perhaps their kindred spirits, the Advaitins of Suresvara's line of thought) admit *anyonyāśraya* as a fault.

Each of the first five views seems disturbing in the light of the basic purpose of the Indian systematic philosopher, who is endeavoring to explain how the world goes consonantly with the requirement that *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* must be attainable. If (I) everything is real, then it seems hard to understand how we can destroy anything. But if we cannot destroy anything, then in particular we cannot destroy bondage, and since the destruction of bondage is a necessary condition for freedom, *mokṣa* becomes impossible. If on the other hand (II) nothing is real,

again it seems hard to see how we can destroy anything, this time for the reason that to destroy something one seems to have to be able to destroy the thing on which it depends, and there is no such thing if one accepts (II). On the acceptance of (III) as we saw, the same consequences follow as from (II). If (IV) is true, we have the difficulty that we cannot destroy bondage because to do so we should have to destroy an infinite series of entities, each depending on the next. On (V), the interdependence view, everything being interdependent with everything, in particular the attainment of freedom must be interdependent with the destruction of bondage, (or as Nagarjuna puts it, "*nirvāṇa* is *samsāra*"), and freedom seems unattainable by any means. ((VI) does not appear to me to be objectionable in the relevant respects, although I lay no claim to have exhaustively analysed the possibilities.)

The majority of philosophers in India have been, I should suppose, non-extremists—i.e., they have not been willing to accept any of the first five principles as they stand. Most philosophers in India find the question "which entities are real?" to be a significant question, one which can be answered neither by "everything" nor "nothing!". But since this is the case, they must adduce additional criteria for reality besides the core criterion of being a referent of a dependence relation.

This introduces in turn a new distinction between appearance and reality. For the extremists (Mimamsakas, Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas, Jains, Madhyamikas, *svabhāvavādins* and fatalists), either nothing is real or everything is—the apparent is quite literally either the non-existent or the only existent(s). For the non-extremists, some of the real entities in the world, "real" in the referent-of-a-dependence-relation sense, are to be distinguished as (relatively) unreal by some additional criterion. This is the line taken by the Vijnanavada or Yogachara school, including the "Buddhist logicians", as well as by Vedantins and by Sāṃkhya.

Now the apparent, in the sense of that which is a referent of dependence relation but does not satisfy the additional criteria of reality, is recognized in order, as we have seen, to provide

something which can be destroyed and whose destruction leads to *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*. But in order to bend our efforts to destroy it, we must be able to identify it; in fact, these schools unanimously conclude, ignorance in the sense of failure to discriminate the apparent from the real is a central aspect of bondage. The additional criterion or criteria which must be provided, then, must be epistemological criteria (at least in part); they must give us a way of *telling* the real from the apparent in this secondary sense.

With great good sense, all the schools under discussion proffer the criterion of verification at this point. The really real is that which is verified, the merely apparently real is falsified. For Buddhists the real has *arthakriyātva*; for Vedantins, it is *trikālābādhya* "unsublated throughout the three times (past, present and future)". The appeal, unanimously, is to experience. But this is awkward. In order to identify the sources of bondage, the merely apparently real, we must experiment, but in doing so, we set up habits (*samskāras*, *vāsanās*) within us of precisely the sort we wish eventually to stamp out. This tension haunts both the Buddhist and Vedanta theories of this non-extremist variety. One comes to wish for still additional criteria to tell reality from appearance, good habits from bad ones, criteria which can be put into operation in advance of the *karmic* habituation which experimenting with bondage engenders.

In this connection, one perfectly understandable appeal becomes relevant, the appeal to prior experience on the part of men who have gained *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* in the past. This is one kind of further criterion, one whose relevance is uncontroversial even though its credibility is debatable.

If one rejects authority as a criterion, it is hard to see where else he can turn. The Indians (in contrast with Western rationalism) never even considered the theory that one can deduce the nature of reality from *a priori* principles alone; in this perhaps Indian thought avoided a kind of problem which has cost European philosophers a great deal of—it would now seem—fruitless energy. All Indian philosophers agree that inference depends upon perception ultimately, and cannot func-

tion independently of experience. There have been, to be sure, other attempts to provide additional criteria—these are incorporated in the esoteric *pramāṇas* which appear in the various Vedantic systems, for instance. None of these esoteric *pramāṇas* has managed to win wide support among the more critical non-extremists. The problem, I think it can be said, remains unsolved.

When men come to realize that a crucial problem remains unsolved, there is a tendency to conclude that it is insoluble. If this problem is insoluble, the non-extremist must modify his assumptions in some fashion or other. I think that in fact this is exactly what has happened. Some Vedantins have construed *mokṣa* in different ways from the traditional ones; others have rejected the idea that to gain *mokṣa* one must break the chains of bondage ("everyone is already in *mokṣa*"!); still others have replaced the philosophical problems with theological ones, turning the initiative over to God and devoting their energies to worship. The resulting impression, for outsiders, is that Indian philosophy is pessimistic, other-worldly, escapist, and anti-intellectual or mystical.

It need hardly be said that this impression, though it may reflect the latest developments in Indian thought, is quite inaccurate for Indian philosophy as a whole. Yet strangely this has not been said as frequently by Indian scholars as it ought to have been.

Perhaps the perspective can be corrected by re-identifying, in some such fashion as has been suggested here, the fundamental problems which generated the *darśanas*, and which remain as relevant today as they did in classical times.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DRISHTANTA¹ IN INDIAN LOGIC

S.S.BARLINGAY

THE history of Indian Logic reveals that originally the syllogistic argument consisted of ten parts or *avayavas*.² But in the course of the development of syllogistic method, it was reduced to five and it came to be known as a *vākya* or a 'sentence pattern'³ with five constituent parts. These parts were called *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*. This kind of argument with five parts was again subjected to severe criticism at the hands of logicians of rival schools like Mimamsa, Advaita and Buddhism. The Mimamsa and Advaita Schools reduced the argument to either the first three or the last three parts, whereas some Buddhist logicians⁴ even reduced it to two—*dr̥ṣṭānta* and *upanaya*—reminding one of the Aristotelian enthymeme. Vatsyayana, the great commentator of the Nyaya-sutras, has tried to defend these five parts⁵ by arguing that each of these parts stands as it were for each *pramāṇa*, and since the *pramāṇas* or the sources of knowledge, according to *nyāya*, are four, the syllogistic argument should also consist of four parts and a conclusion, bringing the total to five. It is not necessary to judge the strength of this argument, since it is outside the scope of this paper. But what is relevant here is this; whether one be a Buddhist logician or a logician belonging to orthodox systems, one does not exclude *dr̥ṣṭānta* from the sentence pattern of syllogistic argument. It may be objected that some Buddhist logicians like Arcata⁶ have said that there can be some arguments where there is no necessity for *dr̥ṣṭānta*, which is added only for the sake of recognition. But since Arcata's argument will

be referred to later and since his view supports my point of view⁷, I need not consider it here.

The logicians of *Navyanyāya* School understand by *dr̥ṣṭānta* also *vyāpti*, with an appendage of illustration proper. But there is not sufficient evidence to think that *vyāpti* was included in *dr̥ṣṭānta* even at the time of the Nyaya-Sutras. This may lead one think that, unlike the Greek Syllogism, the Indian Syllogism proceeds from particular to particular as in the case of the argument considered under *upamāna*. But evidently this is not the case. For, though perhaps *vyāpti* might not have been specifically included in earlier times under one of the five parts of syllogism, even the earliest logicians including the author of the Nyaya-Sutras⁸ have not explained the syllogistic inference without a reference to *vyāpti*. So, *vyāpti* or *sāhacarya* (co-extension of *hetu* with *sādhya*) or *avinābhāva* (—going together of *hetu* and *sādhya*) seemed to be the keystone of syllogistic reasoning.

Many times the Indian type of syllogism is compared to the Aristotelian one. But evidently non-statement of *vyāpti* explicitly in some systems of Indian logic is not a significant difference which would distinguish it from the Greek. For, even for Aristotle there can be an enthymeme where the major premiss is absent. E.g. 'Every Greek is mortal because he is a man'. Statement of *dr̥ṣṭānta* in the body of the syllogism, then, is the only characteristic difference⁹ which distinguishes the Indian type of syllogism from the Greek. ^{9a} It is worthwhile pointing out that whereas the Greeks do not include an instance in the body of syllogism, the Indians insist on such an inclusion and state that there would be no *vyāpti* in the absence of *dr̥ṣṭānta* which in turn would lead to a fallacy called *Anupāsāmhāra* or inconclusiveness.

What is the reason for such an insistence on *dr̥ṣṭānta* in Indian Logic? It is often alleged that Indian Logic is not formal.¹⁰ The truth seems to be that Indian Logic is not logic at all in the traditional European sense of the term, though it makes use of principles of Logic. In the first place, it is a misnomer to equate 'Logic' with what is traditionally called 'The Nyaya School of Thought'. No doubt, Nyaya School makes a profuse use of the

logical principles for promoting its tenets; but other schools, too, make use of the same or similar logical principles. But the point to note here is whether in Nyaya or other Indian schools of thought the logical principles serve merely as a means of proving their thesis. Thus, only those principles which are necessary for proving their point will be discussed in the logical prolegomena of their systems; and a complete logical theory like an axiomatic deductive theory will not be evolved.

Since the Indian Logic, including the Buddhist one, is essentially a metaphysical system, logical arguments are used only as a means of proving the categories of reality. The conclusions in such a system of logic are bound to have an existential import. Thus, it is quite in keeping with the ideal of the metaphysical nature of the enquiry that only those logical principles which are consistent with the existential conclusions, positive or negative, are employed, and not the others. A classification of *pramāṇas*, for example, is not a classification of authorities or standards or logical principles employed by Indian Logic, but of the ways of knowing the reality and reality alone. It is indeed true that sometimes logicians resorting to grammatical rules have used terms like *pramāṇa*¹¹ in an ambiguous manner and this has resulted in confusion between the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge. But even so, it is a defect arising out of the unclear understanding, not of the logical principles, but of the metaphysics of these systems. If the Indian logicians have made use of only certain logical principles and not others it is on account of the limitation of their enquiry and it will not be fair to blame them for not employing the other logical principles. What is sufficient for the present is to see whether they have understood the meaning and limitations of the logical principles when they employ them. My point will be clear if we evaluate *anumāna* as a source of knowledge. Only that inference which leads to the knowledge of reality is called *anumāna*.¹² Every kind of inference is not so called. A mere study of the logical principle of Tarka¹³ is not the objective of an Indian logician which is termed by him as *ayathārtha-jñāna*, i.e., knowledge having no relation with reality.

I think it is this point of view which is responsible for the structure of Indian Syllogism. A *pratijñā* or enunciation is always a statement, positive or negative, about something, i.e., something that 'is' or 'exists'. The subject of this *pratijñā* is always a particular entity. This particular entity may be either an individual or a class. But in neither case will it be a void; it will be either directly or indirectly based on perceptive experience.¹⁴ But whether this subject of *pratijñā* is an individual or a class, the relation which it has with its predicate (here the *sādhya*) is that which exists between a member and a class.¹⁵ Even when an Indian logician is talking of sound or *śabda*, or *pṛthivī* or that which possesses smell, he is talking of them as if they were particulars¹⁶ and not universals. The type of syllogism, made use of in Indian Logic, then, is not of the subsumptive¹⁷ type like :

All men are mortal
and all Greeks are men
∴ All Greeks are mortal

as in Aristotle, but as W.E. Johnson puts it, of applicative¹⁸ type like :

All men are mortal
and Socrates is a man
∴ Socrates is mortal

Either you are demonstrating that a certain entity is a member of a certain class, for example, in '*śabdo anityaḥ*' or you are pointing out that the '*sādhya*' (or for that matter the co-extension of *hetu* and *sādhya*) is connected with a certain place—this place being a member of the class of places where *hetu* and *sādhya* are found together as in the case of '*parvato valmīmān*'. But in either case the relation is a class-membership relation and never a relation between a class and a subclass. The *vyāpti* is a universal major premiss and the subject of the conclusion is a member of the class indicated by the subject of the major premiss. The *pakṣa*, then, stands in subaltern relation

to the class pervaded by *hetu*. The crux of the problem is this : under what conditions can this subaltern relation be valid ? The simplest answer would be that it would be valid if the class represented by the subject of the major premiss is not a null class. This, of course, raises further problems about the nature of the class and the nature of implication.

The traditional Western logic was also entangled in a similar problem. It is believed that if the proposition "All men are mortal" is true, then its subaltern "some men are mortal" is true. But the modern symbolic logic points out that from a universal proposition one cannot derive a particular proposition. Prof. W.V.O. Quine¹⁹ writes : 'A, 'All F are G,' would seem at first glance to be stronger than I, 'some F are G', and to imply it; but it does not, because of the possibility of there being no F. . . . It may happen that all my dimes are shining (in that I have no dimes to the contrary) and yet be false that some of my dimes are shining, simply because I have no dimes at all. The most that we can say is that if all F are G, and there are F, then some F are G.

"If the reader thinks it odd to say that all of one's dimes are shining when one has no dimes, he is perhaps interpreting 'All F are G' to mean, not simply that there is no F that is not G, but 'there are F, and none of them is G'. This, however, even if it be one of several defensible interpretations of an ambiguous idiom is clearly not the interpretation which would make 'A' the simple contradictory of negation of 'O': some F are not G. It is the general logical practice, and a convenient one, to understand 'All F are G' simply as the contradictory of 'O'." It follows that the proposition 'all men are mortal' does not yield a subaltern conclusion 'Some men are mortal'.

Let me explain the idea further. A universal proposition does not have an existential import. It merely describes a certain relation termed by modern logic as material implication. If between p and q there exists material implication such that if p is true, q is true, it does not follow from this either that p exists or q exists. An implication points to a relation and not an existence; and the relation of 'implication' like all other logical

relations can be true without any consideration whether the terms between which the relation seems to hold exists. If, for example, 'Trustworthiness implies wisdom', it does not follow from it that there is someone who is trustworthy or someone who is wise, as the proposition 'All trustworthy are wise' is likely to suggest. Bradley was the first to point this out, though not very clearly, when he stated that a real categorical proposition is a hypothetical proposition. He, thereby, wanted to assert that the truth of the hypothetical proposition is not dependent on whether the antecedent or the consequent of the proposition exists.²⁰ Russell, too, interpreted the categorical universal proposition in a similar manner and it is only in consonance with this practice that all general propositions were interpreted as implicative propositions of the form 'if p then q or $p \supset q$ '. Whether Aristotle actually had this kind of implicative form in his mind as the only kind of interpretation of universal proposition need not concern us here. Perhaps, he had two different kinds of universal propositions in his mind, one pointing out an 'implication'²¹ between the subject and the predicate and the other pointing out this relation as well as existence of the subject.²²

But it is plain that from the pure relation of implication between p and q one would not be able to draw any conclusion at all, except for the type of $p \supset q \supset r \supset p \supset r$, which is based on the law of transitivity and which does not require any existence either for p or q or r. But when the existence of p or q is to be inferred from $p \supset q$, in addition to $p \supset q$ we must also state that there is p. This is symbolically represented as ' $p.p \supset q$ ' and is termed by Prof. Church as the rule of *modus ponens* in his P_1 system: * 100. From $A \supset B$ and A, to infer B.²³ From 'All men are mortal' which can be symbolically represented as $(x)(Fx \supset Gx)$ if one has to draw validly a conclusion 'Socrates is mortal', which can be represented as $(\exists Y)^{24} (GY)$ the following assumptions have to be made :

- (i) that Socrates exists or $(\exists y) = \text{Socrates}$
- (ii) that $y \mathcal{C} x$ or $\exists Y \mathcal{C} y = x$
- (iii) and that $X > 0$

When one makes these three assumptions one might draw

the conclusion in the following way :

(1) $[(x) [(Hy) (y \in x), x \text{ is a man} \supset y \text{ is mortal}) \supset (Hy \text{ is mortal and } Hy = \text{Socrates})]$

(2) $[(x) (y) [(Hy) (Fx \supset Gy)]; \therefore (Hy) (Gy) \supset$

(3) $[(x) [(Hy) [(y \in x) \supset (Fx \supset Gx)]; \supset (Hy) (Gy)]]$

This conclusion, in addition to the rule of *modus ponens* also presupposes the rule of substitution.^{24a} The rule of substitution is the following : from A, if b is a variable, to infer S-b/B-A. Indian logical systems, too, make use of this second rule of inference and make the applicative kind of inference possible.

We have seen that merely from the rule of implication no conclusion can be drawn. The rule of implication must be turned into a rule of inference in order to make an inference possible. This precisely seems to be the function of *drṣṭānta* in Indian Syllogism. Without *drṣṭānta*, *vyāpti* would be merely equivalent to a hypothetical major, and the minor would be merely a member of the class. But it remains to be proved whether the class is a positive class or a null class, without which an inference about a member of a class would not be possible. As has been stated above, a hypothetical major signifies only implication and nothing else. It is the addition of an existential import which changes the *vyāpti* from an implicative proposition into implicative inference.

Here, it may be objected that if *vyāpti* itself is an inference, what is the significance of the part, *upanaya* : '*ayam ca tathā*'. The objection, however, is not valid because, as we have seen, the Indian type of syllogism is of the applicative type and it is the rule of substitution*101 in P₁ system of Prof. Church that is made use of for drawing an inference. The minor term is not p but only a member of the class p, say p₁. Thus in Indian type of syllogism the conclusion that is drawn is of the type :

$$P_1 \cdot q$$

This conclusion is drawn from the premiss, $p.p \supset q$ where both p and q are classes.²⁵ This can be drawn in the following manner :

$$1. \text{ /- } (p.p \supset q) \supset p$$

$$2. \text{ /- } (p.p \supset q) \supset q$$

3. By adding \neg $(p.p \supset q) \supset (p.p \supset q) \supset p.q$

4. By Tautology $\neg (p.p \supset q) \supset (p.q.)$

A class includes its members if the class is non-empty.

On account of *dṛṣṭānta* it is proved that the 'p' is non-empty; that is, it includes p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n etc. Thus $p.q$ can be expanded into $p^1 \dots p_n.q$. Thus,

5. $\vdash (p.p \supset q) \supset (p_1 \dots p_n.q) \supset (p_1.q)$

Thus it is the *dṛṣṭānta* in Indian Logic which makes the transition from a class to a member of a class possible and provides the rule of *modus ponens*. Though it is not ordinarily possible to infer $(\forall x)(\exists x)$ from $(x)(Fx)$, as soon as one knows that 'x' is really equivalent to $(\forall x \dots \exists x)$ the transition becomes possible; and there can be an inference from general to particular. This is the value of *dṛṣṭānta*.

It has been pointed out above that Aristotle, perhaps, had two different concepts of universal propositions, one of which could be expressed by $p.p \supset q$ and not simply by $p \supset q$. Such propositions express more than the hypothetical propositions. For, whereas in pure hypothetical propositions the antecedent can be false and the consequent true, in such propositions both the antecedent and the consequent can be either true or false because antecedent is given true. This would yield the truth of subaltern and converse relations. Such propositions then would have an unmanifested *dṛṣṭānta* with them. However, since Aristotelian logic is not quite explicit in this regard, it is possible to interpret Aristotelian proposition otherwise. At least here the Indian Logic scores a point of clarity over the other.

The significance of instance or *dṛṣṭānta* is further stressed by Indian logicians by asserting that if *dṛṣṭānta* is not stated no conclusion (of the above type) can be drawn.²⁶ Non-statement of the instance has been regarded by them as a fallacy. This indicates that they were aware that for an inference where the transition is from a class to its members the class must not be a null class. The concept of *pakṣa* in Indian Logic should be carefully examined in this connection. *Pakṣa* has sometimes been translated as ■ minor term, which indeed it is. But *pakṣa* indicates something more. *Pakṣa* has been defined as that where

the co-existence of *hetu* with *sādhya* is yet to be proved and can be doubted. It means that when one is not certain that *vyāpti* exists in some object then that object is called a *pakṣa*. This may happen in two different ways :

- (1) Where this *vyāpti* exists but one does not know that it exists and so where one wants to prove *vyāpti* as in the case of minor term, or
- (2) where the existence of minor term is not relevant, that is, where minor term is not a member of the class pervaded by *hetu* because there is no such positive class at all.

This may happen when nothing is *sapakṣa*, i.e., where the only relation that exists between *hetu* and *sādhya* is that of implication. Now, I believe, in a syllogism, where the instance cannot be stated, it may be either because (1) there is no *vyāpti*, i.e., a universal connection between *hetu* and *sādhya*, or (2) because the *vyāpti* indicates only an implication and does not denote any positive class of the implicants i.e., where everything is a *pakṣa* and nothing is a *sapakṣa* (the second case of *pakṣa* mentioned above). Let me take an instance of Inconclusiveness or *anupasamhāri savyabhicāra 'sarvamanityam, abhidheyatvāt'* (everything is transitory because it is nameable). The universal major premiss states :

(for any x) (x is nameable) implies (x is transitory)
or

(x) (x is nameable $\supset x$ is transitory).

From this certainly it is impossible to draw any conclusion of the form :

($\forall x$) (x is nameable $\supset x$ is transitory).

'*Sarvam*' here does not suggest that ' x ' is equivalent to ($\forall x \dots \exists x$). For, had it been so, we would have been able to give an instance of it. '*Sarvam*' in such instances would suggest either (1) that *pratijñā* is not different from *vyāpti*, or (2) that the *vyāpti* between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not based on the observation of any instance—that everything is a *pakṣa* and nothing is a *sapakṣa*. This would mean that the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is that of material implication. Thus, '*sarvam*'

is called \equiv *pakṣa* not because everything is included in the *pakṣa*, (and so it is a matter for consideration) and that *pakṣa* exists, but because the existence of everything *vis-à-vis vyāpti* is doubtful. This is clear because here the *pratijñā* does not state anything different from the *vyāpti*. The *vyāpti* would be : 'yat abhidheyam tat anityam' (whatever is nameable is transitory). But what does 'yat' mean ? It does not mean anything except 'sarvam' because there is nothing which is not nameable. 'Sarvam' in this sense then is certainly implied by the major premiss, by the $D^1.t \rightarrow f \supset f$ which means $p \supset t \supset p$. But if by 'sarvam', we take the other alternative, where 'sarvam' is a summation of 'n' particular positive instances then certainly though there may exist material implication between nameability and transitoriness, still, an inference is prevented. Since there is nothing of which transitoriness can be positively asserted on the ground that it is nameable, one cannot be sure whether the *vyāpti* is non-empty or not. Hence from it even a conclusion of the type 'This is transitory' (*etat anityam*) cannot be drawn.

It is interesting to note that some Buddhist logicians like Arcata who think that we are drawing a universal conclusion from *vyāpti* as '*sarvam kṣaṇikam*' from '*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*,' specifically state that there is no necessity of stating any instance for the ascertainment of *sādhya*. The reason is plain enough. If we are going from universal premisses to a universal conclusion, there is no necessity of any instance. As has been pointed out above, this would be a kind of subsumptive type of inference and can be best demonstrated by

$p \supset q \supset r$. $p \supset r$, or $(x) (Fx \supset Gx) \supset (x) (Gx)$

It appears that logicians of Nyaya School were aware of this kind of inference based on implication and the rule of transitivity. Like Aristotle's dictum, *de omni*, they have a rule '*tad vyāpya-vyāpyasya tad vyāpyatvaṃ*', which literally means the pervaded of the pervaded is the pervaded by the pervader. If one takes three classes, *ghaṭatva*, *prthivīva* and *dravyatva*,²⁷ such that *prthivīva* is the subclass of *dravyatva* and *ghaṭatva* is a subclass of *prthivīva*, then according to the rule of transitivity one can assert the proposition 'wherever there is *ghaṭatva* there is

dravyatva on this ground that wherever there is *ghaṭatva* there is *prthvītvā* and wherever there is *prthvītvā* there is *dravyatva*. Assertion of such a proposition does not require any illustration, the reason being that such a proposition is not a *pratijñā* or enunciation of any specific or particular truth. This implication, according to Nyaya, exists even if all members of the classes, *ghaṭatva*, *prthvītvā* and *dravyatva* are destroyed. For, according to Nyaya, even though all members are destroyed, the class 'exists'. So, the relation between the classes also 'exists'. It is worthwhile to note that for Nyaya the 'existence' of classes is not more real than the 'existence' of particulars as the so-called Platonism asserted. Nor is it real in the sense that the particulars are real. *Jāti*, according to Nyaya, does not have *sattā*²⁸ as a *dravya*, *guṇa* or *karma* has, whether particulars under the *jāti* exist or are destroyed. Implication between classes, then, according to Nyaya, has nothing to do with the existence of instances. But if one has to construct a specific inference like 'this pot is a substance because it has *prthvītvā*', a specific instance has to be adduced. Implication is at the background of all inference, but it itself is not an inference according to Nyaya or most other logical systems. Rules like the rule of implication or *vyāpya-vyāpakabhāva* are meta-language rules of the logical language or *parārtha anumāna*, and it is only the application of such rules which, according to Indian Logic, is always from general to particular that is called *anumāna* or deductive inference proper. Whereas for implication no instance is required, for the inference there is need of such an illustration. Thus, Indian logicians were aware both of the rules of implication and of the fact that if any particular conclusion was to be drawn from any major premiss, it was not sufficient to have the general proposition as a major premiss, but it was further necessary to know that the subject of the major premiss was not an empty class.

NOTES

¹ *Dṛṣṭānta*—Illustration.

In Akṣhapada-Sūtras there is a mention of another *Dṛṣṭānta* as a category. But a discussion whether that is a different category or the same as this is outside the scope of this paper.

² There is a mention of this in Akṣhapada-Sūtras. Vidyā Bhūṣaṇa also mentions one Jaina Logician Bhadrabahu who talks of ten parts of a syllogism.

³ *Vākya* here, does not mean a sentence in the ordinary sense of the term. It consists of five parts which are themselves sentences; *Vākya* is a technically defined word.

⁴ Dinnaga and Dharmakīrti, however, talk of only three parts of a syllogism.

⁵ Commentary of Nyaya-Sūtra 1.1.1. The *Pramāṇas* are *Pratyakṣa*, or perception, *Anumāna* or deductive inference, *Upamāna* or analogy, and *Śabda* or language (or Verbal testimony).

⁶ In his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Heṭu-Bindu*, Arcata writes :

"*dṛṣṭānta-vacanam na sādhyasiddhyartham*".

"*tasmāt yaiva sarvopasaṃharaṇaḥ vyūptiḥ pramāṇasiddhiḥ pratibandha-mibandhaḥ sādhyasiddhau samarthā saiva tat smṛtaye pradarśaniyā*".

⁷ Refer to the discussion in the later part of the paper where I refer to the distinction made by Nyaya logicians between *vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhava* and *anumāna*, or (to use the language of modern logic) between implication and inference. I have tried to show that the rule of implication is a meta-language rule of the logical language.

⁸ Nyaya-Sūtras : 1.1.34 - 1.1.38

⁹ An indefinite particular proposition may be another difference. But that is not a formal one.

¹⁰ In his Prior Analytic II, Sect. XXIV Aristotle does refer to inference from Example. But the importance of Instance seems to have escaped the notice of most of the deductive logicians, Greek or otherwise.

¹¹ Almost all authors like Kuppaswami Śaṣṭrī and Vidyā Bhūṣaṇa mention this. But evidently there is a difference between principle and application of principle. Indian logic does presuppose logical principles which are formal in character. It is of course true that Indian logic does not make use of notations like A, E, I or O. But it is also not true that the use of notations was not known to the Indians. Algebra which is definitely of Indian origin uses 'ya', 'ta' etc., as symbols. Similarly Indian grammar has introduced a very wonderful system of symbols which can be profitably used in logical works. Introduction of zero or *śūnya* is also a very important step in this direction.

¹² Some commentators of Udayana's Nyaya-Kusumanjali try to interpret *pramāṇa* as both ; '*pramā eva pramāṇam*, and '*pramāṇāḥ kāranaṃ pramāṇam*' ; thus reducing the difference between the object of knowledge and means of knowledge to zero.

¹³ Raghunātha Śhīromani for example says that *Anumāna* is *pratyakṣopajitā śarūpataḥ phalataḥ* (*Anumāna : Dīdhiḥ*)

¹⁴ It appears to me that the concept of *Tarka* has also undergone a change in the development of logical concepts. Perhaps originally it stood for formal principle of thinking and was presupposed by *Anumāna*. It is only in this sense that it occurs in Mahābhārata as in the Verse, "*Tarkopatiṣṭhaḥ...*" etc. But in course of time it became an additional argument in support of *Anumāna*. It would thus be argued by reverting *Vyāpti*, that if there is no fire, there is no smoke. 'But the smoke cannot be denied because it is visible'. Such an argument is very different from the fact of experience. Since, smoke which is perceptible cannot be denied, *Tarka* is then useful for proving the *Vyāpti* and comes to be defined as '*vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropeṇa*'.

¹⁵ This may lead to a number of problems :

a) According to Nyaya, *Abhava* is also perceptible, though it will always be a correlative of something which is positive,

b) According to Nyaya, Dravya, Guna and Karma alone are existing. How can a class exist then? But though a class is not an existent it is a class of existents. Satta is a Jati. So, Jati cannot be a Satta.

c) Guna or quality will be thought to be a universal in Western philosophy. But it is not thought so here.

d) Re. "*svanūpatah, phalatah ca pratyaksopajivi (Dīdhiti)*". So, even if the subject in Pratijna is a singular term and a name, the bearer of the name is assured.

¹¹ A class or a sub-class is defined by some property, whereas a member of a class is only demonstrated. So, whereas a class can exist without a member, a member always denotes a particular existence. A unit class should not be confused with a member.

¹² It is because of this that in some systems of Indian Logic "*Kerala-vyāhṛiki-vyāpṛi*" is disallowed.

¹³ Please refer to the last paragraph of this paper and footnote 7.

¹⁴ It is perhaps true that Greek logicians including Aristotle have not clearly distinguished between the subsumptive and the applicative type and have made use of the two kinds of syllogisms indiscriminately. But from this it will be difficult to conclude that Aristotle was unaware of this distinction.¹⁵ On the contrary his recognition of the fallacy of division and composition indicates that this distinction was at the back of his mind.

¹⁶ *Methods of Logic* pp. 71-72.

¹⁷ This may perhaps go against the idealistic theory of judgment. But I am not sure.

¹⁸ Aristotle's Syllogistic.

¹⁹ Without this, the validity of the subaltern relation, conversion of the universal affirmative proposition and validity of moods like Darii etc., cannot be explained.

In fact Łukasiewicz even goes further and says that Aristotle had only this kind of implication in his mind when he talked of syllogism, the two premisses standing for the antecedent and the conclusion for the consequent.

²⁰ *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, p. 72.

²¹ Assuming Socrates to be existing.

²² *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, p. 72.

²³ It may be objected that an Indian type of syllogism can be subsumptive in character and that there can exist a relation of class and subclass between *Hetu* and *Pakṣa*. This is possible and I have explained this under *Vyāpyavyāpaka bhāva*. If a major premiss of such a syllogism has existential import then the syllogism will not only be valid but will also be true. However, if the conclusion of such a syllogism is universal it will have no existential import necessarily and so the *Dṛṣṭānta* in the *Vyāpṛi* or major premiss is redundant. On the other hand the *Dṛṣṭānta* becomes valuable only if the conclusion is particular. But in such a case the minor term will have an existential import and will stand in subaltern relation with the major term; and this minor term, so far as Indian Logic is concerned, is, as a matter of fact, either an existential singular term or a summation of existential singular terms. I am, therefore, inclined to take the view that the Indian type of syllogism is of an applicative type and not of subsumptive type. I have tried to show in the text of this paper how an applicative type of inference can be deduced from the implicative one. So even if somebody says that the Indian type of syllogism is subsumptive and not applicative, it does not affect my position. It must, however, be remembered that at least by way of practice for Indian logicians the *pakṣa* is a particular or rather an existential singular term or an existential class which stands in a relation of class-membership with *hetu*.

²⁴ *Ghaṭarva* = potness, *Ṛtheitva* = earthness and *Dravyatva* = substantiveness.

²⁵ Indian logicians have distinguished between *Bhāva* and *Satta*.

SAMAVAYA—A CRITIQUE

K. C. VARADACHARI

SAMAVAYA is a word that signifies combination or union, conjunction : —intimate union, constant and inseparable conjunction or inherence; it is claimed to be one of the important categories of the Vaiseshika realistic philosophy. They use this category to explain the relationship between *dravya* and *guṇa* and *guṇa* and *jāti*.¹ Thus a quality inheres in the *dravya*, blue colour inheres in the sky, brown in the wood, and viscosity in oil and so on. That is to say, the quality cannot appear apart from the *dravya*, and exists in the *dravya* alone. No doubt one quality passes and another quality takes its place when a black colour of the mud passes and gives place to red when a brick is 'fired', which shows that qualities inhere in a substance but changes of quality do not affect the substance. So too the *jāti* or *sāmānya* (classness) inheres in a quality.

All these inherences are said to be of the same nature. It is when the claim is made that all the *samavāyas* are one only that we have to try to understand exactly what this means. It means for one that all kinds of *samavāya* or inherence are of the same kind and that there are not many kinds of *samavāya*. For example, the inherent relation between *dravya* and *guṇa* is the same kind as that between *guṇa* and *sāmānya*. It means simply that if the *guṇa* changes the *sāmānya* changes or ■ *guṇa* can have many *sāmānyas* but a *sāmānya* can inhere only in one *guṇa*. So too if ■ *dravya* changes the *guṇa* changes but *guṇa* cannot exist apart from *dravya*. This is true of all kinds of inhering categories.

The inhering relation can be therefore of two kinds :
(i) eternal as in the case of the qualities of the eternal substances

which do not change their qualities at all, e.g. the soul being cit. But its knowledge function can be a temporary quality. Thus the knowledge function is related to the substance as temporary but knowledge-nature is inherent. This is clearly a case of inherence (*samavāya*), which holds together two categories or even more, since in knowledge we find many categories are held together.

Thus in the demonstration of complete definite knowledge the Nyaya logicians propounded a theory of six-fold contact, *ṣaḍ-vidha-sannikarṣa*. Six-mannered contact is a better translation than six kinds of contact. Knowledge aimed at is definite knowledge and in perception complete knowledge would involve or imply knowledge of *dravya*, *guṇa*, *sāmānya*, *karma* too, and knowledge about a thing would imply knowledge of its name (denotation) and in order to be meaningful it must belong to a language within which it inheres or which inheres in the name, and lastly it must be clear for any definite knowledge there should be the statement of existing in a place and time. This last is called *abhāva* or non-existence but it can well be shewn that *abhāva* was a category that came later than or as a reflection on *bhāva* or existence. This of course does not make *abhāva* an inference, for *abhāva* can be perceived as an absence of what was previously present.

The *ṣaḍ-vidha-sannikarṣa* has clearly to be perceived as the development of the definiteness of knowledge. Surely *karma* was omitted for activity and rest were considered most probably to fall into the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* contact.²

There have been earlier thinkers who did not think that we need a category like *samavāya*. (i) Because *samavāya* speaks the language of aggregation which is permanent togetherness, (2) because one would require a *samavāya* for a *samavāya* and so on *ad infinitum*. Why not be satisfied with contact (*samyoga*) which is temporary and all relations between objects which are temporary or between objects and qualities even, it is so. Thus *samavāya* is a category that we need not accept. That everything changes and change means the change in *guṇa* and *sāmānya* and so on, is the view at the back of this criticism.

The question is, do we need to say that the contact between the knower and the object known is of the same order or kind as that between the *dravya* and the *guṇa* or the *guṇa* and the *sāmānya* or between name and form and name and language (the earlier version is between ether in the ear and ether outside). There is an essential difference between the two types of contact and we cannot say that *samavāya* and *samyoga* are identical. If *samyoga* can connect then *samavāya* also can, but the differentia between the two lies in the fact that in *samyoga* one can disconnect oneself from the object just like a copulatory link between two carriages, but one cannot disconnect the *dravya* from *guṇa* in a mechanical way. It is a metaphysical distinction, not a mechanical disjunction that is possible between the *dravya* and *guṇa* or *guṇa* and *sāmānya*.

The criticism that one requires another *samavāya* to connect *samavāya* is a specious piece of intellectual logic that does not believe that there can be any connection at all, but a characterless substance or reality.

One question however may be raised and that is to ask whether *samavāya* is not a kind of internal relation as distinct from an external relation? If it is an internal relation then is it not clear that the terms must in a sense be so related and modified by each other that when a *guṇa* passes or a *dravya* changes the terms would also get modified? The *samavāya* or inherence or internal relation will bring about a contradiction in so far as it has to fall away from one *guṇa* and catch hold of another *guṇa* which means that inherence acts as a polymorphic entity. Further any internal relation is a contradiction in so far as it is fixed and unchangeable and no dynamic explanation can be given. That is the reason why in Idealistic metaphysics which accepts internal relations as fixed we are presented with a block universe. Relations are from a realistic point of view clearly to reveal two kinds or rather three: one, there can be connection between objects (*dravyas*), and this is *samyoga*; the *samyoga* between a knower and his object reveals to him that the object possesses characteristics like *guṇa* which in turn belongs to a class of qualities. The connections that he establishes with the *guṇa* and *sāmānya*

are clearly through the perception of the *dravya*—this is of course in some cases modified—for one can perceive a *guṇa* or ■ *sāmānya* apparently but no sooner than he does so perceive he begins to seek out the locus (*āśraya*) or abode of these qualities and *sāmānyas* which he had perceived. Thus some thinkers say that it is better to hold that one perceives the abode of *guṇa* and *sāmānya* and the description of this experience can be *samyukta-āśraya*. But one asks whether this obviates the conception of *samavāya*. The term *āśraya* only shows that one perceives the *guṇa* in a *dravya*; it does not show how the *guṇa* and *dravya* are related metaphysically—metaphysically discernible but physically impartible. This ideal conception of the relation between the *dravya* and *guṇa* is dropped out. The fact remains that we have to have a separate concept for explaining this relationship between *dravya* and *guṇa* : it does not matter at all if one calls the relationship as one of primary and secondary qualities and then reduces all to subjective ideas—all these will not get rid of the experience of the *dravya* and *guṇa* and *sāmānya* or even name and form and name and language within which the former is meaningful. These relations are not internal in the idealistic sense of modifying the nature of the terms except as factors of implicative inference nor are they external in the sense that they make no implication at all to experience.

Thus *samavāya* is a valuable category for explaining the peculiar function of metaphysical analysis in relation to the problem of relation between a *dravya* and *guṇa* and *guṇa* and *sāmānya* and also between name and language not to speak of name and form.

However it can be seen that *samavāya* is used by Nyaya-Vaisheshika in another connection. This is in respect of Causality. They have distinguished between *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* and *nimitta kāraṇas*. There is another cause known as *prayojana* utility or final cause. The first, *samavāyi kāraṇa* is so called because it inheres both in the cause and the effect, that is, it is *dravya* (substance) which is necessary and it is that which undergoes change of state. Mud is the material which inheres in the pot. Gold is the material that inheres in the bangle. Cotton

inheres in the threads and cloth. This is called *upādāna* or material cause. Thus inherence means that which is present in both the states of cause and effect. Surely there are changes in *guṇa* in the states cause and effect. The efficient cause is the person who brings about the effect using the cause. It is called *nimitta*. Many cases are there which show that *nimitta* also includes occasion or purpose and therefore *prayojana*, may be included under *nimitta*. The occasion for making a pot or bangle or cloth can be definitely given. It is the motive. It is true that whilst we can give motives for the doing of certain things, it will be difficult to give the cosmic reason for bringing into being creation or for Nature. However the reason for the creation of the world will give rise to the problem of *nimitta* on the part of God.

The *asamavāyi kāraṇa* is of course most interesting for it describes all those causes which do not inhere in the effect but cooperate with the cause (*samavāyi*) to bring about the effect. They are in the case of making a pot, the potter, the wheel, the stick, water, etc.

The *asamavāyi kāraṇa* therefore refers to all those implements and ingredients (*sāmagrī*) which do not form part of the effect at all but which are nonetheless necessary for its production. The usual examples given in the manuals unfortunately do not give us any clear idea of the nature of the *asamavāyi kāraṇa*.

Thus *samavāya* would mean when applied to causality again inherence which reveals that Nyaya-Vaisheshika did not reject a kind of modified identity between cause and effect. All that they claimed was that the totality of causes (including *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* and *nimitta*) do not exhibit themselves in the effect, and indeed it is precisely because certain things are not in the cause but which have been brought into being in the effect that it is claimed that the effect is non-existent in the cause but comes into being anew.

It is clear that *samavāya* is a necessary concept for revealing the metaphysical and realistic facts of the perceptive and inferential order. The term '*samyukta-āśraya*' can hardly be used in

terms of causality which is a factor of inherence. Can we do without *samavāya* because it is a multiplication of categories? It has been shewn that the law of parsimony or the Occam's Razor cannot be applied in all cases. Inherence in this limited sense shows that the effect is not in the cause nor the cause in the effect in the sense of logical implication but that it is more probable to hold that there must be some substance common to both the cause and the effect. In this lies the refutation of Nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) which claims that there is no substance at all and that out of Nothing something comes into being. Logical implication flows from effect to cause but not from cause to effect, inherence being only of *guṇa* in *dravya* but not of *dravya* in *guṇa*. It is *śeṣavat amumāna*. Visishtadvaita claimed that *samavāya* is not quite adequate to explain the relationship between God and the soul and nature, for all these are *dravyas* and not in the relation of *guṇa* and *dravya*. *Samavāya* was refuted in the usual way of leading to regress and so on, and one must confess that it was also shewn that inherence must be permanent and reciprocal or not at all. That is to say it must be permanent and not impermanent. This of course is to demand from objective and realistic analysis something that is not there. Change reveals this demand for some inherences being temporary: it is not perhaps necessary to say that all should be permanent and none should be temporary.

The relation between *dravya* and *dravya* as, for example, between God and souls is said to be one of inseparability (*apṛthaksiddha*). So too the relation between God and Nature is said to be one of inseparability (*apṛthaksiddha*). This is on the ground that God is ever exercising the power of control, direction, support and enjoyment of them. In other words, the constant exercise of power over the two *dravyas* mentioned (souls and Nature) is said to be logically being defined as inseparability. Suppose the souls are separated from God; what will result? Suppose Nature is separated from God; what will result? In the one case the souls may cease to be as also in the other case Nature will cease to be. In other words it is inconceivable that either the souls or Nature cease to be and this assurance-of

their eternity it is that makes us assume that God does not even for a while cease to exercise power of preservation of them. However, how are we to explain the processes of change in the soul's consciousness-function and the Nature except by saying that God with whom they form a unity (*samavāya* or Oneness) wills the manifold manifestations of souls and Nature?

Thus *aprthaksiddha sambandha* differentiating itself from *samavāya* does rescue the souls and Nature from being mere *viśeṣaṇas* or *guṇas*, for it firmly establishes the fact that it is relation between real entities (*dṛavyas*) and secondly the inherence is not of the causal (*upādāna*) order or kind, and that it is permanent.

This is usually lost sight of because some thinkers almost reduce the soul to the level of a *guṇa* and Nature to the level of *triguṇas* which because of this misuse or abuse of the term leads to various misinterpretations.

However we have yet to feel our way to speaking about *samavāya* as the principle of Reality as basically governed by Unity or System or One-Many. All pluralistic thinkers must arrive at the realisation of the necessity for a principle of Inherence or Aggregation and Combination which will produce Happiness for all. In what sense can this sense of inherence or union be discovered in all and between all. It is impossible to think that this inherence can be between all individuals as such, except by the assumption of a common bond of love that animates all from within, inseparable from our nature. This may be Atman or the living principle in all. But is it the technical inherence as we have met with in the Nyaya? No. However Vedanta has spoken of this Self in all and all in the Self in a sense of basic inherence or should we better choose the word *aprthaksiddha*? As it has been pointed out *aprthaksiddha* is linked up with the Power of the Divine, the Cosmic Support of all whereas the love that sustains all is of the order of inherence, internal linking—but then these are terms which are not adequate to describe the sense of support and love that are combined in our transcendent experience of the Divine and the Bhagavatas.

NOTES

¹ *dravya*: substance—substrate of a quality or qualities which may be changing
guṇa: quality (Nyaya Vaisesika); constituent element or energy (Samkhya).
Sāmānya: generality or universal that is reflected in each *guṇa* and entity.

² *Some Problems of Indian Logic*, K.C.Varadachari.

EMPIRICISM AND RELIGIONS

NINIAN SMART

THERE is much scepticism today, in the English-speaking world, about the possibility of metaphysics. The notion that we can, by some form of reasoning or other, discover the truth about Ultimate Reality, is suspect. The root of this condition lies in the impact of scientific method upon philosophy: this found its formal expression in the Verification Principle. In this paper¹ I want to consider the effect of empiricism upon the philosophy of religion, with special reference to two main points. First, scepticism about metaphysics is sometimes used paradoxically as a preliminary to an irrationalist defence of revelation. I want to argue that in the present condition of the world, where the great religions are at last reasonably aware of one another, this defence, on the whole, fails. Second, it may be backed up by the thesis that there is a fundamental unity in all religions, revealed somehow in intuition or mystical experience. I want to argue (unfashionably) that this charitable view is misleading. But before going on to these major topics of the paper, I wish briefly to say something about the challenge of empiricism and its relevance to Indian philosophy.

I

Empiricism and Indian Philosophy

[Some Indian philosophers with whom I have conversed have hinted that there is no need to worry much about contemporary empiricism and linguistic philosophy. This

attitude perhaps stems from two considerations. First, India has from early times had its own acquaintance with empiricism, naturalism, materialism and the like; and so there is a tendency to think of modern empiricism as no new thing, as already docketed among possible views, as the kind of thing which appeals to people of a certain temperament, and therefore as something that can safely be ignored by philosophers of other schools. Second, modern empiricism appears to have a Western origin, and religious people in India may feel that it is a by-product of Western 'materialism' (in the unphilosophical sense) and of its comparative indifference to spiritual ideals. Both these considerations, though having a grain of truth, are misleading. For though the naturalistic tradition in Indian philosophy has been of considerable importance, just as it was also among the Greeks, neither ancient Indian nor ancient Greek naturalism can be compared in importance to contemporary empiricism, for a simple reason : *scientific method had not been evolved*. The theory of knowledge has to do with ways of knowing, and modern science is a way of knowing distinct from all others and tremendously fruitful. Thus ancient naturalism is a mere intuitive foreshadowing of a scientific empiricism. Again, as to the second consideration, it must be remembered that science is neither Eastern nor Western, and it would be absurd (save in a merely historical and unimportant sense) to talk of French physics or Thai chemistry or Indian zoology. (This is why the Marxists sometimes make fools of themselves by speaking of bourgeois science.) It is true that much of Western philosophers' neglect of religion is due to the indifference to spiritual values mentioned above, but this does not mean that contemporary empiricism can be neglected by the pious. Far from it, for some of the indifference arises from intellectual reasons, chief among which is the feeling that the application of scientific method leaves no room for religious truth. For this and other reasons, it is unfortunate that we still tend to speak about Indian, Chinese, British and German philosophy. What philosophy ultimately means is that the only sort of philosophy is a world philosophy. Sadly, however, national

pride, West and East, and ignorance, mainly in the West, provide obstacles to the realisation of this goal. But when I say 'world philosophy' I emphatically do *not* mean that there should be some metaphysical doctrine accepted by all philosophers in the world; but only that philosophers should argue with one another openly and courteously, treating all ideas as public property, and forgetting the historical origins of these ideas. The philosopher must be a citizen of the world.

Thus contemporary empiricism is bound to have an effect on the philosophy of religion, whether religion be conceived as Christian or Hindu or Buddhist. It is true that some attacks upon religion by philosophers² show a total unawareness of the fact that some of the points they adduce only apply to Christianity, so that the arguments are parochial. Nevertheless, the notion that there is a transcendent Reality or state apprehended through revelation or religious experience needs to be defended in the face of modern empiricism and anti-metaphysics if it is to be acceptable to intelligent persons.

II

Anti-metaphysics and religious irrationalism

The Madhyamika is of special interest in this connection, for it illustrates very nicely the main problem arising from metaphysical irrationalism, i.e., from the view that philosophical arguments cannot succeed in establishing anything about Ultimate Reality. The characteristics of the Madhyamika relevant to our present inquiry can be summarised briefly as follows³: (i) the rejection of dogmatism or *dr̥ṣṭivāda*; (ii) the denial of the possibility of discursive knowledge about Ultimate Reality, and connectedly the attempt to show the contradictory nature of all possible views; (iii) nevertheless, the claim that there is in some sense an Absolute (*tathatā*, *dharmakāya*); and (iv) the thesis that the Absolute phenomenalizes itself in a revelatory way (as the *Tathāgata*).

Thus, very curiously, the breakdown in metaphysics can

still turn out to be a triumph of religion, and the abandonment of discursive thought leaves room for the acceptance of a revelation. It is curious too that a very similar position was held by Mansel, in the last century, who, in his Bampton Lectures,⁴ erected a new defence of Christianity upon the basis of philosophical agnosticism and who in one way or another would subscribe to the four features of the *Madhyamika* described above, save that Christ, not the *Tathāgata*, becomes the phenomenalized Absolute.

Nor is this all. Kierkegaard, who has deeply influenced Christian theology, likewise subscribes to metaphysical irrationalism and uses it brilliantly and suggestively to introduce an appeal to faith and revelation. Even Wittgenstein (he loved to read Kierkegaard) hints at a similar position. Certainly, some of those who have been influenced by him have fashioned a similar 'defence' of religious truth⁵. Thus we discover, in different places, philosophers who have been driven, for varying reasons, into holding that metaphysical argument cannot yield the ultimate truth and who have used this situation as a paradoxical support for revelation and faith. It is a kind of intellectual *satyāgraha*.

The general form of metaphysical irrationalism can be expressed roughly as follows. "One feels that perhaps there is an Ultimate Reality; and yet upon scrutiny of the metaphysical attempts to establish its existence and to show its nature, one sees that they have inescapable defects. All we can do is to point dumbly towards the unknown and inexpressible X, and to acknowledge the incapacity of all thought and language. But yet there is revelation: if we seek insight into Ultimate Reality, this can be our only source. But it is a source which in the nature of the case cannot be defended by reasonings. The inexpressible shows itself to us, but mysteriously."

Now there is ample warrant in religion for the view that God or Brahman is ineffable. There is warrant too for the view that it is by revelation that we know the truth. And there is warrant again for the view that it is by faith and spiritual experience, rather than by ratiocination, that the truth is to be

apprehended. So metaphysical irrationalism as a preparation for revelation seems a plausible line of approach.

Nevertheless, as it stands, it is untenable.

First, for the following and obvious reason : that if a simple appeal to revelation is made, in the context of the world as we find it, where there are differing revelations or supposed revelations, it is legitimate to ask why one formulation rather than any other should be chosen. Mansel had no warrant to identify Christ rather than the Buddha with the unknown X.

It may be replied that we do not choose revelations, but rather they choose us. But (i) revelations claim to enshrine the truth, and the fact that most people are born into, rather than choose, a religion does not entail that there is no means of deciding the truth. Likewise, people differ in traditional beliefs about morality, but this does not imply the subjectivity of morals. (ii) If the objection is an echo of the thought "God chooses us, not we Him", then we must remember that this thought itself expresses an element of revelation (theistic, moreover), and it would be circular to argue upon this basis.

But it may be further objected that revelations do not compete. They all, perhaps, witness to a single truth in all religions.⁶

This brings me to the second major topic of the paper.

III

The Fundamental Unity of Religions

Revelations employ words⁷, and words seem to conflict as between one formulation of religious truth and another. For instance, it is necessary, according to the Christians, to have faith in a personal Creator, but this is unnecessary, according to the Theravada. So the following dilemma obtains : either words here mean something, in which case there is competition; or they mean nothing, in which case nothing is said. But if nothing is said, anti-religion is an equally good expression of religion as is religion, and this is absurd.

But, it may be replied, theological words are not literal and are not precisely definable. One must look beyond their overt meanings. God is not literally a Father, nor Durga literally a Mother. But this is no argument. God is not literally a Father, but in Christian theology He is not even non-literally an onion. Some expressions are more appropriate than others. This is all that is needed for the contention that here words mean something.

But if words can be, so to speak, stretched, it may still turn out that all revelations witness to a single truth. But what truth? The rub lies in this; for the fundamental truth has to be expressed. But how? Maybe the great religions could agree upon a highly abstract formula, but not one which would cover the following points (i) whether there is rebirth and *karma*; (ii) whether there is a personal Creator; (iii) whether there are any incarnations of such a Creator; (iv) whether if so there are one or many; (v) whether Ultimate Reality exists as the ground of the visible cosmos; and (vi) whether salvation involves identity with Ultimate Reality or not. More abstractly, one could put the argument as follows: in order to speak of the fundamental unity it must be specified, i.e., put into words. These words I shall call the 'propositional nucleus'. An empirical revelation then will consist in (a) the propositional nucleus and (b) the remainder. Even given agreement over a propositional nucleus, there will be disagreement about the remainder.

But, it may be said, the remainder is inessential. But what are the criteria of inessentiality? It will be impossible to get the best minds (*mahājana*) of all the great religions to describe *all* the remainder as inessential. But if so, what is the point of the talk about 'fundamental unity'?

In any case, the central truths propounded by early Islam and by the Theravada respectively share nothing significant in common.⁸ It is true that there are resemblances between Sufism and certain aspects of the Mahayana. But this is not to the point, for if the best minds of the main stream of Muslim orthodoxy and of the Theravada cannot agree upon a substantial propositional nucleus, what are the defenders of fundamental unity to

say? Are they to say that Buddhaghosa misunderstood the inner truth of Buddhism? Such an appeal to an 'esoteric' truth secretly going back to the founders of the great religions, who have allegedly been grossly misunderstood by a great mass of their followers, scarcely recommends itself to the serious historical investigator.⁹

Further, from the point of view of bringing actual unity of purpose among the great religions, such an attempt to sponsor an esoteric doctrine will fail. Does it help to tell Christians that the 'real meaning of their faith has eluded the great figures of the Christian tradition, or to tell the Theravadin that, despite the spiritual traditions and practices of the Sangha in Ceylon, Burma and elsewhere, the Buddha *really* taught belief in an eternal Self? Even if this latter could be established, we are still left with the problem of the religious experience of countless Buddhists in the Lesser Vehicle.

Yet the upholders of fundamental unity may still be dissatisfied: for, they will say, the ultimate truth is inexpressible. But the difficulty about this belief is that if it be taken in its obvious sense, then the inexpressible truth cannot be connected with any one expression of revelation rather than any other, nor with all of them taken together (supposing that they are compatible) rather than with atheism or anti-religion. The reason why the illusion exists that there can be such a connection between the inexpressible and doctrines is that historically metaphysical irrationalism has often taken the form of the transcending of religious positions. For instance, *śūnyatā* has the flavour of Buddhist *dhyāna* about it; Kierkegaard's metaphysical despair has the tang of a man who cannot worship enough. This is not surprising, for it is precisely this kind of *dialectical ineffability* which characterizes religious discourse—we go beyond the words of worship, for instance, but our silence only has significance in that context, in the context of the words which we have previously uttered. Thus if the appeal to ineffability is taken in its proper religious context, it is itself only intelligible given that certain propositions are already thought to be true. But the supposition that the highest

truth is completely ineffable spells disaster for the very notion of truth. Silence itself can neither be true nor false. And silence is compatible with all propositions whatsoever. Thus the fundamental unity of religions cannot be defended by saying that the ultimate truth is completely ineffable.

A subtler way of synthesizing religious revelations is by saying that there are different levels of truth. At one level, say, the truth is that there is a personal Creator; but at another level, the truth is that there is an impersonal Absolute. But though this way has been used, it does not solve our problems. For Radhakrishnan¹⁰, one level is higher; for Zaehner¹¹ another. For Shankara one, for Ramanuja another. We thus have on our hands a priority decision¹² between different types of doctrine, which themselves reflect different patterns of religious or spiritual experience.

It is therefore of the utmost importance to distinguish between an interpretation of other religions or doctrinal systems from the point of view of one's own (which is comparatively easy to do) and looking at them from a 'neutral' and sympathetic point of view. The thesis of fundamental unity nearly always turns out to be a version of the former process, but buys unity at the expense of misinterpreting other faiths when these are considered *from their own point of view*.

The richness and variety of patterns of religious experience and practice must be kept in view. The idea of fundamental unity is an attempt to conceal this richness and to impose upon it a spurious uniformity.

It remains to ask why the idea is so appealing. Why should there be thought to be a single thread running through all faiths? Part of the reason is that people are used to an outmoded form of definition. Because both Buddhism and Islam are commonly called religions¹³ it is thought that they must have some doctrine in common. But, as Wittgenstein has already shown¹⁴, the use of the same word for various things is often based upon family resemblance. A may be like B, B like C, C like D, but there may be no direct and substantial resemblance between A and D. But a more important reason for the thesis

of fundamental unity is this. Since experience plays such a central role in religion, and since also it is often (and in a way rightly) defended as being intuitive, it is thought that it enhances the claim of religious experience to be veridical if it everywhere testifies to the same truth.

Thus to some degree the idea is based upon a fear : a fear that otherwise the truth-telling qualities of prophetic and mystical experience may crumble away. And yet for all that Muhammad and the Buddha can scarcely be directly compared ; and there is a wide divergence in many ways between Isaiah and Meister Eckhart. It is both clear-headed and courageous to recognize different patterns of religious experience, and it is to the credit of some of the greatest Indian theologians and philosophers that they have done so. But, as I say, there still remains the problem of the 'priority' of these different patterns, and this problem cannot simply be solved by dogmatic assertion that one or other represents the higher truth.

Our conclusion, then, is that metaphysical irrationalism as a defence of religion cannot be bolstered by the appeal to fundamental unity. In effect irrationalism involves an appeal to revelation : this appeal must fail if there are more than one revelation, for we still need reasons for deciding between revelations. Nor can we get round this by holding that somehow or other all revelations implicitly say exactly the same thing.

IV

Metaphysical Irrationalism and Natural Theology

There is a further objection to metaphysical irrationalism which we have not so far noticed. Although it has the virtue of stripping away over-intellectualism in religion, it nevertheless leaves us in the dark about religious experience, for the following reason. If someone claims to have an experience of God, he is necessarily interpreting that experience in some degree. In a theistic context he is not merely saying that he has had an experience of a certain sort, but he is further

claiming that this experience is directly linked with the Creator of the cosmos. Now an unknown X is by no means necessarily the Creator of the cosmos, nor even a Being (it might, like *nirvāṇa*, be more like a state than a substance). Metaphysical irrationalism cannot help us in linking the experience of the individual to anything beyond the experience. Admittedly the experience itself may in some sense carry with it the intuition that here something transcendent is being met with. Nevertheless, men wish to know whether this transcendent entity or state has anything to do with the Ground of the cosmos, or whether the experience of the transcendent brings a cessation of rebirth. Both these questions involve metaphysical, and even empirical, argument if they are to be answered. It follows that in the widest sense of 'natural theology' (where this is evacuated of its theistic overtones), natural theology is necessary, if the traditional kind of religious belief is to be vindicated.

Of course, we may settle for something less, namely the view which I have elsewhere¹⁵ called 'psychological pragmatism'. This is a view favoured by some Westerners who have fallen in love with Zen: what we want from religion or a way of life is experience of a certain kind, and never mind (once you have gained *satori* or whatever kind of 'illumination' is being sought) whether it reveals the truth or not. The point of religious practice reduces to the function of engineering such ineffable states of mind. Indeed, there is a close connexion between ineffabilism and psychological pragmatism. Once you adopt this position, then any conflict between empiricism and religion vanishes, anti-metaphysics is to be welcomed, and natural theology is of no interest whatsoever.

Nevertheless, psychological pragmatism is not so much a version of traditional religion (it is not even an adequate interpretation of Zen: for Western Zen and Zen are not, I suspect, the same things at all), as a new faith. No philosopher can object in principle to such a new faith. But it is his duty to point out that it is not a traditional position in new dress. Indeed, if it pretends to be, it is masquerading. All I am concerned

with in the present article is the relation between certain modern ideas and religion as it has traditionally been understood, namely as a way of life presupposing certain truths about the nature of the cosmos. Since psychological pragmatism does not presuppose anything about the nature of the cosmos, it is not, in this sense, a religion. Some form, then, of natural theology is necessary if religion is to be defended. At the same time, of course, we can learn from metaphysical irrationalism the danger of thinking of religion exclusively in intellectual terms: Metaphysics of some sort is needed to vindicate the truth-claims of religious experience; but it is parasitical upon the latter in so far as without living experience religion is pointless and empty.

Both in regard to metaphysics and religious experience itself contemporary empiricism presents an important challenge.

V

Empiricism and Religious Experience

The challenge of empiricism in this context can be summed up as follows. Truths about matters of fact must be established upon the basis of experience. They must be testable by experience, and the most fruitful way of thinking about such testing is by using the concept of *falsification*. A statement is factually significant if and only if it can in principle be falsified. This provides a good criterion for evaluating scientific theories, or rather for deciding which of them genuinely are scientific theories. Now it so happens that religious truths, even if they may be claimed to be based in some sense upon experience, are such that there is no way of falsifying them in principle: we cannot conceive any empirical test which would do this, or even a mystical experience which would do this. Consequently, religious statements are not factually significant.

The matter can be put in a more informal way by saying: whereas scientific method does yield agreement, since scientists agree on how to agree, the same cannot be said about religious

teachings. Look at the world (our empiricist can say) and see how the Buddha says one thing, Christ another, Ramanuja another.) Look how the adherents of different faiths claim to have a view of the ultimate truth, and yet see how the views differ! How can there be truth, when there is no methodology? How can there be conclusions when there are no rules of inference?

The answer to this challenge is perhaps hard to come by. But one thing is clear: the answer must necessarily involve saying 'Different realms of discourse have different methodologies'. It is not sufficient for the pious man to say: I know the truth of religion in my bones, I know it by direct illumination (or what you will). It must be shown that it is reasonable to think that religious truth is not the same sort of thing as scientific truth; and it must be further shown what the rules of religious argument are. (I know this sounds sophisticated and not at all what we expect of missionaries and the like: this is partly the fault of the missionaries, and partly the result of the fact that nature has endowed different men with different capacities—but intellectuals are necessarily sophisticated, and they also necessarily have a place in the religious community). It follows from the nature of the challenge and from the nature of the kind of answer which I have foreshadowed that a necessary element in contemporary religious philosophy must be analysis—or, as it is sometimes called, linguistic analysis.

On the other issue, namely the anti-metaphysical streak of modern empiricism, similar remarks apply, in that arguments as to whether there is a Ground of the cosmos are partly criticized on like grounds (namely, that there is no way of testing conclusions empirically). Here again we are landed with methodological problems.

Regarding the analysis of doctrines and the rules of inference in religion, it is perhaps superfluous to add that this necessarily involves the comparative study of religions. It is a very considerable weakness of contemporary philosophy of religion in the West that the arguments so commonly centre upon the Christian religion alone. Perhaps there is something typi-

cally British about this, for there is a like neglect of French, German and other Continental philosophy, and this reflects the common British feeling that once you cross the Channel you are among very strange and ignorant people, whose chief peculiarity is that they are liable not to know English! However, one must add a *caveat* about the comparative study of religions. It is a study which once fell into bad odour, for the comparisons tend to be odious, and so people searched for a new name, such as the 'history of religions'. But of course the philosopher, when he contemplates religious facts, is not merely interested in history, but in central likenesses and differences, so that the old name still has a virtue, in bringing this important aspect of religious studies out into the open.

VI

Conclusion

I have argued that the challenge of anti-metaphysical empiricism is an important one, and that the irrationalistic defence of religion fails. I have further argued that the answer to the challenge would necessarily involve us in the analysis of religious concepts and rules of inference, and that this in turn means that the philosopher must engage in the comparative study of religion. These conclusions have, as a by-product, the pleasant implication that Eastern and Western philosophers will, in regard to an important theme, be brought closer together.

NOTES

¹ Part of the paper was read to the philosophers at Banaras Hindu University in August 1960 and at Bombay University in the following month. I am most grateful for the criticisms and friendliness of these two audiences.

² Consider, for instance, the influential volume *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (1955).

³ I am, of course, much indebted to Professor Murti's classic *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (1953).

⁴ *The Limits of Religious Thought* (1858).

⁵ See, for instance, Thomas McPherson's "Religion as the Inexpressible" in the Flew & MacIntyre volume (see n.2).

⁶ I have in mind the work of Guénon, and those influenced by him. See his *Introduction to Study of the Hindu Doctrines* (1945).

⁷ This is true even in spite of analyses such as are given by some modern Christian theologians, in which it is claimed that revelation is not a set of propositions but God's self-disclosure. For already in using the term 'God's self-disclosure' we are describing and interpreting the event. See John Baillie, *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought* (1956).

⁸ See my "Numen, Nirvana and the Definition of Religion", *Church Quarterly Review*, January 1959.

⁹ Partly because it would mean that the techniques of historical investigation would have so drastically to be revised that the historian would be involved in a kind of contradiction.

¹⁰ See, for instance, his *The Hindu View of Life* (1949).

¹¹ See his *At Sundry Times* (1958).

¹² See ch. V of my *Reasons and Faiths* (1958).

¹³ For the question of the definition of religion, see the article referred to in n. 11 above.

¹⁴ In *Philosophical Investigations* (1953).

¹⁵ In "Yoga in the Suburbs", *Listener*, 12 January 1961.

THE REAL CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS EXISTENTIALISM

WILLIAM HENRY HARRIS

It is often said that the principal value in existentialism lies in its protest against some tendencies in modern life. I do not altogether believe that this is true. Existentialism gives positive affirmation to several points which are fundamental to any constructive philosophy. And we should avoid popular tendencies to dismiss all radical criticisms of modern life as extreme, as well as the comfortable assumption that truth always lies within the bounds of good taste and moderation. Existentialists should be heard out for what they have to say. Existentialism is more than an aging fad. Therefore let us address ourselves to several misconceptions about existentialism which obscure its real contribution.

One of the principal positive contributions of those who have been called existentialists lies in the fact that they have brought back into the arena of serious intellectual discussion, even philosophical discussion, such fundamental human experiences as love, fear, hatred, anxiety, hope, tragedy, and desire. Classic philosophers from Plato to Spinoza to William James have discussed such experiences. They have been analysed with great care by Asian philosophers. But the recent tendency has been to consider such matters as of merely subjective import. These things, which are the very stuff of our every waking moment, have been considered to be a fit subject for lonely hearts columns or for ladies magazine fiction, but they are not thought to have anything to tell us about what the world is really like. It is thought that that can be found only by systematically

denuding ourselves of all that is distinctively human. This dichotomy between intelligence and existence has not made us more intelligent; it has often made the expression of our desires and emotions more foolish.

Such basic human experiences have even proved to be an embarrassment to many of those psychologists to whose care philosophers have sought to commit them. Clark Hull says that in order to keep himself from succumbing to the temptation of regarding man as a purposeful creature, he forces himself "from time to time" to regard "the behaving organism as a completely self-maintaining robot, constructed of materials as unlike ourselves as may be."¹ Strange empiricism! Strange indeed are those philosophies which hope to understand man and his world by painful inferences from the behaviour of white rats, or by entirely reducing the complexity of his consciousness to the simplicities of chemical reactions. To call an existentialist or a personalist merely negative in his protest at such a point is to make an assumption as to what a constructive point of view should be. It is philosophically constructive to re-emphasize the subjective richness of our experience and the real character of our relationships with one another.

It is likewise a positive contribution to be reminded that institutions are to be judged in terms of their ability to express and contribute to the fullness of human experience. In contemporary society institutions have been judged in terms of their contributions to military power, economic efficiency, or consumption and entertainment. Existentialists have reminded us of how hollow life can be even after all these values have been gained. They expose the pervasive tendency to convert our relationships with other persons into I-It relations, treating other persons, and even ourselves, as things, rather than genuine Thous.

This point has been frequently misunderstood. A person is not necessarily antisocial simply because he refuses to idolize social institutions. One may condemn the hollowness and disgust of much of modern life without being antisocial. It is a mark of our condition that a lean and hungry concern for the

inner life of man should be so easily equated with hostility toward others.

While the existentialist emphasis is not without weakness and ambiguities which need careful criticism, some of the misunderstandings which have greeted it have been so systematic and hostile as to seem almost wilful. The label of social irrelevance has persisted in spite of the fact that the existentialist camp is usually made to include Sartre, Camus, Simone Weil, Tillich, and Jaspers. Such people have often shown more concern for the plight of their fellowmen and more effective courage in resisting tyranny than most of their academic critics.

Another favorite whipping post is the existentialist emphasis upon the absurd. The real point is this: existentialists not only call us back to deeper levels of experience as a starting point, they also remind us that we must face experience as we find it. We can reason about it and relate experiences to one another. But one thing we must not do is to explain our experiences away. Experience has been explained away in various ways. It has been shown to be a "typical" experience. It has been shown to be "only a part" of a grand scheme of cosmic purpose. It has been shown to be "nothing but" a glandular reaction. Here, however, existentialists have been realists: They have insisted that an experience is what it is and not some other thing. They have clung to the irreducible givenness of human experience. This is what an empirical surd is: it is an irreducible, non-rational given. The redness of red, the bitterness of hate, the redemptive joy of love, can be brought into meaningful wholeness. But their "absurdity", their givenness, the fact that they happened in the first place must not be forgotten nor glossed over.²

Why should there be anything at all? But there is. Existence is often an irritation and an embarrassment. The most anguished attempts to escape from it are not to be found today in the traditional Orient. Modern scientists would often find it so much easier to live in the realm of theories and pure essences. Unheard melodies are sweet and experiments can be designed where men function as machines, and saints and poets are as simple as rats. In foam rubber modern society where birth is

anaesthetized and death is a perfumed "passing away" it is almost possible to ignore the painful and exhilarating tension which always separates essence and existence.³ If one does not say such words as death, depression, loneliness, and fear they will not exist. From such a modern viewpoint, existentialists must naturally be shown to be morbid or silly.

Again, existentialists are said to be subjectivists who advocate a blind, irrational leap of faith. Since the works of Søren Kierkegaard are so crucial to an understanding of existentialism, it is unfortunate that more attention is not given to his most philosophical book, the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Here he makes himself quite clear:

When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focussed upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth, even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true.⁴

It is important to see that Kierkegaard goes on to cite the knowledge of God as an example of what he means. He shows that the endeavor to prove God as an "object," a thing among things, is fruitless; the kind of truth he is seeking lies rather in the nature of the relationship "even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true." He clearly does not imply that what is objectively true does not matter, nor, incidentally, does he deny the existence of God.⁵ A century before, Kant, while stressing that only the "physico-theological" (teleological) argument could establish the existence of God within the

framework of pure reason, went on to point out that the God so proved would be simply a finite world-architect and without religious meaning.⁶ And, of course, many centuries before, the Upanishads distinguished *jñāna* from the *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* of everyday discourse. Knowledge about things is important, but it is acquaintance knowledge which transforms us and gives us insight. Acquaintance knowledge is not unimportant nor irrational simply because it cannot be subsumed under something which it is not.

A clear understanding of what subjectivity means will make clearer what Nietzsche and other existentialists mean in saying that God is dead. They do not mean that he has been disproved. They do not make the mistake of thinking that he was murdered by the communists, or the Darwinian theory of evolution, or the scientific and historical study of sacred scriptures. Such a mistake has been as widespread among those who enjoy thinking of themselves as the enemies of God as among those who imagine that they are his friends.

A quarter of a century ago the American poet Edna Millay, in *Conversation at Midnight*, saw more clearly that the "death" of God did not come about by the deliberate act of mankind :

Man has never been the same since God died.
He has taken it very hard.
Why, you'd think it was only yesterday,
The way he takes it.

Not that he says much, but he laughs much louder than he
used to,
And he can't bear to be left alone even for a minute, and he
can't
Sit still....

He gets along pretty well as long as it's daylight; he works very
hard,
And he amuses himself very hard with the many cunning
amusements
This clever age affords.

But it's all no use; the moment it begins to get dark, as soon
as it's night,
He goes out and howls over the grave of God.

If God had been killed by brave, direct action, only the weak and immature would mourn his passing. As it is, the mourners are principally the most sensitive and courageous spirits of our age.

God was not killed by opposition and skilful refutation, but by irrelevance. This irrelevance has been most assiduously cultivated by some of those institutions allegedly dedicated to his service. Frequent sensational "exposes" to the contrary notwithstanding, religious leaders and institutions are rarely dramatically corrupt or hypocritical. Religious groups rarely harbour more obscurantism and superstition than that generally current at the time and place. The worst thing about most religious institutions is that the relationship they seek to maintain with God does not make them conspicuously better. They do not stand in judgment against popular madness and evil. Many religious leaders show great dedication toward the eradication of those evils which blemish man and rationalize an acceptance of those radical evils which threaten to exterminate him. Many religious leaders go forth in full cry against forms of idolatry which have not tempted the people who hear them in 2000 years, and indirectly reenforce idolatries which call forth every evil of which man is capable. Every religious tradition shows more courage in attacking evils historically associated with another faith and culture, than in reforming from within its own faith and practice.

A doctrine is not necessarily true because its adherents seem to succeed. But surely no doctrine can be true if it has no results—or bad ones. The God of popular western (and popular eastern ?) religion is usually irrelevant—and thus dead. No God who is merely a utensil, or merely the God of a particular time, place, race, class, or culture, is big enough to survive in an age of science and world culture. Religious, as well as non-religious, existentialists are frank upon this point.

But the God of the philosophers and theologians has usually been as dead as the God of popular wish projection. Hume and, as we have seen, Kant saw this before the rise of the existentialist movement and wrestled with the issue with instructive ingenuity. It is perhaps the same issue underlying the "atheism" of Lord Buddha many years before them. And sixty years ago William James, not usually accounted an existentialist, put it as clearly as anyone and pointed beyond it :

The books of natural theology which satisfied the intellects of our grandfathers seem to us quite grotesque, representing, as they did, a God who conformed the largest things of nature to the paltriest of our private wants. The God whom science recognizes must be a God sale, not a retail business. He cannot accommodate his processes to the convenience of individuals. The bubbles on the foam which coats a stormy sea are floating episodes, made and unmade by the forces of wind and water. Our private selves are like those bubbles;...their destinies weigh nothing and determine nothing in the world's irremediable currents of events...

In spite of the appeal which this impersonality of the scientific attitude makes to a certain magnanimity of temper, I believe it to be shallow, and I can now state my reason in a comparatively few words. That reason is that so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.⁷

In a later passage James underlines his constructive existentialism even more clearly :

Individuality is founded on feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the

making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done. Compared with this world of living individualized feelings, the world the intellect contemplates is without solidity or life.

Thus the "free thinker" is as quaint and as beside the point as the theological obscurantist. Each of them raises a dust and then complains that he cannot see. The former "proves" that God does not exist by defining him badly and looking in the wrong place. The latter, sensing the incommensurability of his arguments and his conclusions, takes a blind leap, instead of revising his theology.

Here religious existentialists make a distinction between faith and belief which is quite helpful. As noted above, it may be comparable to the saving *jñāna* of Indian philosophy. Belief is theoretical acceptance; faith is existentialized belief. To have faith in God is to trust, but this does not deny doubt nor a continuation of intellectual investigation. In faith, will, action and feeling are joined to intellect in a total response to that Object-Subject which is worthy of complete concern. To illustrate a fundamental issue in a specific way, to have faith in President Kennedy is not the same thing as having a belief that such a man exists. To have faith in God is *not* the same thing as belief that Calcutta is north of Madras. The latter is a theoretical possibility or probability. It is only on the existential level that faith can be justified or disconfirmed.⁸

To believe in the existence of a being is not at all the same as having faith in the character of existence itself. Beings are contingent and accidental. To argue for the existence of God as if he were a thing among other things is to doom the argument from the start. To see that he cannot be so argued may be a service to faith. Nothing could be more fatal to faith in God who is really God than a theoretical demonstration that he has the same kind of being as does the moon or Mt. Everest. We must always find methods appropriate to whatever we propose to investigate. It is not necessarily a plea for irrationalism when religious existentialists insist that in the search for God (the

deepest meaning of our existence) the usual methods of scientific verification are irrelevant. For God is not an object among objects. He is the pervasive Subject-Object of all activity and subjectivity. He is the ground of being itself.

I can withhold judgment on ideas and upon objects so long as they remain objects. But I am involved in existence and confront the pervasive Subject-Object of all activity and subjectivity whether I bring the encounter into full consciousness or not. It is not necessary to have correct ideas about God in order to be shaped by him. My correct ideas are always too local to be wholly true; my errors are a dim response to the pervasive presence of God. I do not decide to have a faith or not have a faith. To exist at all I must in some measure commit my will and feelings. To move to a more coherent (more adequately empirical, more meaningfully integrated, more effective) faith I do not move from no faith into faith. I always begin from some standpoint and some commitment. Every commitment is always under judgment; the burden of "proof" cannot be placed upon religious faiths alone. Existentialists have helped to make us aware of the subjectivity which is concealed within each pretence of objectivity and immunity. The question which always remains is : What is the most adequate faith ?

God is as much alive today as he ever was. What have expired but not wholly been interred were a large number of childish and irrelevant notions about him. The God who is dead is the God of professional patrioteers, sentimental anthropomorphism, and philosophers who debate issues with neither objective nor subjective meaning.

The God of the philosophers rarely had much life in him in the first place. An unmoved First Cause might be of interest to physicists but it is religiously irrelevant. No one dies for an unmoved First Cause; no one prays to it. Even physicists today are more interested in operational hypotheses. The most meaningful traditional argument for God is probably the one least currently popular, Anselm's ontological argument. He pointed out that he was aware of the existence of God as soon as he was aware of his own self-existence; it was impossible to deny God

without assuming what he sought to deny. This argument is cast in a rationalistic frame which is not relevant to its central point. It was certainly not refuted by those quick to point out that they could conceive of many things which did not in fact exist. Anselm was talking about Existence itself; How is it possible that there should be anything at all? In terms of modern science, of course, what cannot be denied is of less use than what is merely probable. But there is importance and religious meaning to Existence as such. This is what existentialists have sought to explore. Some of us have always defended natural theology because it is so important to be able to explore religious questions without appeal to revealed authority. But it is as important to reason appropriately as it is to be willing to reason. Existentialists may contribute to a more relevant and vital natural theology, one which will promote a dialogue reaching into all great religious traditions. The God Who Is is more likely to be found as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—and as the "Truth" of Gandhiji, the *saccidānanda* of Shankara. By which we are trying to say that God is in events, not simply in concepts; he is found in verbs and not in nouns. He is discovered in life, activity, and subjectivity, rather than in definitions or in the laboratory.

In my moments of deepest sincerity I find a hunger for meaning to which most scientific and theological discourse seems irrelevant. This hunger for meaning is neither *merely* subjective nor merely pathological. When I confront other Thous in ultimate seriousness, I find it in them too. The meaning of our existence must be sought in a total encounter with it, facing both its value and its evil (*Shiva as well as Vishnu*), both its rational structure and its brute givenness, both its power to determine us and the freedom which we have within it. The Existent is the ground of every existence, even that of the rootless modern man who finds it hard to accept a fact beyond the range of technology and the majority vote. This is the real contribution of religious existentialism.

NOTES

¹ Clark Hull, *Principles of Behavior*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1943, p. 27.

² Perhaps this insight can be related to Nagarjuna's contention that there is no difference whatever between Nirvana and Samsara (*Mādhyamika Kārikā*, XXV, 19 and 20.) Whatever joy and autonomy we are to achieve is available to us now in the midst of life, not in escape nor in simple manipulation of the externals of life.

³ The author accepts the position of Ramanuja that consciousness is always qualified, as *vide Śrībhāṣya*, I.I.I. Great teachers like Professor Mahadevan often do much for students who stubbornly resist their teacher's central doctrines.

⁴ Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, II.II.2, Princeton University Press, 1941 (1846), p. 178.

⁵ Cf. Rollo May (ed.), *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*, New York: Basic Books, 1958, p. 25a.

⁶ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, first ed. section 627.

⁷ William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York: Modern Library, n. d. (1902), pp. 481-485, 488-489, and 492.

⁸ Cf. Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith*, New York: Harper, 1957. Also Kierkegaard *op. cit.*, Book I.

GANDHIAN TECHNIQUES IN THE MODERN WORLD

S. P. ADINARAYAN

THE essential features of the Gandhian technique are simplicity, directness, emotionalism, realism in the sense of a careful analysis and appraisal of the opponent's strength and weakness, fair-play and fairness to your adversary, an insistence on the discovery of spiritual values in the most mundane of operations and finally an uncompromising attitude to evil as known and held.

All these aspects of the Gandhian technique are well illustrated in his epic fight against the British. Gandhiji was no profound student of the international situation. Out of the milieu of confused currents and cross-currents that is politely called the international situation he spot-lighted that which affected him and his country most and went all out against it. There was a simplicity and directness in his fight against the British. He did not bother what Germany, Russia, France or even Burma thought about the matter. It was a one to one affair. The British Raj was a thing of evil, it had to go. No compromise on that issue. Yet it was not an unmixed evil. He was scrupulous in appraising the British character, both its good and weak points and the benefits of the British rule. For he did not deny that there were some benefits. At the same time he refused to be side-tracked. His emotionalism is well illustrated by that statement of his during World War II—that he felt like crying when he visualised the possibility of historic buildings like the House of Commons in London being bombed. Gandhiji was not ashamed of his emotions. He was not imbued with the British Public School spirit which wears a mask over its face and boasts that it is unaffected by the varying fortunes of life.

Gandhiji was not ashamed to sing and dance, to cry, quarrel and shout.

Apart from its spiritual implications the non-violent fight of Gandhiji against the British illustrates his great sense of realism. Britain was armed to the teeth. There were only a handful of guns in India. Therefore a military engagement was out of the question. Some other and equally powerful weapon must be found. This he found in soul-force and non-violence. The non-violent fight was based on a shrewd and realistic appraisal of the potentialities and possibilities of the situation. In the conduct of this fight Gandhiji revealed himself to be a brilliant strategist—strategy that successfully covered two worlds, that of matter and spirit.

The fight against the British might appear to some as a purely political, material affair but Gandhiji lifted it to spiritual heights. It was a fight against evil, a fight which incidentally led to self-purification. It was a fight not only against the evils of the British Raj but also of the evil within us. For external evil cannot be fought unless internal evil has been overcome.

Finally his frankness was further revealed by his great willingness to admit his mistakes when he realised that they were mistakes. He had no false pride in the matter. Like a true scientist he was prepared to go wherever truth led him. He made no attempt to control its direction in consonance with his pet theories or prejudices. He was not ashamed to talk of the Himalayan blunders that he had made. On one occasion he remarked that Swaraj was stinking in his nostrils. A daring and humiliating thing to say, for, Swaraj was very dear to his heart. But he was not going to get it by hook or crook but through righteousness alone.

When we compare Gandhian techniques to those prevalent in the world of international dealings today one cannot but be struck by a sense of contrast. While simplicity and frankness was the essence of the Gandhian technique secrecy is the order of the day. While Gandhiji had a window to his soul modern nations delight in setting up iron curtains. While Gandhiji laid all the cards on the table (not that he ever played Bridge)

modern diplomacy is a very hush-hush affair. While Gandhiji believed in telling everything, we believe in keeping the enemy guessing all the time. In fact each nation has surrounded its military preparations with such complete and impenetrable secrecy that the claim has been put forward that inter-national spying is a justifiable operation.

Turning next to the spiritualization of politics which, as it was earlier pointed out, was an essential part of the Gandhian technique we again find that the opposite is the order of the day now. The modern politician has a neurotic, almost a pathological, dread of mixing religion with politics while Gandhiji unashamedly gloried in it. We in India have built up a secular state and seem to be very proud of it. God has been confined to the narrow groove of religiosity and we seem to live in the perpetual dread that one day He may seek election to and enter our Legislative Councils. For this unhealthy state of affairs we are as much to be blamed as the politicians and the policy-makers, whom it is both easy and comfortable to blame for everything. Religion has been made the cause of much bad-feeling, bloodshed and quarrels in this country in spite of our great reputation for tolerance. Some years ago I was attending a Christian conference. In the middle of it news was brought of a particularly severe Hindu-Muslim riot in another part of the country. A friend of mine thereupon got up and shouted "Let us get rid of religion in India for at least ten years." Of course he did not mean it. He was a very devout Christian but one could very well understand the reason for that outburst.

There are two sides to every religion—the doctrinal and the social and cultural. On the doctrinal side compromise is not possible, not even desirable. It is our duty to hold fast to truth as we see it. This is not narrow-mindedness or dogmatism. One must have the courage of his convictions and hold fast to them. On the other hand much co-operation is possible on the social and cultural side of religion. In India we have failed to appreciate this difference between the doctrinal and the cultural. Hence our bitter religious rivalries and misunderstandings. While holding fast to doctrinal truths over

which no compromise is possible, it is our duty to take an intelligent interest in the social and cultural side of our neighbour's religion. Again there is much Atheism and anti-religious feeling in the world today. People of all religions can come together to build up a Theistic front against materialistic and agnostic forces. Such a move would be in the true Gandhian spirit. If we do all this we will be paving the way for the politician to take a less rigid attitude towards secularism.

We next come to another very fashionable political technique i.e., the doctrine of co-existence. This as a political theory is very much in the air today. An older view till recently current held that two nations with fundamentally different viewpoints must sooner or later fight it out. There can be no peace unless one nation is either annihilated or dominated by the other. The newer point of view explores the possibility of nations with divergent points of view and policy living side by side and agreeing not to interfere with each other. The theory of co-existence has been put forward with a good deal of earnestness and vigour by our Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who has not only preached but practised it with remarkable success and some occasional failures. Co-existence can be practised on three levels—individual, national and international. Matrimony is a good example of co-existence on the individual level (in spite of the increasing divorce rate). Here the disintegrating force of a number of differences between husband and wife—caste, colour, culture, and personal tastes—are overruled by other factors working towards tolerance, i.e., love, fear of public opinion or concern about the future of their children. On the national level co-existence takes the form of different sub-groups within a nation, be they religious, linguistic or racial agreeing to live together in amity and peace. We have already seen its implications on the inter-national level.

It looks as though recent political thought has added a new stage to the traditional Hegelian dialectic of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Co-existence would come in between anti-thesis and synthesis. But human nature whether individual or national does not progress according to neatly arranged plans. Sometimes

it progresses in platforms, sometimes in straightlines towards a goal, sometimes in circles and sometimes it even kicks back and regresses. Already there is a fear in some quarters that the breathing space afforded by co-existence may be used for greater military preparedness. This possibility is undoubtedly there. But there is no reason why this welcome interval should not be used for creating an atmosphere of greater trust and understanding.

After this lengthy excursion into the nature of co-existence let us now ask the question, what is the verdict of Gandhian philosophy on this matter? On the whole this verdict would tend to be negative. Gandhian philosophy is strictly dualistic in nature. It sees the world in terms of a rigorous dichotomy—good and bad, black and white, while in co-existence all the chromatic gradations of the rainbow are present. While Gandhian philosophy believes in one truth, co-existence believes in many truths. But in the complicated world situation today a strictly dualistic view on this or that matter is not possible. Many attitudes have to be taken into consideration, many attitudes tolerated in the interests of a higher synthesis. The weakness of Gandhian philosophy seems to be its lack of a strong international sense. It is on firmer ground when it comes to the national level. As regards the co-existence of several groups inside a nation Gandhiji would have preferred 'conversion' to co-existence. He would have preferred a change of heart in the Hindu and Muslim to a partition of India.

Gandhian techniques are the strongest on the individual level. The problem of co-existence on the individuals level is an ethical one. Regarding certain matters co-existence is impossible. No man can serve two masters. We cannot owe allegiance to light and darkness, truth and falsehood, God and the Devil at the same time. Today in our country when we are making a special attempt to fight corruption on all fronts it is dangerous to compromise with evil, to co-exist with it even in its pleasantest or mildest form. The narrow path is the only way—there are no parallel roads. Tolerance, a virtue at the international level becomes a sin on the ethical

Let us now turn to another aspect of Gandhian technique, i.e., large scale political and social reform. Today the cult of the mass man is very much in the air. Individuality, the birth-right of every one of God's creation was never more in danger than it is today. What is the attraction of the concept of mass man to our politicians? They are attracted towards the idea because it makes reform or what they think is reform easily possible. It is easy to introduce a new idea among a group of hundred people if all of them think alike and most difficult to do so if each one of them thinks differently. On the whole Gandhian philosophy is on the side of individual as opposed to the mass man. There are two ways of bringing about social or political change: 1. by changing external circumstance and 2. by changing the heart of man. The former is spectacular and produces quick results while the latter is a slow and tedious process. It is easy to bring about a political reform by a revolution rather than by convincing every member of a society about the desirability of such a measure. But the work of a revolution can be undone by a counter-revolution but change based on conviction in the heart of man is relatively permanent. Gandhiji tried to reach the heart of every Indian. He despised the spectacular methods of the modern propaganda machinery. He tried to make a simple and direct appeal.

Fasting played an important part in the Gandhian technique. This was not a new idea, it was as old as man himself. Gandhiji used fasting as a weapon for changing the hearts of men. Others called it coercion. We may recognise three types of fasting: 1. Fasting as a sign of repentance for past sin and as a means of self-purification, 2. Incidental fasting and 3. Fasting as a political weapon. The first two types of fasting are purely personal affairs. The third type may take the form of a hunger-strike. Of course thousands are on 'hunger-strike' in our country today for the simple reason that they have nothing to eat. But this is a different matter. The thing that makes political fasting objectionable in the eyes of many people is the threatening attitude involved. There is an attempt to force the hand of the opponent by saying "If you do not do things my way, I will die."

In 1931 after the second Round Table Conference the British Government announced its intention of giving the scheduled castes a separate electorate. Gandhiji felt that this would disrupt Hindu society. He went on a fast unto death. The Hindu conscience was stirred but not so that of Dr. Ambedkar, the accredited leader of the scheduled castes. He called it a political stunt. But ultimately a solution was found in the formula of reservation of seats. The Yerravada Pact was concluded. Dr. Ambedkar reverently touched the feet of Gandhiji. But some people still said that he was coerced into the pact by the prospect of Gandhiji dying.

If A and B go on a fast nobody cares. Not even a dog will bark. Unless a man has reached a certain ethical and spiritual standard his fasting will not stir the country. And a man who has reached such a standard will not fast for frivolous reasons. Hunger-strikes carry with them their own safeguard against excess, for hunger is a deep seated instinct in man which cannot be annulled easily. Gandhiji did start the fashion in hunger-strikes but many silly things have been started in the name of a great man. Many such strikes have rightly been treated as jokes. The hunger-strike is probably the most vulnerable aspect of the Gandhian technique.

Is the Gandhian weapon of soul force suited to this atomic age—this age of mechanised military strength? Can passive resistance be practised in the event of a military invasion of India? Gandhiji's celebrated biographer Sri Pyarelal spotlights the following five points about passive resistance:—

1. Resist the commandeering of land, houses and movable property by the invader.
2. Do not agree to any system of forced labour.
3. Completely boycott all jobs under the invader.
4. Do not buy anything from the invader and
5. Refuse using their currency.

Such a programme was very successful in the fight against the British, though put into practice long after the invasion.

Can soul force prevail against the atom bomb? There are no limits to the operation of soul force. Soul force cannot prevent an atom bomb from being dropped but it can prevent its

being made. It can change the heart of the enemy. Prof.P.T. Raju writing in the *Gandhian Marg* of January 1960 hits the nail right on the head when he says "Ahimsa in the full sense in which Gandhiji understood the term can succeed only if the situation in which it is used is turned into a *moral situation*. Gandhian techniques are spiritual weapons. To apply them to politics, politics must be first spiritualised. This is a tough job."

Today we live in a highly mechanised, complex and complicated kind of industrial society. We think that techniques to succeed in this kind of setting must themselves be highly complex. We thereby commit *the fallacy of similarity*. Gandhian techniques are staggeringly simple. We are frightened by this simplicity. We think that they are too good to be true. Yet those who have had the courage and faith to put them into practice have found them to be amply rewarding.

THE TAMIL SAIVA MATHAS UNDER THE COLAS (A.D. 900-1300)

M. RAJAMANIKKAM

IN the days of the Pallavas, there existed some mathas which imparted religious and moral education, served as resting places for the devotees and were also centres of charities. Just as temples and festivals grew and developed in the days of the Colas, mathas also increased in number. Among them, some had the name of the Lord; some had the names of the Cola kings and their feudatories; many were named after the Nayanmars; some others had various kinds of names. The different names of a few mathas are given here :

I. Mathas With God's Names

1. Avaduturai	Tirunila Vitangan-matha	144 of 1925
2. do	Sivalokanayakan-matha	148 of 1925
3. do	Sarvadevan-matha	103 of 1925
4. do	Sankaradevan-araccalai	159 of 1925
5. do	Panjanadivanan-matha	67 of 1926
6. Tiruvilimilalai	Alagiya Tiruc-Cirrambala- mudaiyan-matha	392 of 1909
7. Sikali	Tirumurait-tevarac-celvan matha	158 of 1911
8. Usattanam	Kuttadu Nayanar-matha	218 of 1908

II. Mathas With The Names of Kings or Feudatories

1. Tirunanipalli	Arumolidevan-matha	186 of 1925
2. Orriyur	Rajendra Colan-matha	132 of 1912

3. do	Kulottunga Colan-matha	200 of 1912
4. Udaiyargudi	Rajendra Colan-matha	622 of 1920
5. Usattanam	Vanarayan-matha	211 of 1908
6. Valisvaram	Virapandyan-matha	357 of 1916

III. Mathas That Had Nāyammārs' Names

1. Tirumangalam	Paranjoti-matha	246 of 1930
2. Karkudi	Tiruvagisam-Rajendracolan matha	467 of 1908
3. Madurantakam	Tillaival Andanar-matha	404 of 1922
4. Tiruppugalur	Nambi Tirumurugan- Tirumatha	88 of 1928
5. Kalukkunram	Naminandi Adigal-matha	179 of 1894
6. Tiruvadigai	Vagisa-matha	49 of 1903
7. do	Tirunavukkarasadevar- matha	382 of 1921
8. Tiribuvanai	do	203 of 1909
9. Tirumananjeri	Parasamayakolari-matha	534 of 1918
10. Palaiyarai	Tirujnanasambandan- Tirumatha	392 of 1908
11. Tiruvilimilalai	Tirunavukkarasar-matha	402 of 1909
12. Tiruppalaṭṭurai	Tirunavukkarasadevan- matha	583 of 1909
13. Visayamangai	Tirutondattogaiyan- Tirumatha	192 of 1929
14. Tirupputtur (P.C.)	do	104 & 116 of 1908
15. do	Tirujnanasambandan Tirumatha	129 of 1908
16. Araiyaninallur	do	174 of 1935
17. Sengattangudi	Sirutondan-Tirumatha	76 of 1922
18. Valivalam	Tirumuladevar-matha	116 of 1911
19. Kanci	Sundarapperumal-matha	S. I. I. 1.87
20. Nodiyur	Tirujnana Sambandan Tirumatha	199 of 1932-33

IV. *Maṭhas With Other Names*

1. Avaduturai	Tiruvidi-matha	147 of 1925
2. do	Pramanavasagan-matha	155 of 1925
3. do	Narpattennayiravan-matha ¹	150 of 1925
4. do	Peruntiruvatti-Araccalai	71 of 1926
5. do	Munnurru-Irupattu-nalvan ²	158 of 1925
6. Draksharamam	Panmahesvara-matha	344 of 1893
7. Annamalai	Dhanmavanikar-matha	547 of 1902
8. Devarayanpettai	Manuvilangap-pillaiperral-matha	278 of 1923
9. Cidambaram	Arapperunjelvic-calai	266 of 1911
10. Sikali	Tirumurait-tevaracclvan-matha	158 of 1911
11. Vennainallur	Tirurvedam-Alagiya-Tirumatha	35 of 1922
12. Tiruvatpocki	Elunurruvan-Tirumatha	179 of 1914
13. Tirukkodika	Ainnurrenman-Tirumatha	60 of 1930
14. Tiruvarur	Nalayiravan-Tirumatha	477 of 1912
15. Caturvedimangalam (P.C.)	Colan-vasal-tirandan-matha	312 of 1927-'8
16. Tiruppurambayam	Matha (Head-Andar Kadiya-baranar)	353 of 1917
17. Tiruvalangadu	Vannara-Madeva-Andan-matha	93 of 1926
18. Tiruppugalur	Matha-hospital attached	97 of 1928
19. Kottur	Matha (Head-Tirumaligai-p-piccan)	446 of 1912
20. Tiruvaiyaru	Matha (Head-Sadasiva-Bhattarar)	121 of 1925
21. Tiruppalaivanam	Anbarkkadiyar-matha	350 of 1928-29

Apart from these, there were mathas attached to the temples of Saikkadu, Tiruvallam, Tirumudukunram, Koyirkadu, Gomai, Tiruppampuram, Achuthamangalam, and Tiruvidaikkali etc.³

The Santāna of The Mudaliyārs of Tiruccattimurram

About the first part of the 13th century A.D., some new mathas arose. The most important of them was the Tirujnana Sambandan-matha at Tiruccattimurram. *Tiruccattimurram-ttu-Mudaliyār* was one of the descendants of the Santana of *Anḍār-Parudipperumāl*. The Branch mathas belonging to his santana sprang up at Anaikka, Usattanam, Vilimilalai, and Valivalam. The Sishyas of Namasivaya-devar who belonged to the *Tiruccattimurram-ttu-Mudaliyār* Santana lived in the *Narpattennayiravan tirumatha* at *Tiruvanaikka*,⁴ *Paripurana Sivacarya* of the santana of the *Mudaliyār* mentioned above was the pontiff of the *Kuttadu Nayanar matha* at *Usattanam*.⁵ *Tavapperumal* alias *Jnanasivacaryar* granted land to the *Alagiya-Tiruccirrambala Mudaliyār-matha* at *Vilimilalai*.⁶ *Somanatha-devar* alias *Ediropiladar* of the same santana was the pontiff of the *Tavapperumal-Tirumatha* that was at *Valivalam*.⁷

The Santāna of The Mudaliyārs of Māligai Maḍam

There was a matha called 'Maligai-madam' at *Tiruvidaimarudur*. It is not possible to say when it was founded. But in the days of *Rajaraja III* (about A.D. 1240), *Dattan-Udaiyar-Isanadevar* of the santana of *Maligai-madattu-Mudaliyār* was at *Nallur*. His *Sishyai* granted him a matha and lands.⁸

Perumbarrappuliyur-Nambi says that his spiritual guru was *Vinayaka*, who was a disciple of *Venkadar*, the pontiff of the *Maligaimadam* at *Tillai*.⁹ Most probably *Nambi* might have flourished after the Cola period.¹⁰ But anyhow, it is gathered from this that there existed a *Maligai-madam* at *Tillai* in the time of *Nambi*. A certain pontiff of this *Maligai-madam* has been offered invocation in the prefaces of the later works, i.e., the *Vedāranya Purāṇa* and the *Tirukkannapper Purāṇa*.¹¹ It is clear from these invocations that the acaryas of the *Maligai-madam* were well-versed in the *Saiva* scriptures.

The Santāna of the Mudaliyārs of Senbaikkudi.

There existed a matha called *Anḍār-Embiraṇār-tirumaḍam* at *Tiruvanaikka* in the days of *Rajendra III* (at about A.D.1250).

It belonged to the Santana of the Mudaliyars of Senbaikkudi.¹² Similar to the branch matha of the Santana of the Mudaliyars of Tiruccattimurram at Tiruvanaikka, there existed also in the place a matha belonging to the Santana of the Mudaliyars of Senbaikkudi. Possibly its head matha was in existence at Senbaikkudi.

The Acāramalagiyān-tirumadam at Tiruvārūr and its branches.

A matha called Acaramalagiyān-tirumadam was in existence at Tiruvarur in the time of Maravarman Kulasekhara Pandiyan (about A.D. 1236). Its branch with the name of Tirujnana Sambandan-tirumadam existed at Tirupputtur, in the Pandiya country. Its pontiff was Srikanthasiva. There were also the mathas of the Mudaliyars.¹³ There was a matha called Tiruttondattogaiyan-tirumadam at Govanda-puttur in the time of Rajendra III. It had a branch at Tillai.¹⁴ At about A.D. 1280, there was a matha at Tirupputtur in the Pandiya land, with the same name.¹⁵

The Santāna of Marudapperumāl.

One Namasivayadevar of the Santana of Marudapperumal built in about A.D. 1230, the Siruttondan-tirumatha at Sengattangudi. Land was granted to it.¹⁶ The head matha of this santana is not known.

Saiva Mathas from Literature.

Till now, information regarding the mathas referred to in the inscriptions were dealt with. Now, let us consider about the mathas that we come across in the Saiva Siddhanta works. R. Gopinatha Rao says that Meykandadeva of Tiruvennainallur mentioned in the inscription of Tiruvannamalai might himself be the Meykandadeva, the author of *Siva-jñāna bodam*, and that he flourished in A.D. 1232¹⁷. Tiruviyalur-Uyyavanda-deva-Nayanar¹⁸ composed *Tirucundiyār* a Saiva

Siddhanta work, before Meykandar's *Siva-jñāna-bodam*: Tirukkadavur-Uyyavanda-deva Nayanar, a student of his disciple, wrote another Siddhanta work called *Tiruk-kalirrup-paḍiyār*. The Sivacarya of Meykandar's father was one *Arunandi-Sivācāryar* who was in the Tirutturaiyur matha. In his old age, he became the first disciple of Meykandar. Considering these details, it is revealed that there must have existed in this country, Saiva Siddhanta mathas at Tirutturaiyur and Tiruviyalur even prior to Meykandar. In the reign of Kulottunga I (A.D.1115) Sivananda-Mahamuni was renowned¹⁹. Since Sivananda-Mahamuni also was undoubtedly a great Saiva like Parasamaya-kolari Mahamuni who wrote the *Kannivana Purāṇa* in the reign of Kulottunga I, since Arunandi Sivacarya lived at Tirutturaiyur itself in the later days and since he was the spiritual guru of many disciples and was very old in the time of Meykandar, there is room to suppose that he might have been a disciple of Sivananda-Mahamuni mentioned above.

Meykandar had 49 disciples. Among them, Arunandi-Sivacarya was the first and foremost. He is the author of *Siva-jñāna-Sittiyār* and *Irupā-Irupahdu*, both Saiva Siddhanta Sastras. Another student of his called *Manavāṣaṅgam Kaḍandār* wrote a Siddhanta work called *Uṇmai-Viḷakkam*. The foremost among the students of Arunandi Sivacarya was *Maṟai-jñānasambandar*. He stayed at Tillai and rendered religious services. It is his disciple Umapati Sivacarya who is the author of eight *Saiva Siddhanta* works, namely *Sivaprakāśam* and others. He established a matha at Korravankudi, and gave Saiva Siddhanta lessons to many.²⁰ Considering the facts that from the time of Meykandar, his disciples spread far and wide in the country, established mathas and began to foster the Saiva religion, that many of the Mudaliyar mathas mentioned above sprang up suddenly at several places in the 13th century in which Meykandar flourished, that when Meykandar was born, Nilakantha Bhashyam, Sankara Bhashyam, Ramanuja Bhashyam, Madhva Bhashyam, the commentaries to Brahma Sutra spread in the country and created religious confusion in the land, and that

Meykandar was born only to repair that confused state and to establish the true Saiva Siddhanta²¹, there is every possibility to suppose that the different kinds of Saiva mathas mentioned above might have been those founded by the disciples of Meykandar²². The following statement of the scholars of inscriptions confirm our supposition :

“....Saivism thus appears to have gradually grown stronger and stronger under the patronage of the Cola kings so that in the beginning of the 13th century, we notice a number of mathas presided over by Saiva Sannyasins, spreading their influence over a pretty large portion of the Tamil country. All this must have been in spite of the teachings of the great Advaita philosopher Sankaracarya whose doctrines are well-known. The philosophical expositions of the Advaita teacher do not exclude the methods of pious devotion to be practised in the first stages of spiritual development, but insist on strict adherence to the paths of karma as laid down in the Sastras. The Saiva creed, on the other hand, does not appear to have paid much attention to Sastric karma but, taking unsullied devotion to Siva as its basis, it received into its fold all classes of people without any distinction of caste. This catholicity of the Saiva faith rendered it not very popular with the orthodox Brahmins but the non-brahmin classes eagerly took to it and at the beginning of the 13th century, as stated already, it was apparently very influential with its centres in many places....The mathas of the Saiva Sannyasins called Sivayogins (177 of 1908) or Mahesvaras (164 of 1908) were mostly named after the famous Brahmin Saiva Saint, Tirujnanasambandar and the non-brahmin saint Tirunavukkarasar.²³ Tiruvavaduturai Adinam was founded by Namasivaya Desikar who belonged to the holy line of the first set of disciples of Meykandar and the Dharmapura Matha was established by Jnanasambanda Desikar of the same line.²⁴ We see that both of these looked after the administration of many temples; in addition to that, they ran many institutions which imparted general and specific religious instructions. We may also suppose that the ancient Tamil mathas were maintained on similar lines. From the facts that there were men and women,

branded with the sign of the trident to work in temples,²⁵ and that at one time 36 persons were sold as slaves to the matha,²⁶ we learn that a number of persons were required to do service and look after the different kinds of work in the matha. Therefore we can infer that many matters associated with religion were attended to in the matha.

"From about the tenth century onwards, it became a very common feature to attach mathas to temples. These institutions wielded great influence and in a majority of cases held control over the affairs of the temples. Pilgrims from abroad found a ready residence in them. They served a useful purpose as teaching disciplinary institutions. They maintained teachers for several Sastras. It is thus quite clear that the mathas, besides controlling the affairs of the temple, and providing boarding and lodging to devotees, were important centres of educational activity and spiritual instruction."²⁷ "Not only devotees and helpless people but also those suffering from sickness received help in some mathas. Sometimes even animals were attended to in similar institutions, and an instance from the Kerala country has been cited."²⁸

NOTES

¹ It is learnt that there were forty-eight thousand Sivanadiyars in Madurai and were rendering Sivattiondu (Nambi Tiruvilaiyadal Prayer—22). 'The forty-eight thousand' was a group name like Tilla three thousand; Tirupperundurai, the three hundred; Tiruvakkur, the thousand; Tiruvilimilalai, the five hundred, and these groups of devotees flourished at Cidambaram, Tiruvanaikka, Tiruppuvanam and other places and were doing Sivattiondu.—Takkayaga-p-Parani, 219 & its commentary. The fact that a dancing woman called herself 'Narpattennayira-Manikkam' shows the regard and piety she had towards the group.—202 & 214 of 1929-30.

² The feeding house called 'Munnurirupatru-nalvan', named after the assembly of the village suggests that strength of its members to have been 324.—A.R.E. 1925, p. 83. Other group names also may be taken in the same sense. Inscription No. 73 of 1914 also suggests the same view.

³ 269 of 1911, 232 of 1921, 63 of 1918, 243 of 1925, 40 of 1925, 86 of 1911, 409 of 1925, 276 of 1925.

⁴ 586 of 1908. At present it is Sankaracsarya's matha—A.R.E. 1909. pp. 104-5.

⁵ 218 of 1903.

⁶ 392 of 1908.

⁷ 108 & 109 of 1911; A.R.E. 1911, p. 75.

⁸ 49 of 1911; A.R.E. 1909, p. 75.

- ⁹ Nambi Tiruvilaiyadal Invocation v. 23.
- ¹⁰ Tamil Polil, Volume 14, pp. 81-83.
- ¹¹ N.T. Int. p. 20.
- ¹² 584 of 1908.
- ¹³ 129 of 1908, A.R.E. 1909 p. 104.
- ¹⁴ 192 of 1929.
- ¹⁵ 104 of 1908.
- ¹⁶ 76 of 1922.
- ¹⁷ Sen Tamil, Vol. 3, pp. 189-90.
- ¹⁸ In the inscription of A.D. 1213, since the name, 'Palaravayan Uyya Vandan' is found (149 of 1932-33), the name "Uyyavanda devar" is the name that was in vogue in those days.
- ¹⁹ 380 of 1908.
- ²⁰ Santanacuriyar caritram, pp. 17-31.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
- ²² There was a matha called Meykanda-Santati-matha at Villiyanur in the days of the late Nyayakas. In it, a disciple of Meijnana-Mamuni of Tiruvakkarai was the pontiff-206 & 207 of 1936-37.
- ²³ A.R.E. 1909, p. 103.
- ²⁴ Santanacuriyar caritram, p. 17.
- ²⁵ 76, 216-219, 409 of 1925 and 91 of 1926.
- ²⁶ 90 of 1926.
- ²⁷ A.R.E. 1923, p. 110.
- ²⁸ A.R.E. 1928-29, p. 78.

TAGORE : HUMANIST OR TRANSCENDENTALIST ?

CHARLES A. MOORE

Is Tagore a humanist, as held almost universally by students of his philosophy,¹ or is he a transcendentalist, a mystic, a theist, a humanitarian—or what ? Of course, any such “tag” is a dangerous thing, and it is for this reason that the special designation of humanism as Tagore’s essential point of view must be examined—for accuracy and adequacy—because it may well be that “humanist” falsifies his *basic* philosophy.

In a recent brief study,² the writer examined Tagore’s philosophy from the single aspect of the meaning of spirituality in his thought. This study was made specifically in the context of an East-West orientation, and the resulting thesis was that by his particular interpretation of the meaning of spirituality Tagore provided a *substantial and fundamental bridge between East and West*. It was shown that Tagore denounces the common interpretation that only the East, especially India, is spiritual, whereas the West is non-spiritual or even materialistic, especially as compared with the high spirituality of the Indian tradition.

In this context, it was found that Tagore recognized the spirituality of the West, that he seemed to advocate humanism as a spiritual attitude toward life and reality, that he found spirituality in humanism in its many aspects, and that, thinking of the West exclusively as humanism, he found the West to be spiritualistic in its humanism. However, that study concluded with a statement to the effect that, despite all this, Tagore never abandoned his Indian, and especially his Hindu tradition, but merely expressed the view that the *negativistic, escapist, and anti-life* aspects of that tradition must not be considered the essence

or the whole of Hindu thought and that it should be at least supplemented by a more positive, value-laden application to life and to activity in life.

Unexpressed in that study, however, was a doubt in the writer's mind that this was the end of the story, or the whole story, or even the truth about Tagore's real point of view. Although a good "case" can be made for the view that Tagore is a "humanist par excellence," the writer seemed to find conflict between this interpretation and what seemed to be Tagore's *ultimate* adherence to the Vedantic point of view. It is important, if we would understand and interpret Tagore correctly, and also if we would see his philosophy in its proper perspective in the East-West orientation, to examine or re-examine Tagore's points of view with reference to these two possible major interpretations, humanism or transcendentalism, because it may well be that the "bridge" which Tagore constructs between East and West in his alleged doctrine of humanism and his doctrine of the practicality of religion may not actually be true to the mind of Tagore.

In order to "set the stage" for this study, it may be helpful to re-state the fundamental principles of the thesis of Tagore's humanism and of his recognition of the spirituality of humanism—and of the West. Then, in the light of this review, we shall be in a better position to challenge this interpretation and to indicate "the other side"—prior to reaching a conclusion, in terms of either humanism or transcendentalism or in terms of what may be Tagore's basic view, namely, a synthesis of these two and what amounts to a particular interpretation or application of Vedantic Hinduism, or possibly a still different attitude.

I

*Tagore's Humanism*³

There are almost innumerable evidences of Tagore's humanism and of his recognition of the spirituality of Western

humanism, if that is the basic attitude of the West.⁴ A personally significant expression of this attitude, of course, is his famous rejection of the mere traditionalism and ritualism of orthodox Hinduism, and his giving up of his life in the ivory tower of literary activity, under the conviction that the life of the spirit, specifically religion, demands more than this, demands that man enter the life of service and beneficial activity for the progress of mankind, materially and spiritually, and apparently under the conviction that this progress cannot be effected except in terms of such activity. This human activity takes many forms for Tagore. He praises the apparently typical (and spiritual) Western fight against evils and seeking for ideals, in whatever area of life these ideals happen to be, in art, in intellectual activities, in ethics, in literature, etc. He finds that reason and science—marks of the West—are or can be spiritual, both in aiding man in the search for truth, laws, and principles beyond appearances, and also in lifting man above a purely materialistic perspective.

As a matter of fact, even religion itself is looked upon as exclusively a human experience, originating in man's needs, and serving man in a wide range or variety of forms, but primarily helping man to continue and to achieve the uniquely spiritual aspect of human existence which separates man from the entire animal kingdom. Man's overcoming of the "fear of death" through the knowledge derived from science and from science in action Tagore considers an indispensable preliminary to the achieving of spirituality. In humanizing religion, he says that "the humanity of God, or the divinity of Man" is his chief concern (p. 15). He also speaks of God who is God and man at the same time (p. 112). He apparently finds the ideal of religion in universal love of and service to mankind, in the more humanistic and even "worldly" sense of service to man as man and in the world.

Activity in life and among men is the mark of the truly religious man, and this life involves the life of activity—as exemplified in the advice of the Buddha, in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, and in the previously mentioned activity of the West in fighting

against evils, overcoming poverty, and seeking ideals in morality, the arts, and the sciences. The love of man, he says, "gives us the testing of the great whole, which is the complete and final truth of Man" (p. 47). Material prosperity is indispensable for man, and he finds no value in poverty as such. He denounces the "callousness" of both asceticism and luxury. It is interesting to find him quoting a humanistic Chinese sage who said, "To increase life is called a blessing" (p. 153).

To cite his negative approach to humanism, we must note his sincere and genuine opposition to what may be called the "pure" or "extreme" form of spirituality found in Vedantic Hinduism. For Tagore, the only significant infinite is the infinite in its human aspect; he soundly rejects any idea of what he calls the "Indian ideal of the utter extinction of the individual separateness" (p. 200). He criticizes the interpretation of the Vedanta doctrine which holds that "Brahman is the Absolute truth, the impersonal It, in which there could be no distinction of this or that, the good and the evil, the beautiful and its opposite, having no other quality except its ineffable blissfulness in the eternal solitude of consciousness utterly devoid of all things and all thoughts" (p. 203). Instead, he seeks "a Being who comprehends in himself all things that are human in knowledge, will and action" (p. 204).

In all this, of course, we are defining humanism as that view in which man is the dominant and ultimate reality, the criterion of value, truth, and reality, in which, if there is a God, he must be interpreted in human ways—Tagore is not even afraid of the charge of anthropomorphism—and in which, negatively, there is nothing higher than man which determines or controls man or in terms of which man could in any way become insignificant.

On the positive side and as an *essential* statement of Tagore's humanism, the following comprehensive and perhaps most significant quotation may be in order :

"It [man's developed consciousness] inspires these creations of his that reveal the divinity in him—which is his humanity—in the varied manifestations of truth, goodness and beauty, in

the freedom of activity which is not for his use but for his ultimate expression. The individual man must exist for Man the great, and must express him in his disinterested works, in science and philosophy, in literature and arts, in service and worship. This is his religion, which is working in the heart of all his religions in various names and forms" (pp. 14-15).

The foregoing would certainly seem to be wholehearted and fundamental humanism, in which the ideal Man is the goal of all human activity, in which religion is exclusively a device by which human beings can serve each other, in the form of love and unselfishness, and in which any infinite which may exist can claim status only as a human infinite—and not as a transcendental It, a quality-less Ultimate, or any reality which demands rejection of, escape from, or the insignificance of practical human activity in the form of the fulfilment of man's distinctly human capacities in seeking the true, the good, and the beautiful, in the intellectual, the aesthetic, and the moral activities of man among men. This is humanism, surely.

II

Beyond Humanism

The above-cited statements and attitudes of Tagore would certainly seem to present a strong "case" for his humanism, and many more such statements could be cited. However, in the light of other specific and precise statements and general attitudes, and in the light of the implications of much that he has to say about the traditional Indian point of view, namely, Vedanta, it would seem clear that humanism is not the height of Tagore's thought or the whole of it. Instead, his entire humanistic perspective is overlain by a transcendentalism which is quite typically Hindu—although, as we shall see, it is an interpretation of traditional Vedantic Hinduism which includes the humanistic approach. While Tagore is quite critical of the so-called negativistic, escapist, purely otherworldly, etc., interpretation of Vedanta, which makes for the insignificance

of the individual man and of human values, this view of Vedanta is what he calls an *interpretation* by some Hindus—a view, therefore, which does not represent the true substance or the whole truth of the highest Hindu spiritual point of view. He rejects this *interpretation*, but he does not reject the Vedanta.

There are many indications in his basic philosophical treatise, *The Religion of Man*, that unmistakably justify this non-humanistic interpretation. Let him speak for himself: *Phenomenal world*. Tagore speaks repeatedly of the phenomenal world (p. 203) or of the "world of appearance" (p. 19), and repeats the Upanishadic prayer, "Lead me from unreality to reality" (p. 181). Throughout his treatise on the religion of Man, Tagore seems to be talking about an attitude which is strictly human, but one both senses and finds in his words the idea that Brahman is still "behind the scenes." In fact, he says specifically, "but, as our religion can only have its significance only in this phenomenal world comprehended by our human self, this absolute conception of Brahman is outside the subject of my discussion" (p. 203), which is restricted to religion as such. His religion seems to be humanistic—but even this is not a correct *interpretation*—whereas his philosophy is typical Vedantic transcendentalism. (More on this later).

Surprising as it may seem, in view of his strong tendency toward humanism, Tagore does not reject the doctrine of *māyā*, although he does not accept it as "illusion," but, rather, as creation (p. 136). Also, he speaks of man as a creature of a creator—and, in fact, this is the basis of man's capacity to achieve knowledge and other spiritual values (p. 101). There is no doubt that in Tagore's view there is something that exceeds man himself (p. 57). One cannot justifiably attribute to Tagore the view that man's estate and man's reason are ultimate. They become or are significant because they reflect, or are based upon, or are in search of, an ultimate reality. In the long quotation cited at the end of Section I of this paper, it will be recalled that his spiritual activities are "manifestations" of truth, goodness, and beauty, and that it is these ultimates that confer divinity and spirituality upon man, "the divinity in him." "We

become aware of a profound meaning of our own self at the consciousness of some ideal of perfection," (p. 145) which is clearly not within man but above man, giving significance to his search for ideals or perfection.

Beyond Death. "Man has a feeling that the apparent facts of existence are not final; that his supreme welfare depends upon his being able to remain in perfect relationship with some great mystery behind the veil..." (pp. 144-145). He assumes life after death, apparently with no question whatsoever (p. 197). He speaks thoroughly approvingly of the ideal of the peace of the eternal (p. 86), and of the peace of God.

Perfection in Being, Perfection in Doing. Tagore speaks approvingly also of the "ancient explorers in psychology in India who declare that our emancipation can be carried still into the realm where infinity is not bounded by human limitations," and insists that they "are not content with advancing this as a doctrine; they advocate its pursuit for attainment of the highest goal of man... discipline (is for the purpose of) helping us to develop our humanity to perfection so that we may surpass it in a finality of freedom. Perfection has its two aspects in man which can to some extent be separated, the perfection in being, and the perfection in doing" (pp. 191-192). In other words, Tagore is a humanist as far as life and activity are concerned, but there is a goal and a perfection of being beyond the doing.

Mukti. As suggested in quotations cited already, there seems to be no question but that Tagore believes in and advocates both the goal of *mukti* and the method of renunciation, (pp. 180-197) non-attachment (p. 86), surrender to God (p. 86), and dedication (p. 180) as the means to *mukti*. It is in the state of *mukti*, or the achieved "unobstructed vision of unity, the incarnation of the real, which is a joy for ever," that constitutes the goal (p. 182). He says, further, "It [the soul] cries for its *mukti*, its freedom in the unity of truth," and quotes the prayer, "For what sin should I be compelled to remain in this dungeon of the world of appearance?" (p. 182) Further, "They know that the object of these adventurers is not betterment in worldly wealth and power—it is *mukti*, freedom (p. 183).

Further—and here the matter of definition may be important, but we will not go into that—"In such a world (of effort to improve man's state of life) there can be no question of *mukti*, the freedom in truth, because it is a solidly solitary fact, a cage with no sky beyond it. In all appearance our world is a closed world of hard facts.... But within this enclosure is working a silent cry of life for *mukti*, even when its possibility is darkly silent.... And this *mukti* is in the truth that dwells in the ideal man" (p.71).

The Inner Life. Tagore is typically Indian in contrast to his seemingly supreme interest in the development of the external life of man, in holding that the inner life is the true and truly important life of man (p.71). He never denounces—although he seems to say he does not understand and has not had such an experience—the attitude, method, and search of the *yogi* for the infinite (p.204). All of this certainly sounds like traditional Hindu Vedanta—at least, as Tagore puts it, in the last or fourth stage of life. His view certainly seems to transcend the mere humanistic approach. It also certainly challenges or questions the merely humanistic approach. This is typical Hinduism and Vedanta—with qualifications which will be brought out later.

Monism. A characteristic doctrine of orthodox Vedanta, of course, is the view that there is an ultimate One which is the sole reality. Tagore believes in such an ultimate One. His principle of unity is not limited merely to the unity of Mankind. He speaks repeatedly of the Universal Spirit, the Supreme Person and the Universal Self (pp.91, 20, 21). He quotes with obvious approval the Upanishadic view that "this world which is all movement is pervaded by one supreme unity, and therefore true enjoyment can be had... only through the surrender of our individual self to the Universal Self" (pp.20, 21). Again, he says approvingly, "... the positive aspect of the infinite is in *advaitam*, in an absolute unity, in which comprehension of the multitude is not as in an outer receptacle but as in an inner perfection that permeates and exceeds its contents..." (p.64). Since man is a creation of a creator, says Tagore, he is able "to realize in his

individual spirit a union with a Spirit that is everywhere" (p.101). Recall his statement that the soul "cries for its *mukti*, its freedom in the unity of truth" (p.182), and "we gain in unobstructed vision of unity, the incarnation of the real, which is a joy for ever" (p.182). There would seem to be no question, then, about Tagore's acceptance of an ultimate spiritual unity that transcends man, the world, everything; and is the real. He quotes : "The infinite and eternal has to be known as One" (p.65).

The Infinite. Tagore—despite his humanism—holds to the doctrine of the infinite or a transcendental ultimate, and there is no question that he is here thinking of the traditional Hindu concept of Brahman (and the concept of unity) in the sense that the ultimate reality is an infinite One regardless of just how that One is conceived, as an unqualified or neutral "It", to use Tagore's word, or a "Supreme Person," to use another equivalent which Tagore uses often, or whatever the interpretation may be.

In his discussion of "The Four Stages of Life", a chapter in *The Religion of Man*, Tagore treats at length, and obviously accepts, the idea of an infinite beyond all human capacities. He is very careful to repeat his doctrine that religion helps to train man in his attitude and behaviour toward the infinite in its human aspect (p. 189), and he immediately points to the tendency of the Indian mind which has ever been toward that transcendentalism which does not hold religion to be ultimate but, rather, a means to a further end. This end, he says, consists in the perfect liberation of the individual in the universal spirit across the further limits of humanity itself" (p. 189).

Tagore attempts to explain this "extreme form of mysticism" to Western readers by the analogy of science which he describes as "mysticism in the realm of material knowledge" (p. 189)—in the sense that it helps men go beyond appearances and reach the inner reality of things in principles which are abstractions; emancipates our mind from "the thralldom of the senses to the freedom of reason," and by this analogy Tagore obviously means that the traditional Hindu form of mysticism

emancipates man from the entire world of appearances and from the world of reason. He contrasts this view with "the common sense view of the world" (p. 189).

As to whether he accepts the typical Hindu doctrine or not, he says, "We humbly accept it following those teachers who have trained their reason to free themselves from the trammels of appearance and personal preferences. Their mind dwells in an impersonal infinity where there is no distinction between good and bad, high and low, ugly and beautiful, useful and useless, where all things have their one common right of recognition, that of their existence" (p. 190).

He continues, "The final freedom of spirit which India aspires after has a similar character of realization. It is beyond all limits of personality, divested of all moral, or aesthetic distinctions; it is the pure consciousness of Being, the ultimate reality which has an infinite illumination of bliss" (p. 190).

Further, he says, "Our teachers in ancient India realized the soul of man as something very great indeed. They saw no end to its dignity, its consummation in Brahman himself. Any limited view of man would therefore be an incomplete view" (p. 194).

Recall the quotation cited earlier in which he seems to question "some interpretations" of the Vedanta doctrine that Brahman is "the absolute truth, the impersonal It, in which there could be no distinction of this and that, the good and the evil, the beautiful and its opposite," etc. The point of this quotation, however, is to show that this is the ultimate truth and that religion (his special concern) has its significance only in the phenomenal world comprehended by our human self (p. 203). In religion, man "realizes himself in the perspective of the infinite" (p. 42).

III

Conclusion

So, what is Tagore's basic philosophy? Is it humanism, theism, or transcendentalism? Does he deny his Hindu tradition?

It seems that what Tagore does is to reject both what is traditionally known as the doctrine of Nirguna Brahman and also the doctrine of Saguna Brahman, *separately*, adopting the "two forms of Brahman" doctrine from the Upanishads, emphasizing the synthesis of these two forms as stressed in the *Iśa Upaniṣad*, emphasizing the Nirguna Brahman as reality, but refusing to accept this alone and finding it necessary (if that is the correct word) for the Nirguna Brahman to express itself, in the form of Saguna Brahman, in the world of man. I think the key passage in this connection is the following: "And I had intently wished that the introspective vision of the universal soul, which an Eastern devotee realizes in the solitude of his mind, could be united with this spirit of the outward expression in service, the exercise of will in unfolding the wealth of beauty and well-being from its shy obscurity to the light" (p. 175).

Tagore sees this dual nature of reality as a synthesis of East and West, as well as of the two forms of Indian mysticism, in and from the Upanishads, and he also expresses "delight" at the prospect that these two streams (from East and West) may come together (p. 87). His repeated references to the *Iśa Upaniṣad* makes this point crystal clear. To be sure, his emphasis is unquestionably in the direction of (almost) demanding more consideration for the Saguna aspect of Brahman, which is relatively ignored in much (*not* all) of Indian thought. Tagore never denies the existence of Nirguna Brahman, but he does insist on Saguna Brahman as well. He says, ... "such an ideal of the utter extinction of the individual separateness has not a universal sanction in India. There are many of us whose prayer is for dualism so that for them the bond of devotion with God may continue forever. For them religion is a truth which is an ultimate and they refuse to envy those who are ready to sail for the further shore of existence across humanity. They know that human imperfection is the cause of our sorrow but there is a fulfilment in love within the range of our limitation which accepts all sufferings and yet rises above them" (pp. 200-201).

"While accepting their testimony as true [that is, the testimony of the yogis, who have achieved the state of *samādhi*,

"the complete merging of the self in the infinite, a state which is indescribable"], let us *at the same time* have faith in the testimony of others who have found a profound realm, which is the intense feeling of union, for a Being who comprehends in himself all things that are human in knowledge, will and action. And he is God, who is not merely a sum-total of facts, but a goal that lies immensely beyond all that is comprised in the past and present" (p.204—italics mine).

Whether all this points to the "extreme form of mysticism" in which the Nirguna Brahman is emphasized as the sole reality, or the doctrine of two forms of Brahman, in which Nirguna Brahman and Saguna Brahman are equally ultimate, or theism, in which there is a personal God as the ultimate reality, obviously far transcending man in status and reality—whatever it is that Tagore really believes, it seems *not* to be humanism. Clearly there is more in Tagore's comprehensive mind than merely the undifferentiated and ineffable quality-less Absolute and more, too, than even the highest perfection of man. Tagore, it would seem, rejects the sole reality of Nirguna Brahman but he also rejects the ultimate validity, as it were, or the ultimacy of man. Possibly but doubtfully, it would seem that his fundamental point of view, at least the view which is basic—against both undifferentiated Absolutism and humanism—is a form of theism in which a God of love, a God characterized by all the ideals of the true, the good, and the beautiful, a God who recognizes differentiations, distinctions, and values, is his ultimate reality. His *practical* emphasis is upon man; but his *theoretical* emphasis seems to be in the form of a tacit acceptance of what, to repeat, he calls "the extreme form of mysticism" in India, and these two may find their meeting-place in theism—but one is compelled to conclude that even God is only one aspect of the Absolute.

In other words, Tagore does not accept what might be called Western humanism, because it is inadequate, lacking a ground or basis for the ideals which Tagore thinks of as the perfection of man. He does not so much reject the ultimate mysticism of India as "demand" that the Absolute be, as it were,

a living Absolute, an expression of the infinite in the finite—and he uses the clear analogy of the two birds in the Upanishads (p.135) to express this point.

In essence, then, Tagore never abandons the spiritual essence or heights of his Hindu tradition, in the Upanishads and in the Vedanta, but he does insist on its enrichment and fulfilment in the world and in the activity and life of man in his search for ideals and for a spiritual fulfilment which unquestionably transcends the human.

The major problem of this paper has been to determine whether Tagore is a humanist or not. What has been written so far is undoubtedly somewhat confusing, because it is next to impossible to be exactly precise in designating the "ism" with which Tagore's philosophy must be identified. There is rather ample evidence for humanism, theism, general transcendentalism, the belief that Saguna Brahman is the ultimate reality, that Nirguna Brahman is the ultimate reality, and the "two-forms-of-Brahman view." One wonders, as a matter of fact, whether Tagore himself could tell exactly which one of these views represents his basic attitude, for they all find a place in his writings. Furthermore, it must be realized that Tagore's philosophy is not static but takes various forms during the course of his life. There is also the fact that we must pay attention, not only to the written word of Tagore, as far as his literal beliefs are concerned, but also to his own spiritual experiences—and these, too, are difficult to interpret precisely.

One point stands out, namely, that, whatever his basic philosophy may be, it does *not* seem to be humanism. Many other alternatives are, within reason, acceptable, but, contrary to common opinion, it would seem quite clear from the evidence presented in this study that, though Tagore is emphatically interested in the full development of man, his view of both man and reality significantly transcends humanism in some form of transcendentalism, whatever particular name one must give, if one must give a particular name, to that more ultimate point of view.


NOTES

¹ See, for example, many comments to this effect in Ramananda Chatterjee, ed., *The Golden Book* (Calcutta: The Golden Book Committee, 1931).

² "Tagore on Spirituality, East and West," prepared for publication in *Aspects of Indian Culture* and in a special issue of *Vishva Jyoti*, Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur, 1961.

³ All statements and ideas attributed to Tagore in this paper are drawn from his *The Religion of Man*. The Hibbert Lectures for 1930. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931). Specific references to this volume throughout this paper will be indicated in parentheses at the end of the passage.

⁴ The present writer does not accept this interpretation of Western thought and/or culture, since it completely ignores the influence of Judaism and Christianity.



THE PLACE OF SRI MADHVA'S SYSTEM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

P. NAGARAJA RAO

INDIAN philosophy is not all one system. It is the complex heritage of four thousand years of uninterrupted spiritual thinking, carried on by the sages of ancient India. The great sages, through their spiritual experience, realised great truths and have described them in terms of logic and reasoning. The intellectual version of the spiritual experiences of the sages are called *darśanas*, i.e., systems of philosophy. Tradition divides Indian philosophical systems into two groups :—(a) orthodox (*āstika darśanas*), and (b) heterodox (*nāstika darśanas*). The first group of systems accepts the authority of the Vedas, and the second group rejects the authority of the Vedas and builds its system on the experiences of its prophets. The *āstika darśanas* are Nyaya, Vaiseshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta. The *nāstika darśanas* are Buddhism, and Jainism. Among the *āstika darśanas* the first four accept the authority of Vedas only in a nominal way. It is only the Mimamsa and the Vedanta schools that accept, substantially, the authority of the Vedas. In fact all the systems of Vedanta derive their doctrines from the triple texts, *Upaniṣads* (a part of the Vedas), (2) *Gītā* and (3) the *Vedānta sūtras*. All the schools of Vedanta, e.g., Shankara's Advaita, Ramanuja's Visishtadvaita, Madhva's Dvaita, are based on the triple texts. In fact to the great amazement and utter wonder of all, all the three systems equally claim that their philosophy is in essence the message of the triple texts. All that is best and noblest in Indian philosophy is found in Vedanta. Vedanta, in one form or other, is the living religion of the Hindus. The

great philosophical systems of contemporary Indians, e.g., Gandhiji, Tagore, Radhakrishnan, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, etc., are all a series of developments based on Vedanta.

Sri Madhva represents a unique type of Vedanta, which has neither a before nor an after. His system is based on the authority of *Vedas*, *Purāṇas*, *Mūla Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata*, and *Pāñcarātra āgamas*. He is against the discrimination of one part of the Vedas as against the other as Shankara does. For Madhva the entire Veda is authoritative. The unique feature of his interpretation is, he harmonises all the passages in the light of a single principle namely that they adore and glorify the infinite auspicious qualities of the Lord Narayana. Lord Narayana is the ultimate Reality (*para tattva*). God is the supreme Reality. He is the only independent category, and the rest of the categories, though they are *reals*, are still dependent on Him. God is the Real of reals. He is not an indeterminate, indefinable, vague spiritual substance, devoid of all predicates. He is the infinite home of all auspicious qualities in an infinite degree. He has no material detestable qualities (*heya guṇas*). He is not of the same stuff as *prakṛti*. He is made of stuff that transcends the *prakṛti*, which is not a complex of the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The Lord is the supreme person. When we describe Him as a person, he is not to be compared to the humans. There is no difference between the Lord and His qualities or limbs. There is also no difference between the Lord and his incarnations (*avatāras*). He is full of knowledge, power and love. There is nothing greater than He. He has the power in Him to argue out of existence souls, space and time and destroy them. But He does not choose to do so. He is in no way in need of any thing. The Consort of the Lord, Lakshmi, too, does not add to His glory. It is for her happiness that she loves the Lord. The stark, unexceptional independence of the Lord and the utter abject dependence of all others on the Lord is beautifully brought out by Sri Madhva. The souls are creatures. He is the creator. We depend on Him for our knowledge, activity and existence. We are free because

he has given us a gift of freedom. It is a *datta svātantrya*. The glory of the Lord is nowhere so warmly, so unconditionally, and so exaltingly described. He leaves us in no doubt about the relation of man's dependence on God.

The God of Sri Madhva's philosophy is not the limited infinite God of the Nyaya school, nor is he held in inseparable relation with Matter and Souls as in Ramanuja's school. He is an independent supreme Lord. One special feature of Madhva's God is, He is not easily apprehended by all alike. The Lord of Madhva reveals Himself to the devotees in different measures, according to their spiritual eligibility. All know the Lord in their own measure. None can know Him completely. The God of Madhva's philosophy is not a sentimental king or ruler who wipes out the sins of all men and saves their souls. He never overrules the claims of morality. He lays down that each soul should work out its moral life and must prepare itself to receive the grace of the Lord. The preparation is all that man can do. It is again the Lord's grace that is the primary cause for the *mokṣa* of the soul. *Mokṣa* is the bestowal of the Lord's grace. The way to it is pure *bhakti*, Love of the Lord. The Love of the Lord grows in us with ceremonial purity and ethical excellence. These two are necessary for *Bhakti*. The individual soul is atomic, and real. The souls are infinite in number. Their nature, i.e., *svarūpa* is unchangeable. Every soul knows not what its exact nature is. The *svarūpa* of the soul is hidden from itself, by two covers (*āchchādakas*). One of the covers hides the soul from the true vision of the Lord, the second hides the true nature of God itself. The soul, to know its true nature, needs God's grace. Grace is the Lord's gift. The true vision of one's own nature is called *mokṣa*. For the realisation of this the only method is pure *bhakti* (*amala bhakti*). The *bhakti* results in the *prasāda* of the Lord, that ensures the true vision of the Self. The Lord does not create the souls. The souls are uncreated and eternal. They have a beginningless association with a positive *karma* and that is responsible for their births. This *karma* is destroyed at the time of *mokṣa*.

The God of Sri Madhva's philosophy does not bestow

the prizes of life, e.g., wealth, honour, progeny, etc., on the souls in a whimsical, arbitrary manner. Each gets his deserts according to his *karma*. The Lord sees that the good accrues to the soul after it has toiled for it and earned it. The evil-minded souls are not punished at once because of their mere evil dispositions. They are punished only after these dispositions have expressed themselves in specific acts. The God of Sri Madhva's philosophy is a just and moral God. If the Lord's activities governed by the sense of justice is described as cruel, it does not affect His greatness. Dealing out moral retribution is His characteristic. He has neither *vaiṣaṃya* nor *nairghṛṇya* i.e., neither cruelty nor inequity.

The nature of the souls is unalterable. All the souls are not equal in their moral value. It is true that the nature of the soul is also characterised by consciousness and bliss. But these characteristics are not so perfect in the souls as in God. The *svarūpa* of the souls determines their destiny. Some souls are called *mukti-yogyas*. They have in them the potency and power to achieve *mokṣa*. They are destined to achieve it. There is a second class of souls called *nitya-saṃsārins*, who eternally revolve being bound to the wheel of *saṃsāra*. They never attain *mokṣa*. There is a third type of souls called *tamoyogyas* whose nature leads them to eternal hell. These souls are destined to languish in hell for ever. There is no hope for them. No soul can outstrip the limits of its nature.

The classification of souls into three divisions has angered the critics of Madhva a good deal. Some describe this aspect of his philosophy as unprogressive and sectarian and inhuman. They cry out, is it not possible for one type of soul to improve by its moral efforts to attain excellence? Further, they declare, it is unspiritual to shut the door against the moral progress of individuals. It is a philosophy of predestination very much like Christian Calvinism. It mocks the concept of the freedom of man in the face, and makes it a nullity. It also makes God a legal-minded, punctilious bureaucrat that works in a fetish manner according to Law.

The critics are working for something which is not possible

according to the tenets of Madhva's philosophy. The supreme sanction for the threefold classification of the soul is Scripture. As for moral progress, the commentators of Madhva argue that to admit the endless possibility is to destroy the very nature of the soul. The nature of the soul is eternal. If we admit the possibility of the *tamoyogya* becoming a *Sāttvik* soul, that virtually means the very nature of the *tamoyogya* soul is changed out of all recognition. Then he does not become *Sāttvika*. Moral progress, if it is conceived in a miraculous manner, destroys the very *svarūpa* of the soul. Such a destruction is not envisaged in the Scripture. As for the freedom of man, it is a gift from the Lord and it is completely circumscribed. As for the expectation that the Lord must do the impossible, Madhva does not admit it. God, according to Madhva, works according to his own Laws, which He has Himself chosen to obey. So He is not a helpless bureaucrat. He is the Law-giver and the laws are His. His adherence to them is the result of his sweet will. Those who have faith in Madhva's interpretation of the Scripture and some knowledge of the limits of human nature, goodness and perfectibility will not find it so difficult to believe this doctrine. It is very difficult to overcome one's true nature however much we may try it. *Svabhāvo duratikramaḥ*. Ravana accepted this before Sita. Duryodhana affirms it. We cannot jump over ourselves. It is not of course flattering to be told that there are definite limits for our growth. But that is the hard truth and there is no running away from it. Madhva has made bold to state it in clear terms. He has neither whitewashed the nature of man nor ignored evil elements in man. It is a fair though not a flattering picture of man.

Sri Madhva's philosophy is *theistic*, pluralistic *realism*. But here one must notice that the unique nature of his system is not only its theism but also its realism and pluralism. His God is not deistic, nor pantheistic nor limited. His God is the efficient cause and not the material cause of the world. He does not suffer any taint by anything in the universe. His reality and independence is of an infinite order. He is the upholder of the

moral Law and not an exception to it or a destroyer of it to vindicate His glory.

The pluralism of Madhva's philosophy is radical. There are pluralisms in Indian philosophy; but Madhva's pluralism is ultra radical. No two things in the world are alike, no two qualities are alike. Difference is fundamental and foundational to reality. The Nyaya-Vaisesika systems have sundered reality into a number of categories and have sought to connect them by a network of relational categories, e.g., *sāmānya* (universals), *samavāya* (inherence) and *saṁyoga* (conjunction). Madhva goes one step further in his Logic and does not admit that there is an universal present common in the things that belong to a group. He does not admit an *anugata dharma* (common characteristic among the objects belonging to a group). He explains concepts on the basis of *similarity*. Again similarity is not the same in two objects. He seeks to distinguish objects which look like one another, on the basis of a characteristic inherent in each object which distinguishes it from others, while it itself needs no other distinguishing mark to isolate it. The unique characteristic of each object is self-differentiating (*svato-vyāvṛtta*). The unique characteristic of each object is called *viśeṣa*. Madhva's doctrine of *viśeṣa* is the fulcrum of the system. His concept of difference, his pluralism, his realism revolve round the pivot of his doctrine of *viśeṣa*. It is this doctrine that enables him to expound his pluralism. Pluralism cannot go farther than this.

Let us turn to understand Madhva's realism. According to Madhva, objects of the world exist independent of the knowing. Knowledge does not create objects. Knowing does not produce objects, but only reveals them as they are. It is like a searchlight. Knowledge is revelation and not construction. The mind of man reveals objects. Experiencing makes no difference to objects or facts experienced. Knowledge always refers to something external. Objects of knowledge have an external reference. Even in delusive cognition there is an objective reference. Delusion arises from our wrong predication and from lack of content. The content is misapprehended. Even in delusive cognition there is fact of immediacy. The

realism of Madhva asserts that there is the cognition of even the absolute non-existent (*atyantāsat*). Madhva admits an infinite plurality of souls. He proclaims a five-fold difference as eternal. The souls are different from one another, as well as from God and the world. The world is different from the souls. The different aspects of matter differ among themselves. This is the celebrated *pañcabheda*. This difference persists even in *mokṣa*. Even after release souls are graded in respect of their perfection. The souls are also of the nature of three *guṇas*. According to Sankhya, *prakṛti* alone is a mixture of three *guṇas*, but not souls. According to Madhva souls also are of the nature of *prakṛti*. This must have been at the root of his threefold classification of souls, according to predominant proportion of *guṇas*.

The physical world is the creation of the Lord. The Lord is its efficient cause. He is not its material cause. The purpose of creation is to enable each individual soul to work out its salvation. The Lord has no profit to gain from creation. It affords the soul opportunities to achieve through devotion to the Lord and discipline salvation. The phenomenal world is not illusory. It is declared to be real. Madhva's concept of the real has to be clearly understood. It does not mean that the real must eternally exist and should not be sublated at any time. The real is that which is not superimposed, *anāropitaṁ tattvam*. The real can be dependent also. There are two types of reals, independent and dependent. The Lord alone is the independent real. The rest are dependent reals. For a thing to be real it is enough if it is located for sometime and in some space. We should not confuse the *anitya* (non-eternal) with the unreal. Understood in this grand sense the world is real (*satyam*). The world of pots and pans, mountains and rivers is not the mere creation of Nature nor is it the result of evolution. It is the creation of God. In one of his moving devotional hymns Sri Madhva explains the need for God thus : "If the world is not the creation of the Lord, who created it ? It may be argued that men created it. If that is the truth, men would have created themselves perfectly happy (*nitya sukham*). The expe-

rience of men falsifies this hope. So, from this it follows, that the Lord created the world none else." Madhva is opposed to scientific naturalism and atheistic materialism. Sri Madhva's philosophy is an integrated one. It does not leave out matter, nor souls nor God. It gives proper place for all the categories. It explains the nature and function of each of the categories in relation to other. There is nothing but baffling commonsense in the philosophy of Madhva.

Madhva insists on *bhakti* as the supreme method to attain the Lord and his apostle Jayatirtha describes *bhakti*, in the celebrated classic *Nyāyasudhā*, as follows: "It is supreme attachment to the Lord based on the complete understanding of the greatness and supremacy of the Lord, which transcends the love of one's own self and possession and which remains unaffected and unshaken in the face of a thousand difficulties. It flows uninterruptedly. This kind of *bhakti* secures *mokṣa*, (*mokṣaśca viṣṇu-prasādena vinā na labhyate*)." The worship of the Lord is to be conducted in a proper manner.

The Lord must be worshipped with all his company (*parivāra*). Each deity must be worshipped in a proper manner, according to the status and position he is given in the hierarchy. This is called the scheme of *tāratamya*. This must never be violated. The supremacy and the glory of the Lord Vishnu, has meaning only when there is a huge body of dependent Gods on Him. The presence of *prakṛti*, the existence of other reals in no way affects or limits the glory of Narayana. On the other hand, the legion of dependents constitutes His glory and power. In his theory of knowledge Sri Madhva admits three *pramāṇas*, perception, inference, and scripture. He gives the highest place to scripture. He has many minor, but still significant differences with the Nyaya school. He believes in the reality of oneness and validity of memory.

One of the most significant doctrines in his theory of knowledge is his conception of *sākṣin*: *sākṣin* is of the very nature of sentience. It can directly apprehend itself, pleasure, pain, time and space. In addition to this it also knows what is presented through one or other of the senses. The knowledge

derived through the *sākṣin* is valid. In this respect Madhva differs from other systems like the Nyaya for example which assigns the duties of the *sākṣin* to *manas*. Madhva's doctrine of *sākṣin* has saved him from the fallacy of infinite regress in respect of the determination of the validity of knowledge. The concept of *sākṣin* is responsible for our general knowledge of things and the concept of all; for the knowledge of time and space during sleep, etc.

From the few points adduced in this essay we are able to see the significant place of Madhva's Dvaita Vedanta in Indian philosophy.

MANDANA AND DHARMAKIRTI

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

I

IN his introduction to the critical edition of the text with the author's own commentary of the first chapter of Dharmakirti's *Pramāṇavārttika*¹ Raniero Gnoli says that Mandanamisra 'was contemporary with, or slightly later than, Dharmakirti'.² This view needs further examination.

Buddhist traditions in Tibet consider Kumarilabhatta as a contemporary of Dharmakirti³. Kumarila's contemporaneity with Dharmakirti seems to be supported by Karnakagomin who while explaining a passage in the *Pramāṇavārttika* refers to Kumarila as being criticized by Dharmakirti.⁴

Dharmakirti defends Dinnaga against the criticisms of Udyotakara and is in turn criticized by Vacaspatimisra. He is also much later than Bhartrihari whom he criticizes. Hsüan Tsang does not refer to Dharmakirti at all; but I-Tsing mentions him as a great Buddhist logician. Hence Dharmakirti may be assigned to the beginning of the seventh century A.D.

Regarding the date of Mandanamisra, Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri suggests 615-695 A.D. (cf. the *Brahmasiddhi* by Acarya Mandanamisra, Madras, 1937, Introduction, p. lviii). But this date was based on a general scheme relying upon Bhartrihari's date of death recorded by I-Tsing, and has to be revised in the light of further evidence that is now available. Although the tradition identifying Mandana with Sankara's disciple Suresvara may not be correct, Mandana has to be taken as a contemporary of Sankaracarya; according to Amala-

nanda, Vacaspati defends Sankara against the criticism of Mandana.⁵ As Prof. Kuppaswami Sastri points out, 'Mandana's attitude towards Sankara is that of a self-confident Advaitic teacher towards a rival Advaitic teacher holding divergent views on certain questions.'⁶ I have shown elsewhere⁷ that the works of Sankara must have been composed towards the close of the eighth century A.D. Consequently the floruit of Mandanamisra is to be placed towards the close of the eighth century and the beginning of the ninth. Hence it is clear that Mandana cannot be a contemporary of Dharmakīrti, but later than that Buddhist logician by nearly two centuries.

II

In his *Sphoṭasiddhi* Mandana defends Bhartrihari's Sphota theory against the attacks of Kumarilabhatta and Dharmakīrti. It has been pointed out that Mandana uses rather strong language in referring to the opponents of the Sphota doctrine. It was difficult to believe that Mandana would refer to the great Mīmāṃsa teacher Kumarila by such terms as *durvidagdha*, *manda* and *sāndrāvidyātimirapaṭalācchāditāntardṛś*.⁸ The commentator Paramesvara suggested that the reference is to the pupils of Kumarilabhatta,⁹ also implying thereby that Mandana was much later than Kumarila. Professor Kuppaswami Sastri suggested that 'a careful comparison of the earlier portions of the *Sphoṭasiddhi* with the relevant portions of the *Bṛhati* would induce one to think that Mandana has in his mind Prabhakara's sneering remarks against the Sphota theory'.¹⁰

In the *Sphoṭasiddhi* Mandana actually quotes a line from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (I-247) :

*'vākyam na bhinnam varṇebhyo vidyate 'nupalambhanāt'*¹¹

Reniero Gnoli has pointed out¹² that Mandana has actually paraphrased a long passage from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and given as Purvapaksha in the *Sphoṭasiddhi*. It may also be noted that in Karnakagomin's commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* several passages from the *Sphoṭasiddhi* have been quoted as from Mandana and refuted to establish Dharmakīrti's

position.¹³ Hence it is quite probable that the writer referred to as *durvidagdhā*, etc., in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* is the Buddhist philosopher, Dharmakīrti.

NOTES

¹ *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*, the First chapter with the autocommentary, Rome Oriental Series, XXIII, Rome, 1960.

² *ibid.*, p. xix.

³ S.C.Vidyabhushan, *History of Indian Logic*, p. 304f.

⁴ *The Pramāṇavārttikam with the Svavṛtti and the commentary of Karmakagomin*, published under the editorship of Rabula Sankrityayana, Allahabad 1943, p. 438:

'apare āpīdānim tanmatānusāraṇaḥ Kūṃḍīlaprabhṛtayoḥ parikṣakamanyoḥ evam etad anuvadanīti'

This suggests that Dharmakīrti was a younger contemporary of Kumārīlabhatta.

⁵ Commenting on the *Bhāṣanī* passage (p. 958-9 Nīlāyasaṅgā ed.) *'sthitaprajñāś ca na sādḥakāḥ'*, Amalananda says: *'bhāṣye sthitaprajñāśalakṣaṇanirdeśo jīvanmuktusādhakā uktāḥ. tatra sthitaprajñāś sādḥako na sāḥśītkāraḥ ita madḥanāṃśair uktam dūṣaṇam uddharati sthitaprajñāś ceti'*. See also S. Kuppaswami Sastri, Introduction to *Brahmandīhi* for details.

⁶ *loc. cit.*, p. xlv.

⁷ K. Kunjunnī Raja, 'On the Date of Saṃkaracārya and Allied Problems', *Adyar Library Bulletin*, vol. XXIV, pp. 125-48.

⁸ *'durvidagdhair avakṣipte darśane padadarśinām yathāgamam yathāprajñam nyāyaleśo mdarśyate'* *Sphoṭandīhi*, v.2 *'sāndrāvidyāsimirapaṭalāśchāśutāntardīśo ye dṛṣṭim mandā cāramunimata kurvate sūcamānam'* *ibid.*, last verse.

⁹ *Sphoṭasiddhi*, commentary, Madras University ed., p. 8.

'dīpyā hi bhāṣapāḍādyuktayuktīryāmohutāntahkaraṇā...'

¹⁰ *op. cit.*, p. lxi. cp. *Bṛhātī*, Madras University ed., p. 166:

'casmāś cīḍambanaiḥ cecarsate 'rehabhāśana it'

¹¹ p. 210.

¹² *op. cit.*, p. xixf. *Pramāṇavārttika* (Gnoli's ed.), p. 128, line 10 to p. 129, line 13 (*atha mā bhāṣ*, etc.) is paraphrased in *Sphoṭasiddhi* (Madras University ed.) pp. 216-22.

¹³ Karmakagomin must be later than Mandana whom he quotes. It has been pointed out that the commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, by Karmakagomin and Sakyamatī (preserved only in Tibetan translation) are substantially identical, except for the fact that the former contains some discussions on language where the quotation from Mandana also occurs. Sakyamatī's date seems to be the second half of the seventh century. Hence Karmakagomin's commentary has to be taken as an enlargement of the first part of Sakyamatī's commentary. For the opposite view see Gnoli, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

SIMONE WEIL AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EGO

FERNAND BRUNNER

To pay tribute to the eminent thinker to whom this article is dedicated, and also to his country, which has so exceptional a place in the history of human thought, I should like to deal with an aspect of the philosophy of Simone Weil, a French author whose thought is unusually lucid and profound and who died, after living a heroic life, in 1943, at the age of 34 years. It is no paradox to discuss Simone Weil in India, for there is not only an affinity, but also a certain dependence, between her doctrine and Indian thought. Having started as a militant communist, Simone Weil moved, from 1937 onwards, in the direction of religion and metaphysics. She then discovered not only Christianity and the deep significance of Greek philosophy, but also the thought of India. Early in 1942, she read the Bhagavad Gitâ. Later on, she learned Sanskrit, and her *Cahiers* (Notebooks), written between 1940 and 1942, from which Gustave Thibon took *La Pesanteur et la Grâce* (Gravity and Grace), the first of her books to be published, in Paris, in 1948, are full of references to India and of quotations from and comments on the Upanishads. A few weeks before she died, Simone Weil corrected her French translation of certain fragments of the Upanishads, thus showing that she was still faithful to the Indian inspiration that she had been privileged to receive. Published in volume I of the *Cahiers* (Plon, Paris, 1951), the translations cover fragments of the Brihad-Aranyaka-Upanishad, the Chandogya-Upanishad and the Isa-Upanishad, to which is added a summary of the Kena-Upanishad. It is chiefly in volume I of the *Cahiers* that we find references to Indian sources.

But there are others in the other volumes as well, and at the end of volume II the editors have collected translations of certain passages from the Bhagavad-Gîtâ, with Simone Weil's brief explanations of such Indian terms as *guṇa*, *dharma*, *puruṣa*, *âtman*, etc.

Simone Weil was influenced by Indian thought—that of Buddhism as well as that of Brahminism. The fact remains, however, that her thought drew on other sources as well, the chief ones being Christianity, Greek philosophy and that of Spinoza. For Simone Weil believed that truth was to be found everywhere. In this respect, she resembled the thinkers of India, who are so often inclined to welcome spirituality in all its forms. Beauty is found in many works of art, though it is apparent only in the particular work that is being contemplated. In the same way, in her view, truth is present in all religious traditions, but when we consider one of them we forget the others. Thus, just as beauty is one despite the diversity of beautiful things, truth is one in all the different religious traditions. Simone Weil loved to discover this, and she insisted, for example, on the unity of the teachings of Greece and of India. The Good, she wrote, quoting Plato, is that which every soul seeks, that on account of which it performs its every action, feeling that it is something real, yet uncertain, and incapable of sufficiently realizing what it is. In the same way, the Atman, she added with reference to the Upanishads, is that for which one loves one's wife, one's sons and one's wealth; it is only the Atman that is precious (cf. *Cahiers*, III pp. 136-137).

Let us then note one of the themes of Simone Weil's thought, which is at the same time one of the themes of that of India and of the world: the destruction of the ego. Our author considers that the only thing we possess in the world, for everything else can be taken away from us by the events that occur, is the power of saying "I". It is this, according to her, that must be given to God, that is to say destroyed. For everything else that we can offer, if the ego subsists, is a vain offering. The ego has to disappear to leave room for God. This is one of Simone Weil's central doctrines. In her *Intuitions préchrétiennes* (Pre-

christian Intuitions), a work dating from the same period as the *Cahiers* and including commentaries of Greek authors, she writes that nothing in the world is the centre of the world, and that nobody in the world has the right to say "I". "For the sake of God and of truth", she continues, "we must give up in favour of God the illusory power that He has given to us of thinking in the first person. He has given it to us so that we may be able to give it up through love. God alone has the right to say 'I am' ". (p. 137). Then she explains that this renunciation does not consist in transferring to God one's own position as an individual centre. If one loves God in this way, even if one dies a martyr's death, this is not true love of God. God's "I am", which is true, is infinitely different from man's "I am", which is illusory. This is why the Hindus have said so profoundly that God must be conceived both as personal and impersonal.

Man has an imaginary divinity, she says again in the *Cahiers*, of which he must divest himself. He must "lose his perspective", that is to say leave the point of view of his limited ego. But how then is he to go on acting as an individual? She sees in this problem the theme of the Bhagavad-Gîtâ. In an extraordinary text, she writes: "Man has no being, he only has possessions. Man's being is situated behind the curtain, on the side of the supernatural. All he can know of himself is what has been lent to him by circumstances. My ego is hidden from me (and from others); it is on the side of God, in God and is God (âtman). To be proud is to forget that one is God." (*Cahiers*, I, 200). This last sentence is characteristic of her incisive style, which does not fear an apparent paradox. A proud individual is not the one who believes that God is the only reality in man and in the world, but the one who thinks that man has reality outside God.

Simone Weil has given another name to the destruction of the ego, namely "decreation". Decreation consists in passing from the created to the uncreated state. "Creation", she writes, "is an act of love and is perpetual. At every instant, our existence is God's love for us. But God can only love Himself. His love for us is love for Himself through us. Thus He who

gives us our being loves in us our willingness to give up our being." (*Cahiers*, III, 302-303). Not to be does not mean here to die merely, but to be dead to separate existence. To decreate oneself is to give up existing outside God. It is to become nothing so that God may become everything, to empty oneself of the belief in one's own reality. Decreation is the revelation of God, for God has only been able to create by hiding Himself. It takes us "behind the curtain, on the side of the supernatural", to the point where "the soul's love for God is *transcendent in the soul*. It is the death of the soul", Simone Weil adds, "Misfortune comes to him whose body dies before his soul." (*Cahiers*, II, 185).

As he must not have a separate existence, man must not have a separate knowledge or a separate will either. Simone Weil wants God to know in her, and not herself. It would be enough, she says, for me to have withdrawn from my own soul, to let this table that stands before me have the privilege of being seen by God. "I must withdraw", she writes, "so that God may come into contact with the beings that chance has placed on my path, beings that He loves." (*Cahiers*, II, 335). To withdraw from oneself so that God alone may exist is also to withdraw so that He alone may have knowledge. The supreme knowledge of which Simone Weil speaks is not knowledge of this or that, or even the knowledge of God as the supreme object of knowledge, for it is impossible to conceive, imagine or visualize God. God and the supernatural are hidden in the Universe; they are therefore hidden inside the soul too. Supreme knowledge is God knowing in us, God as the supreme subject of knowledge. Ultimately, to know is nothing but letting God know in us, giving ourselves up to the infinity of God, Who alone has the power to be and to know. The end of knowledge, that which we have to know, is the beginning of knowledge, the One who alone knows.

Such is the Good or the Atman, which is at the same time the end of will and of love. For we cannot have as our end a given good, that is to say a mixture of good and evil. The end of will and of love must be the pure, infinite Good that will

cannot aim at as it aims at an object. We must therefore detach desire from all our private "goods" and wait. Experience proves, says Simone Weil, that this waiting is satisfied : we then attain the absolute Good. And just as the object of knowledge turns out to be nothing but the supreme subject of knowledge, the object of will and of love is ultimately the supreme subject that wills and loves. It is not what we may desire and love, but that which wills and loves in us and in all beings. We do not love ourselves, according to Simone Weil, nor do we love any finite object. In reality, we love nothing but God, and we love God because He loves Himself in us. "It is not for me to love God", she writes. "God loves Himself through me." (*Cahiers*, II, 334).

In many passages of her writings, Simone Weil forcefully emphasizes the cruelty of the evil that reigns in this world, human misery and the absence of God. For her, indeed, facing up to evil is a method of purification. Our thought of God must be pure and unadulterated. This is why, in her view, we reach God only when we have recognized His absence in this world. Then, paradoxically and contrarily, the world that is entirely empty of God becomes God Himself. It is when our thought is entirely free of the world that God lives in it and, through it, in the world. Our illusory "I" makes way for the "I" of God.

There is no need to insist on the affinity of this doctrine, which often refers to India, with Indian philosophy. Simone Weil's doctrine at least has in common with Indian thought a profundity that has rarely been equalled. We venture to point this out as a tribute to one of the greatest thinkers of India, Professor T.M.P. Mahadevan.

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SANKARA AND VACASPATI MISRA

S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI

THE *Bhāmatī* of Vacaspatimisra is the most important work in Advaita, not only because it is the origin of the *Bhāmatī-prasthāna* (Bhamati School) as against the *Īvaranaprasthāna* (Vivarana school) but also because it is the earliest commentary on the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* extending to the end of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Pañca-pādikā* of Padmapada, though earlier to the *Bhāmatī*, breaks off at the end of *sūtra* 4 of the first *pāda* in the first *adhyāya*, though references in the *Bhāmatī* to the *Pañcapādikā* in the second¹ and third *pādas*² of the first *adhyāya* confirm its existence for those *pādas* also. Both the *Pañcapādikā* and the *Bhāmatī* are called *śikṣā*, commentaries and not *vārtikas*. A Commentary differs from a *vārtika* inasmuch as it only explains the views of the author of the text while the definition³ of the *vārtika* itself guarantees its going against the *bhāṣya* and even criticising it, in addition to explaining its purport.

Katyayana, the author of *Vyākaraṇa-vārtika*, Uddyotakara, the author of the *Nyāya-vārtika*, Kumarila, the author of the *Mīmāṃsā-vārtika* have all gone beyond their texts. Even in Vedānta where great reverence is given to the author of the *sūtras* and the *bhāṣya* and strict adherence to their views is a necessity, we observe in many places difference of views in the interpretation of the texts, though not in fundamentals. Suresvarācārya, the author of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* differs from Sankara in the interpretation of the text of the Upanishad. Thus interpreting the text *Sa mene na vadiṣye iti* (*Br-IV,3,1*) which is explained in the *Bhāṣya* as 'He (Yajnavalkya)

thought that he would not talk (with Janaka that day)' Suresvar-acarya says that the above interpretation being contradictory to what happened is not good, but splitting the sentence as *sam yenena vadiṣye iti* and explaining it as 'He thought that he would talk vigorously with Janaka (that day)' is much better as it concurs with what exactly happened. Being the author of a *vārtika* which is authorised to criticise the text his position is justified. But, curiously enough we find many places where Vacaspati though a commentator criticises the *Bhāṣya*. It may be said that Sankara also deviates from the *sūtras* in the section called *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* (I-1-6). Not so. Sankara does not criticise the *sūtras* but after ascertaining the purport of the entire *sūtras* and the *Upaniṣads* in favour of Advaita, he interprets the *sūtras* of *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* as expounding the quality-less Brahman as against the interpretation of the *vṛttikāra* which favours the qualified Brahman as the subject of *Ānandavallī*. But criticism is different.

Amalananda, the author of *Kalpataru*, an important commentary on the *Bhāmatī*, doubts the propriety of the *Bhāmatī*, a *ṭīkā*, indulging in criticising the text, and arrives at the conclusion that the *Bhāmatī* is also a *vārtika*. He says, "Now it is not proper for a commentator to discuss the defects of the *Bhāṣya*. It (discussion of the defects) is the duty of a *vārtika*. (Answer) Then let the *Bhāmatī* be a *vārtika*. Indeed, *vārtika* has no horns.⁴ This is why Vacaspati interpreted the *sūtras* I, i, 15 and II, i, 5 independent of the *Bhāṣyas* thereon". We shall now consider some *sūtras* where they differ:

(1) Sankara accepts only one *avidyā* as is evident from his words in I.iv.3. "This causal potency is of the nature of *avidyā*, denoted by the word *avyakta*, located in the Supreme Lord and, identical with Maya, the great slumber. It is in this that the *jīvas* are immersed without a knowledge of their selves".⁵ But Vacaspati commenting on the above *Bhāṣya* says: "We do not say that *avidyā* is one and common to all *jīvas* like the *pradhāna* of the Sankhyas. *Avidyā* is different with each *jīva*. Therefore when one *jīva* gets Brahman-knowledge his *avidyā* alone perishes while *avidyās* of others persist and continue to function,

(2) *Māntravarṇikameva ca gīyate* I.1.15. Sankara while recounting the Vṛttikara's interpretation of the *Ānandamayādhi-karaṇa* says that in the text *ānyontara ātmānandamayaḥ* which is a *Brāhmaṇa*, Brahman defined in the *mantra* "*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*" is alone presented and nothing else, since it is proper that only that which is proclaimed in the *mantra* should be explained in the *Brāhmaṇa* and since the context is not hampered. Vacaspati, on the other hand, considering that Brahman proclaimed in the *mantra* "*satyam jñānam*", etc., is not easily recognisable in the aforesaid *Brāhmaṇa* text due to difference of words Brahman and Atman, interprets the *sūtra* independently. He says that the part of the chapter dealing with the four *kośas*, Annamaya, Pranamaya, Manomaya and Vijñanamaya should be taken by the word *mantra* since like *mantra* it is the means to get at Brahman. The passage proclaiming Anandamaya should be taken by the word *Brāhmaṇa*. They should have the same meaning. Appayya Dikshita explaining the *Bhāmātī* text in the light of *Kalpataru* says that the Annamaya, Pranamaya, Manomaya and Vijñanamaya all these *kośas* are proclaimed as Brahman in their contexts,⁶ only for the sake of the knowledge of Brahman through the *sthūlārundhatī nyāya*.⁷ It may be asked that Vacaspati has to abandon the primary sense of the words *mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* since, says Amalananda, the author of *Kalpataru*, that in the interpretation of Sankara also the word *mantra* does not mean the *mantra* alone but the whole context.

Appayya Dikshita, however, defends the view of Sankara saying that the word *mantra* in the *Bhāṣya* interpretation means the *mantra* alone and not the whole context. Sankara's reference to the context is only to point out that the context is not broken by the introduction of any new subject, and not to show the meaning of the word *mantra*, and Brahman proclaimed by the word Brahman can be identified when proclaimed by the word Anandamaya since Anandamaya is the innermost of all the *kośas*.

(3) Again, stating the locus of *avidyā*, Sankara says that "*akṣaram*, the unmanifest, the potency to create name and form, the latent state of the elements has for its locus the Lord" (1-2-21).

The potency of the cause is the nature of *avidyā* indicated by the word *avyakta* and located in the Supreme Lord (I.iv.3). The authors of the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Samkṣepasārīraka* take these texts literally and teach us that Pure Brahman is the locus of *avidyā*. Vacaspati on the other hand holds that *avidyā* is located in the *jīvaś* and not in *Īvara* who by nature being self-effulgent does not brook ignorance.⁸ He interprets the *Bhāṣya* 'located in Brahman' as 'has for its content Brahman' thus avoiding evasion of the *Bhāṣya* text. Vacaspati's view is condemned by the authors of the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Samkṣepasārīraka* as contradicting the *Bhāṣya* text. But Amalananda comes in to defend Vacaspati's position. He says: 'Vacaspati of unfathomable knowledge knowing the correct meaning of the passage saved the Lord from being affected by ignorance and illusion.'⁹

(4) *Bhāveṣopalabdheḥ* (II.I.15): This *sūtra* gives the reason for the identity between cause and effect. According to Sankara the purport of the *sūtra* is this: The effect is non-different from the cause since it is cognised only when there is the cause. If it be said that the statement is not correct as the reason applies also to things which are not identical like fire and smoke, the smoke which spreads over the sky not being cognised when there is no fire, Sankara answers that the reason proclaimed in the *sūtra* is not this but that the cognition of one thing always connected with another shows their identity.

Vacaspati says that the reason finally shown too is not free from fallacy. We find that the pot which is different from light is always cognised along with it. So Vacaspati interprets the *sūtra* in a different way. He says that the mark of identity is one's existence and cognition being always dependent on the existence and cognition of another. The existence of pot is not dependent on the existence of light. So they are different. The existence and cognition of the effect on the other hand are dependent on the existence and cognition of the cause and hence their identity.

(5) *Ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadeśāt anyatra śreṣṭhāt*. (II.iv.17) Sankara interprets this *sūtra* thus: The senses are not mere functions of the vital airs. They are different because of their being proclaimed as such in the *Sruti* text—"From this the vital air,

mind and the senses are born". Vacaspati does not accept this interpretation saying that Sankara has to complete the proposition (*pratijñā*) by filling up "different from vital airs" and that the *probans* because of the declaration of difference in the *Sruti* text is a repetition of the next *sūtra*. He prefers the interpretation of Vṛttikara. It is like this : The senses are different from *prāṇa* since they alone are referred to by the word *indriya* and nowhere is *prāṇa* referred to as '*indriya*'. Sankara's *adhikaraṇa* should be read in the succeeding *sūtras*.

Appayya Dikshita however supports the interpretation of Sankara. He says that the *adhikaraṇa* favoured by Vacaspati has no value in this *pāda*, nay in this *Darsana*, since in this *pāda*, Atman is to be distinguished from all other things. It is the same whether *prāṇa* is accepted as the twelfth *indriya* or different. We must realise that Atman is different from *indriyas* and *prāṇa* also. But in Sankara's interpretation the *adhikaraṇa* is necessary since, if according to the *pūrvapakṣa* the *indriyas* are only the functions of the vital airs we determine the difference of Atman from the *indriyas* by the determination of difference from the vital airs themselves and there is no need to determine the difference from *indriyas* separately. The filling up of the proposition by adding 'different from vital airs' is not necessary as the words '*anyatra śreṣṭhāt*' can be added to the proposition also. There is no repetition since in the first *sūtra* statement of origination is meant and not declaration of difference.

(6) *Aśuddham iti cerna śabdāt*, (III.i.25). This *sūtra* is the answer to the objection that the Vedic rituals are impure as they involve killing of animals. The answer is that since there is the Vedic injunction 'kill the goat in a sacrifice' the sacrifice is not impure (will not lead to hell). Sankara asks how this Vedic injunction can be reconciled with the Vedic injunction 'do not kill any animal'. He answers that this is a general rule and the injunction of killing in a sacrifice is an exception and the general rule applies only to other killings giving room to the killing in a sacrifice.

Vacaspati does not accept this reconciliation. He says

that the prohibitive injunction, not being situated in the context of any sacrifice, does not at all cover the killing in sacrifices. It applies only to killings for the benefit of man, that is his nourishment.

If the prohibitive injunction were found in the context of a sacrifice like 'Do not tell lies' then the killing like the uttering of falsehood might have been taken as that which helps the sacrifice. It is not so. Hence it applies only to killings belonging to everyday life. Thus since the prohibitive injunction does not pervade the killings in sacrifices they are not mutually contradictory, and there is no need for applying the rule of 'general rule and exception.'

Appayya Dikshita again defends the position of Sankara. He says that *sāmānya viśeṣa nyāya* applies to killing in sacrifices also as the prohibitive injunction 'Do not kill any animal' applies to all killings whether they are for the purpose of sacrifices or for food. How is this ? Appayya Dikshita replies that killing is any activity culminating in the death of an animal and it is common to both. If it be asked how then the prohibitive injunction 'Do not tell lies' in the context of a sacrifice applies only to lies which are uttered for the fulfilment of the sacrifice and not for any other purpose, Appayya replies that the injunction 'Do not tell lies' being found in the context of a sacrifice refers only to lies which are uttered for the fulfilment of sacrifices. But the injunction 'Do not kill any animal' placed in non-sacrificial context, applies to all killings which are 'for the aspiration of human beings'. This applies to the sacrificial killing also which is indirectly conducive to human aspirations. By killing, the sacrifice is fulfilled and by the sacrifice man gets the heavenly abode.

NOTES

¹ 1-2-26

² 1-3-19

³ uktānukta duruktādi cintā yatra pravartate,
tam grantham vartikam prāhurvārtikajñā māṇṣiṇṇaḥ.

⁴ Nānu tīkāyām duruktacintā na yuktā; vartike hi sā bhavati; tarhi vārṇikatvam astu;
na hi vārtikasya lṅgam asti ata eva ānandamayādhikarṇe māntracārṇika sūtre ārambhaṇā-
dhikarṇe ca bhāve co pa labdheriti sūtrabhāṣyam anapekṣya vyākhyām cakāra (II.IV.17)

⁵ Avidyātmikā hi bijasaktiḥ avyaktaśabdānirdēṣyā paramēśvārāśrayā māyāmaya mahā-
sūptiḥ yasyām svarūpa prabodharahitāḥ krate samsāriṇo jīvāḥ (I.IV.3)

⁶ ye annam brahmopāsate ye prāṇam brahmopāsate
vijñānam brahmacet veda etc.

⁷ In weddings the bridegroom should show the Arundhati star to the bride. That
being very small he points first to a neighbouring star which is not Arundhati saying that
it is that and thereupon withdraws his statement and points out the real Arundhati.

⁸ vidyāsvabhāve brahmaṇi avidyānupapattēḥ Bh. 1-2-21.

⁹ ajñāsvabhāntatādoṣāt arakṣat paramēśvaram. (Kalpataru, p. 258, Nirmayasagar ed.)

TOWARDS THE UNSTRUCTURED HUMAN PERSONALITY*

C.T.K.CHARI

I THINK that I shall be honouring an advaitic scholar like T.M.P. Mahadevan by a re-appraisal of the issues which have always divided sharply Absolutists from Personalists in the East and in the West. Personal Idealism, in recent European philosophy, arose as a vigorous protest against Absolute Idealism, especially the kind sponsored by F.H.Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. Bradley's Absolute, which came in for much rough handling, was branded as 'a universal minotaur', 'a metaphysical monster' and as 'a Jehovah whose eyes cannot behold any iniquity'. Personal Idealism conceived along neo-Hegelian (T.H.Green, J.M.E.McTaggart, J.Royce), neo-Leibnizian (Boström, Koslov, Lopatin, H.R.Rashdall, J.Ward, C.A.Richardson, G.H.Howison, E.S.Brightman), neo-Lotzean (A.S.Pringle-Pattison, B.P.Bowne, A.C.Knudson) and neo-Spinozistic (Vladimir Solovyov and S.L.Frank) lines brought with it a new emphasis on the person as a uniquely differentiated individual; on value, freedom, spontaneity, novelty, as attributes of personality; on the tension between value and disvalue; and, by implication, on the reality of time and history. Bradley and Bosanquet castigated personality as a limiting and exclusive category. One can be a person only in a *society* of persons. However much it may suit us to keep *meum* and *tuum* accounts, an Absolute or fundamental reality cannot so degrade itself. *A fortiori*, it cannot be engaged in moral struggle or transactions in time. While personalists of William James's persuasion have met the difficulties with the hypothesis of a God who is *primus inter pares*, or even *unus inter pares*, personalists with more panentheistic

leanings have argued that personality is an inclusive rather than an exclusive category. The recognition of personality is in proportion to its richness. Boström maintained that determination is not necessarily limitation. Personality is determined, but not necessarily limited. Royce used his logic of self-representation to buttress the conclusion that the structure of an infinite spiritual whole repeats itself in its members. The neo-Spinozists, Solovyov and Frank, claimed that personality is a finite form with infinite content. We find the same ironical temper in modern Visishtadvaita and Saiva Siddhanta regarded as reactions against an over-drawn Advaita. The late P.N. Srinivasachari wrote in his *The Idea of Personality* : 'The view of the Dvaitavadins and the theists that the *jīvas* form a plurality of independent reals fails to establish real unity between them. The absolute idealism of Spinoza and Hegel and the *Bhedābhedavādins* suffers from the defect of attributing imperfection to God and making Him less real than the Absolute....But the theistic monism of Vedānta like that of Visishtadvaita provides for the logical need for unity and the moral and spiritual need for mystic union....*Paramātman* and *jīvātman* are distinguishable but not divisible; they are one in connotation but two in denotation. *Paramātman* is logically immanent in the *jīva* as the monad of monads but is ethically transcendent and is both in their mystic union.' In his *The Philosophy of Viṣiṣṭādvaita*, Srinivasachari claimed that 'Visishtadvaita is the meeting-ground of the extremes in philosophy like monism and pluralism.' V. A. Devasenapathi has written in an almost similar vein in his *Saiva Siddhānta* : 'A pluralism which maintains total exclusiveness of each individual without any basis for co-operation among themselves or common allegiance to a supreme authority is untenable.' The Siddhantin's insistence on the supremacy of God supplies a valuable corrective to unbridled monism and unmitigated pluralism. 'Advaita we saw means for him not mere non-difference as it does for the kevaladvaitin but a "union-in-separateness".'

In my Presidential Address to the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1956, I have

urged the need for a re-examination of the basic logical concepts of identity and difference along modern analytical lines before pronouncing a confident verdict on the great mystical experiences of the human race. Words like 'pantheism', 'theopanism' and even 'panentheism' imported into studies of mysticism often signify little more than the verbal magic which ravished Marlowe's Faustus :

I see there's virtue in my heavenly words.
Who would not be proficient in this art ?

'Transcendence' and 'immanence' on a mystic's lips are challenges to metaphysical convention and not gratifying assurances. The contraries are often huddled together. Jili's 'We are the spirit of *one* though we dwell by turns in two bodies' is seemingly flouted by Hallaj's 'We are *two* spirits dwelling in one body'. 'Likeness to God', at least in mysticism, may not be assimilable to the familiar categories.

Our fierce logical desire to hack meaning out of every word must encounter sooner or later *Finnegans Wake* with its esoteric vocabulary which no reader can hope to exhaust. An outstanding problem of contemporary metalogic and metamathematics is the 'decision-problem' (*Entscheidungsproblem*). Recent work on the necessary and sufficient conditions of Gödel's 'undecidability theorem' has shown that the incompleteness discovered by Gödel is not just an accidental feature of a particular formal system, for instance, cardinal arithmetic. As Rosenbloom has observed, every language with a finite alphabet in which the rules of word and sentence formation are constructive, i.e., in which we can determine in a finite number of steps whether a given chain constitutes a valid proof, is a 'canonical language'. By generalizing the results for particular 'canonical languages' we obtain what applies to all of them. The class includes the languages which, by their precision, have proved useful in logic and mathematics. The thesis of Gödel, Church and Rosser is in effect the contention that there are intrinsic limitations to what 'canonical languages' can accomplish. The only precise languages known to us are incomplete. They

cannot demonstrate their own adequacy and consistency by the constructive methods available in them. L.O.Katsoff's 'evolutionary metaphysic' which ascends a series of metalanguages is, in my opinion the pursuit of an *ignis fatuus* and not an adequate assessment of the difficulty. It is instructive rather to go back to Kant's insistence that the understanding (*Verstand*) is rooted essentially in limitation and determination and Hegel's far too easy dismissal of the problem with his *aufgehoben*, *Begriffsbestimmungen* and innumerable blue-prints for the universe.

The freebooting philosopher will find treasures in recent information theory. A new light has been shed on the kind of human knowledge which alone can be articulated and rendered definite. The finiteness of information scientifically available to man is the basic presupposition of information theory. No observation can give us an infinite amount of knowledge; no measurement can yield infinite accuracy. A further interesting restriction on information seems to lie in its quantal character. Verification is essentially of a quantal nature. Fairthorne and others have suggested that the suggestion can be linked up with Brouwer's intuitionistic calculus.

It is in this context that I should like to refer to the introduction of an indefinite metric by Heisenberg and others into recent quantum field theory. I am not speaking of the now generally familiar 'indeterminacy' or 'uncertainty' of quantum mechanics. Von Neumann's theorem asserts that no ensemble of quantum-mechanical states contains sub-ensembles with radically different statistical properties. The attempts at a deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics by Bohm, Bopp and others, by-pass the theorem instead of dealing with it. I have discussed the technical issues elsewhere. I am drawing attention here to the revolutionary step of positing an indefinite metric in quantum field theory. Dirac in 1942 introduced an indefinite metric as a means of removing the infinite self-energy of the electron. Heisenberg in 1954 proposed the theory in a more fundamental form. He divided the total Hilbert space of ordinary quantum field theory into a Hilbert space I spanned by all states having energy less than an upper bound; and a

Hilbert space II having a non-positive metric spanned by states having a non-definite norm. The ordinary rules of quantum mechanics apply to Hilbert space I. Hilbert space II is a method of dealing with singularities which occur at very short distances in Green's functions of orthodox field theory. In regions of the order of an electron, there occur states with 'negative transition probabilities'. The theoretical physicist cannot dismiss Heisenberg's construct as a mathematical curiosity. 'Ghost states' with 'negative transition probabilities' appear in a rigorous analysis of the usual quantized field theories in certain forms, e.g., in the Lee model. This may be the case even in the most realistic quantum electrodynamics. I shall dwell on an epistemologically significant outcome of the mathematical speculation. The concept of 'probability' seems in a curious way to be complementary to space-time description. I shall return to the point at the end of the paper. The immortal Newton said that 'poetry is a kind of ingenious nonsense' inviting an unfavourable comparison with physics. The brittle illusion of a well-ordered mechanical world has departed today leaving physicists less complacent on ultimate issues.

Has the quantum 'uncertainty', with its possibly associated 'indefinite metrics', any bearing on the status of organisms or living beings? One thinks at once of the quantum theory of vision elaborate with such a wealth of detail by M. H. Pirenne and F.H.C. Marriott. The frequency-of-seeing curve is S-shaped rising from 0 to 100 per cent with increasing intensity. The suggestion that the fluctuations occur in accordance with quantum laws and provide a good part of the explanation of the uncertainty of response is not one which can be set aside. I should like to follow up the suggestion by advancing considerations of a more general kind. Recent cytogenetics has been busying itself with the chemistry of heredity. Watson and Crick have conjectured that there is an alternate arrangement of phosphate and sugar in DNA not unlike the dots and dashes of a Morse code. It has been said that there is enough DNA in the germ cell to encode information contained in about 1,000 large text-books. Elsasser, however, has detained us with

some pertinent observations. The intrinsic limitations of observation of which quantum and information theories speak are cumulative in a fashion which renders dubious the more obvious methods of analysing complex wholes in terms of simpler constituents. Information tucked away in the shape of structural modifications of the macro-molecules (proteins and nucleic acids) of the germ cell raises more questions than it answers. Elsasser has shown that a rigorously defined Newtonian or Laplacian causality demands that information is strictly conserved from moment to moment. Epigenesis in biology *prima facie* suggests an enormous increase in the information-content of the developing organism. The 'automata' which have figured as sensational news items—Grey Walter's 'electronic tortoise' which can learn to go to a box to be 'fed'; Shannon's 'maze-solving mouse'; Edmund Berkeley's 'squee' which picks up nuts, the 'reading machines' of McCulloch and Pitts must be kept well above the level of elementary molecular disorder to function smoothly. Machines which duplicate genes and chromosomes must be packed away in fractions of millimetres and still function reliably. Micro-cybernetics imports statistical assumptions about 'irreversibility' which are alien to classical physics. Von Neumann, in his posthumously published *The Computer and the Brain*, asserted that the logic utilized in the central nervous system must be different from all our logics. Jordan speculated on the possibility of quantum indeterminacies getting 'amplified' to macroscopic regions and 'triggering' biological, psychological and perhaps parapsychological responses. I agree with Elsasser that 'triggering' and 'amplification' are mechanical analogies which are inappropriate to the new statistics that quantum physics and biology both seem to require. Partially structured biological responses the laws of which are relations among structured properties regarded as *functions of time* surely call for the embedding of various types of metrical definiteness (Woodger has shown in his *Turner Lectures* that the ordinary language of scientific biology presupposes the conventional logical constants, operators and functors) in a non-definite field.

I go further now and hazard the suggestion that any

profound and far-reaching treatment of Human Personality has to reckon with unstructured or partially structured extensions of it in a field involving relations with other persons. Current psychological theory, relying on orthodox methods, has not come to terms with either parapsychological phenomena or mystical experiences. The loss is incalculable. It is as if poetry and character were left out of Shakespeare's *Macbeth* in the hope of exposing the raw mechanics of the supernatural. The adequacy of even the most advanced psychometric methods—multiple regression, factor analysis and multiple discriminants—must be re-examined from an epistemological angle. Modern psychology has not yet been subjected to the searching philosophical criticism by which modern physics has benefited and modern biology is advancing. It is untrue to say that psychometric methods set out without making assumptions. Eysenck has expressly repudiated a blind empiricism and operationism which ostentatiously arms itself with the usual 'brass instruments' to cover up its inherent weaknesses. R. B. Cattell admits that the factorist enters the experimental field with some hypothesis even when he seems to enter with none. For one thing, he has to assume that 'some structure' exists to be discovered. It is the cogency and relevancy of this assumption in all its usual forms that I am questioning. C. R. Rao analysing the mathematical presuppositions of the method of multiple discriminants has shown that the 'Mahalanobis statistic' specifying the 'distance' between two 'populations' in terms of multiple variates is strictly analogous to Euclidean distance defined by oblique axes. R. A. Fisher has observed that the 'multiple discriminant' is translatable into the language of 'unit vectors' specifying the 'direction' of one 'population' with respect to another. Factor analysis, too, makes assumptions translatable into the metrizable of abstract spaces and measure theory. Cattell has explained that the terms 'independent direction of personality variables', 'vectors', 'factors', 'personality dimensions' are used interchangeably by most writers. Geometrically speaking, we hear, a correlation coefficient is the 'angle between two variables'. I would ask whether this metrized

model of intra-personal and inter-personal relations is adequate for the purposes of parapsychology or even depth psychology. Modern verse can boast of prosody which has no pattern of iambic or dactyl or other metrical units. The sprung rhythm of Hopkins and others has given verse a freedom impossible for classical poetry. Constable described Turner's paintings as 'airy visions painted with tinted steam'. Must the psychologist peddle his old wares?

The point which I am seeking to make may be put in another way. In more complex 'personality testing', especially in the parapsychological domain, the 'tester reliability' is at least as important as 'test reliability'. Many orthodox psychometrical tests prescribe such highly standardized measures for administration and scoring that 'tester reliability' can be deemed sufficiently high for all practical purposes. In group tests designed for mass-testing and machine-scoring, there is no special need for measuring 'tester reliability' and 'scorer reliability'. But 'tester reliability' and the temporal stability of a phenomenon like 'Extra-sensory Perception' (ESP) at the ordinary perceptual-motor level may well be the crux of parapsychology. We naturally want our measures of 'test reliability' to disclose what proportion of the 'total variance' is 'error variance' and what proportion is 'true variance'. In factor analytical treatment, the greater the 'error variance', the less the 'common factor variance'; other things being equal, the 'common factor variance' is a source of practical validity. In depth psychology and parapsychology we must be careful lest the nuances of interpersonal relationships should be dismissed as 'error variance' from the standpoint of some conventionally constructed and hastily applied method. Parapsychological experiments which appear to be identical do not yield identical results. Recent work has shown that interpersonal relations are reflected in projective tests in the form of prestige values ascribed to the tester by the testee. With the psychological tester, as with Sterne's Tristram Shandy, we have to wait for the third book to see the hero appear.

I must stop to explain that the issue I am posing is not

between a naively phrased 'Wholism' and a no less naively phrased 'atomism'; between 'idiographic' and 'nomothetic' methods. The layman's disbelief in the 'measurability of mind' carries little or no value for the serious philosopher. Burt has explained that 'measurability' in any science is a relative property. Statistics does not, as is popularly imagined, deal exclusively with quantities measured by 'greater' and 'less' or with linear quantities measured by 'intervals' on a number-scale. Our description can range anywhere from the merely designatory or classificatory scheme to complex multi-dimensional or matrix analysis. Cattell and Stephenson both speak of factor analysis and multiple discriminants in 'wholistic' language, a point often missed by the defender of 'idiographic' methods.- G. W. Allport, in his *Personality and Social Encounter*, pronounces that the 'common trait' approach is inferior to the more complex, but ultimately more revealing, 'individual trait' approach. Allport finds that even the subtlest of nomothetic methods 'carries us only to the point where we see that the score on a certain variable is interdependent with other scores on other variables.' 'The *personal nexus* wherein all variables are joined eludes every nomothetic approach.' This does not seem to meet all that Cattell, Eysenck and Stephenson have said. Cattell has distinguished R-techniques, Q-techniques and P-techniques. The R-techniques are supposed to measure *common traits* of which everyone has *some endowment*; the Q-techniques correlate persons and reveal *types*; the P-techniques by measuring a number of variables on the *same person* spot what is *unique* in the individual. Eysenck thinks that psychology requires a linguistic purge; he would not speak of P-, Q- and R-techniques. He tries to amend the terminology by referring to T-analysis disclosing common traits (Cattell's R-techniques); P-analysis dealing with typology (Cattell's Q-techniques); and O-analysis centered round individual occasions (Cattell's P-techniques). Cattell holds the view that the P- and Q-techniques reveal traits which resemble significantly the 'common traits'. The P-technique is supposed to have substantiated some of the 'source traits' detected by the R-techniques, for instance, the

'cyclothymic trait. Again, neuroticism loads such manifestations as perseverance, freedom from impulsiveness in the individual. Cattell finds that individuals grouped together by the Q-techniques as one 'type' are similar with respect to their endowment in the 'common factors'. Eysenck has been much less enthusiastic about the Q- and P-techniques; that is, P-analysis and O-analysis. He thinks that there is no obvious reason why the factors extracted by O-analysis should at all be identical with those disclosed by T-analysis or P-analysis. Why should a predisposition to neurosis, he asks, be subject to diurnal variation in O-analysis? Eysenck's emphasis falls massively on 'common traits'. A 'trait' correlates characteristics of behaviour; a 'type' is a group of correlated 'traits'. Notwithstanding their differences in methodology and outlook, Eysenck and Cattell both tend to assume that the uniqueness of personality can be resolved statistically into the intersection of a number of measured variables. Stephenson sometimes appeared to make an assumption of a slightly different kind: there are laws of individual differences distinguishable from, although related to, more general laws of behaviour; presumably the former are not to be reduced wholly to the latter though this question of reducibility, discussed in such fine detail by Woodger in his Tarner lectures, is lost on many psychologists. For Eysenck, there are only laws of behaviour. Allport's suggestion that personalistic psychology should abandon its exclusive dependence upon all doctrines of generalized, categorized motivation and 'source traits' and use a more flexible terminology, ever keeping in view Stern's dictum: *keine Gestalt ohne Gestalter*, is valuable but, on the statistical and topological side, it calls for certain restrictions put on definite metrics. The possibility takes us beyond the dichotomy of 'idiographic' and 'nomothetic' methods.

In parapsychology much valuable work in 'personality testing' has been done by the Nicols along orthodox psychometric lines and by Gertrude Schmeidler along projective lines. I should like to see more of this done by other parapsychologists. At the same time I submit that it is worse than useless for the parapsychologist to pretend that all problems pertaining to a

deep interpretation of the scores can be blithely set aside. What precise construction, I would ask, are we to put upon the projective scores? Shall we go all the way with Wittenborn and Stephenson and adopt a factorial approach to Rorschach scores? Or, shall we accept the highly symbolic interpretations proposed by the psychoanalyst? The issues about 'validity' and 'reliability' have to seek new modes of expression. The experimenter's disdain for life-situations or 'spontaneous phenomena' is a symptom of his limitation and not a measure of his insight. Allport has pleaded that 'case history' records call for their own canons of validity and reliability. J. L. Mursell wrote ten years ago that although there are projective elements in some psychometric tests and psychometric elements in some projective tests, the attempt to combine them by some quick standardization would probably result in the loss of both elements. Eysenck defends his nomothetic standpoint by arguing that the differences of opinion among factor analysts *no more affect the validity of their method than the controversy between Pearson and Fisher over 'confidence' and 'fiducial' limits detracts from the value of statistics.* The analogy will not do. Kendall has shown that, in all relatively simple controlled experiments, 'confidence' and 'fiducial' limits coincide. The differences in interpretation among factor analysts, on the other hand, arise at a crucial stage in the application of the method. The most difficult part of factor analysis is the estimation of the elements to be inserted in the 'leading diagonal', the 'communalities' as they are called. It is not always possible to find a unique set of values for these elements. Very often no set of values will make the determinants of the expected order vanish with the result that we are forced to seek higher-order determinants. In so doing, we have to make further assumptions. It is the epistemological relevance of these assumptions that I would again dispute. Eysenck's criticism of Cattell sometimes rests on technical considerations drawn from second-order determinants. Grandison, in Richardson's novel, rescued one lady and found himself betrothed to another; he managed the situation with his incredible delicacy. Can we be sure that the professional psychometrist

transferred to parapsychological and other domains is always a miracle of tact ?

The hypothesis of unstructured, or at least not easily metrizable, aspects of Human Personality which I am recommending can be considered in the light of some reflections advanced by Gardner Murphy, one of the exceptionally well-informed students of Personality. He has told us that Human Personality can be studied at various levels of complexity. We can consider it atomistically and statistically as an object in a larger context, like a dot in a chart or map without paying much attention to its internal complexity. We may also regard Personality as an identifiable and bounded something with an internal structure and identity. We may finally regard Personality as an organismal field involving complex interpersonal relations. In his *Human Potentialities* Murphy unfolds fascinating perspectives for the field-theoretical study of personality. He writes : 'There exist... in human societies a great many phenomena of awareness in which self is not distinctly marked off or in which it has properties quite different from the self as we know it. There even appear to be some completely selfless experiences existing momentarily, and experiences of complete immolation or identification in groups or cosmic processes....Such investigation shows that the sharp isolation of the individual is merely one special case of consciousness, like Euclidean geometry among non-Euclidean systems....This re-opens some issues raised in ancient Greece and in ancient India regarding the real separation of one person from another, and reminds one of John Donne's words : "No man is an island". The Advaitin, the Visishtadvaitin, the Dvaitin and the Saiva Siddhantin should re-consider their theses in the climate of modern science. Murphy uses the Lewinian 'life space' or *Lebensraum* as a possible framework for the field-theoretical approach to selves-in-their-environment. I am afraid that I am unable to convince myself that Lewin's 'life space' and 'hodological space' (or 'space of attraction') satisfy the rigorous requirements of modern mathematical topology. I would suggest that, in the parapsychological domain at least, the assumption of non-metrizability is

made more explicit. The Brouwer-Menger-Urysohn dimension and the Lebesgue dimension involve issues about the paracompactness of spaces. A locally metrizable space is metrizable only if it is paracompact. A paracompact Hausdorff space can be given a non-Archimedean metric. The requirement of non-metrizability, in a possible field-theoretical approach to Personality, can be stated rigorously.

Many current scientific studies of human personality rely on a conventionally defined probability theory. Spencer Brown has questioned the procedure in parapsychology. He has made three points. In the first place, the concept of probability in applied statistics is an arbitrary mixture of empirical and non-empirical elements. Rhine's startling results arguing for 'Extra-sensory Perception' (ESP) perhaps illustrate only a breakdown of the concept of 'randomness' on which we have been relying too much. Secondly, the 'control series' used in ESP experiments were lax and permitted great latitude in interpretation. Thirdly, Brown claims that by manipulating random digits he has obtained non-random results. I have attempted elsewhere to meet the second and third contentions on technical grounds. Brown's criticism of parapsychological experiments is unjustified. He fails to provide any real explanation of the remarkable and consistent results obtained by S.G. Soal and dismisses them as 'atypical'. Yet something more than cavilling lies behind Brown's first objection. I would emphatically insist that the concept of 'probability' is not to be thrown away just because it appears to Brown obscure and ill-defined. None the less, probability and statistical 'levels of significance' are *not the open sesame to all the mysteries of the universe*. Modern probability theory uses various structured mathematical spaces. The set-theoretical models of Kolmogorov, Doob and Cramér presuppose a Borel-mapping function in a Hausdorff metrical space. In the models of Koopman and Victoris probability is analogous to a Dedekind cut among numbers. Kawada constructs a Boolean logic with a non-negative additive function. There is no definition of 'randomness' that can avoid circularity. Von Wright remarked that 'mathematical randomness' is a tauto-

logical property while 'physical randomness' is the *use* we make of a tautological property in exploring some complex series of happenings. Brown is mistaken in thinking that the use of a tautological property can give us only tautologies; applied statistics deals with *departures* from the tautologically defined property of 'randomness'. But the complex series to which applied probability theory usually addresses itself have a common characteristic. They are series in which, in spite of certain *generally known* factors or causes (e.g., the weight of the coin, spin, resistance of the air, etc., in coin tossing), we can detect no *overall pattern* in terms of which they can be described uniquely. Statistics serve a purpose only when our empirical investigation of phenomena has gone some way. It is the wholly statistical character of the evidence for ESP coupled with the absence of empirical knowledge concerning predisposing factors which has made a physicist like Bridgman reluctant to accept the facts. Quantum theory, I said earlier in the paper, has the salutary lesson to teach us that the use of the probability concept is complementary to space-time description. In parapsychology it is the validity of space-time description which is at stake. A 'non-random series' is not necessarily a causal series or one amenable to general laws. It may be an 'a-causal series' in the far-reaching sense urged by the late C.G.Jung.

Personalistic philosophers, in my opinion, are not always and sufficiently sensitive to the newer perspectives in science. Brightman accused S. Radhakrishnan of wavering between pluralism and monism, dualism and non-dualism, in his treatment of mysticism. Would not Brightman's charge apply equally to mystical personalists like Solovyov and Frank? Jacques Maritain discounts the very possibility of a substantial contact, *contact entitatif*, between the creature and the creator, even in the most exalted mystical states. It must be a little chastening to find the peerless mystic Juan de la Cruz saying (*The Living Flame of Love*, stanza ii, Edición crítica, Vol. II, pp. 417-19) that the substance of God touches the substance of the soul. Personality is no rounded, palpable whole providing a long-term investment for our theories. It can revenge itself on us by irony

LIFE'S PATTERN

SWAMI PARAMATMANANDA

THE ideal pattern of Life that has been chalked out in the sacred books of the Sri Vaishnavites is charming to comprehend and contemplate. It is comparatively easy to follow and build up, and is singularly free from the risks and temptations that beset spiritual life in other paths such as *Yoga*. One may deem it as the most popular yet the highest, the most natural yet the most mystic and the subtlest yet the least complex. This incomparable feature has its basis in the attitude of complete self-surrender to the Supreme Being so ably advocated in the precepts of the Sri Vaishnavite Acaryas and so amply demonstrated in their exemplary lives and conduct. The relationship between the individual and the universal soul is conceived of by them as that between the bond-slave and his liege-lord, which culminates naturally in the consciousness of the soul's being an instrument manipulated by God according to His sweet will and pleasure. For the individual soul, according to their system of philosophy, lives, moves and has its being in God; and the ultimate destiny of the earth-born finds its fulfilment in the actual realisation of that eternal soul-relationship and the consequent attainment of the Divine beatitude. The attitude of the absolute abandonment of self to the Divine Being implies the conscious and unremitting endeavour on the part of the devotee in three directions : namely, to look upon himself as a servant of none else and nothing else but God, to consider God as the means of his redemption from the thralldom of the cycle of birth and death, and to regard none else and nothing else but God as a possible source of abiding and real joy. All this is really a negation of the

individual's fancied sense of egoistic independence and the presumption of his inherent ability to secure and enjoy the highest happiness by his self-effort. The dawn of the desire for such renunciation is possible only when there is the overpowering consciousness of one's absolute dependence on the Divine Protector of all and an unqualified faith in His omniscience, omnipotence and infinite tender loving concern for the welfare of His children on earth. The conviction about not only the futility of self-endeavour but also its thwarting nature should be so glowing that the individual feels that his attempt to seek his own deliverance is like wresting the new-born baby from the shielding arms of its mother and entrusting it to the care of a murderer trafficking in human flesh. In short there should be a vacuum of egoism in the nature of the individual.

Truly the ego in us is such a hydra-headed monster that it robs God of His legitimate possession and sovereign prerogative and boundless mercy in the matter of saving the individual soul, with the sole object of devouring it and consigning it to its doom as though it were a delightful pastime. The individual by sheer forgetfulness of his eternal soul-relationship with God, which makes him an heir to His Divine ministrations of grace and pure love, takes up the responsibility of saving himself and thereby commits his soul to the monstrous ego that swallows it up. To give oneself up to the sway of the hideous ego and the unbridled senses is nothing but the slaying of one's own soul. Egotism, like fire, destroys whatever it lays its hand upon and is a menace to the devotee. The true lover of God disregards even the salvation-assuring residence in His imperishable abode on account of the taint of self-seeking in it and prefers selfless service to God in whatever birth ordained by Him. Sita in her exile in the Asoka Forest exclaims, "For me dwelling in the midst of Rakshasis, bereft of the companionship of Rama, of what avail is my life or wealth or decoration with jewels?". She means thereby that when they do not serve Rama's purpose, they are fit to be shunned as poison. Like the touch of poison in a similar way is the equally ruinous contact with the sense-object to a genuine lover of God. Indulgence in sense enjoy-

ments, whether forbidden or sanctioned by the Dharma Sastras for the lay aspirant, is tantamount to the consumption of poison. The former type of forbidden enjoyments is like pure poison, which at the outset reveals its deadly nature; whereas the latter type is like food mixed with poison, which with its innocent but insidious appearance beguiles the unwary man and terminates his life. The endeavour to find real happiness in sense enjoyments can be likened to the attempt to allay one's thirst quaffing tongues of flame and to seek shelter from the scorching sun under the extended hood of a venomous cobra. Evidence is not lacking to show that the God-loving person to whom God-contemplation is the sole occupation and enjoyment is of such extremely tender and sensitive nature that the very sight of sense enjoyment is unbearable and puts out the flame of his life. He is just like the mythical bird, Asuna, which while hearkening to the elysian strains of music—which are its only meat and drink—expires at the very hearing of the grating of a drum. Above all, egotism and sense enjoyment that revel in the murder of the vital essence of our being, engender a marked tendency to insult the genuine servant of God, and this is a heinous sin, productive of instantaneous perdition of soul, though the name and form of the victim may persist for a time.

It is in this wise that egotism, with its dual form of attachment to the body, mistaking it for the soul, and the illusory notion of the independence of the soul, is all-destroying by its very nature and productive of affront to the true servant of God and inimical to the attainment of the Lord. Hence the ideal seeker, finding a breeding ground in himself for egoism and the consequent ruling passion for sense enjoyment, looks upon himself as his formidable foe. The worldly-minded who have become slaves to egotism and sense enjoyments, by their talks and deeds, hasten the growth of those obnoxious weeds by awakening the dormant tendencies in the mind; and hence the ideal man shuns their very sight as though he has stumbled on a venomous serpent. The Sri Vaishnavites who have triumphed over these two hostile forces, by their words of advice and experience, create a vivid perception of the evils lurking in them

and in consequence supply a tremendous incentive to uproot those fatal tendencies; and hence the ideal man beckons the Vaishnavite as his benign protector that saves him from sin and evil. When he comes across the Divine manifestations in the images in the sacred shrines, he will look upon the Isvara in them as his own father in view of His watchful and unerring guidance. When he beholds his spiritual preceptor who has given a vision of the truths of God and soul, he, like the famished man at the sight of food, hungers for his gracious company that vouchsafes wisdom and dispassionateness. If he sees his own disciple rich in the qualifications of a devotee, he will look upon him as something near and dear, having a well-spring of his happiness. The three monsters of egotism, wealth and lust are to be dreaded by the ideal man as they respectively estrange the well-wishers, beget the love of the enemies and kindle a feeling of concern towards the indifferent. It is the fashion of egotism to throttle the idea of serviceability to God and His devotees in a humble spirit and to foster self-aggrandizement, and so the sight of sincere lovers of God, instead of evoking a feeling of worshipful reverence, provokes a sense of fancied superiority or equality and thereby causes unfriendliness. The greedy, instead of fleeing away from the worldly, who are hostile to their spiritual pursuits lured by their wealth, court their friendship, frequent their abode, invite them to their feasts, indulge in the praise of their qualities and thus curry favour with the very enemies. The lustful in their mad pursuits of sense-enjoyments run after women in spite of their indifference and thus become the butt of ridicule.

The ideal man is convinced that godly qualities like self-restraint and dispassionateness are too difficult to acquire by self-effort on account of his age-long addiction to evil propensities, or by the effort of others as they too are steeped in egotism, greed and lust. They spring only out of the abundance of God's grace secured by the blessings of one's *guru*. Hence, he practises indifference towards bodily concerns, cultivates a longing for spiritual attainment and turns his mind away from the quest of pleasure in things temporal. He seeks the maintenance of

his body in the very offerings he makes to God and looks upon it as the concluding part of his daily worship. If troubles, physical, mental or environmental were to arise, they should be regarded as the fruit of his own past *karma* which he needs must exhaust, or as dawning of His grace which begets a disgust for life on earth and a longing for the eternal life to come.

Having adopted the path of complete self-surrender to God—according to which God is the sole means—he should give up the idea that his strict observance of the Sastric injunctions is a means for his salvation. He should aspire for the ripe wisdom and the flawless way of life which the ancient illustrious Acaryas had made their own, and possess a heart that melts with devotion at the very mention of the shrines which are the favourite abodes of the Lord. He must pray for ever at those hallowed centres for the age-long continuance of the Divine ministrations of mercy to the worldly. He should have a pronounced aversion for anything other than God-consciousness, smart under the agony of unbearable suffering which life on earth in a fleshy tenement entails, and pine for the ineffable bliss in the transcendental realm. Last he should observe the restrictions of diet conducive to the purity of heart, seek the alliance of the holy and shun the company of the wicked.

Such is the picture of the ideal man as enshrined in the gospels of the Sri Vaishnavites of yore.

THE PURUSHAKARA THEME AND THE ROLE OF THE CHRIST

N. SUBRAHMANYAN

It is well known that *jñāna* (understanding), *Bhakti* (devotion leading to surrender) and *Karma* (performance of prescribed duties and rituals) are the three broad paths to salvation recognized in Hindu philosophical thought. Of these *Bhakti* is the most fascinating to speculate on and is perhaps easy to practise (but not necessarily the most valid); and in certain of its ramifications it provokes comparison with some aspects of Christian religious thought. The *Bhakti* concept, as elaborated by Sri Vaishnavas especially the commentators on the *Nālāyira Prabandham* and a famous Vaishnavite doctrinal text *Sri-vacana-bhūṣaṇam* by Pillai Lokacarya and commented upon by Sri Manavala Mamuni, is a complex of philosophical ideas which bears a strong similarity to certain essential aspects of Christian thought. It is interesting to note that the similarity between these two systems of thought becomes suspiciously close and so is well worth a study in however brief a manner.

The *Bhakti* cult has had many famous sponsors, votaries and followers, Saivite, Vaishnavite and non-denominational. Of all these the most famous are the Vaishnavites who both in doctrine and in practice have been uncompromising in the matter of devotion to a personal God—Vishnu (by whatever name He might for the time being go). Among them there is one form known as Radha-Krishnaism which depicts the (divine) love of a cowherdess to Sri Krishna. Some forms look debased and vulgar while others put on an aspect of spiritual excellence. Sri Krishna's call to Arjuna to surrender unto Him (the Lord)

unconditionally without thought of consequences, is only a call to the devotee to surrender unquestioningly to the will of the Lord. That is the patent beginning of the *Bhakti* cult in Hindu religion. But there is another and a more sophisticated mode of presenting this surrender theme. It is that surrender to the Lord is not direct but through the good offices of a kindly mediator namely the divine Mother, the Loka Mata, who pleads for the sinning mortals with the absolute and unbending God and earns mercy and pardon to those who otherwise have no hope of salvation.

On the surface there is a contradiction here : The contradiction is that on the one hand it is supposed that God is all merciful and full of grace so that the devotee may unconditionally and without further thought surrender himself (i.e., do *śaraṅāgati*) to Him; and on the other, it is claimed that God's absolute and inexorable justice takes the form of reward for virtue and castigation for vice irrespective of redeeming circumstances like repentance; that is *paścāttāpa* (repentance) on the part of the sinning mortal will not be followed by *Anugraha* or *Kṛpā* (merciful forgiveness) on the part of God. Thus this situation requires an agency which can plead the cause of the former with the latter and mitigate punishment. In the Christian religion, Christ plays the rôle of the Great Mediator; and in Vaishnavite thought the rôle is assigned not to the Son of God but to the Spouse of God; she is the third force called *Puruṣakāra Śakti*. But if the *Puruṣakāra Śakti* and the Lord be treated as but two aspects of the same entity, the contradiction can perhaps be resolved.

Traditionally the *Puruṣakāra* theme is explained by alluding to the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is also known as the *Śaraṅāgati Veda*. That is, it is said that the purpose of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is to stress the importance of the rôle played by Sita or Piratti, who is *Puruṣakāra* while Sri Rama is the (inexorable) Lord and Ravana (among others) is the unrepentant sinner. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* Sri Rama's purpose was to sternly punish the sinning Ravana; while Sita's purpose is to secure the Lord's mercy to the sinner who, too, after all, is one of Her children, in the

cosmic sense. This she does, not by praying for cancellation of the punishment but by herself undergoing the suffering which is intended for the sinner. She suffered at the Asoka Vana the cruelties and indignities heaped upon her by the Rakshasis Ekakshi, Ekakarni, etc. So verse V of *Srī-vacana-bhūṣaṇa* says that the *Rāmāyaṇa* speaks of the 'greatness of Her who underwent imprisonment' (*சிறப்பித்தவர் ஏற்றம் சேர்ந்தார்*). This is just vicarious suffering comparable to what Christ suffered on the Cross.

Viewed from this angle, it should be clear that Sita persuaded Sri Rama and Lakshmana to leave her alone (on one pretext or another) and made it possible for Ravana to take her away for imprisonment at the Asoka Vana. Even when Ravana died unrepentant, as punishment for his sins had been so mercifully borne by the kindly Mother, salvation for the sinner became automatic. This rôle of Sita Piratti playing the mediator is plainly mentioned in verses 10 and 11 of *Srī-vacana-bhūṣaṇam*. There it is said that the function of the *Puruṣakāra* is to plead with both the sinning (and even unrepentant) mortal and the Absolute (and inexorable) God; i.e., to plead with the former to *repent*, and with the latter to *relent*.

In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the theme of repentance followed by surrender and *Puruṣakāra's* mediation followed by divine pardon is well brought out on another occasion. That is Kakasura the demon (in the form of a crow) had hurt Sita Piratti and the Lord decreed that the Asura should die; and to that end despatched his unerring arrow after him. The Asura could not avoid the arrow which pursued him like *Karma*. Not all the Gods in Heaven could suggest a way out. They all said "You cannot escape your decreed fate unless you surrender yourself (i.e., do *Saraṇāgati*) unto the Lord who has decreed your end". But when the Asura so surrendered himself unto Sri Rama, it was Piratti again who pleaded the cause of the Asura and suggested that a token punishment might suffice. Here we have repentance, surrender, mediation and grace; and the vital rôle is again that of the *Puruṣakāra Sakti*, but for whom nothing could have saved the Asura. Here Piratti had almost said "Lord, he

knew not what he did". This led to pardon by grace; and the sinner who might have lost his soul, lost but an eye.

The following passage in *Srī-vacana-bhūṣaṇa*, 11, is characteristic of this aspect of Vaishnavite thought : "God keeps close account of all one's sins and will punish one *accordingly*; to save oneself from this inescapable climax to one's *Karma* on this earth, there is no way but to completely surrender oneself unto Him. Let not the sinning mortal for one moment doubt : 'Will He accept me who am full of sins ?' 'Will he not relentlessly punish me ?' Just a bit of repentance is sufficient to earn his grace and pardon." This philosophy can be summed up as follows : '*Bhakti* by surrender—called *Prapatti*—washes away all sins' (சர்வ அபராதங்களுக்கும் பிராயச்சித்தமானது பிரபத்தி). As surrender without repentance is unthinkable, repentance is a prerequisite of God's mercy. This is just the basic ingredient of Christian religious thought. The whole *ensemble* of Pardon including repentance, confession, etc., in the Christian religion resembles the *Prapatti* and *Anugraha* of the Sri Vaishnavites; thus the sequence of Pardon following atonement and atonement following repentance is the same as *Anugraha* following *Prāyaścitta* and *Prāyaścitta* following *Pāścāttāpa*.

The secular truths of filial duty, conjugal loyalty, sanctity of the trusted word, etc., so beautifully proclaimed in the *Rāmāyaṇa* are superficial and intended for the masses. The basic concern of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is to lay down the doctrine of salvation by surrender and to explain the ancillary processes of (1) sin; (2) divine wrath; (3) mitigation of the wrath by *Puruṣakāra* mediation; (4) divine grace; (5) salvation; and to expatiate on the value of *Prapatti*. This tropological representation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is characteristic of Vaishnavite thought and is seen in its most elaborate form in *Srī-vacana-bhūṣaṇa* and its commentary.

Though the *Rāmāyaṇa*, for the sake of convenience, is generally used to exemplify these doctrines, many other stories in the Hindu mythology also serve this purpose. Lakshmi, the *Puruṣakāra Sakti* mitigated the anger of Narasimha which exceeded all bounds even after the destruction of Hiranya.

Gajendra, the Lord of the elephants, was in sore distress and he cried out 'Oh, the Infinite, the fundamental and the Absolute ! I surrender unto Thee !' But this cry remained unheeded till *Puruṣakāra Śakti* drew the attention of the Lord to the situation and set the mechanism of grace into motion.

It is not my intention here to suggest that all Vaishnavite thought runs on these lines but to spotlight the attention of the novice to the existence of a system of thought in the side alleys of Hindu Philosophy which rather resembles at least in some of its details certain well known characteristics of Christian religious thought.

THE AGAMIC TATTVAS AND THE AGAMIC CONCEPTION OF MIND

T. P. MINAKSHISUNDARAM

THE Agamas and Tantras describe the evolution of this world from their material cause *māyā* or matrix. They consider this explanation which describes thirty-six *tattvas* or stages of evolution better than the Sankhya theory which explains in terms of twenty-four stages or emanations. Whether it is an improvement or not, it is clear that it is indebted to this Sankhya theory. The Agamas speak of thirty-six *tattvas* or emergent emanations with their own respective worlds, etc. In this essay these theories are looked at from the point of view of a poetic vision, and therefore all intellectual and logical discussions are avoided. This is an attempt at understanding and enjoying the vision of this mystic philosophy.

It occurred to me that for explaining the conception of Mind, the whole theory of this evolution could be understood. What is meant by Mind in Western thought with its unconscious, sub-conscious, conscious and superconscious levels cannot be explained in terms of the Indian word *manas*. The thirty-six *tattvas* appeared to me as a psychological theory of perception at various levels, if one may use that term in that extended sense. Perhaps the theory starts with what may be called super-conscious perception, but for the purpose of proceeding from the known to the unknown, one may try to understand what is happening when a man is awakening himself slowly from sleep. He has been withdrawing himself within himself; sleep may be looked upon as *laya* as such absorption. When he wakes up, there is a kind of a general awareness of something outside him;

there is *jñāna* or knowing, but still in the *laya* stage. He is not still active in the real sense of the term; he brushes away his sleep and he is now the active man of the waking stage. But he is still in the *laya* stage because perhaps he is still lying on the bed. The objective world seems to have been evolved one stage further because things there are clearer to him. Thus he has passed from the *śiva-tattva* stage to the *śakti-tattva* stage; or to put it the other way about, the quiescent matrix seems to have been set into vibration by the penetrating sight of awareness of the seer. The first emanation is the world of general awareness or *śiva-tattva* and a clearer active knowledge of the object is *śakti-tattva*. In what follows we will confine our attention to the seer, because it is easy for us to explain how the object reveals or undergoes further detailed evolution in terms of the ever expanding perception of the seer.

Next follows pure enjoyment of this perception wherein knowledge and activity seem to be beautifully equipoised, that harmony itself being a definition of the *bhoga*. This is called the *sādākhya tattva* or *sadāśiva-tattva*. It is the perfect union of the Mother and the Father as the mystics explain it in their own erotic poetry. But this is an enjoyment of freedom and joy. Whereas the ordinary enjoyments of the world fetter, the seer is, here, the Lord and not the slave of his perception. He enjoys *adhikāra*; *adhikāra* is activity and control. Therefore the conative aspect, the *kriyā-śakti* has the upper hand. This is the *māheśvara-tattva*. But this gives rise to a purer and clearer vision, to a much more penetrating insight. Naturally at this stage cognition has the upper hand. This is the *suddha-vidyā tattva*. These are not really five different stages. These are five states or aspects of one indivisible whole. Here there is no time; it is beyond time; *śiva* is the substrate, for all these one may conveniently bring to mind Croce's aesthetic experience where no question of time arises, where there is no question of entanglement but freedom and joy of pure enjoyment, where the perception and expression become fully equipoised, though from one aspect the one may predominate and from another aspect the other may predominate. Perhaps the Agamas

are here trying to give us an idea of the superconscious.

When one descends down into the world, he experiences a succession of perceptions and events. Thus arises the conception of Time when he experiences the further stage called the *kāla-tattva*, etc. Thereafter he looks deeply into the objective world and experiences a uniformity of Nature—the law of cause and effect. This is his experience of the next stage—the *niyati-tattva*. Slowly more and more is revealed and he learns more and more about the details; what was unknown or unnoticed becomes clear. Thus he experiences the succeeding stage of *kalā-tattva*, the gradual removal of ignorance about this world. This kind of experience increases his knowledge and he comes to know more and more about the details. This increase in the knowledge with the thirst for knowing more and more is the experience of *vidyā-tattva* which is the next stage. He experiences a new attraction to this objective world. His affective energy is kindled and he experiences attractive features which make him hanker after them. This is his experience of the further stage called *rāga-tattva*.

This may be looked at from the point of view of our mental set-up. But when one descends from pure experience to arrive at a detailed perception of the world as it is, one has to think of it in terms of time, therefore one has to experience time and also come within its fortress. Here starts the fetters, restrictions and the limited range of human perception. Therefore time or *kāla-tattva* is the first emanation here in this *asuddha-māyā* as distinguished from the *śuddha-māyā* of the superconscious. The framework of time makes our perception a series of successions. This succession is a chain of causation—the law of the universe—the uniformity of Nature so very essential to human thinking though one may not give valid reasons for believing in this uniformity of Nature so essential for induction. It is in the very nature of existence in the *asuddha-māyā*. This is *niyati-tattva*. Again on account of this, there is the possibility of learning by degrees, within this frame of time and causation by repeated trials and errors, when slowly errors disappear and our knowledge and command over Nature slowly widen.

This possibility is also something intrinsic. This is called *kalā-tattva*, the gradual removal of the veil of ignorance. If man has to experience this world, instead of turning upward to the superconscious, there must be the potentiality of knowing this world—the cognition of objects of the *asuddha-māyā*. Man comes to cognise and function, because of the *kalā-tattva*. Pure intelligence of the soul goes to the superconscious and *buddhi* to be described later on is itself an object. Therefore the capacity to cognise within the *asuddha-māyā* is necessary in this framework of experience of the world. This is the *vidyā-tattva*. The affective energy or *icchā-śakti* has to be posited within this framework of mundane experience so that one can hanker after the worldly things. This fettering emanation is the *rāga-tattva*. The soul is now ready for worldly perception, wearing, as it were, this five-coloured spectacle of *kālam*, *niyati*, *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga*. This seems to explain the frame of our mental outlook, a frame which limits and directs our perception.

The soul of the seer descends further down to become a mortal man equipped with his body and mind. The soul now experiences the world as an ordinary man does, partly ignorant, partly egoistic, sometimes greedy, sometimes hankering after things and sometimes over-powered by anger when he meets his opposition. This is the experience of the *puruṣa-tattva*. Here he could distinguish himself from the world and his body as a whole, i.e., in its causal stage and this experience is that of *mūla-prakṛti*. Hereafterwards the seer or the soul experiences the world in terms of *sattva* or equilibrium, *rajas* or activity or *tamas* or inertia which as it were emanate from *mūla-prakṛti*. The experience of *sattva* bespeaks intellectual firmness, mental resoluteness, happiness in the face of great loss, cleanliness, good efforts, self-control, sympathy and mercy. This is the experience of *sattva* or peace and happiness. There is a burst of activity and he experiences the great attractions of the world, where he cannot but speak in terms of I and Mine. This is the experience of *rajas*. When even this subsides he experiences a lack of intelligence, contentment, enthusiasm; his laziness and sleep overpower him. This is the experience of *tamas*.

Man is caught in the meshes of ignorance, but he experiences some knowledge, naturally, not the right kind of knowledge. When the *sāttvic* equilibrium is there he experiences the kindly light of *buddhi*. He understands things according to his own bent of mind, i.e., his own previous experience or *karma*, in terms of pleasure, pain and delusion. Then comes the experience of *ahaṅkāra*, where the experience is experienced in terms of the ego. In the previous experience of *buddhi* there was the experience of the particular nature of the object more or less defined and determined in that experience. But in the succeeding experience in *ahaṅkāra*, the I and the Mine predominate where one individual feels separated from the other, and where the external object is seized. Here arises further the experience of the mind which as it were divides itself into two kinds of experiences. There is the perception of the presentation of the object. This is *citta*. Next follows an experience of indecision or doubt about this perception. This is called the experience of *manas* as distinguished from *citta*.

Man descends and opens his ears and eyes and all the sense organs. He experiences the sound, the moving wind, the light, the taste and the smell and also the sense organs. There is the experience of activities of the various organs of activity and finally there is the experience of the cause of the gross elements and of the gross elements themselves.

From *puruṣa-tattva* downwards, except for some difference the theory of Agama is more or less that of Sankhya where *puruṣa* turning towards matter deludes itself as being part of the latter. It will be clearer to go up the scale in the description of this part of evolution. The world is there appearing as a combination of gross elements, themselves arising from their subtle cause, the *tanmātras*. The former are sensed through their respective sense organs and motor organs and there is the experience of the sensations.

When perception starts, *manas* first seizes the sensations in its *citta* aspect and wavers in doubt, *ahaṅkāra*, with its mood of self-assertion and egotism resolves to obtain knowledge. Finally *buddhi* decides. The resulting feelings of pleasure,

pain and delusion are governed by the previous stage of experience or rather by *karma* and in accordance with the predominance of *sattva*, *tamas*, *rajas* as the result of the *karma*. These three *guṇas* are from *mūla-prakṛti* with which *puruṣa* remains entwined.

Mind is part of the inert matter and the conflict between body and mind does not arise in Indian philosophy. Mind is the general name for *citta*, *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi-cit-śakti*'s. The reflection of *cit-śakti* falls on *manas*. Like the water in the lake passing through the sluices or channels to the fields and taking the form of the field, *manas* with the reflected light also passes through the sense organs to the objects and takes the form of the objects. That is how one has perception. But mind used in the sense of consciousness can be explained only in terms of this Agamic theory of evolution. Here we have attempted to explain it in the terms of psychology. How far this approach is successful it is for others to judge.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF GESTALT

A. S. NARAYANA PILLAI

"All that exists has meaning"—Edmund Husserl

The gestalt principle of explanation is the principle of organic wholeness variously manifesting itself as configuration, figure and ground, form-totality and closing the gap.¹ The demand in the perceptual field is for a closed spatial system, regular, orderly and self-sufficient. This closed system, however, may be beautiful or ugly : the gestalt principle seems to be indifferent to the aesthetic qualities. The perfect gestalt may be ugly. On the other hand, an imperfect gestalt, like a semi-circle, may be beautiful. The gestalt requirement is only completeness and completeness does not take account of aesthetic values.

In the field of volition too the demand is merely for an effective system of purposes, efficient and non-disturbing. But whether these purposes are worthy or unworthy, moral or immoral, is not considered. Efficient action may be immoral and inefficiency may go with morality. In other words, the perfect gestalt in volition may be the imperfect in morality and *vice versa*.

In both the cases, i.e., in perception and in volition the demand of gestalt is only that there should be *no gaps*. Wertheimer calls this principle, "closure" (*Geschlossenheit*). Gaps should be avoided, systems of lines or of purposes must be completed and stability established.² But closing the gap or completing the system gives no clue to the aesthetic nature of the figure or the moral nature of the action. The gestalt concept seems to have no reference to the normative qualities of these perceptual and volitional gaps that are closed.

I

Gestalt Leads to the Norm

Nevertheless, it is important to note that if the positive implications of gestalt are brought out and developed it may lead to the normative qualities. The emphasis on the avoidance of gaps, of the incomplete in objects and acts is only the negative aspect of gestalt. There is a positive aspect which is the stress laid on the *formation of figures* and a unified totality. Köhler has shown in his works how from the mass of apparently unrelated material presented to consciousness, forms as articulated wholes are evolved. Spots and lines in space group themselves into patterns almost in spite of ourselves. To see them in any different grouping involves special effort; in the first moment of relaxation we get the original pattern again. It is as if some forces are holding the parts of the original configuration together. "...From a perfectly even sequence of strokes or impacts a rhythm emerges, which subordinates every sound to a definite temporal series. This incorporation of all items in an all-supporting rhythm occurs quite by itself, often with irresistible constraint, like a work of unconsciously operative forces of the soul."³

This figure-forming activity is operative in the perceptual and the volitional fields. Optical organizations of all sorts bring the sensory fragments in the perceptual field not merely into completion but also into *coherence, simplicity and symmetry*.⁴ The same is the case with audition and the other sensations. Melodifying, rhythmifying and figure-ground forming are means to this end. And even in simple volitional tasks like memorizing, formulations of one sort or another present themselves automatically.

II

Search for Symmetry

The gestalt law of Prägnanz⁵ (precision) also emphasizes this. This law formulated by Wertheimer states that all expe-

rienced fields tend to become as well articulated as possible. A circle, for instance, is a more "pregnant" or precise gestalt than a rectangle or a square. This explains why, as Goethe in his colour researches found out, the after-images of square originals quickly become blunt at the corners and terminate in smaller, rounded images. If three, four, five or six points are arranged evenly about a centre, phenomenally a triangle, square, pentagon or hexagon result : eight points, however, no longer compulsively result in an octagon, but yield, instead, a circle. Kirschmann observed that when polygons were arranged to stimulate the peripheral areas of the retina they were seen as circles.

In all these there is more than a mere 'closing the gap'. There is a natural struggle for proportion and symmetry. The changing, incomplete systems seek not mere completion but symmetry. The demand of gestalt is not that an open figure should *somehow* be closed. On the other hand, gestalt seems to effect a closure only when this leads to *symmetry* and *balance*. The closure is not the end; it is only the means to an end. Where this end is achieved by "closing the gap" this is done. Where it is not achieved the principle of closure is not operative. An all-but-complete figure 'demands' the completing elements only if the completion will give simplicity and symmetry.

The law of closure which states that incomplete figures tend to complete themselves requires to be understood in this sense only. It is a special case of the law of *Prägnanz* which itself is not to be regarded merely as emphasizing equilibrium and stability but precision and symmetry.⁶ It is not always the *incomplete* figure which is an unresolved tension but the *unsymmetrical* figure.

III

The Normative Factor

In this positive emphasis on symmetry by the gestalt doctrine we have an indication of the normative factor. The dynamic

of the soul seeks not mere *completeness* but a *configuration*. The lack of completeness may produce tension, restlessness and excitement but the dynamic tendencies are not directed merely towards this end which when attained may give a sense of relief and rest. They aim at a positive configuration or formulation in accordance with certain *holistic standards*. Their purpose is to create out of a variety of elements a form-totality which possesses certain normative properties.

In a configuration there is always an immanent plan, the actualization of which gives the repose and liberation characteristic of an ideal-fulfilment. The properties displayed by the form-totality are symmetry, organization, balance, harmony, architectonic, proportion, etc. It is not merely the unorganized striving for organization: it is the unsymmetrical seeking symmetry.

This principle implicit in the concept of gestalt must be made explicit and the gestalt formula suitably modified. Only then can we use the concept as a comprehensive, interpretative principle both in the positive and the normative fields of experience.⁷ This modification has to be effected mainly in four directions.

IV

Emphasis on Inner Structure

In the first place, the present gestalt formula while not ignoring the *inner* structural tendencies of the soul as factors in experience tends to stress unduly the outer objective stimuli. When we ask, what are the conditions under which configurations arise we are given a list of *relations among the stimuli* which are said to operate in producing the patterns. The relations are nearness, likeness, "common fate", objective set (*Einstellung*), closure, position and eidotrophy.⁸ These are said to govern the appearance of the "figures" out of the complex totality of stimuli. When we are confronted with a heterogeneous group of stimuli⁹ these relations decide what patterns will emerge out of them.

But this account misses an important point, viz., that the motivating factors in pattern-formation are both internal and external.¹⁰ In fact, of the two sets of factors the really dynamic and operative one is the internal.¹¹ The urge to completeness and pattern formation comes out of the dynamic nature of consciousness: it is an *inner* need for unity and symmetry. The individual is not a passive part of the situation within which configurations are formed. "It is under the stress of a felt want" says L. W. Cole, "that the field takes shape. These 'felt wants' are deeply rooted within the organism...."¹²

Gestalt should, therefore, *shift the emphasis to the inner forces which evolve the pattern from the mass of outer material supplied*.¹³ These forces determine the properties of the form-total and their nature should be studied. Why certain patterns are beautiful and why certain systems are good cannot be understood by studying merely the objective factors and stimuli. They can be understood only in the light of the ideals that are operative in us.¹⁴

V

The Totality of Experience

Secondly, the concept of gestalt at present has a very narrow scope. It still roams about the lower levels of experience and has not emerged out of the field of sense-perception and volition. It is true that toward the end of the "twenties" there occurred a definite increase in the experimental productivity in the field of emotion. But studies of emotion have been comparatively few. The work of the "Lewin school" was mainly regarding "will" and "action". They are valuable in themselves and they have rescued the gestalt school from the charge of overbusyng itself with the hackneyed theme of perception. But emotion still remains in the background.¹⁵ It is certainly a fair estimate of the work of gestalt psychology to say that its positive contributions centre on the topic of perception and to a lesser extent, of volition. Confined thus to cognition and conation the gestalt concept is narrow in its reference.

It should be made to embrace the *totality of our experience* which includes sense-perception and cognition, conation and the emotional attitudes and feeling-tones. Any discussion of values is impossible without reference to the affections. Köffka speaks of objects possessing "initial" character and "end" character.¹⁶

VI

Not Tension-Release but Enjoyment

Thirdly, because it touches only the cognitive and conative aspects of our experience, gestalt now talks only of release from tension. Its formula is "closing the gap".¹⁷ Gaps produce emotional tension that puts the person in an unstable psychological equilibrium. "Unrest, nervous excitement, fear and despair are the emotive states of mind in which the unfulfilment as well as the violation of structural interests, failure to attain the goal find expression".¹⁸ Lewin shows that "a tense psychic system is the condition precedent to all mental activity."¹⁹ "An uncontrollable impulse" says G. H. Hartmann, "to do something is simply a strong or tightly-organized gestalt in which the gap 'demands' to be closed".²⁰

These *demand characters* function as field forces in perception and volition. When the desired goals are attained the tension is relieved and a condition of stable equilibrium ensues. The pleasure that results is sensuous pleasure that comes of a 'felt need' satisfied. Non-fulfilment of a perceptual or volitional gestalt puts the organism in a disturbed state. There is restlessness, a feeling of instability, nervousness and even fear. These tense experiences do not last long; they seek their own termination. The gestalt tends to complete itself. When this completion is achieved the resultant state of mind is one of relief combined perhaps with a little exhaustion. A pleasant mood emerges and fills the mind. In a sense this is a *negative* state. Absence of tension and the consequent discomfort is its main characteristic. The positive feeling of pleasantness is its faint counterpart.

A full gestalt-experience, on the other hand, must be a total experience which gives not mere release from tension or sensuous pleasure which is directly conditioned by conative and cognitive moods but joy.²¹ The experience of beauty reveals this characteristic. It is neither simple, emotional disturbance, nor a mere cognitive impression,²² but a totality of experience which gives not mere relief or rest but a pure, non-sensuous bliss. In fact, this is present in the whole realm of values so much so that it is often difficult to distinguish one value-attainment from another. Aesthetic ideals share the characteristics of moral ideals and these in turn are akin to religious ideals.²³

VII

No Dualism of Subject and Object

A fourth modification of the present gestalt concept becomes necessary when we consider the relation between the subject and object of experience. The two are now *opposed* and what is more, a sense of their separateness persists. Perception at the sense-level is possible only by the sundering of subject and object. But in the sphere of values the disappearance of the subject-object dualism is a *sine qua non*. Aesthetic experience, for example, is the blending of our individual personality with the object.

This is well brought out by the principle of Empathy²⁴ (*Einfühlung* or "Infeeling"). This principle recognises the fact that in artistic activity we bestow on things our own moods and feelings. A spontaneous projection not of mere sensations but of real psychic feeling into the people and things we perceive is regarded as its essential feature. This act of projection follows perception immediately and blends our personality with the object. This blending is not a kind of association or recollection. It is an identification of the personality with the aesthetic object, a fusion of the two. This phenomenon occurs wherever a value is realized. In fact, the possibility of the fusion of subject and object is the test of the normative nature of an experience. This breaking down of the barrier between the subject and the object

is *not* taken account of by the gestalt formula. At present it deals with a configuration resting on dualism and separateness. There is need for modification of the formula in this direction.

VIII

The Modified Formula

These considerations reveal the limitations of the gestalt concept as used in psychology. It is true that experience is determined by constellations of stimuli which form patterns or 'figures'. But there is a normative element involved in this figure-formative activity. In every configuration there is an immanent plan. The principle of closure is not an adequate statement of this gestalt-ideal. The gestalt forces that organize our experience seem to aim only at closure but that is because of our imperfect reading of the organizing process. As we follow up the process we see the forces working towards a more complex end, viz., symmetry. The search for symmetry and balance is the real work of these forces.

The transition from positive experience to normative experience is not a sudden jump. The same forces operate in both : only in normative experience they operate in a more complex and fully-developed form. The gestalt account of experience should therefore emphasize not completeness but *configuration*. The gestalt-formula, in order to include in its scope both positive and normative experiences, should be modified to emphasize the following points :

- (1) The greater importance of the inner "structure".
- (2) The taking into account of the totality of experience.
- (3) The fulfilment in positive joy and not in negative tension-release.
- (4) The subject-object fusion that takes place.

Then we get a normative concept, a significant principle of wider application. Gestalt will not then be limited to the provincial domain of psychology but will become a characteristic approach to all knowledge.

NOTES

¹ Cf. K. Koffka, "The sum of sensations is not equal to our phenomenal world". (*Psychologie der Wahrnehmung*, VIIIth International Congress of Psychology, 1926) Pub. 1927. Also Wertheimer "What happens in the total is not conditioned by the nature of the parts", (*Ueber Gestalt-theorie*, Symposium I, 1927, pp. 39-60).

² Cf. R.S.Woodworth, "In Gestalt theory, an imperfect figure means unbalanced brain tensions, while a good figure means equilibrium and therefore the brain response to what is presented gravitates toward completeness, regularity and perfection of figure". (*Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, p. 110.)

³ See Friedrich Sander, "Structure, Totality of Experience and Gestalt", *Psychologies of 1930*, p. 195.

⁴ At the Göttingen Congress of Experimental Psychology in 1914, Gelb reported that if three light points were briefly flashed successively in a straight line, they were seen as a symmetrical group, even when the two intervals had an objective ratio of 10 to 30 cms. This pressure toward symmetry and coherence was especially marked if the time intervals from points 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 were equal or appeared to be equal.

⁵ The word is translated as "precision" here. The term "eidotropy" used by G.H. Müller also designates the tendency of an image to become "typical".

⁶ Cf. L.W.Cole, "The Law of *Prägnanz* must not, however, be understood simply as a levelling process. Wulf found, for example, that when he asked his subjects to reproduce exposed patterns under certain conditions curves and angles were accentuated", *General Psychology*, p. 484.

⁷ Cf. G.W.Hartmann, "Despite the extraordinary fruitfulness of Gestalt theories in many areas of psychological interest, they do not constitute at present a well-rounded and finished system of ideas", *Gestalt Psychology*, p. 159.

⁸ See Wertheimer's essay, "Untersuchungen Zur Lehr von der Gestalt", *Psych.-Forsch.*, 1923, 4, pp. 301-350.

⁹ These stimuli may be dots or lines or geometrical figures or "things" in three dimensions like trees or tables. They may also be 'temporal' instead of 'spatial'.

¹⁰ In fairness to the Gestalt school, it must be pointed out that some of their writers do recognize the importance of the 'internal' factors. But the tendency generally is to emphasize and elaborate the 'external' factors only. Cf. L.W.Cole, "Dealing, as he so frequently does, with the phenomena of visual perception the Gestaltist sometimes gives the impression that the dynamic factors are *out there* among the stimuli, that it is the spatial nearness, continuity etc., acting upon the retina, which results finally in cortical organizations..", *op. cit.*, p. 494.

¹¹ Friedrich Sander refers to "the dispositional features of the soul, with their dynamic which strives for actualization", *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 494.

¹³ It is from this point of view that Köhler himself thinks that the word "configuration" is not quite adequate as a translation of the German word "Gestalt". The word "configuration" seems to suggest elements *externally* put together in a certain manner. But if we remember this, there is no harm in using the word "configuration", See *Psychologies of 1930*, p. 149.

¹⁴ Cf. "Justice is like the kingdom of God—it is not without as a fact, it is within us as a great yearning" (George Eliot).

¹⁵ That a large field awaits the researcher here is shown by the striking results obtained by Dembo in her gestalt study of the typical emotion of anger—probably the only exhaustive analytical treatment of the problem from the *dynamic* point of view. (See "Der Ärger als dynamisches Problem", *Psychol. Forsch.*, 1931, 15, pp. 1-144).

¹⁶ See his discussion in the *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, 1925, p. 600.

¹⁷ Op. cit.

¹⁸ Friedrich Sander, Op. cit., p. 201.

¹⁹ See "Vorsatz Wille and Bedurfins", *Psychol. Forsch.*, 1926, 7, pp. 330-385.

²⁰ Op. cit., p. 206, foot note.

²¹ Cf. W. McDougall, "Is joy mere pleasure, and are the two words synonymous? Obviously not; joy is universally recognised as something more than and *higher than* mere pleasure. Whenever did poet write of pleasure in the lofty strain of the beautiful lines that Coleridge wrote of joy?"

"O pure of heart, thou needst not ask of me
What this strong music in the soul may be!
What and whercin it doth exist,
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist,
This beautiful and beauty-making power,
Joy, virtuous lady! Joy that ne'er was given
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour.
Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud—
We in ourselves rejoice
And thence flows all that charms our ear or sight,
All melodies the echoes of that voice,
All colours a suffusion from that light."

Clearly joy is more than pleasure, however intense".

Social Psychology, p. 129.

²² Cf. S. Alexander, "Thought enters, and imagination, and all the motives, conscious or hidden, which stir the mind.", *Beauty and other forms of Value*, p. 130.

²³ Cf. Vidyadhara, "Rasa...is like the bliss of the soul from the contemplation of the Supreme Being.", *Ekārcāli*.

²⁴ The term was first used by R. Vischer. J. Lipps is the most eminent representative of this school of aestheticians. See Lord Listowel's, *A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics*, pp. 169-173.

THE MOVE TOWARDS INTEGRATION

M. AROKIASWAMY

ONE feels extremely happy to contribute a paper to a volume that commemorates the fiftieth birthday of an honoured colleague like Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan, with whom I was fortunate to work even before I came to the University as one of its teachers in a premier educational institution in Madras—the College of Pachaiyappa Mudaliar.

The great question that faces the country to-day, in fact the greatest question, is how to integrate its forces and present a united whole. It is agreed on all hands that India is a vast country and it bequeaths problems equally vast in character. Its peoples are many and their origin, mode of life, language and religion are equally many and this makes the greatest difficulty for any scheme of unification. The only way to go anywhere near achieving this lies in finding the basis of disintegration. India is no doubt the abode of many races. Some call it an animated museum of many races and others call it the anthropologist's paradise. Whereas in Europe the Aryan accounts for the origin of the people in general no less than seven races seem to account for the origin of the people in India. The Dravidian, the Aryan and the Mongolian are the main stocks from which the Indian people spring while by their intermixture four other races—the Aryo-Dravidian, the Mongolo-Dravidian, the Scytho-Dravidian and the Turco-Iranian—also account for their origin. Fortunately, however, the question of race does not present to us the real problem, since during the passage of a long time men have forgotten their historical and in some cases pre-historic origins. What ails Indian society at the present moment

is the solution of the problem of caste. Once some solution is arrived at in this matter the integration of India may be a comparatively easy problem.

It may be the impression in very many quarters that this problem of doing away with the caste is only a modern problem. But when we look at it from the historian's standpoint it would appear most clearly that it had exercised many a great mind from very early times, right down from the Buddha to our own day. Not one of them was oblivious of the fact that caste beyond bounds was both unreasonable and detrimental to the healthy growth of society in India. The very system of caste must have arisen in this country more as a defence against hostile forces and to that extent as a centripetal force. In fact the system of caste at its earliest stage gives us the picture of a racially composite social polity working its way through a carefully planned division of labour not different from what may be seen to-day in a well-organised firm or manufactory. The dominant Aryan community was divided into priests, warriors and traders and the other racial groups in subordinate alliance with the Aryans were made to form the class of servants known as the *śūdras*.

The difficulty arose only when one among these classes claimed superiority over the others and thus made the whole system itself a danger to society far from being its defence. The sages of the Upanishads had understood this danger and they gave a philosophic explanation of the equality of men and pitched their argument on the inherent divinity of the soul. In the *Bhagavadgītā*, generally described as the cream of the Upanishads, caste is indeed described as having been created by God not to emphasise the superiority of one or the inferiority of another but "in accordance with the division of qualities and functions". Thus this great work struck the note of quality as the basis of caste where birth had been emphasised wrongly as the criterion of human greatness. Hereafter the Brahmin is to be not the one who performs the functions according to the *Smṛtis* but one who is characterised by purity, austerity, self-control, peacefulness, wisdom and faith in God. And so also with all the castes. The Vaisyas, who also called themselves

as twice-born, were not to be praised for that but for the great qualities of the soul that they displayed. The epics that followed paid due homage to this criterion of merit and who does not know the *Rāmāyaṇa* that makes even the monkeys equal to godly men. The example of the boat rower on the Ganges becoming a brother of Sri Ramachandra is a typical case in point. In the same way throughout the *Mahābhārata* we find this respect to the aristocracy of merit yielding place to the aristocracy of birth. In Buddhism that rose as a revolt against Brahminism we find this new principle displayed even with greater vehemence. It threw open the doors of its abbeys and monasteries to men of all castes and status thereby making it clear that all men at birth are equal. From the ideal of caste by equality Buddhism and Jainism flew one step higher and declared the doctrine of human equality.

Thus it would be seen that the move towards integration has been as old as the 6th Century B.C. The later day philosophers only served to give a philosophic bias to the new move. The Vedantic philosophy has for its cardinal principle the equality of man and emphasised it all the more when it based it on the divine nature in man. Of Sankaracarya it is said that when a Chandala who crossed his path was asked to move away he turned round and asked the great preacher whether it was the "food-made body" that was wanted to be carried away from his path implying thereby that the inner soul was of a higher nature and that was equal for all. And then Sankara was astounded at the profundity of the Chandala and declared that he was the humble disciple of anyone who teaches the Oneness of the ultimate reality, whether he is a Brahmin or a Chandala.

Sri Ramanuja even went further in annihilating caste. Indeed the traditional account of his renunciation attributes it to his disgust of his wife's old-fashioned orthodoxy which would not allow her to show due respect to Brahmins by quality rather than by birth. He even had the doors of the temple at Melkote opened on specified days for the so-called polluted castes. In the *bhakti* movement that rose side by side with these innovations in religion many devotees of both Siva and Vishnu sang the

praise of God and are believed by popular faith to have attained *mukti* or salvation and they were to be found strangely enough in all castes and creeds including Nandan the untouchable, Kannappan the hunter and Nilakantha the harpist, who was a wandering minstrel.

In fact it came to be considered that the religion of *bhakti* was almost a negation of caste. Ramananda, a great mystic who did much for the propagation of the new cult in North India declared categorically: "Let no man ask a man's caste or sect. Whoever adores God is God's own." Chaitanya, the great saint of Bengal, was himself a social reformer. Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Swami Vivekananda were also of the same type. Both of them were social reformers while being religious preachers, until we come to Rammohan Roy, who was a social reformer unalloyed. Mahatma Gandhi testified to the permanence of this spirit, when he attacked caste with all the vehemence at his command.

The move for integration once begun has thus gone on intermittently in keeping with the importance of the problem it involved. Sir T. W. Holderness, who was permanent Under Secretary of State for India and did much to codify the Government of India Act of 1919, wrote in his book *Peoples and Problems of India*: "The very word Pariah of our dictionaries comes from the name of the great labouring caste of the southern districts, Madras. They, to men of higher castes, are unclean and polluted. Few of us when we use the word actually realise the full infamy of its meaning in its country of origin." Much water has flown under the bridge since this was written and what is called the Harijan uplift movement has forced its way far into our social fabric and the unclean and the untouchable have been steadily resurrected from their old state of degradation upto a point when they have become the cynosure of the higher classes of society. Here lies surely a way for integrating society in India. The western conception that we in India have been uncivilised enough to keep the blot of untouchability on our social consciousness is unaware of the historical causes that have made such a situation unavoidable. So many races, and peoples have

been thrown on India almost as on a dumping ground through long centuries that for quite a good period of her history she had to struggle against diverse colours, languages, customs, beliefs, religions and in a word different levels of culture and civilisation during which she had to make various makeshift arrangements with her society. This meant cruelty and injustice to many for what they were not responsible for. But time alone could remedy the defect. What is in progress in the country to-day is in that direction.

ATMA VADA

S. RAJAGOPALA SASTRI

INDIA has always been the land of *Ātma-vicāra* and this characteristic is revealed in all her systems of philosophy. What man is basically and what his hidden potentialities are have a fascination for the thinking man at all times. The psychologists of the present century investigated human personality and brought to light many interesting and curious facts which stimulated further research on man. But unfortunately all these have been motivated by the scientific standpoint and many interesting hypotheses, merely because they could not be verified, were abandoned. The investigations of the Society for Psychical Research along with those of Parapsychology have revealed highly instructive facts of the human personality. Hypnotism, clairvoyance, clairaudience, dreams, abrupt changes of human personality, the possibility of the existence of disembodied spirits—all these have been slowly obliterating the boundaries between the strictly scientific and the intuitive knowledge. But all told, we badly feel the need of a foundational body of knowledge regarding man, "the noblest of creation".

Such a foundational body of knowledge is given in the various schools of Indian philosophy in their treatment of the Self. In the subject of man, departments of knowledge like science, religion and philosophy are clearly intertwined and unless we correlate the findings of all these three branches, our knowledge of man will probably continue to be shallow. But as our aim in this paper is more philosophical than scientific we shall base our discussions of the Self on what philosophy has to say on this question and thus strive to arrive at the knowledge of the most probable.

... A human being may be split up into several factors and we may see how they are related to each other and also how progressively each becomes more fundamental than the other and in this way we may find out the most basic. The most obvious element in this analysis is the body which is made of matter. All the wonderful make-up of the body and the various systems functioning in a harmonious manner including the complex structure of the sensory organs are mortal and die away after some years. We know very well that the fertilised ovum with the help of the proton elements undergoes a process of mitosis and finally results in the formation of the child which grows and develops and finally becomes the adult. Secondly, the sense organs are regarded as being more important than the gross physical body on the ground that they give us the knowledge of the external world. They may be the proverbial windows of the soul but when compared to the other factors they are not very important. The next in the hierarchy is described variously as the mind, the understanding, the *manas* or the *antaḥkāraṇa*. This is the inner organ and is very necessary for knowledge, for the senses by themselves will not give us any unified or coordinated real knowledge. The several systems describe it in various ways. One of the Upanishads describes it as follows : "Desire, resolve, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind." Some regard it as a sensory organ while others take it as something more than a sense organ. Whatever may be the precise character of *manas*, it is clear that without its functioning no unified knowledge is possible. It is a condition of perception. The Naiyayika teaches that it is the inner sense by which we know the inner states of feelings, desires and cognitions. The self perceives the inner states through the instrumentality of the *manas*. The next factor is *prāṇa* or life-principle and its importance is very obvious. In modern times we understand by life the vital principles the non-functioning of any of which is enough for the person to die. But in Indian philosophy we speak of the five *prāṇas* or the vital airs which systematically govern the functioning of the body and its health. Though the Indian thinkers have isolated *prāṇa*, European thinkers as a rule

have identified it with the physical body. The next in hierarchy is what is vaguely called *buddhi* or the intellect. Quite a lot of ambiguity is caused by mistranslating the word and it must be said that the several systems themselves use the term in their own way and give it their own meaning. According to the Nyaya, it merely stands for cognition while according to the Sankhyas it is the first evolute from *prakṛti*. It stands nearest to the self and reflects the consciousness of the self. Other schools do not uphold this view. They regard it as the last but one link in the gamut of the self. The individual ego comes next and is regarded as the apex of these factors. This empirical ego is the knower, the agent and the experient. He transmigrates from body to body according to his merit and demerit. He is the embodied self. The *ātman* is the ultimate factor beyond which there is nothing. It is the transcendental principle and none of the systems of philosophy are perfectly agreed as to its nature. Discussion is almost always centered on the *ātman* and the other principles are regarded as merely the tools of the *ātman* or the Self. Hence the most exacting and detailed investigation is on the nature of the Self.

The soul-principle is permanent or eternal. On this point all systems of thought are agreed. It is an eternal and permanent substratum continuing to exist even after the death of the body. It is empirically related to the body, the senses, *manas*, *prāṇa* and *buddhi* but it is really distinct from them. All the different systems of philosophy discuss this question in great detail and arrive at contradictory conclusions. Some do not believe in the existence of the soul at all and argue that there is really no soul and the term is a misunderstanding of some other factors like cognition or sensation. The Carvakas argue that what is called the soul is nothing more than the body with consciousness and that there is no proof for its existence apart from the body. But more enlightened Carvakas maintain that there is a soul apart from the body, that this is the permanent knower (*jñātā*) and experient (*bhoktā*) but that it is destroyed at the death of the body. All other schools of thought have unanimously rejected these teachings of the Carvakas.

The theory of *Nairātmya-vāda* or the doctrine of No-self is the position of the Bauddha according to whom what is taken as the self is nothing more than a stream of cognitions. According to the other schools of Buddhism, it is an empirical aggregate of body, and the four kinds of mental processes, viz, feeling, perception, disposition including will and self-consciousness. There is no other principle beyond these and what some of the orthodox believers of the Vedas describe as the *ātman* simply does not exist. The Yogacara in particular maintains that the self is nothing more than the stream of cognitions. Kumarila Bhatta in his *Sloka-vārtika* criticises this position in great detail and conclusively proves that the self is something more and beyond these cognitions.

We find a refreshing unanimity regarding the eternity of the soul and no philosopher maintains that it is transitory. Even the Jains teach that the self which they call as *jīva* is eternal. It is an eternal spiritual principle. It is different from the body, and the senses. Nonetheless it inhabits the body and exists throughout the body. A spate of arguments centers round this question and the Jaina position is ridiculed rather unjustly without the Jaina view-point being clearly understood. The Jaina asserts that it is a spiritual being and hence non-spatial. But if the *jīva* is non-spatial how does it inhabit the whole body of the man or the animal of which it is the *jīva* ? This question is answered by saying that the soul pervades the whole body by spiritual illumination like the lamp lighting a whole room. Just as a red ruby placed in a vessel containing milk imparts its lustre to the milk, the soul illumines the whole body with its 'consciousness'. This disposes of the many uncharitable criticisms made of the Jaina soul that in the case of an ant it is of the size of the ant and that in an elephant it is of the size of the elephant. Considerable ingenuity is exhibited by the critics who taking their stand on the term '*madhyaparimāṇa*' used by the Jaina seriously argue that when the child or the animal grows and develops there would be difficulty for the soul which also has to develop and grow. A soul which grows and develops is certainly not eternal. Also how can there be transmigration

from one body to another? These are not very fair and sound criticisms for the Jaina has already explained that the *jīva* is spiritual and hence, non-spatial. Only he need not have described the soul as being of '*madhyaparimāṇa*'.

There is a multiplicity of *jīvas* as each living thing has its own *jīva*. In this respect it is fundamentally different from the Advaitic *ātman* which is one, homogeneous and undifferentiated. But the Jaina teaches that there is a graded hierarchy of *jīvas* from the most imperfect up to the most perfect. The most imperfect souls inhabit bodies of plants and the four elements. Next we have souls of animals and men having one to five senses. Perfect souls are those who have attained omniscience. Potentially every soul is perfect but as a result of accumulated *karmas* (material particles getting attached to the soul and thus obstructing its spiritual and full vision) it has to struggle through various lives to reach perfection.

Though the *jīva* is eternal, it undergoes modifications. Though it is distinct from the body and the senses, it is said to be an agent, knower and an experient. It experiences pain and pleasure. Consciousness constitutes its essence. Cognition, conation and affection are its qualities. That the Jainas should characterise the self as permanent, and at the same time describe it as undergoing changes may appear to be hardly satisfactory. This criticism is founded on the principle that an eternal thing does not change. But the Jaina metaphysics justifies such an apparent contradiction: A substance is possessed of qualities or attributes and modes. Modes are merely the changes in the attributes of the object. These attributes and modes are created and destroyed while the substance is permanent. Applying this to the spiritual substance the soul, we see that the soul is permanent or eternal even while undergoing changes of states. These changes are merely in the attributes and the substance without the qualities is unchanging. Thus the conclusion is arrived at that though the soul changes; it is nonetheless eternal.

Some writers do not distinguish the Jaina theory of the "inclusiveness of the substratum" and the "exclusiveness of the attributes", from the principle taught by Kumarila Bhatta that

changes of states in qualities which are merely accidental do not in any sense render the self a contingent one. The author and the commentator of *Tattva-saṃgraha*, do not distinguish these two views but club them together. The Jaina metaphysics though plausible is false for what are actually contradictories cannot be valid at one and the same time. That substance could be eternal while the qualities could go on changing can hardly be taken seriously for what it implies is that there is no relation between the attributes and the substance. If the attributes are related to the substance which is something really over and above the qualities, it cannot be asserted that the qualities could be changing and the substance be permanent. If on the other hand it is maintained that the substance is nothing more than the sumtotal or the mere added unity of the attributes, there is nothing really like the substance independent of the qualities. If the qualities change then the substance also changes and it cannot be eternal. The Jaina merely tells us that the self is eternal and that it is of the essence of consciousness. But in this context the term essence means nothing more than that it is an invariable quality of the self and thus coming under the category of the attribute it is liable to change. Thus the substance also should be a changing one. The mere statement that the soul is eternal does not really mean anything. Thus the Jaina cannot sustain his position that the *jīva* is immortal. The same criticism does not apply to Kumarila's argument and we shall take up this question later.

As compared with the Nyaya theory we see that the Jaina view is more correct in that it maintains that the *jīva* is always characterised by *caitanya* (consciousness) and that this is its essence. This is a right note and probably this is the only important contribution of the Jaina psychology to the problem of the self.

We may at this point take up the Nyaya theory of the soul and see what exactly are its defects. That consciousness is not the essence of the soul but that it is only an accidental and adventitious attribute is its theme. The Naiyayika also regards the soul as eternal and that it is a substance. It has the following

characters : cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. The soul is the inherent cause of cognition and hence it is a substance. It is all-pervading, eternal and incorporeal. It has consciousness as its attribute but it is only an accidental trait, limited by the subject-object relation. The self acquires consciousness because of its association with the *manas* and the body. Essentially the self is unconscious. In this particular respect the Nyaya is at variance with almost all the other systems. Most of these regard the self as being transcendental consciousness. But the Naiyayika argues that consciousness cannot exist unrelated to subject or object. Hence in the absence of this we cannot have consciousness at all. It need not be an attribute of the self for in the state of perfect freedom it does not exist. He does not probably imply that the self is *jada* or inert but only that it is unconscious. This conclusion is reinforced by his drawing attention to the absence of consciousness in the dreamless sleep (*suṣupti*) and affirming that *suṣupti* is the real true state of the soul in its pure condition. Moreover consciousness is only a quality and the subject of consciousness, the self, can exist without it. But all these points of the Naiyayika are easily answered. The Advaitin as we have seen, holds that the self as such is pure consciousness and self-luminous. Kumarila Bhatta also in his *Śloka-vārtika* quotes with approval the *Mantra* in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* (4-3-6); "When speech ceases, what light does the person possess? He possesses the light of the Self Oh, King". The self illumines the body, etc., but is itself not illuminated by anything else. In other words it is *svayam-jyotiḥ*. Kumarila also accepts the *ātman* as self-luminous. The Sankhya philosopher also holds that the *puruṣa* is unrelated, attributeless self-luminous eternal and omnipresent being identical with consciousness (*cit*). Thus the negation of *cit* by the Nyaya is the most fundamental difference between it and the other schools. The Nyaya recognises that the self is of subject-object consciousness which is limited only to the empirical sphere. This makes the soul the knower, the agent of the act of knowledge. The self is a *dravya* and is endowed with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, etc.

The criticism is sometimes put forward that because the self is the basis of some transient qualities, for the qualities cease to exist at the time of liberation, the self also should necessarily be non-eternal. The Nyaya holds that the self is partless and that it has neither a beginning nor an end. There is an infinite number of such selves. In this point also the Nyaya clashes with the Advaita theory of the single *ātman*.

Another point on which the Naiyayika disagrees with the Advaita is regarding Bliss being the essence of the soul. The Advaitin maintains that bliss is not the attribute of the self but its very essence. According to him, *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* constitute the very essence of the *ātman* and they are not adventitious. Nor are they *ātman's* attributes for the *ātman* has no attributes. Many other systems do not agree with the Advaita in this respect of the soul being bliss. The Mimamsaka, the Naiyayika, the Sankhya and the Jaina do not accept the view that *ānanda* is the essence of the self. The Nyaya is of the view that in the released state, the soul is perfectly free from pain. According to Vatsyayana there is neither evidence nor justification to hold that the self is bliss. The state of *susupti* (dreamless sleep) may be compared in a measure to the state of release.

The Nyaya concept of the soul is hardly satisfactory when taken as a whole. If the soul is not essentially conscious but is only the subject of empirical consciousness, it is reduced to the level of inanimate objects. Are we to compare the repose of a stone to the liberated state of the soul? The denial of consciousness to the self is philosophically a very serious defect for unless it is eternally conscious, we cannot even, as Sankara says, maintain that consciousness is absent. By describing the soul as the possessor of the nine qualities and by ascribing a non-eternal characteristic to these qualities, the Naiyayika makes himself open to the criticism that when the qualities disappear, the substratum also becomes incapable of existing, because it is really nothing more than these qualities. The substratum is nothing more than a synthesis of these qualities and the description of the soul as eternal and omnipresent seems to be without meaning. If the soul is eternal and omnipresent

there seems to be very little present to make us realise it unless we are told of other factors which are not merely attributes of it. The denial of consciousness in the sense of a some thing transcendent considerably weakens the case of Nyaya. If the soul is not consciousness but only a knower, when consciousness disappears, the subject also disappears because he is nothing more than the qualities. If A is nothing more than the totality of b, c, d, and e and nothing else, when b, c, d and e become extinct the combined product also becomes extinct. In the general picture of the Nyaya concept of the *jīva*, the description of it as eternal, *vibhu* (all-pervading), indestructible, partless, etc., does not seem to have any meaning.

The Sankhya treatment of the self (*puruṣa*) is probably not more satisfactory but nevertheless is nearer the Advaitic concept. The two fundamental bases of the system are the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The former is pure *cit*, pure consciousness and is distinct from the body and the senses as these are merely evolutes of *prakṛti* or matter. The *puruṣa* is not with the attribute of consciousness but is consciousness itself which is its very essence. But at the same time the Sankhya is unlike the Advaita because it teaches that the soul is not of the nature of bliss. The Sankhya self is eternal, pure (unmixed with anything empirical). It is the seer (*draṣṭā*) and the experient (*bhoktā*) but not an agent (*akartā*). It is immutable and not liable to modifications. The Nyaya-Vaisesikas attributed qualities to the self but the Sankhyas regard all these so-called qualities as merely the modes of *buddhi* or intellect which is the first evolute of *prakṛti*. *Prayatna* (effort) is not the nature of the self for it is a mere mode of *buddhi*. It is devoid of desires, volition, *dharma* and *adharma*. Nor has it virtue or vice. In common with the other systems, the Sankhya also believes in a multiplicity of *puruṣas* or real selves on the ground that we are all endowed differently in the physical, intellectual and the moral spheres. Also our experiences are different from each other. Like the Advaita, the Sankhya also makes a distinction between the empirical self and the real self or the *ātman*. *Puruṣa* remains beyond the actions of *prakṛti* and the *buddhi* and is a purely

conscious principle while the *jīva* is 'nothing' but the *puruṣa* limited by the body, the senses and *ahamkāra*. It is an agent and an experient. The empirical body possesses within itself the material body which in course of time wears out, a subtle body possessing the various senses, emotions and passions. This is called the *liṅga-śarīra* and serves to distinguish one *puruṣa* from the other. Neither the Nyaya nor the Mimamsaka makes this distinction. This distinction is a very convenient *deus ex machina* which explains very satisfactorily the purity of the self and the impurity of the individual as such. The *ātman* is the ultimate principle—one without a second, pure consciousness, existence, and bliss, unrelated and undifferentiated, (bereft of *sa-jātiya*, *vi-jātiya* and *svagata bheda*), the absolute principle which is the same as the *Brahman*. The question may be asked; what happened to the pristine purity of the self? How did the pure self come to this low and mixed condition? This is always the difficulty with absolutistic philosophies which start with the Absolute or God. How did the infinite become the finite, is a question which is very difficult to answer. Advaita Vedānta posits the existence of *māyā* or *avidyā* which makes the infinite the finite and the Sankhya philosopher also posits *avidyā* as a result of which the *puruṣa* beyond *buddhi* comes to believe that he is reflected in *buddhi* and that he has a body, senses, etc. This is an attempt to solve the question: How does the pure *puruṣa*, a pure *cit*, become so low as to identify itself with the body, senses and *manas*, etc.? This difficulty confronts the Jaina also for he has to answer the question: How does it happen that while the *jīva* in the original condition is pure, he comes to be associated with matter to such an extent as to become incapable of correct perspective? With these systems, there has been a fall, as it were, from the original condition of the pure self but in the Nyaya and the Mimamsa systems by not overtly making the distinction between the pure and the impure, the empirical and the transcendental, we have a pushing up, as it were, of the self which from the low states gradually makes itself more and more perfect until the transcendental state is reached. The Sankhya *puruṣa* in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan is a pure

self emptied of all contents and is a mere fiction of the imagination. *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are not facts of experience but abstractions set up beyond experience to account for it. *Puruṣa* is not the body or the senses nor even *buddhi* which also is material though very finely attenuated. *Puruṣa* does not change at all nor is it the cause or effect, It does not depend upon anything else for illumination—it is self-illumination. It is not bliss (and here there is a marked difference with the Advaita Vedānta concept of the self), does not move, is neither atomic in size nor of limited size and not active. It has no qualities at all. Without beginning or end, without any qualities, omnipresent, an eternal Seer, beyond the senses, mind and the intellect, beyond space and time, beyond causality, unproduced and unproducing, it is *cidrūpa*. It is this description of the self which has made Dr. Radhakrishnan characterise the *puruṣa* as mere contentless entity, and a mere product of imagination. It is also a negative concept and is absolutely unrelated to us and we never experience it. What we perceive and experience is the *jīva* conditioned by *prakṛti* and its modifications. But Kapila teaches us that the *jīva* is a *puruṣa* unrelated to *prakṛti*. If the *ātman* is only one, the plurality of *jīvas* is understandable from at least one standpoint. "But the Sāṅkhya dualism between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* and a plurality of infinite *puruṣas*, each unlimited and yet not interfering with the unlimitedness of the others, though existing out of and independent of them, cannot be regarded as a satisfactory solution".

The Mīmāṃsā system does not make the distinction between the *ātman* and the *jīva*. The concept of the *ātman* of the Mīmāṃsaka has been often much misunderstood even by eminent thinkers. As Dr. Mookerjee has observed in his "Buddhist Doctrine of Flux", the Bhaṭṭa theory of the soul has not been faithfully presented but distorted by prejudice even by such persons as Vidyāranya, Sadananda and other Naiyāyikas who took Parthasarathi Miśra as their authority ignoring Kumārila. Vidyāranya says that the Bhaṭṭa self is a multiple entity with a twofold aspect of consciousness and unconsciousness. In his *Pañcadaśī*, he compares it to a fire-fly having darkness

and illumination both in its constitution. Dr. Mookherjee hence says, "This conception of the soul as a compound of spiritual and unspiritual factors is a logical construction of the Vedantic critics and is not the orthodox presentation". That Kumarila should be accused as postulating a self with two logically inconsistent attributes passes one's comprehension. This is not all. Kumarila teaches that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is illumined by itself (*Svayamprakāśa*). Parthasarathi Misra holds a different opinion that the self is an object of mental perception. Eminent scholars like Dr. Jha, Das Gupta and Hiriyanna do not make this distinction at all between the views of Kumarila and Parthasarathi and are content to criticise Kumarila from out of the mouths of the later day Advaitins and Naiyayikas. We may pass over this aspect.

To the Mimamsaka also, the *ātman* is not to be identified with the body, senses or understanding or cognitions. It is eternal and imperishable. It is non-material, conscious and omnipresent and takes a particular body in accordance with its merits and demerits acquired in the previous births. But unlike the *ātman* of the Advaita Vedānta the self is an agent (*kartā*) cogniser (*jñātā*) and experient (*bhoktā*). It is also the substrate of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, impression, cognition and volition, and merit and demerit. These are merely the modes of the self. All these processes undergo changes and variations but the *ātman* is unaffected and continues to be eternal. Kumarila Bhatta argues that the self is unaffected and continues to be eternal for the reason that the fundamental characteristics of *ātman* are not affected. Accidental qualities undergo changes but consciousness and *jyotiṣa* (illumination) do not change and hence the eternity of the soul is not in any way affected. The vast ocean continues to be the same in spite of the changes in foam, waves, etc. A snake continues to be the same whether it is coiled or straight and in the same way the *ātman* is the same irrespective of the changes in some of its adventitious traits. This is very different from the Jaina contention that while the substance is constant the attributes change.

The metaphysical assumption that we may have contradictory traits in one and the same object and that experience supports this, we have already seen is a contention which cannot be accepted. But Kumarila's emphasis is not on the dichotomy between the attributes and the substance but only on the changes undergone by cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. But these are not fundamental to the self just as the cloth worn by a person cannot be said to be a fundamental part of him. The foam, froth and the waves may undergo changes but that does not mean that the ocean is changing. Hence Kumarila's teaching in this respect is correct. He does not state anywhere, as some of his critics state the position to be, that the self has the two-fold character of change and permanence as its dual nature. He merely maintains that changes in the inessential characteristics do not destroy the eternity of the soul. Regarding the perception of the self, Kumarila uses the expression, "*mānasa pratyakṣa*". As he says in his *Tantra-vārtika*, this statement merely means, the notion of "I" which is all the notion that we have of the soul points to its mere existence, the self which is of the nature of pure consciousness. It is thus clear that Kumarila does not regard the self as both subject and object for if the soul is self-illuminating, whatever other persons may say, it cannot be the object and it is unlikely that Kumarila should be unaware of this.

The Mimamsaka does not make a distinction between *ātmā* and *jīva* as the Vedantin does and he is precluded from making the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical by his realism. Nor does he regard the changes undergone by the self as merely either apparent or unreal. They are real but immaterial and do not affect the eternity of the self. The Mimamsaka also argues for a multiplicity of selves and one may feel that the criticisms passed against the multiplicity of the *puruṣas* apply here also. But there is a fundamental difference between the two. The various selves with their diverse bodies, senses, *manas*, action, etc., are different from one another. Though all the selves have consciousness as the same, the differences in the other attributes justify us in speaking

state is absolutely free from pain and this state is not in any way mixed with positive happiness. The Advaitin on the contrary argues that bliss is intrinsic to the self. This pure bliss is not experienced by us in the waking states but only in deep sleep. The reason is that in deep sleep the self is detached, as it were, from the *antaḥkāraṇa* and hence the self is able to experience this bliss which is evidenced by the person later on saying on waking from sleep, "I slept happily and did not know anything." A second argument is that every one desires to live and not to get extinct; in other words every one wants to continue the self. The Advaitin thus concludes that the self is intrinsically of the nature of bliss. The other schools of thought do not agree with this interpretation and argue that the self is not of the nature of bliss. *Sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* are not in any sense the attributes of the self but they represent the intrinsic nature of the self and if they are to be regarded as the qualities of the self, there is little to distinguish the Advaitin from the other systems. The *ātman* is absolutely undivided and undifferentiated.

Advaita Vedānta makes a distinction between the *ātman* and the *jīvas*. *Ātman* is the real ultimate and subjective principle and is the same as *Brahman*, the ultimate objective principle. *Ātman* is all-pervasive but one only while the *jīvas* are many. The *jīva* is the *ātman* under limitations of body, mind, senses, *ahaṅkāra* and so on. It is the empirical self and the *ātman* is the transcendental one. The *jīva* is neither a modification nor a part of the latter. It is only the appearance of *ātman*. *Avidyā* is the keynote of the *jīva* and on the destruction of *avidyā*, the *jīva* ceases to exist and is revealed as *ātman* (as it was all the time in reality). The distinction between the two is only phenomenal and not real. The *jīva* is the knower, agent, experient, affected by merit and demerit, bondage and liberation.

As we have seen, the human individual is a curious blend of the sentient and the non-sentient. The self not being a material substance is not seen by the senses. We may understand the existence of the senses and the *manas* by noting their working. The mental life is always a unity, though in various proportions, of the cognitive, the conative and the affective elements. As

Psychology tells us, in no state of experience do we have any element by itself in entirety for in all cases we have all the other elements also mixed up. Empirical psychology fights shy of superconscious states like the experiences of the *Rājayogī* in his state of *samādhi*. The experiences of these persons justify us in assuming their existence in spite of the apparent difficulty of empirical psychology in explaining such phenomenon. The realisation of the soul, we thus see even from the academic standpoint, is possible though of course it is very arduous and an up-hill task. All the several systems of thought emphasise the necessity of realising the self and they do not stop with this but give us detailed instructions for realising it. Different systems prescribe different steps depending on their basic assumptions. The Jaina teaches that bondage of the soul is due to its association with matter and that liberation hence is the complete dissociation of the soul from it. This is achieved by right knowledge, right faith and right conduct. According to the Nyaya, as we have already seen, liberation is a complete and absolute negation of all pain and suffering. This state of *mukti* is attained by one acquiring a true knowledge of the self and *tattva-jñāna*. The Sankhya also teaches that *mukti* is the absolute absence of pain and suffering. To attain liberation, right knowledge of the *puruṣa* is essential and this consists in the discrimination between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. To the Mimamsaka also liberation is a state entirely free from pain. In none of these systems do we have the inclusion of bliss as of the nature of *mukti*. This is attained by disciplined conduct and observances of the essential *karmas* and right knowledge of the self (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*.) The Advaitin alone maintains that liberation is a state in which the *ātman* is in its true condition. It is a positive state of absolute bliss. *Ātma-jñāna* alone gives us this transcendental bliss. The realisation of the self is possible in no other way.

Ātma-vicāra thus leads to *niḥśreyas*.

THE MYSTIC POEMS OF SAINT TAYUMANAVAR

M. VARADARAJAN

SAINT Tayumanavar lived in Tamilnad during the reign of Vijaya Ranga Chokkanatha in the early 18th century. He was named after God Siva of Tiruchirapalli in South India. He imbibed all the highly philosophic and religious contents of both the Tamil and Sanskrit works, especially *Tevāram* and *Tiruvācakam* in Tamil and *Upaniṣads* in Sanskrit. He has in a regretful mood referred to his scholarship in these two languages,¹ stating that he exhibited his scholarship and scared away Sanskrit pandits with quotations from Tamil works and bewitched Tamil scholars with citations from Sanskrit works. He led a married life for some years, served the ruler of the country as a minister for some years and then renounced all his worldly ties and spent many years in devotion and meditation in a hermitage at Vedaranyam in South India.

While a youth he met a master—a *guru* in silence—and had his initiation in meditation and spiritual communion. He has left about 1500 verses in Tamil, all being devotional and contemplative lyrics. They are the outpourings of a great saint's heart soaring in the philosophical heights. Many of his devotional songs appeal to the religious scholars as well as the ordinary devotees. He was a Saivaite, and his Saivism was a religion of harmony and knew no sectarianism and therefore his writings have a universal appeal.

There has been an age-old tradition in the religious literature in Tamil to sing devotional songs to God in the language of sexual love. But there is no erotic element in them. The mystic poets, the Nayanmars and the Alvars have freely used this langu-

age to express their inexpressible experience of communion with God. There are a good number of such mystic songs in *Tevāram*, *Tiruvācakam* and *Nālāyirapprabandam*, all dating from 7th to 9th century A.D.

Even as early as the 2nd century B.C., there was a literary tradition in Tamil depicting the love of ideal lovers and such poems were called *Akappāṭṭu*. There are several anthologies extant which idealise and glorify this earthly love and household life. The Saiva and the Vaishnavaites saints who came many centuries later freely used the language and the images of these love songs, to express their spiritual experience, to signify the love of the soul yearning for God. According to Tolkappiyanar the ancient Tamil grammarian, the love depicted in the ancient Tamil literary works is of two stages, the premarital or clandestine love called '*kaḷavu*' and the post-marital or household life called '*kaṇṇu*'. It is the symbols of the former that are mostly used in the mystic expressions of the Saivaites and the Vaishnavaites saints.

Long after these saints, came Tayumanavar in the eighteenth century. He found the aesthetic language of these mystic saints useful and adopted the images of those love lyrics to give expression to his feelings of unrequited love as well as to his joy of communion with God. In this mystic language, the soul of the devotee is the lady-love or bride yearning for the love of the bridegroom, God.

Tayumanavar has resorted to the use of this language in three of his poetical works, viz., *Ākārapuvanam*, *Painkilikkanni* and *Anandakkalippu*.

Ākārapuvanam consists of 33 stanzas, of which there are nine written in the mystic language of love. He himself compares his feelings of separation from God with those of the lady-love suffering unbearable despair.² He draws the picture of his Lord—His form pervading the earth, the sky and all—on the canvas of his mind.³ Looking at this picture of the Lord, the saint invites Him to come to him and with a heavy heart sheds tears and remains in a state of gloom and then in an unconscious state. The feelings of separation and desolation overcome him,

In this state of anguish and despair he wants to run away to a sea or a mountain. He rolls down on the earth and looks at the moon and the sun and addresses them: "Who ordered you to come so regularly and create nights and days so unerringly. Who is He ? What greatness is His!"⁴ He then goes on addressing the blowing wind and other objects. "Oh wind ! who makes you blow unceasingly ? Oh rainy clouds ! would the Lord shower His mercy on me like you ? Pray, tell me the means to get at Him."⁵ Oh sky ! you have permeated all the space. Where is your end ? There will be my Lord. Speak to me. Oh earth ! what is there where you end ? Will Adishesha tell me of that ?⁶ Oh Vedas ! you speak the truth, only the truth, to one and all. Tell me which prevails in your conclusion. Oh sea ! your glory is beyond description. You stretch your hands of waves and cry aloud ! Who is He that enabled you to stand without banks ?"⁷

He is then reminded of the tradition of ladies sending messengers to their lovers. He perceives parrots and other birds flying here and there and addresses them. "Green parrots ! Bees of the lotus flowers ! Swans ! you are all accustomed to service as messengers to lovers ! Have you hitherto seen and spoken to the all-pervading Lord ? Please speak to him once on my behalf." He then says to himself, "Will I attain that sublime state of silence ? Will my Lord under the shade of the divine banyan tree desire to descend on the earth for my sake ?"⁸

Painkilikkanni is a work of 58 couplets, all addressed to the parrot as the title signifies (*Painkili* meaning green parrot). The saint herein expresses his keen desire to attain salvation and frequently resorts to the language of bridal mysticism. "Oh green parrot ! Go to the Lord of my bosom and tell him all my sufferings and bring me bliss."⁹ He is the soul within the soul. A sinner as I am, can I attain the bliss of the Lord of Wonders ?¹⁰ Tell Him to come to me secretly, unnoticed by others.¹¹ You are known for your soft pleasant words. Why don't you tell Him my state of emaciation with tears flowing like rivers ?"¹²

"My Lord has no place as His, no name as His, no kith and kin, parents or others as His. Will he discern me ?"¹³ Oh parrot !

tell him how I prayed and longed for the tedious nights to dawn!¹⁴ He made me taste the joy of His communion. He was as intimate to me as the pupils of my eyes and then parted. Will he again come to me?¹⁵ I will not wear flowers in my tresses. I yearn for the flowers of His feet, the flowers that never fade.¹⁶ Oh parrot! you have seen how I pined away on account of my unrequited love for Him. Will He come to me and feast me with His pleasures?¹⁷ He appears nearer to me in my heart. But when I go to embrace Him He deserts me and goes far off. What kind of love is His?¹⁸

"No words are there to describe Him, an embodiment of Bliss. Will I enjoy His communion day and night?¹⁹ Almost when I was about to know Him, my Lord deserted me and hid Himself.²⁰ The devotees with purity of heart joined Him and are in bliss. Such a life I lost, on account of my heart of stone."²¹

"When I desire, He comes not. When I keep quiet He volunteers to come to me. What a nature is His?²² He is in my heart. Yet when I think of Him, there ensues duality and he evades me. He is not a deceiver, but He has a peculiar nature.²³ I care not for the miseries caused by my attachments. But the misery caused by my love for Him is unbearable.²⁴ I renounced all my earthly desires. I attach myself only to my Lord, detaching from all others. O parrot, tell all these to Him.²⁵ While very young he followed me and tested my aptitude. Will he now come and enjoy me?²⁶

"Sleeps the earth, sleeps the heaven, sleep all everywhere. I sleep not on account of my love for my Lord.²⁷ Will my Lord place me in His abode of cosmos and embrace me, thereby ending all my endless woes?²⁸ Many a medicine is there to cure the physical illness. Is there one to cure me of my sickness of love for Him?²⁹ He made me speechless and enslaved me. Now I suffer and if you go and tell Him my woes, He will take your words."³⁰

The saint, after having expressed his feelings of separation and desolation, voices his feelings of joy of communion with God. "To me, the heavenly ambrosia is now bitter like neem fruit. Look at this change in me caused by His love".³¹ Yet

he feels the fetters of his physical frame and yearns for freedom from the earthly life and for eternal union with the Lord. "All have reached the celestial balcony. Why is it that I am still kept in this earthly abode here?"³³

In the end there are stanzas in which are mingled the feelings of separation as well as those of communion, the latter being predominant. "He hides in my heart and is aware of all my secret yearnings. As such how can I express my feelings?³³ Before I cast off this physical frame, will I embrace my Lord, the Master of my soul, to my heart's content?³⁴ Deceitful Lord as He is, He makes not signs and speaks not, but comes in my heart. What a device it is!"³⁵

Though pangs of separation come on the saint with force, in the end we find him immersed in the joy of union with God. Though there are images of sexual love in these couplets, sex has no physical significance in this mystic language. There is not a trace of reference to the feminine beauty.

Ānandakkalippu or the Exultation of Bliss is the third work of the saint. In consonance with this title, the poet sings of his rejoicing over the communion with God. This lyric is full of philosophical expression interspersed with bridal mysticism. But such of those stanzas as are written in the mystic language are very significant, as the ecstasy of union with God has been expressed in them with fine artistic touches.

"Oh lady-companion! the Lord who is the beginning of all and who has no beginning for Himself, the Light that is the Bliss as well as the Knowledge, came to me as the Silent Master and spoke to me what is beyond speech."³⁶

"How can I tell you what He spoke? By His guile I was left alone and quiet, mysteriously isolated from all. He enraptured me and captivated me."³⁷

"He wanted me to cling to Him within, dissolving all the attachments. Oh Companion! how can I tell you what I attained! He spoke to me the unspoken mystery."³⁸

"Like a devil I babbled and roamed speaking about unwanted ills. My Lord scared away the demon of desires and enslaved me at His feet."³⁹

"Controlling my senses and detaching myself from them, I loved Him more and more. He absorbed me in Him and made me speechless.⁴⁰

"He marred the traditions of my birth and I have no future if I speak it out. He is not the clandestine lover but my great protector, my great saviour.⁴¹

"Like the sea bursting its banks, my eyes shed tears overflowing, my body was thrilled, my heart melted, such was His art, dear!⁴²

"He bade me cast aside all the feelings and impressions in my mind, of the real and the unreal alike. He then made me Himself. What a great talent it is!⁴³

"Creation, Protection and Destruction—all these he does and yet He is least affected by these. His great talent is such. He is my heart's witness worth meditating, my dear!"⁴⁴

The music and rhythm of these stanzas, defying translation into other languages, echo the personal experience of the saint in the realm of God-consciousness.

There is no erotic feeling in these mystic poems of love, as the poet-saint has a strong hatred for the hankering of men and women after sexual pleasures. He has expressed his dislike for them in several stanzas even in this *Anandakkalippu*.⁴⁵ He has burnt away all his fleshy feelings and hence there is no taint of carnality in his utterances.

A saint, to whom the world is a snare and sexual pleasures a delusion,⁴⁶ has herein sought the language of erotic love to express the *cravings of his soul for bliss*. This is due to the influence of the sacred lyrics of the four Saiva saints on him.⁴⁷ Their lyrics contain many stanzas of bridal mysticism. And they had no such dislike for the pleasures of the world though they did not approve of people hankering after them. Even on this earth there is the kingdom of God and one can lead a pious religious life of full service to God and humanity. This was their view of life. Saint Tayumanavar falls in line with them and declares that he would like to live in this sinful world if it is to serve His devotees and that he would take many more births if the Lord comes to him in the form of the silent *guru* and blesses

him with His Grace.⁴⁸ This makes it clear that the Saiva saints (of the 7th to 9th century A.D.) had such a benign influence on him as to enable him to make use of the mystic language of sex. And this language served him best to express his complete self-sacrifice and self-surrender to God and his blissful communion with Him.

NOTES

¹ *Tay. Cittar Kanam*, 10

² *Tay. Akārapuṇaṇam*, 32.

³ *ibid.*, 24.

⁴ *ibid.*, 25.

⁵ *ibid.*, 26.

⁶ *ibid.*, 27.

⁷ *ibid.*, 28.

⁸ *ibid.*, 32.

⁹ *Tay. Painkilikkappi*.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 3.

¹¹ *ibid.*, 4.

¹² *ibid.*, 5.

¹³ *ibid.*, 8.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, 10.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 12.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, 13.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 18.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 18.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 24.

²⁰ *ibid.*, 26.

²¹ *ibid.*, 32.

²² *ibid.*, 33.

²³ *ibid.*, 35.

²⁴ *ibid.*, 38.

²⁵ *ibid.*, 39.

²⁶ *ibid.*, 40.

²⁷ *ibid.*, 44.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 45.

²⁹ *ibid.*, 49.

³⁰ *ibid.*, 49.

³¹ *ibid.*, 52.

³² *ibid.*, 54.

³³ *ibid.*, 59.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 59.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 58.

³⁶ *Tay. Anandakkalippu*, 1.

³⁷ *ibid.*, 2.

³⁸ *ibid.*, 3.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 5.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, 6.

⁴² *ibid.*, 7.

⁴³ *ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 16, 22-29.

⁴⁶ *Tay. Teṣṭamayānandam*, 3 ; *Tanṇaiyortovār*, 8, 9.

⁴⁷ *Tay. Akṛapuvanam*, 30, 31. *Aḍiyārvaṇakkam*, 1-4. *Aṭṭilar uṭai*, 1-14.

DOES THE STATE NEED A PHILOSOPHY ?

R. BHASKARAN

I AM happy to be asked to write in the *fest schrift* to be published to Professor Mahadevan and I thank Dr. Devasenapathy for setting me the question to answer here. It may be useful to consider the problem as if it has now been posed for the first time for there is a body of belief that any problem to be worth discussing must be contemporary and that while a careful study of history and tradition may be quite rewarding in itself it serves the general purpose only when it enters in some legitimate way into some issue of live and contemporary concern. Even when an academic excuse is justified as its own reward, the reward in any meaningful sense of the word must needs be very contemporary. It is well known that Plato was convinced that no sensible improvement in human affairs can be expected until human communities get their rulers to become philosophers or persuade philosophers to undertake the task of Government. We have thus good and strong authority for claiming that states need philosophers in places of political power and it can be presumed that these philosophers are not expected to leave their philosophies behind them when they start to govern. The states' need of philosophy is then chronic and almost never satisfied. Yet most states have come into being, have had their ups and downs, and have passed away without "philosophers" at the helm from which one may conclude that the need is neither critical nor crucial. Thus, on the one hand there is as clear an intellectual proof of the need of as good a philosophy as the human mind can ever hope to get and on the other hand there is much historical experience proving that there is no such need. This apparent contradiction cannot be real and the way

to resolve it is to consider the words and their meanings, ■ salutary practice as students of Lewis Carroll would readily acknowledge. States have always needed philosophies and have always got them and have always been guided by them; only the name and status of philosophy has been denied in the schools and among intellectuals to various operative ideals that have animated states in several ages and climes. This is the context which one may profitably study when attempting to answer our question. States undoubtedly have philosophies even when these are not explicitly stated or admitted; and statesmen have to be philosophers of one kind or another if they are to guide and administer states. King Janaka is believed to have been a philosopher-king, but we have no precise knowledge of his philosophical views or his administrative measures. Marcus Aurelius has left us his monuments and his meditations and very good as these are they nevertheless do not shed much light on the union of Government and philosophy. Plato went to Syracuse more than once and was disappointed with the results of his education of a tyrant. Yet the conviction that the ideal ruler must be the true philosopher is pretty deep-rooted in the human consciousness; the philosopher-king is a true ideal and though he inhabits the world of ideas more readily than the world of affairs it is quite proper for us to cherish the ideal as a standard of political aspiration and judgment. It means that it is desirable to serve and be served by men with certain qualities of mind and heart. It implies that it is possible to contrive a system of education capable of developing these mental and moral qualities.

There have been in the past many human societies which admitted such an ideal and supported systems of education designed to uphold that ideal.

It seems desirable here to point out that in societies where traditional attitudes to government and rulers prevailed undisturbed, political philosophy was a related branch of a general philosophy concerned with the destiny of man and the meaning of the cosmos. State and Government in such schemes of thought could only be instruments for the pursuit of ends which neither state nor Government could determine or identify. The

political process in such times and such societies could only be on administrative effort to realise aims which lay outside the purview of politics and statecraft. This situation was radically altered some two centuries ago in the western world when there came about in that area a transfer of political power from kings and noblemen brought up in the tradition of old time government to the generality of the people who from then have had to discover and establish new traditions appropriate to the new situation. The emergence of nationalism and democracy was not another easy stage in the continuing evolution of political society; it was a big break and a fresh start whose significance has yet to be fully analysed and understood. The modern national democratic sovereign state is a chronological, not a logical successor to the 'state' of the past, whether the state which was identical with Louis XIV or the State of which the Greek thinkers spoke. The most important difference, for our purpose, between the state today and the state of the past is that the modern sovereign state is expected not only to serve the needs of the good life but also to prescribe what is the good life. The "good life" is no longer a given pattern which the state and other institutions help to achieve; the state is the only authorized progenitor of the pattern. The evaluation, acceptance or rejection of the pattern is the collective responsibility of the entire citizen body inhabiting the state. Obviously this situation has raised a host of practical and theoretical problems which now engage us all over the world.

Now turning to the question of a philosophy for and of the state at this juncture we can broadly discern two attitudes reflecting two types of human temperament; (1) a practical and pragmatic attitude which does not propose to enquire deeply into underlying causes but concerns itself with *ad hoc* policies and programmes calculated to deal with imminent and pressing social and political questions in a manner which is sufficient for the day, and (2) a theoretical and *doctrinaire* attitude which demands the formulation of universal and perpetual first principles to justify and support several social and political policies and programmes which are all held together in mutual indepen-

dence on these first principles. The issue is formed between these two attitudes and it goes by several names in current political literature.

For the understanding of each of these two attitudes and their interplay in the modern world we seem to require a second education in philosophy, in logic and metaphysics, in psychology and ethics. The attitudes themselves are really philosophical positions, the second more consciously "philosophical" than the first. An observer from outside the field of controversy and propaganda can see also clearly that because of the conflict the forces ranged behind a formulated ideology are compelling their reluctant opponents to fashion an ideology of their own despite their desire to do without one. So it happens that even in the English-speaking world which has a tradition of hiding and diluting its first principles there has come about the necessity of examining and stating them.

"The struggle between what we call the Communist *bloc* and the Free World is fundamentally an attempt to decide between two concepts of humanity. I will call them idealist and the materialist. Will man's destiny be fulfilled when once all men can satisfy their material needs? Or is there some deeper purpose, some higher power of which our bodies are only the transient manifestation?"

These words are taken from a speech by Mr. Macmillan, conservative Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in April 1961. So prime ministers have now to put and answer questions which in older times and climes were left to philosophers. It cannot be said that the Prime Minister was taking a holiday in an alien domain when he spoke these words; he was doing his legitimate work. And how urgently the state needs a philosophy cannot be better illustrated.

Assuming without further proof that the state needs a philosophy now as ever, there is still the question, "what is

philosophy?" For our purposes we can take philosophy to be that by which men, things and thoughts cohere and escape chaos. Without philosophy there is no meaning and no possibility of understanding or even action if action is defined as meaningful or purposive motion. Obviously then philosophy is concerned with spirit or essence, with order and direction, with those incorporeal entities without which there can be no purpose or meaning. Thus philosophy is wholly spiritual in character; and the modern world has had sufficient experience to discover that devoted pursuit of strictly material ends and concentration on material means are both handicapped because they do not by themselves engender and guarantee direction and control. Marxians wanted to replace the old philosophy which sought to describe phenomena by a new philosophy deliberately designed to change the world. The slogan appealed to many non-Marxists too, publicists and lay philosophers who were deeply involved in the processes of mass democracy and so could not develop a thinking view of things. In practice it meant an optimistic world view, viz., that the continuous pursuit of a perennially rising standard of living would in and by itself provide the logic and when the pursuit is collectivised and the participating persons in society are all equalised we shall get all the ethics we need. If this is a philosophy it has the great merit of simplicity; it can be grasped by the meanest mind and no one can contradict it without drawing upon himself the wraths of the populace. But experience has shown and is showing that this "materialist philosophy" is not sufficient and reflection may even show that it is not necessary. Here we may consider Christopher Dawson's view (*The Crisis of Western Education*) that the Western world has nearly lost moral order, "no longer recognizes any common system of spiritual values, while its philosophers have tended to isolate the moral concept from its cultural context and have attempted to create an abstract subjective system of pure ethics." Dawson doubts the viability of a society which has no civilization but possesses only "a technological order resting on a moral vacuum". It is not necessary to agree totally with Dawson in his appraisal

of contemporary western moral philosophy, but his diagnosis of the "moral vacuum" and the inability of a technological order of highest precision to compensate society, state and the individual for the disappearance of the moral order is true enough and we have seen that an appreciation of this predicament has now spread to educators, politicians, statesmen and other operative personnel who mediate between man and the state. If it should happen as part of the continuing secular revolution of our time that we come to recognize the necessity of the old religious cultures that informed and sustained past political societies and then go forward to identify and seek a spiritual core for the states of today we shall be turning away from an interim philosophy of materialism which for over a century seems to have weakened civilization and nearly destroyed culture. The State always needs a philosophy to sustain it and when the current philosophy is incapable of sustaining it, men turn to another and more dependable philosophy and at all times the philosophy of the State is in essence a moral and spiritual order irrespective of the degree of explicitness attained in stating it or the degree of success attained in organizing men and institutions according to it. There can be no state at any time which has no philosophy. It is the function of the social theorist to make such philosophies explicit and to point out when they are wrong or confused.

RAJAVIDYA : MANU AND THE BHAGAVADGITA

V. RAGHAVAN

I

IN the more ancient enumeration, the values or *puruṣārthas* were mentioned as three, *trivarga*, and according to this scheme, *mokṣa* was included under *dharma*, *dharma* itself being taken as being of two kinds, *Pravṛtti-dharma* and *Nivṛtti-dharma*. Thus an ancient *Dharma Sāstra* work would also be a treatise of *Mokṣa Sāstra* and Manu and his *Smṛti*, the pre-eminent example of this class, are authoritatively quoted in the Vedānta. Sankara, for example, quotes Manu nine times¹ in his *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* and a dozen times in his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Bhāṣya*. It is with reference to the *Bhagavad Gītā* that a comparative study of Manu, in this respect, is most illuminating.

II

Karma-Yoga, Rāja-Yoga

In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, it is especially the philosophy of *Karma-Yoga* taught in chapter III that the Lord associates with Manu. In his comments here (IV.1), Sankara explains that it is to enable the Kṣatriyas to rule the earth and to provide them with a philosophical basis and outlook in their activity that the Lord taught this *Yoga* to Vivasvan from whom Manu learnt and passed it on to the kings.

योगं विवस्वत आदिन्याय मर्गदौ प्रोक्तवानहं जगत्परिपालयितुं सा त्रियाणां बन्ध-
धानाय । तेन योगबलेन युक्ताः समर्था भवन्ति ब्रह्म परिरक्षितुम् ।

From this point of view, it is legitimate to take the characterisation of the teaching in IX.2 as *Rājavidyā* and *Rājaguhya* as having a special significance to the *Rājārṣis* or Kings for whom this wisdom was pre-eminently intended, though as applicable to others also engaged in activity, this came to be esteemed as the king of *vidyās* or philosophies and the most precious of esoteric wisdom.

विद्यानां राजा दीप्यतिशयत्वात्, दीप्यते हीयमतिशयेन ब्रह्मविद्या । Sankara.

That the name *Rājavidyā* might be taken in a straight manner as meaning the philosophy of the *Rājans* or Kshatriyas, is supported by the *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha* which explains in II.11.4-18, quoting the very words of the *Gītā*, why this philosophy is called the mystic lore of the kings. The *Yoga Vāsiṣṭha* says that as humanity went about gathering things for its life and began to indulge in mutual fight, it became necessary to have rulers to rule them, and this duty of theirs the rulers could not discharge without punishing people and themselves entering these wars; but wars demoralised them and to remove their depression and provide them with the right evaluation (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*), the sages taught them this philosophy. As this was first taught to the kings, this philosophy, which later spread to others, came to be called *Rājavidyā*.

कालचक्रे बह्व्यस्मिस्ततो विगलिते त्रमे ।

प्रत्यह् भोजनपरे जने शास्वर्जनोन्मुखे ॥

द्वन्द्वानि सप्रवृत्तानि विषमार्थं गृहीभुजाम् ।

दण्डघता सप्रमत्नानि भूतानि भुवि भूरिताः ॥

ततो मुद विना भूषा गृही पालयितु क्षमाः ।

न समर्थास्तदा याताः प्रजामिस्सह दैन्यनाम् ॥

तेषा दैन्यापनोदार्थं सम्यग्दृष्टिः प्रमाय च ।

ततोऽक्रमदादिभिः प्रोक्ता महन्यो ज्ञानदृष्टयः ॥

अध्यात्मविद्या तेनेयं पूर्वं राजसु वणिना ।

तदनु प्रसूना लोके राजविद्येत्युदाहृता ॥

राजविद्या राजगुह्यमध्यात्मज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।

ज्ञात्वा राघव राजानः परा निर्दुःखतां यताः ॥ II. 11. 14-18.

It is this special doctrine of *Karma-yoga* which is associated with Manu. It would be interesting and fruitful to see how its chief features as set forth in the *Gītā* are stressed by Manu in his *Dharma Sāstra*. This doctrine of non-attachment called *Anāsakti-yoga* or *Asparśa-yoga* strikes the balance between *karman* and *sannyāsa* and *pravṛtti* and *niṛtti*; it takes away the sting or the binding taint from *karman* through the resignation of its fruit or through its dedication to the Supreme and by the disinterested discharge of it as one's ordained duty. Along with the sterilisation of *karman* by *phala-tyāga*, the *karma-yogin* is also to develop equanimity in respect of the outcome of his endeavours or their attendant circumstance, whether he is faced with success or failure, gain or loss, pleasure or misery, honour or humiliation. It requires no demonstration to show that these are the leading ideas which run all through the *Gītā*. If we turn to the *Manu Smṛti*, we find Manu speaking of this doctrine at more than one important context. At the very outset, when he sets forth the *dharma*s of the different *varṇa*s, Manu includes among those of the Kshatriyas non-attachment to sense-pleasures, *viśayeṣu aprasaktiḥ* (I.89). *Manu* II.98, says like the *Gītā*, that one should not feel depressed or elated, whatever the sense-experiences be (*na hṛṣyati glāyati vā*). The freedom from *mātrāsparśas* and *dvandvas* is insisted upon in VI.57 which says that one should not be depressed at loss nor exhilarated at gain and should be out of the contamination of *mātrā-saṅga*. *Indriya-saṅga* is again mentioned in VI.75 and the *saṅga-tyāga* and freedom from all *dvandvas* in VI.81. Not only is the path of abandoning *karmans* is called *niṛtti*; Manu states expressly in XII.89 that the disinterested performance of *karman*, of a person of *jñāna*, is as much *niṛtta* (cf. *niṣkāmaṃ jñānapūrvam tu niṛttam upadiśyate*).

III

Keith says in his observations on *Manu Smṛti*³ that in its philosophical parts, its tone often rises to a grave dignity, reminiscent of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. This similarity with the *Gītā*

is not merely in tone, but in the mode of thought and expression also and in continuation of what has been shown above, the following parallels in expression and ideas between the *Smṛti* and the *Gītā* may be pointed out :

(a) Manu II.85-7, on the superiority of *Japa-yajña* :

विधियज्ञात् जपयज्ञो विशिष्टो दशभिर्गुणैः ॥

★ ★ ★

सर्वे ते जपयज्ञस्य कलां नार्हन्ति षोडशीम् ।

Cf. Bh. Gītā IV.28,33; especially X.25.

यज्ञानां जपयज्ञोऽस्मि

(b) Manu IV.22-24, on the different *Yajñas* :

एतानेके महायज्ञान् यज्ञशास्त्रविदो जनाः ।

अनीहृमानाः सततमिन्द्रियेष्वेव जुह्वति ॥

वाच्येके जुह्वति प्राणं प्राणे वाचं च सर्वदा ।

वाचि प्राणे च पश्यन्तो यज्ञा निर्वृतिमध्याम् ॥

ज्ञानेनैवापरे विप्रा यजन्त्येतेर्मंसैः सदा ।

Cf. Gītā, IV.26ff.

श्रोत्रादीनीन्द्रियाण्यन्ये सम्यग्माग्निषु जुह्वन्ति ।

धृष्टादीन् विषयानन्ये इन्द्रियाग्निषु जुह्वन्ति ॥

सर्वाणीन्द्रियकर्माणि प्राणकर्माणि चापरे ।

आत्मसंयमयोगाग्नी जुह्वति ज्ञानदीपिते ॥

★ ★ ★

आपाने जुह्वति प्राणं प्राणेशानं स्यापरे ।

★ ★ ★

श्रेयान्द्रव्यमयायज्ञान् ज्ञानयज्ञः परतप ।

सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते ॥

(c) Manu III.76, *Yajña-cakra* :

अग्नी प्रास्तादृतिः सम्यगादित्यमुपनिष्ठने ।

आदित्याज्जापते वृष्टिः वृष्टेरन्नं तनः प्रजाः ॥

Cf. *Gītā* III.10-16, especially 14.

अप्राङ्मुवन्ति भूतानि पर्जन्यादन्नसंभवः ।
यज्ञाङ्मुवति पर्जन्यः यज्ञः कर्मसमुद्भवः ॥

(d) Manu II.88,89,125 on *indriya-nigraha* and its lack :

इन्द्रियाणां विचरतां विषयेष्वपहारिषु ।
संयमे यत्नमातिप्येत् विद्वान् यन्तेषु याजिनाम् ।
इन्द्रियाणां तु सर्वेषां यथेकं शरतीन्द्रियम् ।
तेनास्य शरति प्रज्ञा दृतेः पादादिवोदकम् ॥
* * *

बलवानिन्द्रियप्राप्तो विद्वांसमपि कपेति ।

Cf. *Gītā* II. 60ff, 67.

यततो ह्यपि कौन्तेय पुरुषस्य विपश्चिनः ।
इन्द्रियाणि प्रमाथीनि हरन्ति प्रसभं मनः ॥
* * *

इन्द्रियाणां हि चरतां यन्मनोजृम्बिधीयते ।
तदस्य हरति प्रज्ञां वायुर्नावमिवाम्भसि ॥

(e) Manu II.57,100 on moderation in indulgence or restraint, and on the golden mean :

- (i) अनारोग्यभनायुष्यमस्वर्ग्यं चातिभोजनम् ।
(ii) अक्षिष्वन्योगतस्तनुम् ।

Cf. *Gītā* VI.16,17.

- (i) नात्यलतस्तु योगोऽस्ति ।
(ii) युक्ताहारविहारस्य ।

etc.

and XVII.6 on *Āsuri Tapas* :

etc. वर्जयन् शरीरत्वं

(f) Manu XI.246 on the supremacy of *jñāna* :

ययैषस्तेजसा वह्निः प्राप्तं निदहति क्षणात् ।
तथा ज्ञानाग्निना पापं सर्वं दहति वेदवित् ॥

Cf. Gītā IV.37 where the same simile is employed :

ययैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निः भस्मसात्कुस्त्येऽर्जुन ।
ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुस्त्ये तथा ॥

(g) Manu X.97, on the basic Svadharma-doctrine of the *Gītā*, in almost identical words :

वरं स्वधर्मो विगुणो न पारययः स्वनुष्ठितः ।
परधर्मेण जीवन् हि सद्यः पतति जातितः ॥

Gītā III.35, XVIII.47.

श्रेयान् स्वधर्मो विगुणः परधर्मात्स्वनुष्ठितात् ।
स्वधर्मे निधनं श्रेयः परधर्मो भयावहः ।
स्वभावनिमित्तं कर्म कुर्वन् नाप्नोति किल्बिषम् ॥

(h) Manu II.98, VI.44-57.66; XII.91.125, on the equally basic idea of equanimity and *saṁatva* of the *Gītā*, in almost the same words.

- (i) न हृष्यति ग्लायति वा ।
- (ii) समता चैव सर्वस्मिन् ।
- (iii) अलाभे न विषादी स्यात्लाभे चैव न हर्षयेत् ।
प्राणयात्रिकमात्रः स्यान्मात्रासङ्गाद्विनिर्गतः ॥
- (iv) समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु ।
- (v) समं पश्यन् ।
- (vi) स सर्वसमतामेत्य ।

Cf. the expression mātṛā-saṅga in Manu and mātṛā-sparśa in Gītā.

(i) Manu XII.24-51 on the three *Guṇas*, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* and the classification of things and persons on their basis corresponds to *Gītā* XVII.

IV

The extension of the above mentioned *Rājavidyā* of *Karma-Yoga* to all those in activity was referred to earlier. In Manu too we find its application to the *grhastha*, chiefly the *Brāhman*. After describing the *vānaprastha* and the *sannyāsin*, Manu describes at the end of Ch. VI (86-96) the *grhastha* who could remain in his house and get released by cultivating the requisite virtues and by gradually renouncing desire after desire, including the rites ordained for the householder by the Vedā. Manu praises the *grhasthāśrama* here and shows how a *grhastha* could become a *Veda-sannyāsika* and practise *Karma-yoga* (86-90). Earlier too, when setting forth the *dharma*s of the householder, (IV.24), Manu speaks of these *grhasthas* who observe the *jñāna-yajña*, which the commentators have explained as referring to the *grhastha* who is a *Veda-sannyāsika*. Cultivating the ten *dharma*s (the *ātma-guṇas* as they are also referred to) common to all the four stages of life, and along with them the knowledge taught in the Vedānta, the *grhastha* should renounce all acts and live in retirement in the support of his son. Thus by ridding himself of all desire (*asprhā*), and intent solely on the seeking of the Self, he attains the supreme state (93-96).

NOTES

¹ Manu I. 5, 21,—Br. Sū. bhā. I.3.28.

I.27 — Br. Sū. bhā. IV.2.6.

II. 87—Br. Sū. bhā. III.4.38.

X.4, 126—Br. Sū. bhā. I.3.36.

XII.91, 105-6—Br. Sū. bhā. II.1.11.

² The penultimate line in *Gītā* IX.2. I had drawn attention to the above-quoted passage and the *Gītā*-parallel in my paper on "The *Yoga-vāñijña* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*", JOR. Madras, XIII. 74-75.

³ *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 445.

PATTERNS AND THEORIES OF CAUSALITY

R. V. DE SMET

METAPHYSICS has long ago been defined as the purely rational science of being as being, i.e., of whatever exists considered precisely as existent. In its process, Metaphysics attempts to answer three different questions regarding its object : Does it exist ? What is it ? And why does it exist and be what it is ? It cannot therefore be satisfied with the discovery of those proximate causes that can explain the various modes of existence, but must push forth until it reaches the ultimate cause of the very existence of this universe, i.e., the supreme Cause of all effects and of all other causes. It is thus by the gateway of causality that the metaphysician accedes rationally to the One God Who is also the aim of the mystic and of the testimonial theologian.

This is the common position of the ancient philosophers, Greek or Indian, as well as of the orthodox Christian and Muslim philosophers. At the very outset of the *Vedānta-sūtra* Brahman is defined as the total Cause of the universe in its three moments : beginning, duration and accomplishment; and Sankara explains how this relational definition ushers in Brahman's more direct definition as Omniscient and Omnipotent and, finally, His absolute characterisation as Pure Being and Subsistent Knowledge. Similarly, in his *Letter to the Romans*, 1.20, Saint Paul writes : "Ever since the creation of the world, the invisible nature of God, His eternal Power and Divinity, have been plainly discernible as known through His effects."

If causality were but of one kind there would be little difficulty in understanding the nature of the Cause upon which

we ourselves and the world are constantly depending. But it is far from easy to recognize the diverse kinds of causes and even more difficult to derive from them that notion of cause which is applicable to God. The field of history is strewn with awesome corpses of inadequate theories, seemingly alive but only masquerading as adequate explanations of the enigma of our existence.

Theories of causality are obviously born from experience. But experience presents us with various patterns or types of causality and all of them are of this world : finite, partial, complementary and never exhaustive, for we do not normally experience divine, universal causality; we can only infer it.

Even before we succeed in making that inference, we can understand that it will be different from ordinary inference. Indeed, to generalize from a few sample cases to the totality of all the cases of the same class does not take us beyond the univocality which characterizes classes, but to rise from typical cases of empirical causality to the unique divine causality implies a process of purification and elevation in the course of which univocality breaks down, and we may well ask whether purification is not to be so thorough that it will leave nothing to elevate to supreme transcendency. In other words, one may doubt whether any type of empirical causality can help us to obtain a meaningful idea of divine causality.

There are two ways of dealing with this difficulty : one may, first, ignore the need for purification of our finite concepts of causality or pursue this "*neti-neti*" process only half-heartedly in such a way as to obtain a mere pantheistic or otherwise anthropomorphic concept of the universal Cause; one may also recognize the incorrectness of all such attempts and search for types of empirical causality which lend themselves to complete purification without losing their positive content and thus permit transcendentalization and no longer mere universalization. Let us, then, review the various patterns of causality which philosophical reflection has concentrated upon at various moments of its history and evaluate their fitness in respect to our own purpose.

1. *Patterns of Causality*

In order to simplify this enquiry we may at once proceed according to a basic classification : patterns of causality can be arranged into two groups, the group of those causes which are simply immanent to their effects, and the group of those causes which, in spite of some immanence, are simply transcendent to their effects. Material causes, for instance, are simply immanent to their effects and are distinct from them only inadequately; this means that they cannot really be added to them since they are a constitutive part of those effects together with the other constitutive part which is called form. Formal and material causes are adequately distinct and their addition or synthesis makes up the effect, but this effect being a whole cannot be adequately distinguished from any of the parts of which it is made.

Transcendent causes, on the contrary, are adequately distinct from their effects. They exist in their own right and not as integral parts of a whole which would be their effect. This independence constitutes their transcendence. In so far as they are actually causing their effect they are also immanent to it, but it is not a general rule that all of them should be immanently causing their effect during the whole duration of its existence; some, indeed, are only required for its production and can exist separately afterwards or even perish totally; others, however, produce effects which cannot endure apart from their causing influence, and they are therefore both transcendent and immanent to their effects.

A, *Patterns of Mere Immanent Causality*

Inadequate distinction between cause and effect. (<i>Pariṇāma</i>)							
Clay Jar (1)	Marble Statue	Atoms Wholes	Milk Curds	Food Blood (2)	Seed Tree	Child Man	Premises Conclusion
ARTIFICIAL			CHEMICAL		BIOLOGICAL		LOGICAL
Upanishads Pre-Socratics Democritus Epicurus Vaiseshika (Aristotle) Bacon			Samkhya Materialists (Spinoza) Meyerson		Stoics (S. Augustine) Evolutionists Karmavadins (Cf. also myths of Cosmic Egg, Hiranyagarbha, etc.)		Plato Plotinus (Descartes) Spinoza (Leibniz) Hegel
(1) Cf. also: iron-scissors, etc.; <i>ākāśa</i> -limited space in jar; etc.							
(2) Cf. also the natural-mechanical pattern of: water-wave; water-foam.							

a) The pattern of *artificial* causality refers to all those cases in which raw materials are given a new shape or structure in view of some practical or aesthetical purpose. This pattern is so familiar to man that the first philosophers naturally focussed their attention upon it when they tried to conceive cosmic causality. Hence, cosmic materials such as the 4 (or 5) elements loom large in the cosmogony of ancient Greece as well as of Upanishadic India. But it was soon found that elements might also be compounds and both Democritus and Kanada conceived them as made up of ultimate but determinate particles which they called atoms or *anu*. Aristotle, on the other hand, abandoned this kind of physical analysis for the more radical metaphysical analysis and found the basic *inner cause of materiality* to be the contrary of all formal principles, namely, a completely formless principle of indetermination which he rightly called bare or

prime matter (*prôtê hylê*). The synthesis of this (obviously unique) principle of indetermination with any of the many possible principles of essential determination (substantial forms) gives rise to material individuals characterized by imperfect determination. Material individuals are what they are on account of their substantial form but mutability pervades them most intimately because prime matter is the other co-constituent of their essence. Hence, they are subject to all kinds of alteration, negative as well as positive, and even to substantial transformation into other material individuals as changeable as themselves. Consequently the material universe which they constitute is also in a continuous process of change and has a "history". Neither prime matter nor the forms are "things" properly speaking, but contrary and complementary co-principles constitutive of all material things.

The above mentioned philosophers were, of course, aware that their material causes could not alone explain our differentiated world. The need was felt for some organizing cause. Vedic *Rta* and Homeric *Anagkê* (Necessity) played that part for some time. Upanishadic philosophers brought in other universal causes such as Brahman, Karman, Time, etc. Similarly, Heraclitus conceived of a universal Logos, and Anaxagoras of a universal *Nous* or Intellect. Empedocles endowed his four elements with Love and Hatred whereas Democritus endowed his atoms with gravitational weight, (supplemented with oblique inclination by Epicurus). Kanada enriched his world of atoms with 4 other substances: time, space, *âtman* and *manas*. Finally, Aristotle himself made it clear that besides prime matter and the forms there were also finite, efficient and final causes and he subordinated them all to a supreme Prime Mover. All this goes to show the inner insufficiency of the material cause and the impossibility of simply raising it to the status of Absolute Cause.

b) However, following the *chemical* pattern of internal transformation, some philosophers thought that it might be possible to conceive the causal matter as infused with active powers or energies and thus possessing a more extensive autonomous scope. Accordingly, the Sankhyas postulated the exis-

tence of Unmanifest *Prakṛti* to which they could reduce all the objective manifestations of reality; provided this *Prakṛti* was conceived as pervaded by the three energetic *guṇas*, all forms of causation could be reduced to one complex self-modification or *pariṇāma*. Yet, the presence of subjective awareness at the very heart of experience was an irreducible datum and they had to couple their *Prakṛti* with a plurality of *Puruṣas* to whom they attributed the function of final cause. Dialectical Materialists dogmatically ignore the originality of intellectual awareness and uphold a sort of monism of dynamic matter, which swallows it up as a mere epiphenomenon. A similar fallacy renders unacceptable the monism of Spinoza since the unique substance, which he calls God, is formally, (and not simply eminently,) endowed with the attribute of extension as well as with the attribute of thought; but his way of conceiving divine causality rather conforms with the fourth pattern in the above diagram.

c) The *biological* pattern points to an even more interiorized conception of causality. Stoics generalized it in their theory of the *logoi spermatikoi* or seminal 'reasons': these are rational inasmuch as they are inner laws necessitating all the particular developments or destinies, but they are concrete 'seeds' for they are energetic. Perhaps, the concept of *svabhāva* or even *niyati*, mentioned at the opening of the *Svetāśvatara upaniṣad*, expresses a similar view. It is also at work in the reflections of Modern Evolutionists but finds there several interpretations, Lamarckian, Mendelian or Neo-Darwinian. Stoics understood the need of reducing the plurality of their seminal reasons to the unity of an omniscient Being, which they called Zeus or God. This theism allowed St. Augustine to assimilate to some extent their "seminal" theory after correcting its absolute predestinationism through the same trend of thought by which he had also integrated the Platonic "ideas" to the simplicity of the one Creator of all.

d) The *logical* pattern of causality fascinated Plato and the Platonists and again Descartes and many of the Post-Cartesians. It inspired their theory of logical-real participation which is perhaps best expressed by Plotinus when he takes up

the analogy of science in order to explain somehow the causal presence of the One in the universe of beings. To the objection that in science a part is not the whole, he replies :

"Undoubtedly the man of science considers actually only that part of science which he is in need of; this part stands on the foreground; but all other parts follow after it and inhere in it virtually in a latent manner; thus the whole of science is in that part. It is undoubtedly in this way that in science one speaks of 'whole' and 'part.' In the intelligible science, everything is simultaneously in act; and this is why intelligible science contains all ready everyone of those parts about which you wish to deal at this or that moment; the whole is ready in each part; and each part draws its own validity and power from its connexion with the whole. You must not believe that one theorem of a science is isolated from the others; otherwise it would neither be scientific nor of practical value and would have no greater worth than the babble of a babe. If it is scientific, this theorem contains all the others. That man of science who knows introduces in that theorem all the others by way of consequence; thus in (geometrical) analysis he demonstrates that one particular theorem contains all those theorems which are anterior to itself and by means of which the analysis is performed and all those which are posterior to, and born from, itself" (*Enneades*, IV,9).

We are here already far from the mere immanence of the material causes for this kind of causal presence of the Whole, though total in each 'part,' yet is exhausted by no one of them, and it allows of a certain transcendence or separatedness, however not absolute, of the causal Whole :

"It is not right to say that the universal One is not present totally, even though it confers on a thing one only of its own powers. There is no cut between itself

and its power and the thing which has received that power only because the One was present to that thing in its own entirety : for it is obviously present wherever each one of its powers is.

"Yet, it is separated. For if it were to become the form of a particular thing, it would cease to be the Universal and to be everywhere in itself; it would be in the manner of an accident the being of another thing.

"Since it belongs to none of those other things, whereas they aspire to belong to it, it comes as close as possible to them, according to its own wish; but it does not become the property of that or any other thing but remains the object of their desire. There is nothing surprising in it thus being present in all things, because it is in none of them in such a way as to belong to them" (*Enneades*, VI,4,3).

What prevents me from saying that the transcendence here emphasized by Plotinus is perfect is the rational necessity which binds, it seems, the plurality of beings to the One, just as it binds the plurality of theorems to the intelligible science, and the fact that this necessity is reciprocal.

Aware of this danger presented by the notion of logical necessity, Descartes tried to exorcise it by exalting the absolute freedom of God in regard to creation but, notwithstanding this he fell again under its spell when he conceived God as "cause of itself" and His essence as the "quasi efficient cause" of His existence, thus giving up His absolute simplicity. Leibniz imitated him in this and, besides, he admitted a moral necessity limiting God's creative power. Spinoza simply turned back to the concept of self-explication and stated that the one Substance is the causal reason of all its attributes and modes in the same way as the definition of a triangle is the causal reason of its necessary properties. Hegel adds nothing to this conception except the "dialectical" mode of the necessary self-explication of God into the universe of nature and history.

B. *Patterns of Transcendent and Temporarily Immanent Causality*

Adequate distinction between cause and effect							
Mere Antecedent Consequent	Invariable Antecedent Consequent	Potter Jar	Potter's Wheel Jar	Teacher Pupil's Science	Effort Result	Command Obeyed Command	Intellect Writing
SEQUENTIAL-	"LEGAL"	TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY		SPIRITUAL EFFICIENCY			
Yadricch- āvadins Cārvākas Greek Sceptics Media- eval Sceptics (Male- branche) Nietz- sche Philos. Analysts	Buddhists Ockam Newton Hume Hobbes Kant Comte J.S.Mill Bain Mach Pearson Russell Bruns- chvicg	Primitives 'mana', magic spells, mantras, etc. Vedas (gods) RV, X. 129 : "Tad Ekam" Aristotle Naiyāyikas Hamelin Alexander		Socrates, etc. St. Thomas Aquinas, etc. Duns Scotus, etc. Descartes (Berkeley) Maine de Biran Bergson Whitehead (Existentialists)			

a) The first pattern in this series can be called "*merely sequential*," since it eliminates causality proper and reduces it to a relation of mere sequence. Such a relation is observed between mere accompaniments of the cause, such as conditions, occasions, or mere circumstances, and the arising effect, although they have no direct positive influence upon its arising. It is tempting, therefore, to try to make the economy of the mere complex notion of cause and to reduce all that precedes the 'effect' to the category of "mere antecedent" and what is usually called 'effect' to the category of "mere consequent." Such a reduction characterizes the scepticism of Yadricchavadins and Carvakas regarding real causality.

A more radical form of scepticism is that proposed in the second century A.D. by Sextus Empiricus: We cannot, he says, know of anything that it is a cause; indeed, nothing that precedes an effect is yet as such causing it, hence, to be a cause it should be co-existent with the effect; now, co-existents are presented together in their mutual relationship, and who, then, can decide which one of them is cause and which one is effect? The notion of cause, therefore, is devoid of all possible applicability. This *reductio ad absurdum* was later revived by some Arabian philosophers and by late Mediaeval schoolmen, such as Nicolas d'Autrecourt. It is easy to see that it takes up causation as a mere external phenomenon completely foreign to the observer himself; it thus fails to notice the fact of internal causation, of which, for instance, the very act of observing is an actual case in which the observer stands in his own eyes as the cause of his observation, so that he can decide which is cause and which is effect. The same reproach bears upon Malebranche's occasionalism. Malebranche is not a complete sceptic in this matter for he emphatically teaches the reality of the one universal causality of God, but he denies that any of His creatures is a real cause; they are but passive channels of divine causality. Had he studied causality less *a priori* and more in the direct experience of his own activity, he might have avoided that exaggeration. On account of his partial scepticism I have ranged him with the Sceptics, but he is not a "mere sequentialist" for he admits that the various states of the world succeed one another according to some general laws.

The most recent form of scepticism, that inspired by Neo-Positivism, criticizes all "legal" views of causality (cf. next pattern), especially the Rationalistic view which reduces causality to the notion of necessary, and not only constant connection. Such a necessary connection, they show, is not required by the facts of experience and, moreover, is empirically meaningless (cf. for instance, J. Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*, pp. 221-275). Insofar as this is exclusively a refutation of Rationalism, which is itself an exaggerated view, we may accept the validity of the Neo-Positivists' criticism but also

regret their failure to provide us with a positive and correct theory of causality.

b) The "legal" pattern of causality has given rise to theories similar to the previous ones inasmuch as they also refuse to admit an ontological influence of the cause upon the effect and reduce causality to a relation of sequence, but different from them inasmuch as this sequence is said to be invariable and deterministic in character. They therefore ignore the fact of free causation though it is vouched for by genuine reflection upon our own human activity as properly human. This is not to say that they did not try to explain it, but what they did in fact was to explain it away through associationist theories based upon their postulate of universal determinism. This postulate was suggested to them by the regularity which obtains in the non-human world of material objects and permits the successful elaboration of positive sciences confirmed by their applicability.

Such a postulate and the theories which it inspires may be excellent within their legitimate scope which is that of sense-observation, but to extend them to the inner world of the human subject is to objectify the latter and lose sight of man's subjectivity. Further to reduce continuous series of facts to legal schemes, whether psychological, as did Buddhists and early Associationists, or mathematical, as do modern scientists and psychologists, is to give a useful translation of the phenomenon of objective experience but not to explain its real content philosophically. Unfortunately the prestige of science became so overwhelming, especially since the time of Hume, that he himself and many after him forgot the specific outlook and means of philosophy as metaphysics and proposed "philosophical" theories which were but an universalisation of what had been found valid within the particular competence of science. These theories are still so much in vogue that they prevent many a contemporary philosopher from realizing that there exists a genuine problem as to the ontological nature of causality.

c) Going back to the past we turn now to one of the most obvious patterns, that of *technical efficiency*. By working with his hands at the production of artificial objects, such as jars,

tools, weapons, statues, etc., man could not fail to reflect that these artifacts depended for their existence, not only upon their material cause, but upon himself as their agent cause. Agent causes are generally intelligent or at least sentient, and this characteristic has inclined philosophers, such as the Vedic sages and the Naiyayikas, to give them prominence over all other kinds of causes and to conceive the makers or Maker of the world as essentially of this kind. There is here a danger of anthropomorphism unless the theory is completed by the inclusion of other forms of causality. Aristotle, who paid much attention to agency and defined it carefully, did also provide correct definitions of the other kinds of causes : material, formal and final, and this is why his theory could be integrated by Aquinas into a satisfactory doctrine of creative causality.

d) The technical agent may seem to give little of his own in the product and simply to draw out of the raw material some form latent in it and according to which he re-arranges it. Such a view could give rise to the Naiyayika idea that effects do in no way pre-exist in their cause, namely in their agent or *nimitta kāraṇa*. This, however, appears no longer probable when we pass to the other type of agency, that of *spiritual efficiency*. In such cases it is much clearer that an agent is not a mere extrinsic factor conditioning the re-arrangement of a raw material, but a real cause which communicates something of its own that is intrinsically constitutive of the effect. And it is further remarkable that causal communication through spiritual agents implies in them no loss of what they yet really give. The teacher does not lose the science he teaches nor the poet the emotion he communicates; nobody loses information by sharing it among others. Yet, the pupil's science, the written poem, the information in the listener's mind, are really given away : though the causal presence of their efficient cause was necessary at the time of their actual origination, they stand now enduring though he may perish. Their distinction from him is adequate however necessary was his momentary immanence to them in their originating phase. They pre-existed in him, yet they stand now in a being of their own that is no longer dependent on him.

Often enough agency, even spiritual agency, presupposes something outside itself, either some kind of stuff or material cause, or some active power, such as senses, appetites, intellect, will, which it informs through some perfection derived directly from the agent himself. This fact led even such remarkable metaphysicians as Aristotle and his Arabian follower Ibn Sina to postulate the eternal existence of pre-cosmic matter as the material required for the world-making action of their Prime Mover. To escape the radical dualism that ensues from such a conception, others have not hesitated to attribute to the one universal Cause both the malleability of matter and the independence of the spiritual agent. This is one way of understanding the statement that the supreme *nimitta kāraṇa* is also the cosmic *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛti*. But it is not the only way and there is no need of such desperate solutions as we can see if we reflect again on the pattern of spiritual efficiency. Indeed, the main characteristic of this pattern consists in this that the spiritual agent can communicate something of his own perfection without losing it or necessarily undergoing any change. It is but accidentally that a teacher of mathematics, for instance, is perfected in some regard through the process of teaching, but with regard to his knowledge of mathematics he neither loses any of it nor does he necessarily improve it by awakening a knowledge similar to his own in the mind of his pupils. This knowledge may rightly be said to have preexisted in him and to originate out of him without entailing any change in him. Without therefore being a material cause in any proper sense of the term, his own knowledge may yet be called the *pradhāna* "out of which" (*yataḥ*) his pupils' knowledge has obtained reality and separate existence. Other instances taken from the field of volition, of special interest to Duns Scotus, Descartes and Maine de Biran, could only confirm the above conclusion. The suggestion of this pattern is, therefore, that some kind of agents can be held to be *nimitta* and *pradhāna*, transcendent and yet immanent, without this entailing any contradiction in terms or unfathomable mystery. However, our conclusion is somehow limited by the fact that none of the cases examined in this section provide

examples of permanent immanency; hence, the necessity of examining a third series of patterns.

C. Patterns of Transcendent and Permanently Immanent Causality

Adequate distinction between cause and effect											
Juggler Dreamer (+ avidyā)		Idea or Atmi Reals	Ariha Sabda	Man Shadow	Sun Sun's Image	Type Copy	End Process	Soul or Body	Atman Vyakti	Act Reals	
Illu- sion	Dream										
VIVARTA		EXEMPLARY				FINAL	FORMAL	TADATMYA			
Buddhists (Bhar- trhari)		Plato (St. Augustine)				(Socrates) Aristotle	Socrates (Aristotle)	Upaniṣads Śāṅkara			
Gauḍapāda Śāṅkarites (St. Augus- tine)		Śabdādvaitins (Śāṅkara) Christian Schoolmen				Sāṃkhya (Śāṅkara) Aquinas Schoolmen	Ibn Roshd Siger (Male- branche)	Augustine Aquinas Schoolmen			

a) The *vivarta* pattern refers to the production of error, especially in the form of perceptive illusion, mirage, etc. It points to the fact that the positive ground of illusion, whether it be a rope mistaken for a snake, a desert steppe seen as a lake, or a magician's implements appearing through his art as what they are not, remains objectively unchanged and the error as such is merely subjective. The advantage of such a pattern results from its ability to suggest that in certain types of causality, the 'cause' may remain entirely unchanged; but it has the disadvantage that such a 'cause' is really a mere condition while the real cause of the produced error is an act of *avidyā* or hasty judgment prompted by fear or the play of sunlight or the magician's tricky activity. Yet it serves well the purpose of those who wish to inculcate that the taking of the world at its factual value apart from its existential dependence upon its universal Cause is the basic error to which we are all driven by our innate nescience and the imperfection of our instruments of knowledge. Hence,

it is not surprising if some "illusionistic" comparisons of St. Augustine echo exactly those of many Indian philosophers. Concerning a point of historical interest, it should be noted here that in Sankara's time the term '*vivartavāda*' still designated exclusively a Buddhist doctrine which he strongly opposed and he carefully avoided using '*vivarta*' as a technical term to express his own doctrine; it took more than a century before some Sankarites adopted it after explaining it in a way sufficiently suited to Sankarism.

b) The pattern of *exemplary causality* was first generalized by Plato. What struck him was the priority in time, in perfection, in independent existence, which the exemplar or type enjoys over all its copies. *The exemplar stands sovereign over its imitations, unaffected by them, neither increased nor decreased by their number, transcending them all through its unequalled originality; it is by essence what they are only through participation.* They exist as copies only through their dependence upon their model; and in those cases when this participation constitutes their very essence, they vanish as soon as it ceases to be active: the reflections of the sun or the moon become extinct when a cloud hides their source, all shadows merge when darkness has set. Both the transcendence and the immanence of the exemplary cause thus appear tangible in commonplace instances. It was therefore tempting to consider all concrete things as images of their ideas. All instances of a species would be explained by their varied participation in the rich fulness of their one species. Above our world of dependent and imperfect images, there was the realm of perfect and independent subsistent ideas, to be discovered by the piercing eye of reason moved by love. Such was the vision of Plato; such also that of Sphotavadins, though they did not intellectualize as such their subsistent types but conceived them as word-essences.

However, the explanatory power of the idea of participation through exemplarity had been but partially used in Platonism or Sphotavada. It was bound to appear that the plurality of ideas or sphotas was itself to be explained through their participation in a unique and exhaustive Exemplar which had to be the

Perfection of all perfections, subsistent Perfection itself. Hence, Sabdadvaitins conceived of a supreme Word or *Sabda*; more metaphysically, Sankara reduced all *ākṛtis* or *arthas* to the absolutely simple consciousness of the supreme *ātmā*; the Neoplatonists, Philo and Albinos reduced all ideas to the rich simplicity of the divine Intellect; Plotinus himself declared in *Enneades*, V.5.5 "that the pure intelligibles do not exist outside God." With S. Augustine this view definitely passed into Christian philosophy. He said that the supreme ideas, which are the exemplars of all the species of realities, are as eternal and unchanging as the Divine Essence, for they are identical with the subsistent Word and the Word is God. This Augustinian doctrine forms one of the main building blocks of St. Thomas Aquinas' teaching concerning the Creator as well as of that of his great colleagues and has become the common possession of all orthodox Christian teachers.

c) Just as the exemplar determines the essence of its copies, the *end* determines the whole process of causation through its intentional presence in the mind of the agent. And the intelligent Creator can endow with purposiveness the non-intelligent agents which He creates, just as an engineer can endow a mechanism with a specific purposiveness which it will follow blindly in all its operations. The end, whether it already exists or is to be effected, is always something to be attained. Hence, it is adequately distinct from the process and transcends it. Yet, it determines it all along and thus pervades it, though it is no part of it. Aristotle found in it the type of his prime movers which move, he tells us, "as the object of his desire moves a lover." He also used the same comparison with the magnet as, later on, Sankara, who, in his *bhāṣya* on *Vedāntasūtra*, II.2.2, explained that there is nothing surprising in the notion of 'unmoved mover' (*pratyrtirahito pravartakaḥ*), "since a magnet, for instance, though in itself devoid of motion, can nevertheless move iron." The Sankhyas, on the other hand, had found in the idea of purpose (*artha*) the only link through which they could somehow reduce their absolute *dvaita*. *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, 31 even called it simply '*hetuḥ*', the Cause. Though it is not usually

reckoned among the *kāraṇas* (factors), all Indian philosophers have meditated on its causal influence and rarely failed to indicate the "motive" of their enquiries. In the West, from Socrates till Descartes exclusively, it was deemed to be the first cause since the agent cannot determine his action apart from it. Descartes initiated the movement away from it because it could not lend itself to the mathematical calculus which he was ushering into the field of "natural philosophy." But even after him it was retained by the majority of Christian philosophers who maintained the legitimacy of a proper metaphysical method, different from the mathematical treatment of reality by the positive sciences.

d) *Formal causality*, at least as exemplified in the relation of the human soul to its body, obtained the preference of Ramanuja. Here also, the immanence as well as the transcendence of the cause are manifest, the more so since he conceived it in a manner which may be called Platonist or Cartesian, i.e., as a complete substance of which the body was a mere *prakāra* or accessory. Yet, the immanence of the *prakārin* to the body was not the mere *apṛthak-siddhi* which may be found, say, between a rock and its colour or form, but a most intimate implication. The Ramanujian soul abides in its body, acts upon it and guides it from inside; the body is entirely subject to the soul as its organic instrument which subserves all its purposes. Ramanuja transposed this pattern to the causal relationship of Brahman with all *jīvas* and *Prakṛti*. To say that Brahman is the soul of the world had many advantages but it failed to secure the total transcendence which the right conception of the universal Cause requires no less than innermost immanence. Among the Arabian philosophers, Ibn Roshd defended a similar panpsychism which he derived from his interpretation of Aristotle's ambiguous statements concerning the "agent" intellect. According to him, the one Creator of all was the complementary Agent Intellect of all finite intelligences which, by their own nature, were merely passive intellects. This doctrine misled some of the mediaeval schoolmen and Malebranche's occasionalism may be considered as its last avatar.

c) According to Thomistic Aristotelianism, the soul is a kind of substantial form, and forms, whether substantial or accidental, are only a kind of act. The term '*act*' denotes that by which a thing is perfect in any way whatsoever. Acts are either pure or mixed with their complementary opposite, the 'potency'. Pure acts are self-subsistent perfections; mixed acts are internal 'formal causes' which, through their synthesis with a corresponding receptor (the internal 'material cause' or potency), constitute a compound reality which is perfect in some way on account of them. To the perfections (either substantial or complementary) in the order of essence, there correspond internal acts in the order of essence, i.e., forms; thus a certain animal is man on account of its substantial form being a rational soul, and this man is a musician on account of a certain accidental form in him, namely, an acquired talent for music. But the perfection of perfections is to be, and its inner cause is act in the order of existence, namely the act of being (denoted in every judgment by the verb 'is'). Existential acts are not 'forms' but the other kind of inner acts. They are determined primarily by the substantial forms, which are their kin potencies, and secondarily by the accidental forms in so far as these actuate complementarily the substantial forms. Hence, for a living being to be is to live, and for an intelligent being to be is to be intelligent, not simply 'to be there.' God is pure existential act without any sort of potency and thus He is subsistently the Perfection of all perfections. Since, therefore, all possible perfections pre-exist in Him in the simplicity of His essence, He can create freely and without any dependence on any matter or instrument a world of finite beings which will depend on Him not only for their essence but even for their existence, i.e., as beings. This is expressed negatively by the phrase '*creatio ex nihilo sui et subiecti*' (creation out of nothing whether of the effect or of any substratum), and positively through such expressions as 'total emanation from God' or 'total origination and preservation and fulfilment in absolute dependence upon God.' All Catholics hold this doctrine which can be considered as a form of *advaita* or non-dualism, since it maintains that there is but one Absolute

Reality, God, and all other reals can neither be nor be truly understood apart from Him. For, in the words of St. Paul, "it is in Him alone that we all live, and move, and have our very being."

The Indian notion which most approximates the idea of 'Act' is that of '*ātman*'. Sankara tells us that, in its primary meaning, it designates all *inner conscious principles*. It then corresponds to that class of acts which comprises rational souls, pure finite spirits (angels), and God Himself as Creator. However, it is also used in a secondary sense to denote all other *inner principles*, such as *indriyas* and any kind of material *pradhāna*. Here, it overlaps the category of act for it would denote not only the accidental and the non-intelligent substantial forms, but also all raw materials and even the prime or bare matter of Aristotelianism, (of which, however, there is no notion in any Indian work).

Indeed, the common expression, '*mṛdātmaka ghaṭaḥ*' shows that clay is, at least in a secondary sense, the *ātmā* of jars. And Sankara discovers in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, 3, 10-11 a wholesale of *ātmās* from sense-objects, (which are the *ātmās* of the senses,) successively through *manas*, *buddhi*, *mahān* or *Hiraṇyagarbha*, *avyakta* or *prakṛti*, up to *puruṣa*, who is the supreme *ātmā*. Of each one in turn he tells us that it is "superior to, more subtle, greater, and more 'inner *ātmā*' than its antecedent" (*para sūkṣmatara mahattara pratyagātmabhūta*). We thus find here a theory of existential participation of subordinate acts in a supreme Act or *Paramātmā*. Elsewhere Sankara explains how this *Paramātmā*, who is identically *Parabrahmā* (the Greatest of all great things), is the total Cause producing the entire universe without any necessity nor instrument nor independent material and without any inner change nor self-benefit. It is in this way that He is the *pradhāna*, the *nimitta-kāraṇa* and the supreme *artha* of all worldly realities. Since these are nothing apart from Him, they are called '*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*' i.e., definable through neither of the terms 'being' and 'not-being', if these are taken in their most elevated and primary meaning (*paramārthataḥ*). The same idea is expressed less negatively by Aquinas and other

Christian philosophers when they tell us that worldly beings are but analogical beings or beings through participation in God.

This participation is a unique kind of relation which appears to have been correctly expressed by the term '*tādātmya*'. Though it may often be translated by 'identity', it means etymologically "the relation of having 'that' (*ta*) as one's own *ātmā*." This relation is not reciprocal, whereas absolute identity would be reciprocal. Sankara points to this important difference when he emphasizes that, whereas Brahman is the *ātmā* of the world, the world is not the *ātmā* of Brahman. Indian logicians also use *tādātmya* to designate the imperfect identity or identity through participation which connects subject and predicate in any judgment: Devadatta is man, but man is not simply Devadatta. Similarly any man is being, but being is not simply man. These are cases of logical participation in the idea signified by the predicate. They usefully serve us as pointers to the relation of ontological participation through which all worldly beings are beings through and in That Which IS Being Itself.

2. *Absolute Transcendence and Innermost Immanence*

The time has now come to gather together the results of our historical enquiry. The different patterns of causality appear to fall into two categories: some of them are mere pedagogical or, to use a Greek idiom, *anagogical* pointers, which can initiate our search but not guide it up to its desired end because their imperfection is such that they are bound to break down during the process of purification and elevation which that achievement requires; the others are directly helpful throughout because they can retain their *svārtha* or proper meaning even through that process.

The four patterns of series A, (namely, artificial, chemical, biological and logical), the first three patterns of series B, (namely, sequential, legal and technical), and the first and fourth of series C, (namely, *vivarta* and formal), constitute the first cate-

gory. They point either to the idea of immanent causality without sufficient transcendence (series A), or of transcendent causality without sufficient immanence (the 3rd of series B and the 4th of series C), or come short of the idea of ontological causality (the 1st and 2nd of series B and the 1st of series C).

There remain then the patterns of exemplary and final causality, spiritual efficiency and *tādātmya*, which constitute our second category. The explanations given of them above may suffice to assure us that the '*neti neti*' process can strip them of their experiential finiteness without impairing the integrity of their essential significations which may then be elevated to their highest possible degree and correctly characterize the causality of the World-Cause. At this degree, though they may still appear to be four, at least to what Aristotle called our owlish intellect, they really merge into the fulness and simplicity of divine causality. Divine causality implies indivisibly the absolute transcendence and innermost immanence which they correctly indicate but are powerless to express. *Tallakṣyate na tīlcyate* : the Father of the universe is sufficiently indicated by them, but neither they nor any finite notion can fully express the mystery of His causality.

No attempt has been made in this article to prove His existence but it is hoped that it may have helped the philosophically prepared minds of its readers to equip themselves for such a task or to confirm their inner conviction of His mysterious existence.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND VEDANTA

E. R. MAROZZI

THE three basic tenets of Vedanta being (1) that Reality of the Universe and man is a spiritual Reality which is One, Immutable, and Absolute : (2) that the soul of man is identical with this Reality and therefore is Divine; (3) that the world experienced by the senses is but an apparent world and has only relative reality—it is our intention here to discuss some of the ideas of psychoanalysis¹ in this light. There are those who try to think of psychoanalysis as a philosophy and try to make it solve problems of man's existence. Of late this has been the more the tendency and in this role there are some inadequacies as we shall see. In its role as a psychological system which attempts to explain the nature of the human mind and personality it fares better. But it is as a therapy applied to the abnormal mind that psychoanalysis has the most validity—and its conclusions here being based for the most part on observations made on the abnormal personality, are properly applicable to that field alone.

On considering principle number one of Vedanta—that of Reality—we find that psychoanalysts have much to say about the facing of reality and about the adjustment of the individual to reality, but there is nowhere a consideration of the nature of reality nor a discussion of what is meant by reality—whether it is material or mental or spiritual; whether it is one, dual, or many; what is its meaning to man. This is a fundamental *sine qua non* of any philosophical system and it determines the character of that system. Psychoanalysis seems to overlook the importance of this consideration even though it has as its goal the adjustment of the individual to reality. There are some assumptions

taken for granted on this point. In Freud's system the common-sense view of reality is assumed—that is, reality is what the physical senses perceive and the way in which they perceive it, external to the *mind and material in nature*. In C.G. Jung's system there is the implication that reality is entirely *psychic*. Erich Fromm thinks of reality as *spiritual*—seeing that he accepts the ideas of Zen and the state of enlightenment as a desirable objective to be attained.

The second tenet of Vedanta concerning the real nature of man leads us to discuss here the nature of consciousness and the goal of the human personality according to psychoanalysis. The mind is said to consist of conscious and unconscious aspects (meaning awareness and unawareness of reality respectively) which have come into being as the result of heredity and environment—at least these have been their conditionings. The role of the unconscious mind on human behaviour is thought to be of paramount importance. There is not agreement among the psychoanalysts as to what are the contents of the unconscious. For Freud the unconscious consists of repressed material—conditioned for the most part by childhood experiences relating to significant persons such as father and mother—which has not been allowed proper expression in the outer world. Jung finds this view incomplete and adds to it the idea of the collective unconscious. While Freud's unconscious (which Jung refers to as personal unconscious to distinguish it from the collective unconscious) contains impressions and elements from the personal experience of the individual alone, the collective unconscious contains the precipitate of the experiences of all mankind. Here primordial images as patterns of behaviour (called archetypes)—“self-portraits of the instincts”—exist and are to be found in symbolic form in all religions, esoteric doctrines, mythologies, legends, fables, and sagas. Jung concludes that the collective unconscious and the archetypes cannot be logically understood. For Erich Fromm the conscious mind represents the social man with the accidental limitations of the historical set-up in which he finds himself—that is, man as conditioned by society, language, and tradition. The unconscious

mind is the universal man—the whole man rooted in the Cosmos—the sum total of his evolution in plant, animal, and spiritual existences—including his past and his future.

In commenting upon these concepts of the nature of consciousness we may say that in Freud's case it is a partial and fragmentary analysis which is probably applicable only to certain kinds of abnormal behaviour. Jung's idea of the collective unconscious is very inclusive but we see in it a violation of the universal law of nature of cause and effect. It seems that images, symbols, impulses, impressions, etc., with their power to influence behaviour, crop up from the unconscious mind by chance—which means that the effect occurs without a cause. This view cannot satisfactorily account for the differences, inequalities, and anomalies in human beings—the genius, the idiot, the cripple, the whole, the criminal, the saint. Chance does not explain it and therefore cannot rationally be accepted. Further, according to the idea of the collective unconscious the individual is open to experiencing any or all of the past *karma* of all mankind. Which means that the consequences of an act done by a particular individual or group sometime in the indefinite past must be borne (or the responsibility fall upon) an innocent or undeserving individual who had no relation to, and nothing to say about the original event.

Vedanta, instead, states that the human mind is the product of varied experiences of many lives which are related to one another by the law of cause and effect. As one sows so one reaps—thus is explained rationally all the inequalities and differences in development among men. The genius 'has acquired his special ability by much effort over an indefinitely long period of time; the idiot and cripple are suffering the results of transgression of moral and spiritual laws committed in the past; and so it is with all the conditions of life. Vedanta asserts that the truth of the human personality is its essential divinity and that the goal of man is to realize that truth through its many experiences. The body and mind are considered as instruments through which the soul functions and are but part of its environment. Fromm's conception of the nature of con-

consciousness, is thus more acceptable to the Vedantin and accords better with the divine nature of the human personality—especially when he calls the unconscious Cosmic Consciousness and the goal that of purification of mind, and of enlightenment.

Regarding the ultimate goal of the human personality which a philosophy is expected to state in a clearly defined way, psychoanalysts tell us about the "normal" or the "adult" as a goal of their principles but they do not tell us with clarity what kind of a person would be the result of their teachings, having a fully developed "normal" mind or "adult" personality. Still, even if such a person could be defined, it would more properly be classed not as a goal of life but as a preparatory condition which is itself a means to attaining an ultimate end. In philosophy an ultimate goal is identified by the fact that once having attained it nothing more remains to be attained, all problems are solved, all desires are fulfilled, and all goals consummated. This is not seen to be so with the goal of normality. Neither will the fulfillment of the psychoanalytic master-urges—that of survival, the will to power (*ego*), and procreation—lead to any kind of ultimate goal. Vedanta states that the goal of man is the realization of his divine nature—the spiritual Self within; therefore the master-urge (into which all other urges are resolved) is the urge to attain this state of realization. "The knower of Truth, being centered in the Self, realizes the joy that is in the Self. With the mind devoted to the meditation of *Brahman*, he attains undying happiness. Whose happiness is within, whose peace is within, whose light is within, that *Yogi* alone, becoming *Brahman* gains absolute freedom."² "Having realized that Self which is eternal, without, beginning or end, immutable—one is released from the jaws of death."³ Thus Vedanta speaks about the ultimate goal. In Erich Fromm's psychoanalysis we find that the goal is stated as a condition of "well-being" and making the unconscious conscious (which is a purification of the mind). Well-being means a state wherein the ego is gone and there is freedom from greed and self-aggrandizement and one experiences one's self in the act of being and not in having, coveting, or preserving. Making the unconscious conscious means to trans-

form the mere idea of the universal nature of man into a living experience—it means “to be open, responding, to *have* nothing and to *be*.”⁴ As stated above, Dr. Fromm prefers to use the term “cosmic consciousness” for the unconscious and states that in his opinion it is precisely the experience which is called enlightenment. Dr. Jung calls the goal of psychoanalysis “individuation”—by which he means the integration of personality which is to be achieved by extending the personality beyond the ego. As the conscious ego cannot come into harmony with the unconscious which is opposed to it, a new center of personality is developed which assimilates (or sublimates) the unconscious contents. This new center Jung calls the “self” (perhaps roughly like the idea of *Ātman* in *Vedānta*). To accomplish this transference of the ego center the use of symbols with a spiritual meaning is recommended.

About the third basic principle of Vedānta—that the world as experienced by the senses and mind is not absolutely real but has only relative status—psychoanalysis has little to say. In Freud's system there is an implied denial of this since he assumed that the outer material world is the only reality. For Jung the world experienced by the individual is a psychic one, so he accepts the relative status of the outer world and also admits that the reality behind psychic facts might be something absolute. On this point Erich Fromm states that what man experiences in normal consciousness is fictitious and unreal, “that the content of consciousness is mostly fictional and delusional and precisely does not represent reality, that most of what is in our consciousness is false consciousness and that it is essentially society that fills us with these fictitious and unreal notions.”⁵ To become conscious of what is unconscious means to get in touch with reality and with truth—to enlarge consciousness, to wake up, to bring light into darkness—and is the same experience which is called enlightenment.

Psychoanalysis in its earlier stages of development was primarily concerned with the therapy of the abnormal mind and was interested in removing symptoms and illnesses. The data gained from this field did not always give it insight into

the normal mind and, again, gave it little or no understanding of the enlightened or supernormal mind. To the early psychoanalysts the latter was a non-existent category and was treated by them as being abnormal. Saints and sages throughout history, as well as the *avatāras*, Buddha, Krishna, Christ, etc., were explained in this way. But factual material belonging to normal or subnormal minds such as that the primary motivations of man are the sex urge, the power urge, or destructive urge—is meaningless when applied to the supernormal mind. It may be, for example, that such a desire as to re-enter the mother's womb where all is comfort and there is freedom from strife and responsibility may be an unconscious urge which warps the behaviour of a neurotic mind; or that the contents of the unconscious may be symbolically interpreted in a primitive way relating to sex or survival. But these interpretations cannot be applied to the supernormal mind for there the same symbols would be seen in a spiritual light—the desire to return to the womb would be the desire to return to God, the Universal Mother, etc. Of course, Freud's view of religion as an illusion which man must be rid of is entirely negative. Having made the objective of the libido (life energy) the return to the womb and the cause of frustrations the prohibited incest-wish (for which art, science, culture, and religion are substitutes) his views are at opposite poles from those of the spiritual man. Looked at from the standpoint of the supernormal mind the physical father and mother—instead of being objectives for which God is a substitute—are in themselves substitutes, as it were, or symbols of God as Universal Father and Mother.

As we have already seen, Dr. Jung in his later developments and Dr. Fromm show a much better understanding of spiritual values than did Freud. Jung introduced re-education into his system, the main component of which is religious training. He said, "Among all my patients in the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty five—there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which living religions of every age have

given to their followers, and none of them has really been healed who did not regain this religious outlook". We have already discussed above the idea of individuation and its correspondence with spiritual ideas. Jung uses Karl Barth's expression of "Absolutely Other" to explain the condition of individuation. That is, a transformation or regeneration occurs which is possible to attain by turning the mind within—then the libido introverts and brings about a renewal of life. The example of St. Paul is given for this kind of experience where he says, "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me : and the life which now I live in the flesh, I live by faith of the Son of God". Thus Jung, though he has made some erroneous statements such as that *samādhi* is like sleep, that enlightenment is a subjective experience, and that the practices of *Yoga* are not meant for the Western world—yet he is much more inclined toward spiritual evaluations than Freud. He (Jung) has adopted the word "self" in the sense of a goal to be attained and the term "*karma*-factor" as the element in the archetypes of the unconscious mind which accounts for contents which precede those of early infancy; he calls the way to the unconscious mind the "journey to the Mother". He finds that out of the collective unconscious sometimes there come predictions, warnings, and data of an intuitional nature relating to future events.

Dr. Fromm finds a striking affinity between psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism (which is basically the path of *Jñāna Yoga* of Vedanta practised in a different way). In expressing this affinity he quotes Dr. D. T. Suzuki on the aim of Zen, "Zen in its essence is the art of seeing into the nature of one's being, and it points the way from bondage to freedom. We can say that Zen liberates all the energies properly and naturally stored in each of us, which are in ordinary circumstances cramped and distorted so that they find no adequate channel for activity.... What I mean by freedom is giving free play to all the creative and benevolent impulses lying in our hearts. Generally, we are blind to this fact, that we are in possession of all the necessary faculties that will make us happy and loving...." Commenting on this Dr. Fromm states, "This description of Zen's aim could

be applied without change as a description of what psychoanalysis aspires to achieve."⁷

NOTES

¹ The term as used in this article relates to the systems of Freud and Jung (original founders) and Erich Fromm of modern times.

² *Bhagavad-Gītā*, V. 8, 21-24.

³ *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, III, 15.

⁴ *Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism* by Erich Fromm, pp. 107, 136.

⁵ *Ibid.* Pp. 98, 109.

⁶ *Zen Buddhism* by D.T. Suzuki, p. 3.

⁷ *Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism* by Erich Fromm, p. 122.

PRAPATTI-MARGA

. R. RAMANUJACHARI

ACCORDING to the Ramanuja school of Vedanta, *bhakti* and *prapatti* are the two ways to the supreme goal of life (*mokṣa*). The former is the same as *dhyāna* or *upāsana* taught in the Upanishads. About thirty-two *vidyās* or forms of *upāsana*, such as *dahara-vidyā*, *sad-vidyā*, *bhūmā-vidyā*, *antarāditya-vidyā* and *śāṇḍilya-vidyā* are referred to in the Upanishads. *Bhakti* is at once knowledge and love; it is "intellectual love." *Bhakti-yoga* is continual, ever-growing meditation on the Lord and his inexhaustible perfections carried to the highest stage, when through divine grace, the aspirant gets a direct vision of the supreme. The popular mind may confuse *bhakti* with acts of devotion such as praising (*stuti*), singing the names of the Lord (*nāmaskṛti*), worship (*vandana*), making offering (*arcana*) and prostration (*praṇāma*); but they are not in themselves *bhakti-yoga*, though they may deepen and strengthen the devotion of the aspirant.

Bhakti is based on a clear understanding of the soul and its relation to God to be acquired from a reverential study of the holy scriptures from a competent preceptor. This presupposes that the hindrances to true knowledge have been removed and the necessary mental purification achieved through *karma-yoga*. *Karma-yoga* consists in the performance of the obligatory duties (the *nitya* and *naimittika karmas*) in a spirit of desirelessness for the fruits, the *kāmya karmas*, the duties pertaining to one's caste (*varṇa*) and stage in life (*āśrama*), besides some specific *karmas* such as *devācaraṇa*, *tapas*, *tīrtha*,

dāna and *yājña*. *Karma-yoga* is thus not a direct means to liberation, but a means to a means. It must not, however, be supposed that *karmā-yoga* is merely a preliminary discipline to be abandoned after the mind has been purified and the stage set for the growth of true knowledge; for that would amount to a violation of the divine injunctions. The aspirant continues to perform *karma-yoga* all the time, at first for mental purification, but later for strengthening *bhakti*. Thus the practical discipline for reaching *mokṣa* is knowledge which is of the nature of devotion. (*bhakti-rūpāpanna jñāna*), prepared for and reinforced by *karma*. This pathway to perfection, though blissful in itself and pursued with great zest by saints and sages of old, is difficult of achievement for ordinary people. Hence the need for another path, namely *prapatti*.

Prapatti is surrender to the supreme. It consists of three elements : *svārūpa samarpaṇa* (the surrender of oneself to God in the firm conviction that one truly belongs to the Lord), *bharasamarpaṇa* (the placing of the responsibility for one's spiritual attainment on the Lord), and *phalasamarpaṇa* (dedication of the fruits of spiritual endeavour to the Lord).

There is nothing that cannot be achieved through surrender. *Prapatti* may be adopted either as a preliminary to *bhakti* or as an independent means to *mokṣa*. When it is directed towards the successful completion of *bhakti*, it is a means to a means, and is called *aṅga-prapatti*; when it is intended as a direct and independent path to perfection it is termed *aṅgi-prapatti*. This path is open to those who feel that they do not possess either the knowledge (*jñāna*) or the competence (*śakti*) to undertake the arduous path of *bhakti*. It is also sought by those who may possess the necessary knowledge and capacity but whose longing for the beatific vision is so intense and urgent that they are unable to bear the delay involved in *bhakti* bearing fruit (*vilambāsaha*). Again, unlike *bhakti* which is open only to the three higher castes of the Hindu society, since they alone are entitled to study the Veda, *prapatti* is accessible to persons of all castes and to both sexes. The *Rahasya-traya-sāra* says :

“அத்தரணர்த்திய ரெல்லியில் நின்று அனைத்துலகும்
 நோத்தவரே முதலாக துடங்கியவன்வியராய்
 வத்தடையும் வகை வன்தகவேந்தி வருந்திய நம்
 அத்தமிலாதியை அன்பரறித்தறிவித்தவரே.”

It means :—The devotees of the Lord have themselves understood and have also made us understand that the eternal Lord who is the cause of all things and who is anxious to redeem us is so full of the might of mercy, that the whole world of beings from *Brahman* to the *Caṇḍāla* and especially those who feel most intensely the sufferings of *samsāra*, may, in their helplessness and without any other saviour or any other fruit, approach Him and seek refuge under Him.

It has five *aṅgas* : (i) the resolve to follow the will of the Lord (*ānukūlya saṁkalpa*) and (ii) to desist from what is distasteful to Him (*prātikūlya varjana*), (iii) supreme faith that the Lord will protect us, (iv) supplication to Him and to Him alone for protection and (v) the feeling of helplessness arising from not possessing (a) the knowledge (*ākīñcanya*) and (b) the capacity to adopt any other means of saving oneself (*ananya-gatitva*).

ānukūlyasya saṁkalpaḥ prātikūlya varjanam :
rakṣiṣyati viśvāsaḥ goptṛtva varaṇam tathā :
ātma nīkṣepa—kārpaṇye śaḍvidhā śaraṇāgatiḥ.

The mental attitude of the aspirant at the point of offering *prapatti* has been described by Vatsya Varadaguru with marvellous lucidity and brevity as follows : “By performing, from beginningless time, what is displeasing to Thee, I have been tossed about in *samsāra*; from this day onwards, I will perform what is pleasing to Thee; I will not participate in what will displease Thee; I have no means by which I could attain Thee; I have resolved to seek Thee as my only means (*upāya*); be Thou my refuge. From now onwards, neither in the removal of what is evil nor in the attainment of what is good have I any further responsibility (*bhara*)”.

The path is simple; it is performed but once (*sakṛdeva*) and not repeated. It is easy (*sukara*). All that is needed is an interest in the goal (*prāpti-ruci*) and genuine faith in the Lord (*prāpya-viśvāsa*). Any person, whatever his caste or sex or station in life, may follow it. Once it is entered upon, no other means is needed. It requires no auxiliaries; and it leads to the goal when wanted and could be followed to secure any object of desire. All this need not make one doubt its efficacy; for the Lord who responds to this small effort on our part is easy of access (*sulabha*) and dependable (*viśvasanīya*), is supremely compassionate (*paramakāruṇika*), independent (*svatantra*) and a source of perennial joy (*nitya bhoga*). The paramount Ruler of the universe who owes no allegiance to any being other than Himself is therefore free to redeem the sinner. To love such a being as a benefactor drives all dread away (*bhaya-nāśa*). If we put our unfailing trust, serene confidence in such a God there need be no fears about our destiny. There is no fear of our being rejected on the ground of our sinfulness. The author of the *Gītā* declares that he, who shrinks away from God thinking that He, by His infinite perfections, is inaccessible, is the worst of men (*navādhama*).

This path seems to make no great demands on man. It requires from us nothing hard, elaborate and difficult; but in a sense, it is really hard to undertake, because it calls for a thorough change of heart, remaking of our nature. Vedanta Desika says, it is like telling the tenant "If you find it difficult to bring me sesame seeds, at the least, get an equal quantity of oil." Once man understands that he is but a limb of God, the inseparable attribute of the Lord, that he exists for the sake of the Lord, that he stands in the relation of property to the owner, master to servant, he can have no difficulty in submitting his will to the will of God, or making himself a willing channel for the realisation of God's purposes.

Bhakti and *prapatti* are essentially forms of *jñāna* (knowledge). Thus Ramanuja's view conforms to the generally accepted formula that *mukti* results from *jñāna* (*jñānān-muktiḥ*). They are termed *sādhya* (what the aspirant has to perform),

while the Lord is called *siddhopāya* (what is already existent). The central principle of spiritual evolution is that the primary cause of *mokṣa* is the grace of the Lord who is self-dependent,

pradhāna hetuḥ svātantrya viśiṣṭa karuṇā vibhoḥ.

This is a message of hope because our salvation does not depend upon our puny efforts but upon the infinite resources of the Lord, whose love for man is stronger than man's interest in himself.

There has been much acrimonious controversy over the nature of *prapatti* and of its place in the scheme of *sādhana*s. It is sometimes said that *prapatti* is essentially a Pancaratra doctrine having little basis in the Upanishads, that Ramanuja makes only a passing reference to it in his *Srī Bhāṣya*, that it has been elaborated into an alternative practical discipline in the post-Ramanuja period and assimilated into the Vedānta system. This view is untenable; for *prapatti* figures in the Upanishads as *nyāsa* and *ātmayāga* even as *bhakti* appears therein as *dhyāna* and *upāsana*. There are explicit statements in the *Iśa*, the *Kaṭha*, the *Svetāśvatara* and other Upanishads referring to this path to perfection. It is well-known that the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*, which by common consent elaborate Vedāntic teachings in popular form, attach great importance to *prapatti*. The first of these is even treated by some as *saraṇāgati śāstra*. That the Pancaratra tradition is not at variance with the Vedic teaching has been the main thesis of Yamunacarya's *Āgamaprāmāṇya*. From the brief reference to *saraṇāgati* in the *Srī Bhāṣya* it might seem that it is considered an auxiliary to *bhakti*. Hence, to show that it is also an alternative route to *mokṣa*, Ramanuja gives a vivid account of *prapatti* in his *Saraṇāgati-gadya* based on his own personal experiences. Here is a confession of his faith, which Vedānta Desika elaborates. In his *Nikṣeparakṣā*, Vedānta Desika refutes the view that *prapatti* is only a preliminary to *bhakti*; and in his *Rahasya-traya-sāra* he gives a classic exposition of the nature of *prapatti*.

If the attempt to subsume *prapatti* under *bhakti* is untenable, it is equally unsatisfactory to enthrone *prapatti* and set *bhakti* at naught. Some thinkers argue that notwithstanding the fact that *bhakti* is prescribed in the Upanishads as the means to *mokṣa*, strictly speaking it is against the nature of the *jīva* (*svārūpa viruddha*) and that *prapatti* is the only real *upāya*, because the *jīva* is the body of *Iṣvara*; it is wholly dependent upon Him and has no will of its own; and it would be meaningless to suggest that the soul whose thought and action are wholly directed by God is able to pursue the path of devotion. It is asked : How can the soul offer itself (*ātma samarpaṇa*) when it is neither the owner thereof nor an independent agent ? Strictly speaking, *prapatti* or surrender which is considered the expiation for all sins (*sakalāparādha prāyaścitta*) becomes, it is contended, an *apāya*.

Any effort on the part of the *jīva* (*svataḥ pravṛtti*) is certain, it is said, to prevent the Lord from taking interest (*Bhagavad-pravṛtti nirodhi*). The Lord, it is feared, would leave conceited man to work out his own salvation. Hence the wise person must desist from undertaking any effort towards his own spiritual uplift. Unable to leave the soul in the fallen state, the Lord strives to redeem it. This is *paragata svikāra*, redemption through the grace of the Lord. When the Lord has resolved to save, nothing can stand in the way; the sins of the soul will be no bar; but when the soul is not so chosen, the effort of the soul would be unavailing.

To this it may be replied that while it is true that the *jīva* is dependent on the Lord for what he is, he is endowed with intelligence and reason and is not wholly lacking in will; he can use these powers to choose the good and reject the evil. That is why the *sāstras* have enjoined duties and prescribed punishments for their violation. Otherwise it would be meaningless to prescribe something which the *jīva* cannot perform.

After discarding *bhakti* as being *svārūpa-viruddha* and recognising *prapatti* as the only *upāya*, some describe its nature in such a way as practically to nullify it. For instance, it is asserted that *prapatti* is no positive means, but is really acquies-

cence in *Īśvara's* work of protecting the soul. All that is expected of the *prapanna* is abstaining from rejecting the Lord's gracious help (*apratishedha*). *Prapatti* cannot, it is said, be more than mere consciousness of the omnipotence of His mercy and of being *nirhetuka* (not dependent on the *jīva's* effort or on any cause whatsoever). In fact, the disproportion between man's sinfulness and the means, if any, at his disposal must be staggering. The Lord's grace redeems because he is bound to protect what is His own. Far from expecting any effort on the *jīva's* part, the Lord is said to delight in the very shortcomings of the self (*doṣa bhogyā*), as the shortcomings of the beloved may cease to be hateful to the lover.

Vedānta Desika says, there is no question of man's sins of omission and commission being relished by the Lord: That would, it is rightly contended, make morality a mockery. Further, *prapatti* is not passive receptivity; it is an intensely active phase of mind involving thorough change or conversion. It is true that God's mercy is boundless (*niravadhi*) and ever-present; but it will not descend on the aspirant unless it is sought. So long as the soul does not desire to be saved, grace does not function. Some gesture (*vyāja*) on the part of the soul is indispensable. Of course, it is not the cause of *mokṣa*, but the occasion that makes the gift really enjoyable. If the Lord's grace were to come to man's rescue unsought, all souls would be saved simultaneously (*sarvamukti prasaṅgāt*) or some only, making God liable to the charge of partiality. It is the way of grace that it works only through petition for grace and not automatically.

In the task of reshaping and transfiguring the inward personality itself, "Not I but the divine in me" seems to be the conviction of deeply religious men all the world over. To say this is not in any way to deny the equal indispensability of personal effort and persistent endeavour for all moral and spiritual progress. The reshaping of personality will no more take place in a man without hard work and endurance on his part, than a great work of art will ever be produced without effort in an hour of indolence. Grace is no substitute for will. God descends from on high upon those who allure it, invite it

by special effort, prepare themselves to welcome it and sustain it when it comes. God turns men to good so far as they will yield to His influence and co-operate with Him. Only on those whose hearts are opened will the spiritual Director enter. The fruits of the tree of life are expressly spoken of as gifts; but these are gifts said to be reserved for the victors.

Grace comes to crown the achievement of effort. Grace does not relieve man of moral responsibility by encouraging self-abasement of a devotional or emotional kind. It does not discourage manly initiative and activity. Man is said to be chosen for salvation; but this does not work automatically. Honest effort is required on the part of man. To inspire such a noble effort, the devotee invokes the gracious help of God. The idea of election far from denying responsibility is linked to a high sense of obligation. It opens up a hope which is good, genuine, inspiring the faithful with a courageous confidence, viz., the hope that the bountifulness of the giver of all good will in the end, break down the sinfulness and the sluggishness of the least responsive among us. But if anything can frustrate the attainment of the final good, it is the besotted fancy that God is bound to come to us, unstriven for, in the course of things, whether we choose or not, and that we may therefore neglect the arduous business of soul-making.

REALISM OF SANKARA AND THE WORLD-ILLUSION

P. K. SUNDARAM

It is said that the Advaitins follow the path set by the Bhatta Mimamsakas in matters empirical and this means that they are so far realists. As it is well-known, they accept six ways of knowing, i.e., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, implication and non-cognition. A *pramāṇa* or a source of knowledge is valid if the knowledge that it provides us with is not contradicted and if it makes the unknown object known for the first time.¹ So far as the empirical knowledge goes, the six ways satisfy the above two conditions of valid knowledge and the world is known through them. Illusions are eradicable by right knowledge, and illusory objects are not knowable through any *pramāṇa* for the reason that though they appear, they are not real. Since they can neither be said to exist because of sublation nor to be totally non-existent because of appearance, they are not the content of any formulable proof and this informulability is the definition of their illusory character. In Advaita, another description for informulability in terms of categorical *affirmation* or *negation* of existence is removability by knowledge. Illusions are notorious for their delusive practical efficiency. Hence, till they are removed by knowledge, there could be no knowing whether one is in illusion or is having a veridical experience.

The metaphysical position of the Advaita is that the nature of the world is, in consonance with the character of its material cause *māyā*, informulable as either real or unreal, but is, all the same, practically efficient. One reason for its puzzling character is that it changes perpetually² and one does not know

in what the change takes place. Is it all change or is there something in which changes take place but which itself does not change? Whatever it is that changes it cannot be both changing and unchanging at once. When gold is beaten into an ornament the gold is still there, with its form and name changed into those of the ornament. Yet the gold itself is the combination of elements and is an appellation and form. In its elemental form, which is that of homogeneous energy, matter is of one uniform nature. Every other variegation of the elemental energy is one of name and form. While names and forms alone change, the material cause remains and pervades all the names and forms. The Advaita stretches this analysis a little further and says that every one of the seemingly concrete and differentiated entities, which, taken together, are called the world, is only an apparent diversification in name and form of what is one and distinctionless spirit. Thus the varying names and forms are contradictable and the reality is *Brahman alone*. As any attempt to explain the origin and existence of the manifold world is bound to fail the framework of human logic with its usual canons of either-or,³ the Advaita postulates the principle of informulability of the process of world-creation, and would prefer the analogy of illusion, where nothing is really produced or transformed but appears to be so, to describe (if it could be described at all) the world-creation and the appearance of the manifold, to the example of material modification. As the world process is not an ultimate fact, the duty of man is to transcend this duality by the knowledge of the One called *Brahman*, in which there could be no plurality and finitude and therefore no fear of contradiction.

So, if uncontradictedness is any proof of truth and reality, then, reality is one and the knowledge of that one alone is true and truth and reality are not two principles but the essential nature of one and the same *Brahman*. What usually passes for valid knowledge secured through the six ways of knowing contrasted with erroneous cognitions is also, in this larger sense, subject to contradiction, despite its practical efficiency.⁴ That is how we witness the paradoxical position of the Advaitins attempt-

ting to prove the illusoriness, in the sense of inexplicability in terms of human reason and of removability by the knowledge of Reality, of the world and thereby render the valid six ways of knowing themselves the instruments of error. For, the very distinction of knower, known and knowledge is inadmissible if distinctions are not ultimate and are contradictable errors.⁵ But this metaphysical error must have to be sharply distinguished from epistemological errors which, rising in the realm of the empirical knowledge, are contrasted from and sublata by empirically valid knowledge. While Sankara's metaphysical idealism and non-dualism would deny that the world has any reality over and above that of *Brahman*, it takes note of the derived reality of the world-manifestation as it is presented to us in such concrete dimensions with its dependable laws and regularities. There is reality in things that appear, but this reality is *Brahman*. What is unreal about the world are its names and forms, limitedness and finitude, its inexplicable relations and categories. Accepting the world presented to the mind as it is, as the object of mind which is itself part of the world-scheme, the problem of knowledge is raised and the nature of this knowledge is determined by the Advaita in as systematic and serious a way as in any other epistemologically realistic philosophy either in the East or the West. It is a proof, however paradoxical it may seem, of the earnestness with which the Advaita takes the sources of empirical knowledge and their claim to unerring validity that they are not slow to press the same empirical sources of knowledge and proof into the service of demonstrating the informulable character of the world marking thereby its sublatability by knowledge. Let us sketch briefly how the Advaita attempts to accomplish this.

Perception is usually supposed to give us knowledge of things which are characterized by difference. But certain Advaitic thinkers like Mandana (800 A.D.), Sri Harsha (1150 A.D.), Vimuktatman (1050 A.D.), Anandabodha (1100 A.D.), Citsukha (1220 A.D.) and Madhusudana Sarasvati (1500 A.D.) have tried to establish that even perception, which, being differential, is normally supposed to be in conflict with Scrip-

ture that denies all difference, gives, if anything, only the experience of oneness and non-difference, and not difference. There are three alternatives with regard to perception: (1) assertion of the nature of the object, (2) exclusion of other objects and (3) both assertion and exclusion.⁶ In the third alternative there are again three divisions viz., (1) simultaneity, (2) assertion preceded by exclusion and (3) exclusion preceded by assertion. Of the three alternatives first mentioned there is no knowledge of difference in the assertion of the nature of the object. Only in the knowledge of exclusion or assertion combined with exclusion, there is the perception of difference because exclusion implies difference. But perception has the function of assertion alone, not exclusion. Even to exclude one object from another as, when it is denied that a pot is found on the ground, one should first have an assertive perception of pot at least elsewhere if not there. Even when it is denied that there is an object called sky-lotus, sky that has been perceived earlier without reference to lotus and lotus that has been perceived earlier without reference to the sky are denied as related to each other. Before excluding one object from another, one must have had a positive perception of the objects themselves without reference to each other. To say that when an object is perceived, *ipso facto* its difference from other objects is also perceived is to be involved in a circle since each of these objects must have been known earlier if the object in point is to be known as different from them. To cognise the jar as not cloth one should know that the jar is different from cloth. But, then, one cannot know that the jar is different from cloth unless one knows that jar is not cloth.⁷ It is not intelligible to say that difference is in the very constitution of things, since then, nothing will be a *thing* on this account as its nature will be a house divided against itself. Difference means duality. If difference is the very nature of things, then, when one says that pot is different from cloth, cloth will be pot itself since the difference from cloth is the nature of pot and non-difference among things will be the only result.⁸ Mādhvasudana Sarasvati says that an analysis of difference which is said to be the content of perception shows up the baselessness

of the notion of difference and that the differential perception is an illusion.⁹ What is given in any perception is only the differenceless Reality as the mere existent.¹⁰

The Advaitin employs inference also to establish the illusoriness of the world :

Everything other than *Brahman* is illusory; because of otherness from *Brahman*; what is other than *Brahman* is illusory, like the illusorily perceived silver in nacre. Illusoriness has been defined as to consist in being "the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence in the locus of its appearance".¹¹ A typical syllogism that depicts the illusoriness of the universe following the above definition is : *This* cloth is the counter-correlate of absolute non-existence located in this thread; because of clothness, like another cloth. The threads of *this* cloth cannot contain any *other* cloth. So the latter is non-existent in these threads. But on the analogy of *that* cloth it is established that *this* cloth made of *these* threads is also non-existent in them.¹² On the same lines the world is described as the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence located in *Brahman*. In short, the world is denied in *Brahman*. Anandabodha's syllogisms here are : the world is illusory because of *inertness* and *objectness* like the nacre-silver and objects perceived in dreams.¹³ Perhaps the strongest point in support of the reality of the world is that it is concretely and indubitably presented. Anandabodha holds that this perception is in fact the weakest ground, for, in dream things are indubitably given and yet the dream is not real. Dream cognitions are as powerfully given as the so-called real cognitions.¹⁴

Comparison, too, as a source of knowledge, is employed in the comprehension of the reality of *Brahman* or *Atman* and the unreality of body and the world. To the question : what is the sense of the word '*Atman*' or the 'Self' ? the teacher replies that Self is of a nature *dissimilar*¹⁵ to that of body, etc., in being eternal, of the nature of joy and pure. The disciple returns into solitude with this answer and meditates on the dissimilarity of *Atman* to body, etc., and gets the knowledge of *Atman*. Scriptures declare only the oneness of Reality and the illusoriness of the world, according to the Advaita. Implication or presump-

tion, which is the fifth source of knowledge, is of two kinds : (1) implication or presumption from the perceived and (2) from that which is heard. The latter refers to facts stated in sentences which have to be interpreted in the sense in which alone the facts will be intelligible. For instance, there occurs a statement in the *Ghāndogya-upaniṣad*¹⁶ "He who knows the Self crosses sorrow". This statement is unintelligible as it is formulated, for, the entire host of bonds of life called *sorrow* cannot be removed by the knowledge of the Self. Knowledge can remove only an error or illusion. Hence the sense and the fact of crossing sorrow are clear only when sorrow, which this world is, is treated as illusory. Non-cognition is accepted as a distinct sixth source of knowledge in the case of those objects which are ordinarily capable of being known by positive means of cognition like perception, had they existed in the locus in which they are not perceived now. Though non-cognition is perceptual in character¹⁷ the instrument of such a cognition is not perception, but a distinctly separate *pramāṇa*, i.e., non-cognition. There is no necessity that the means of cognition should be perception when the resultant cognition is perceptual. In the statement : 'Thou art the tenth', the man who had forgotten to count himself as the tenth realizes that he is the tenth. This realization, though perceptual, is the result of verbal testimony reminding him of his identity. Similarly, it is the verbal testimony or Scripture that results in the direct realization of truth. Similarly, though the world is given in perception, it is really perception of Reality which is one as many, and is illusory. When Scripture assures us that this is so, and a study of Scripture results in the perception of truth and annulment of the illusion of plurality, it is perfectly intelligible that though the resultant cognition is perceptual, the means of cognition need not be so.

It is an interesting study how the Advaita while it employs the *pramāṇas* intended to give us knowledge of the world, is not unwilling to use them to demonstrate the illusoriness of the same. This is understandable because the Advaita takes the Scripture as the ultimate authority in matters spiritual supported by sound reasoning. Judged from this supreme position, the

world sheds its substantiality and plurality. Yet the metaphysically idealistic affirmation of the Reality of Spirit, and the illusoriness of the world leaves the empirical distinctions in the world as it is presented open for analysis.¹⁸ Sankara, metaphysically an idealist, affirming the sole reality of *Brahman*, does not deny that the practical efficiency and the presented distinctions in the world have an order and regularity. Short of speaking of reality, everything in the world has its own laws of being and continuity that are not contradicted except by the *Brahman*-intuition. Describing Sankara as an epistemological realist, we shall show a few of his reasonings defending the reality of the external world against the 'subjective idealists' position, and affirming that extra-mental world is not a subjective illusion. That the world lies outside the knower and is capable of being known, and that objects are not created but revealed in knowledge is a doctrine that Sankara urges with a great deal of force and conviction. He indicts the subjective idealists of slowness of mind.¹⁹ "Idealism's claims can", says Perry, "be substantiated only provided it is true that, to *know* is to generate the reality known".²⁰ Kant's 'Copernican' revolution in theory of knowledge shifted the centre of cognitive experience from the objects to the ego. To Sankara, in knowledge object is primary. It is the nature of the object that determines the knowledge of the object. Knowledge is independent of human action.²¹ The objects of knowledge should be accepted as having an extramental existence because of the very reason that they appear so in cognitive experience. The cognition itself is not known as pillar or wall. They are usually stated to be *objects* of cognition. If it is intended that the ideational content of consciousness looks *like* being an external object, this notion of looking *like* the external object, and the very notion of externality can never be explained unless there were really an external object. Does any one say that Vishnumitra looks like the son of a barren woman? All the *pramāṇas* agree in indicating the extramental reality of objects. The invariable copresence of the object and knowledge does not suggest the identity of the idea and the object but only the relation of attained and the instrument by which it is attained

between them. Moreover, if all cognitions are on a par with each other, one of them cannot be said to know the other as the Vijñanavadins believe. If the distinction between the knowing cognition and the known cognition is accepted, why can the distinction between the knowing mind and object be not accepted? Cognitions which are of a uniform nature cannot know themselves. Fire cannot burn itself. There cannot be any action in the intrinsic nature of anything; subject-object distinction is inviolable in knowledge.

The question remains to be asked : In dreams one seems to see the external objects. These objects are not external but only of the form of ideas. How does this happen ? Sankara answers that while it is true that it happens so in dreams, dreams are illusions. To the suggestion that external world also might be an illusion in this subjective sense Sankara answers 'in two ways. One is that the illusoriness of dream can be affirmed only with reference to waking life.²² Dream is taken to be real till it is contradicted. The other way is that the waking life obeys the criteria of non-contradiction and comprehensiveness in a more consistent way than dreams.²³ In spite of the interruption by dream, one wakes up to find the continuity of his experience. Sankara observes that while the dream experiences are negated on waking, the experiences of the waking life are never negated by anything empirically more comprehensive. The visions of dream are pieces of remembrance, while the waking life is lived by acts of immediate awareness only. Things which one has seen already appear in dream. In waking life, one can come across things seen for the first time. The dream life does not fulfil the conditions of place, time and cause, and the condition of non-contradictedness.²⁴ One sees things like chariot, and dreams that he is travelling by them over long distances. This is plainly impossible in the short span of one's own body and in such a short time. Sometimes one says: 'Lying on my bed in the land of Kurus, I dreamt of going to Panchala country and being there I awoke'. Here, on waking, he should be in the Panchala country which is not the case. The dreamer does not have any regard for the facts of geography. As the *Bṛhadāra-*

*nyaka Upaniṣad*²⁵ puts it, one moves about in dream according to his pleasure. Again, one sleeps at night but dreams that it is day. On waking, he finds that it is night. One creates objects, rides a car, and sees places and things. He produces cars for himself in dream without knowing how to make a paper-boat in real life. Again, the dream itself negates what it creates. Its end flatly contradicts its beginning. What seemed to be a chariot turns out to be man, and the man to be a tree. Things shift their shapes without any ostensible reason. So dreams are delusive.

But this can be known only when one is out of dream. Each experience is real in its own sphere.²⁶ The criterion is one of sublatibility.²⁷ This alone constitutes the difference between dream and waking life.²⁸

The empirical distinction between dream and waking life affirmed by Sankara shows that for him the world is not a subjective dream. If dream analogy is sometimes employed to illustrate the illusoriness of the world, it is only with the intention of showing that there *could* be the production of knowledge and their objects in one uniform substratum, viz., individual consciousness, without the materials required in ordinary life really being there, as we find in dream. This illustration from experience, besides serving the purpose of understanding how in one uniform substratum a variety could appear so indubitably without any modification in the substratum itself, serves as an alternative theory to creationism by suggesting that Reality is the ground of all world-appearance and the world-appearance is not the product of actual creation, but only the inexplicable projection, appearing, yet not having reality, as (and this is only an example) dream objects are. The world is illusory in the only sense that it is not ultimate but seems and is taken to be so, but not in the sense that it is a subjective dream.

NOTES

¹ *anadhigata abādhitārtha-viśayaka jñānarūpam pramāṇrūpam Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, I, p. 3.

² *satyam iti yadrūpeṇa yavnicitam tad rūpam na vyabhācarati, tat satyam; yad rūpeṇa yavnicitam tad rūpam vyabhācarati tad anṛtam*: Sankara on *Taittiriyaopaniṣad*, Memorial Edition, Vol. 6, p. 62.

² Śankara urges that mere reasoning will not give us any comprehension of the truth regarding the world. To the logical analysis, the world is a puzzle. He quotes the following verse from *viṣṇu-purāṇa* (*Brahmasūtra* II i. 2.) that can be fitted into this ideal: *acintyaḥ khalu ye bhāvāḥ*

na tanstarkṇa yojayet.

⁴ Madhusūdana Sarasvatī says: *pratyakṣādīnān tu bādhitaviśayatayā bhramatve'pi avahārasāmarthyena prāmāṇyābhimānāt. Siddhānta Bindu: Gackwad Oriental Series, 36.*

⁵ *tametam acidyākhyam ātmānātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇa-meya-vyavahārāḥ. Śankara's Adhyāsabhāṣya.*

⁶ See Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi: Tarka-kāṇḍa.*

⁷ See Śrī Harṣa's *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, Jha's English Translation, Vol. II, p. 118.

⁸ See Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā.*

⁹ See his *Advaita-Siddhi.*

¹⁰ *adhiṣṭhānabrahmasattvayā eva satra viśayatayā ghaṭādeḥ satyatvasiddheḥ—Vedānta mīmāṃsā, p. 59.*

¹¹ *sarveṣāmapī bhāvānām ārayatvena saimate pratyagvivam atyantābhāvaṁ pratinidīmatā—Tattvapradīpikā: p. 39, verse 7.*

¹² *ibid., p. 40, verse 8.* Wholes are counter-correlates of absolute non-existence located in their own parts because of their wholeness, like other wholes.

¹³ *Nyāya-makaranda*, p. 128. Since there are two *hetus*, the syllogisms are two.

¹⁴ For the conclusion of the invalidity of real perception, the reason is the similarity dream-cognitions—*svapna-bheda-avabhāsanavad: see Nyāyamakaranda*, p. 55.

¹⁵ Dissimilarity, too, is comparison. Positively, in the *Bhagavadgītā*, for example, reality is compared to the all-pervasive and unattached ether, IX, 6., and XIII, 32.

¹⁶ VIII.1,3.

¹⁷ *abhāvapratiṭṭeḥ pratyakṣatve'pi—Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 101.* Non-cognition as a distinct *pramāṇa*, however, is not directly employed in establishing the illusoriness of the world.

¹⁸ Wrote Deussen: "Just as Kant, along with transcendental idealism, maintained the empirical reality of external world and defended it against Berkeley, so the Vedāntins were not prevented by their doctrine of Ignorance as the foundation of all Being expanded in name and form from maintaining the reality of the outer world against the Buddhists' idealistic tendencies", *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 241.

¹⁹ *aviruddhaṁ tu lokaprasiddhaṁ svāmavayatanrekeṇa vijñānena bāhyārtho 'nubhūyate na icchasi, aho pāṇḍityaḥ mahaddarśinām—Sūtra-Bhāṣya, II. ii. 28.*

²⁰ *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 119.

²¹ *na vastu yādhitmyajīnān puruṣabuddhyapekṣam, kim tarhi vastutantrameva—Sūtra-Bhāṣya I.1,4.* H. A. Prichard writes: Knowledge is essentially discovery of something of what already is—*Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 118.

²² *jāgrat viśayāpekṣam tadantatvam, na svataḥ: Commentary on Chāndogya text III, v. 4.*

²³ If one's dream-experience in any one dream were to be perfectly coherent with itself, and if the events of one dream were always to follow in an intelligible sequence on the event of the preceding dream, undoubtedly our dream life would be as real as our waking life. But these are two pretty big 'ifs'—Ritchie: *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 78.

²⁴ *Sūtra-Bhāṣya: III.1,3.*

²⁵ II.1,18.

²⁶ *sarvaviśaye'pi satyameva svapnadṛṣyaiva—Śankara's commentary on Chāndogya pañīad: VIII, v. 4.*

²⁷ *kim punaḥ vaidharṁyaṁ, bādha abādhaḥ iti brūmaḥ: Sūtra-Bhāṣya, II.ii.29.*

¹³ One might say that a person properly adapted to his environment is one whose dreams never end in the sort of surprise that would wake him up—Bertrand Russell: *An Outline of Philosophy*, pp. 65-66. Schopenhauer observes that the only sure criterion is in fact the entirely empirical one of awakening.

THE CHAKRAS OR LOTUSES IN SRI AUROBINDO'S YOGA

M. P. PANDIT

I

THOUGH it is the Tantras that have most thoroughly examined the system of Chakras and developed their knowledge into a fine science with innumerable bearings,—physiological, psychological, spiritual and occult—, on the evolution of man, the existence of the Chakras, their function and potentialities have been recognised in many other traditions both in the East and the West. They were known, for instance, to many of the Christian Mystics in Europe, one of whom, Johann Georg Gichtel, disciple of the famous Jacob Boehme, has given a detailed account of the Chakras with illustrative descriptions based upon, he writes, what he 'has found in himself in divine contemplation, and what he has felt, tasted and perceived'.¹ This knowledge was also a part of the Egyptian tradition. The Sufis know and speak of them. The Theosophist literature has a good part of it devoted to the subject. In India there are accounts of the various Chakras in the Upanishads, particularly the later ones, in Yoga treatises and Puranas. Naturally enough, the expositions vary in details, but by and large, all agree on the fundamentals.

The knowledge of the Chakras and its practical application enters into most of the systems of Yoga in one form or another. The Chakras are described as focal points of power in the body of man which are only partially open. It is a part of Yoga to

become aware of them, and, by prescribed processes to activate and open them fully so as to release the imprisoned faculties into a freedom of knowledge, power and joy leading to an ultimate union of the liberated soul with its Source—the Infinite.

These power-points are described as located at the knots or centres from where the *nāḍīs*—nerve channels—radiate all around. To the subtle vision of the seers who have perceived, these have the appearance of round wheels, Chakras, and the configuration of the *nāḍīs* around the centres, gives the appearance of the petals of a lotus. That is why the Chakras are also known as Lotuses, *padmas*. Each lotus is seen to have a different number of petals with different hues but we do not need to go into these details as they are not very relevant to our present study.

In a system like Sri Aurobindo's Yoga which takes into account the whole of man, due note is taken of this organisation of Centres or Chakras in the human system. Only they are traced to their deeper origins and given their fuller significance. Behind the exterior body of man, Sri Aurobindo points out, there is a Consciousness which is the real core of his existence. It is this Consciousness which pervades the entire being, animating and enlivening it on all its levels. This Consciousness is lodged in an inner or subtler body which extends behind and above the physical. It has several centres of operation, stations of self-formulation and action in forms suited to the governing principles of the different regions or planes in manifestation. Thus there is a centre of consciousness in the predominantly physical region, another in the life-belt, yet another (or more) in the mind-region and so on. Each centre, be it noted, governs not only the particular plane of being within the individual but is also related to the corresponding extension in the wider universe around. Now this system of centres in the subtle body is reproduced in the physical body with the spinal column as the base and the ganglionic centres as Chakras. To each centre of consciousness in the subtle body, there is a corresponding nodal spot in the physical body. By concentrating on these spots or locations it is possible to apply pressure on the Chakras

or lotuses within and open them up, thereby gradually getting an entry into their respective planes of consciousness and possession and control over the energies and power natural to their principles of existence.

These Chakras or Centres of consciousness are naturally many; they are not confined to the physical body. For there are some above the head even as there are some below the feet. But in main there are seven important Lotuses, known to yogins, to which Sri Aurobindo gives the following significances conforming to the traditional knowledge in the light of his own realisation.

First at the base of the spine is the centre of the physical consciousness—*mūlādhāra*—which governs the physical being down to the sub-conscious. All movements of a purely physical nature and those deriving from the sub-conscious parts are regulated from this centre of consciousness. It is also the centre of the sex organ and commands sex-action.

Next is the lower vital centre, the *svādhiṣṭhāna*, below the navel, governing the smaller vital movements of petty desires, passions, greed and the like.

Above it in the navel region is the chief vital centre, the *maṇipūra*; here originate the powerful movements of the vital force, mighty passions, ambition, drive for domination, etc.

Rising higher in the region of the heart, there is the heart centre, *anāhata-padma*, commanding the higher vital, the emotional, and the psychic within. Large and noble movements of consecration, surrender, love, harmony well up from this centre in the heart. When it opens the influence of the psychic begins to expand outward and downward and prepares the way for the emergence of the psychic being.

Next is the throat-centre, *viśuddha*. It governs the movements of the externalising mind, of the physical part of mind which seeks to express in speech what it perceives or receives from its higher levels. When it opens, there comes a power to imbibe the higher consciousness in the physical mind and grow into its light. The neck, throat and the lower face are the regions of influence and action of this centre.

Yet higher is the centre on the forehead between the eyebrows (a little above) which commands, *ājñā*, the inner thought, inner vision and will. It is the centre of the dynamic mind radiating the inner will. When it opens there comes into work a greater than ordinary mental will; an effectuating power, a force of creation. One sees things behind the outer surface and is also enabled to act with a greater will-force from within. The entire forehead and the eyebrows are its region of activity. This centre is the channel of communication between the Higher Consciousness and the inner mind as also the outer mind.

The highest and the last is at the crown of the head, the celebrated *sahasrāra*, the thousand-petalled Lotus. Truly speaking, this centre is not within the body; it is above the head, above the brain, and acts as a centre connecting all that is above the mind with the mind proper situate in the body. All the movements of the Higher Mind, the Intuitive Mind, the Illumined Mind and the still higher altitudes of the Consciousness are first received here and then connected with the mental apparatus. It is the centre of communication between the individual consciousness and the infinite Consciousness around and above. When it opens it acts like a lid opened between the Higher Consciousness and the ordinary mind. Sri Aurobindo points out that though this centre is identified with the brain by some, it is not really so; the brain is a channel of communication between the *ājñā* and *sahasrāra* Chakras. This centre is also called *śūnya* as it gives a sense of Void, entry into a kind of Stillness, a Silence above the activity of the normal mind.

Thus there are seven main centres in the human organism. Sri Aurobindo groups them into four broad divisions :

1) from the crown of the head to the throat, in the region of the mind, three centres : head centre, forehead centre, throat centre;

2) from shoulder to navel, region of the higher vital : heart centre and navel centre;

3) from the navel downwards, region of the lower vital : the penultimate centre;

4) from the root of the spine downwards; the region of the physical consciousness: the physical and sub-physical centres below.

Now, in most of the other lines of Yoga these Chakras or lotuses are sought to be activated and opened up in order to exceed the limits and limitations of the normal human formulation. There is at the base of the spine a reserve of Consciousness-Energy, a store of power which is conceived as a sleeping serpent, *kuṇḍalinī*. Only a little of this power is active—so much as is needed to sustain the normal operations of life—in the human system with most of it lying latent, asleep. By *prāṇāyāma*, regulation and pressure of breath, *mantra-japa*, and like processes (in which even drugs are used by some as aids) this *kuṇḍalinī* is awakened and galvanised into action; it is led up the central channel in the spinal column, the *suṣumnā*. And the *kuṇḍalinī śakti* rises up it strikes the Lotuses which are threaded on it were on that shaft of column, and they open giving entry and conquest to the practisant over their respective domains. The *kuṇḍalinī*—the Energy—end of the manifest divinity in the individual—is ultimately led up to the *sahasrāra* at the crown of the head where she meets the Superconscient Self, the Lord of the Being and there ensues a wide and intense liberation into the Bliss of Ananda.

In Sri Aurobindo's Yoga these centres need, indeed, to be opened and set into full activity; the Consciousness-Energy that is lying latent is also to be awakened and freed into an expanding and ascending movement. But this is not done by mechanical or near-mechanical processes. The awakening of the Sakti and the opening and activating of the Centres of Consciousness embodied in man is to come about *naturally* as a result of the working of the Divine Consciousness, the Yoga-Sakti to which the *sādhaka* of the Integral Yoga opens himself. As this Higher or Deeper Consciousness manifests itself there is an effortless blossoming of the Lotuses or Centres of the individual consciousness :

Our hidden centres of celestial force
Open like flowers to a heavenly atmosphere.²

Contrary to the opening of the lotuses, from below upwards in other Yogas, here the centres usually open from above downwards, from the mind centres downward. But there is no definite rule. Whichever are more ripe open first, and their planes of consciousness are opened to the *sādhaka* with their natural movements, finding expression in his person. Sri Aurobindo gives magnificent descriptions of this process in his epic *Savitri* to which we will now turn.

II

It was on the eve of the impending stroke of Fate on her beloved husband Satyavan. Savitri is in deep Tapas, summoning all her latent strength to meet and fight the Adversary. She calls upon the very Mother of the Universe to descend into her :³

In its deep lotus home her being sat
As if on concentration's marble seat,
Calling the mighty Mother of the worlds,
To make this earthly tenement her house.

In response to her intense call, the Divine Mother sends down an emanation,

A face, a form came down in her heart.

And as the Power from Above treads on the expectant grounds of her being, there is a tremendous reaction :

A mighty movement rocked the inner space.

As a result of the sudden descent of the Force of the Supreme Consciousness that is the World-Mother, like a spring flying into action, the Consciousness-Energy in her body, thrice coiled *kundalinī*, wakes up from its slumber, raises its hood and stands ready for its imperious ascent :

A flaming serpent rose released from sleep.
It rose billowing its coils and stood erect

Once poised for action, the luminous Force storms its way
upward licking up the various lotuses that were lying closed
on the royal route :

And climbing mightily stormily on its way
It touched her centres with its flaming mouth :

And the lotus-centres awakened by the touch, smile and break
into movement all along the way :

As if a fiery kiss had broken their sleep,
They bloomed and laughed surcharged with light and
bliss...

And the mystic Serpent

Then at the crown it joined the Eternal's space.

Not only it joins the Eternal at the summit but it holds
together in a living and thrilled communion both the ends of
her being,—material and spiritual, with all the interconnecting
lotus-centres abloom on the entire terrain :

In the flower of the head, in the flower of Matter's base,
In each divine stronghold and Nature-knot
It held together the mystic stream which joins
The viewless summits with the unseen depths.

As a result,

All underwent a high celestial change...
Powers and divinities burst flaming forth...

Each part of her being, each significant centre is opened to
a new working of the Supreme Power. The three centres of the

Mind, the hub of the thought-mind in the head, the focussing point of inner will and vision between the eye-brows, and the throat-station which gives expression to what is thought in the mind and what is felt in the heart, all these undergo a felicitous change :

In the country of the lotus of the head
Which thinking mind has made its busy space,
In the castle of the lotus twixt the brows
Whence it shoots the arrows of its sight and will,
In the passage of the lotus of the throat
Where speech must rise and the expressing mind
And the heart's impulse run towards word and fact,
A glad uplift and a new working came.

Sri Aurobindo gives another glorious description,⁴ even yet fuller, when he narrates how in reply to the challenge of Death to show her real power and force,

...Savitri looked on Death and answered not...
A mighty transformation came on her...

and

In a flaming moment of apocalypse
The Incarnation thrust aside its veil.

As a consequence of this Descent and manifestation of the Divinity in her person, the Power that sat enthroned in the summit Lotus concealed from view came down and took its position on the seat of dynamic vision and will :

The Power that from her being's summit reigned,
The Presence chambered in lotus secrecy,
Came down and held the centre in her brow
Where the mind's Lord in his control-room sits...

It is here that the inner eye opens in the wake of concentration and the truer will follows to execute what is so perceived :

There throned on concentration's native seat
 He opens that third mysterious eye in man,
 The Unseen's eye that looks at the unseen,
 When Light with a golden ecstasy fills his brain
 And the eternal's wisdom drives his choice
 And eternal Will seizes the mortal's will.

Next was dynamised into activity the spring of expression in the throat to manifest in word and action the Thought of the Eternal :

It stirred in the lotus of her throat of song,
 And in her speech throbbed the immortal Word,
 Her life sounded with the steps of the World-soul
 Moving in harmony with the cosmic Thought.

And further. The manifesting Deity descended into her heart and released the immaculate soul-force latent in the psychic depths :

As glides God's sun into the mystic cave
 Where hides his light from the pursuing gods,
 It glided into the lotus of her heart
 And woke in it the Force that alters Fate.

Then came the turn of the seat of desire and passion, movements of constricted life-force. Taken up by the incoming Power its very desires were uplifted and transformed into tongues of soaring aspiration :

It poured into a navel's lotus depth,
 Lodged in the little life-nature's narrow home,
 On the body's longings grew heaven-rapture's flower
 And made desire a pure celestial flame.

2. The Sun of Supramental Light and Will-Power, transmitting the Knowledge-Power as dynamic vision and command to create, found and organise the supramental creation.

Descent into the Ajna Chakra, the centre between the eyes.

3. The Sun of Supramental Word, embodying the Knowledge-Power, empowered to express and arrange the supramental creation.

Descent into the Throat centre.

4. The Sun of Supramental Love, Beauty, and Bliss, releasing the Soul of the Knowledge-Power to vivify and harmonise the supramental creation.

Descent into the Heart-Lotus.

5. The Sun of Supramental Force dynamised as a power and source of life to support the supramental creation.

Descent into the navel centre.

6. The Sun of Life-Radiances (Power-Rays) distributing the dynamis and pouring it into concrete formations.

Descent into the penultimate centre.

7. The Sun of Supramental Substance-Energy and Form-Energy empowered to embody the supramental life and stabilise the creation.

Descent into the Muladhara.⁷⁵

NOTES

¹ *Vide Theosophia Pratica*

² *Savitri*, II.12.

³ VII.5.

⁴ X.4.

⁵ *Vide The Hour of God*, p. 93.

EVOLUTION IN TIME AND TIMELESS

S. V. RAMMURTY

THE *Phenomenon of Man* by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin published in 1958 is a book of revolutionary significance in science. Father Teilhard was a geologist, a palaeontologist and also a Jesuit priest. He combined the disciplines of science and Christian religion. The latter gave him the direction of evolution as towards transcendent spirit. The former gave him an insight into the development of the universe in a succession of atoms and multiplicity. He points out that in the course of the struggle to grapple with the dimensions of the universe, space was naturally the first to yield as it was the most tangible. Time and space are organically joined so as to weave together the stuff of the universe. Increasing size and duration build up the atoms of matter from which life and mind evolve by increasing complexity of organization. Consciousness is the substance and heart of life of evolution. From consciousness grows self-consciousness which is the power of consciousness to look upon itself as an object. What marks a modern man is having become capable of seeing in terms not of space and time alone, but of duration which is called by Father Teilhard a kind of biological space-time. Thought becomes number so as to embrace all habitable space. Unity becomes multiplicity of atoms. Evolution on the view of Father Teilhard is now gaining the psychic zones of the world and the sphere of matter and life is being covered by a sphere of mind, which he calls the noosphere. Man is not the centre of the universe but an arrow pointing to the final unification of the world in terms of consciousness which he calls the omega point.

Father Teilhard describes the modern disquiet of man as

due to the immensities of space and duration, and of number. Man is as much disturbed by a static as by an endlessly moving universe. There is a growing crisis in evolution. It is not enough to have only two directions—one upward and one downward. There is a need for a half-way house where immensity and multitude are locked in a new entity, a new dimension. Evolution is rise of consciousness and consciousness is the effect of union. Earth is being harmonized into a collective consciousness, an emerging spirit of the Earth rising to a synthesis of planetary unity. Neither science nor religion can develop normally without the other. The same life animates both of them. Though the study of the past may give us some idea of the resources of organized matter in its diffuse state, we have yet no idea of the possible magnitudes of noospheric effects.

Father Teilhard enunciated his view of the noosphere in 1925 though his book was published posthumously in 1958. I have myself long held the view that mind is a dimension of the universe. In 1922, I wrote a paper at Cambridge on "Time, space, matter and mind". Professor Eddington did not see how mind was a part of Physics. Professor Whitehead looked on the view with some sympathy. Einstein could not understand how quantity could be incipient quality—which was part of my argument. Three years ago, a leading Indian physicist asked me if there was any other man who thought as I did of mind. I had not then read the *Phenomenon of Man*. I can now say that Father Teilhard's thought and mine overlap to a considerable extent.

Evolution in science is in time. But it has been recognized that the interest of India has not been in history of events in time but history of ideas in the mind and spirit of India. Lowe Dickinson a former Don of Cambridge during my time there said in a little book called *India, China and Japan* that the civilization of India is in the timeless while that of the rest of the world is in time. The categories of timeless are mind and spirit. Consciousness has the same irreversible direction in time and mind which are derived from spirit within. Evolution in time is in the same direction as evolution in mind, though the

rhythm is different. While matter moves in time, spirit moves in mind. In tracing the evolution of the basic entity spirit you may take as the primary axis either time or mind. It has been recognized to be the genius of India that the process of civilization in India is primarily in mind rather than in time. The evolution of spirit in India shows itself not only in a succession of events or material forms but also and even more significantly in the succession of ideas. The primary idea of India is the unity of the world. Indeed I would define India as an idea, namely that the world is one. From this unity has sprung, duality and the multiplicity. The unity of Advaita Vedanta is succeeded by the duality of Dvaita Vedanta, the two being sought to be reconciled in Visishtadvaita Vedanta. These develop with the increasing complexity indicated by number in Sankhya and the atomistic pluralism of Vaiseshika. There is scope to trace the evolution of spirit in mind in studying the succession of philosophic ideas embodied in the large mass of philosophic literature in India. The need is to study not merely various systems of philosophy as they stand by themselves but the development of each in relation to its predecessor and successor so that the study is of the dynamics of mind rather than its statics. Indian philosophers are many but Indian philosophy is one. In number, the progression is from 1 to 2 and then multiple number. We obtain the structure and nature of their progression. In the philosophic literature of India, the rhythm of progress from 1 to 2 and multiple measure of mind should be capable of being studied. India has on the assessment of Lowe Dickinson the only civilization which gives room for a study of the evolution in mind. In matter, the science of physics has traced the evolution of atoms from atomic number 1 to 2 and more. In life, the natural science of biology has traced the evolution of cells with increasing numbers of complexity. In the consciousness of mind, the evidence of fossils enables us to trace increasing complexity through size and shape of skulls. All this traces evolution in time. I suggest to Indian philosophers that they have a valid line of research open to them in studying the mutual relations of ideological constructions in the philosophy of India.

Such research is likely to yield valuable information parallel to what is obtained from physical science and natural science.

I have referred to Father Teilhard's idea of biological space-time. Science is indeed the study of duality as philosophy is the study of unity. As unity develops into duality and multiplicity, the primary duality of space-time in physical science in the shape of space and time grows in natural science into biological space-time of mind and matter and in religion into the spiritual space-time of Prakriti and Purusha. The setting for the development of Prakriti-Purusha into matter-mind and space-time should be to throw light on the environment corresponding to the inner quality of duality.

I called on Professor Oppenheimer last year at the Princeton University where he is the Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies. He said that he was interested in Sankhya as it came nearest to science in Indian philosophy. I understood him in the sense that Sankhya deals with duality of the universe as science does too. It is up to Indian philosophers to study the parallelism between two models of duality in the universe. At the same time he made another statement. I suggested to him that there is need to reconcile Indian philosophy of spirit with western science of matter going on to life and mind in biology and psychology. He argued that such a reconciliation was not possible. He said that science is a special product of western civilization and that the philosophy of an ancient civilization cannot be reconciled with modern science. I can understand him to mean that Indian philosophy is built primarily on immanent spirit while western science in its association with Christianity is rooted in transcendent spirit. On the surface, immanent spirit seems to contradict transcendent spirit. Indeed Whitehead has said that the fundamental schism in humanity is between the Aryan to whom Law is immanent and the Semitic to whom Law is transcendent. But this ignores the third category to being and non-being namely that which is both being and non-being, a middle category which is recognized in Indian philosophy as true of the unity of spirit. For spirit has the numerical measure of zero and has no distinction between positive and negative i.e., between

opposing directions. Hence on this count, I am unable to agree with the irreconcilability of science and philosophy postulated by Dr. Oppenheimer. Further, hardly any scientist whom I have met in U.S.A. agreed with Dr. Oppenheimer. They said that western civilization is not born in the air but has been derived from what went before in human development viz: Asiatic civilization. Western and Eastern civilizations are both derived from the one spirit of man. Apart from these logical objections to the thesis of Dr. Oppenheimer, the best way of showing that philosophy and science can be reconciled is to reconcile them. I suggest that Indian philosophers may study the sprouts of science in Indian philosophy. I have referred to the sprout of duality in the shape of 'Prakriti-Purusha and its successors, the dualities of matter- mind and space-time. I might refer to another sprout of science in Vedānta. In the *Brahma Sūtras*, the world is described as a vibration in Brahman in the cryptic 'Sūtra: "*kaṁpanāt*". In science, matter moves either in translation in space or rotation in time. These yield the geocentric view of the universe where each body moves in a straight line by its own volition or rotates round itself. This has been succeeded by the heliocentric view where each material body revolves round an observer i.e. an atom of mind. What comes as a third alternative to rotation and revolution? It is vibration which is centered round a particle of spirit, with its two axes given by space and time or matter and mind. The idea of the world being a vibration is a sprout of the scientific ideas of translation-rotation and revolution. The dynamics of these transformations is a valuable study for Indian philosophers. Indeed if one doubts whether a seed can be reconciled with a soil, the sprouting of the seed in soil is the best demonstration of the reconciliation of seed and soil. If the Indian philosopher believes in the reconciliation of philosophy and science which he is bound to do by the very nature of spirit, then he should accept the likelihood of such research yielding results of value.

I would go one step further to urge the need for research by Indian philosophers into the evolution of spirit in mind. Mind is as real as time. As time is both within man and without him,

so is mind. The direction of mind is the same irreversible direction of time. If matter travelled in space and moving in time has a possession of energy, is it not likely that spirit organized in and moving in mind has also the possession of energy? Indeed, energy is viewed in Indian philosophy as *Śakti*, a primary expression of spirit. When one hears of the Russian achievements with sputniks and claims of mega-bombs, one feels that the Russians have discovered a new medium, a new direction, a new velocity and a new energy which are yet related to the old in a definite way. The Russians in making statements about the new, may be applying factors of transformation to the old. What is needed therefore to stand abreast of the new scientists of Russia is to study the factors for calculating the new from the old. These factors relate to mind and spirit in the new view in place of matter and time in the old. The new science can thus be deduced from the integration of mind and spirit with the existing science. A ready way of studying mind and spirit is obtained from the large mass of material which Indian philosophers have in their hands on the dynamics of spirit moving in mind. Mind is the new medium; its direction is the new direction, its velocity is the new velocity, its energy is the new energy. Science in U.S.A. has recently felt, according to Professor Hlavaty, Head of the Department of Mathematics in the Indiana University, that it has come to its limitations and scientists in U.S.A. have come to feel that India with her spiritual experience has the obligation to help science to overcome its limitations. There is no other way in which science in the west can reorganize itself to meet competition with Russian science except by the integration of an immanent spirit from Indian philosophy with the transcendent spirit from Christianity. It is not logical to say that it is not likely that such assistance will be got by western science. Logically it is possible. It is intuitionally felt by the West that their hope of scientific progress lies in the aid from mysticism. Even Father Teilhard who thinks so has fallen into the error of thinking that India with her interest in metaphysics is not likely to be a main stream of human development. The condemnation of metaphysics is an instance of giving a dog a

bad name and hanging it. Metaphysics is the necessary counterpart of physics as time is of space, mind is of matter, as Purusha is of Prakriti. In the task of helping the democratic West in its science, let the philosophy of a democratic India bring to bear its own tradition and treasures of mind and spirit acquired in study and in life.

PHILOSOPHIA CORDIS :
(From the Heart of Man)

FRITZ JOACHIM VON RINTELEN

(Translated from German by Dr. Venkatesh Narayan Sharma)

It was Ludwig Feuerbach who said once that one should consider as the main principle for our universal approach that "God is my first, the reason is my second, man is my third and last thought". The approach of our philosophical thought follows more or less in this direction. Man has become a theme by himself and to understand him the approach of Feuerbach throws a great light on our path and thus enables us to solve this great problem and the world in which he lives and works. Man has all the potentialities in himself and as such we have to take man as man in our approach to all philosophical problems. In other words man can unveil to us that world which we call reality. Reality is his nature and it is his Life Eternal. He has his ups and downs on his path to live and work in his real world. The Being of man has its source and its fountain in this. The spirit of man is here and it is the Inner Man himself. The moment we endeavour to project our thoughts and our meditations to this source, to this Inner Man, we can have a clear picture of man himself.

It is an ancient truth, time immemorial knowledge, that man is the embodiment of multidimensions of his nature, the latter touching the lower as well as the highest sphere of his world. Hence we see how he is surrounded both by his animal impulses and his godly movements. Both endeavour to draw him to their side and he has to struggle hard to find his own way. Watching this struggle of his we can find ways and means and

thus penetrate into the right foundations of his spiritual development itself. Plato, who is considered the one who understands the human personality deeper than Aristotle, the natural scientist, is quite aware of the great tensions in man, those tensions that are essential to balance himself between his physical world and the spiritual world. It is an eternal struggle and in this he needs peace and understanding in order to overcome his troubles and turmoils. Man can reach perfection only when he can transform and unite these forces. Plato compares in this connection man to a chariot driven by two horses. The charioteer is the driving force, the power behind his thoughts and emotions, etc. The strong and courageous horse is the thinking force that leads man to the higher spheres that are eternal and immortal; the other horse is quite contrary to the first one, is tied to wishes and desires, those emotional forces and wants to pull away the chariot in its own ways. That is why the charioteer should be ever watchful and balance the diverse paths taken by the two horses. Yes, a middle path is necessary in this connection and it is this midway that Plato suggests. He suggests that both forces, as represented by the two horses, have their potential powers and one should not neglect either of them and when both are well balanced, man finds a way out in his search and reaches that fullness and perfection that is necessary for his spirituality.

In other words, man in himself has his own inner movement and inner direction, a power, that can unite the ways of the body with the ways of the spirit. If he can utilise this natural and real power of his to its utmost capacity, he can draw in himself these dynamic forces, his inner powers, one pulling him down and the other drawing him up, transform them to their real nature. Thus he can perfect himself. In this connection it is appropriate to quote the following verse of Goethe :

The Soul of man is like the water,
From heaven it emanates,
To heaven it moves,
Again it comes down,

Down to the earth—
An eternal movement this is.

In this change, in this movement, the union of soul and body should be maintained; through such a unity the pendulum can keep up its capacity without being overpowered either by this or by that force. We can watch this inter-relationship in our daily life itself. When we realise this interrelationship in us it is needless to say how happy we are and how blissful we feel when the inner purity illuminates the outer body of ours. We can also observe how the outer tide, the impulse, takes an upper hand over the peace and serenity of the inner side and thus upsetting our happiness and our bliss with all its demoniacal ravages.

In his confusion man might not realise this interrelationship through this way. Yet there is a way out and through that his inner life can be set right. This help emanates from the region of his heart itself. In this sphere the spirit of vital forces becomes less powerful and the movement of the senses adjusts itself to the ways of the spirit. We are naturally aware of the ways and means suggested by religion to balance these two poles of extremities and that is why an abstract philosophical idea of the Absolute cannot go hand in hand with the personality that is surrounded with a living religious atmosphere. The moment we lose sight of this we find barriers and barriers all round and one misses the fountain-source of both the extremities.

Reconciliation is always possible between the paths of the spirit and the body and when this is brought about then there will be an understanding *among them each extending its hand to the other*; the powers of the life itself coming into touch with the forces of the spirit. This needs a mental and an emotional attitude and that is through a right kind of humility. It is a common thing we all know that when the forces of the body become negative and thus put hurdles on our path, the forces of the spirit become tired and helpless in their movement. That is why it is imperative that the heart should be open, for it is the centre of all human activity. Heart is the central region

that receives the forces of the spirit and the body in such a way that they can transform themselves dynamically and place themselves in the service of the Life Universal itself. This action of the heart is in harmony with the activity of the spirit itself. When the forces are transformed in such a manner, then the physical world feels itself in blood relationship with the spirit itself. Those who experience this know how intimately these forces are interrelated. This relationship emanates from an understanding from both the sides; this means the body should prepare itself to submit to the higher powers and the higher powers should, in their turn, descend to the physical region. Then alone the eternal prayer of the man, that is of the Ego, can have its fruit, the body obeying him and cooperating in his life's activities. When one reaches such a state all such complaints that the intellect is a hindrance on our path do not affect the person and all barriers between the I-world and the Object-world as opposite poles disappear of their own accord.

Now let us endeavour to penetrate into the secrets of man and discover his real world, the region of Consciousness and Unconsciousness and see in which way these two play their part in the human being. The source of these two is the Inner Man, a power that is active inside as well surrounds the two worlds themselves. It is the region of the Inner Man and this region it is our work to discover. It is always said that the Inner Man is the Life Universal itself. All we want to behold in man emanate from this fountain source. The forces that project from here are both higher powers, spiritual and dynamic with all their sensitiveness, receptiveness, etc., like that of a seismograph. This Inner Man is often known as Person of Depth (*Tiefenperson*).

F. Kraus gives a narrower interpretation of the nomenclature, "DEEPER PERSON" (*Tiefenperson*). According to Kraus, the activity of the Deeper Person lies in the vegetative world, a world as opposed to *Kortikalen Person* as one understands of this Deep Person. Rothacker speaks often of the animal impulse in the deep person which makes him emotional and influences his entire personality with this emotional, at-

mosphere. When we touch the main characteristics and the inner phenomena that go along with the fundamentals, one can say that the man has not only vital powers and a will of his own but also a transforming power in his being. If we take it for granted that the deeper man has everything in him, then he has at his disposal all the powers that are necessary for the entire human drama. This power he possesses is not far from his spirit and as such his own soul has its habitation in himself. All the life's complications, such as sickness, disarrangement, etc., can find their root causes in this sphere itself. So also the union of the spirit and the body and the equilibrium that we find as a result of this union has its sources here itself. When a person engages himself in his daily avocations, the latter are influenced by the power that is hidden. All his foolish as well heroic actions find an outlet as a result of this potential power. When one strives to become impersonal he naturally cuts himself off from his inner world of consciousness.

In this sphere of the DEEP PERSON one can come into contact with the other. We can then say whether his influences are the outcome of the inner existence or not, there is a definite temperament in him and this temperament should be taken into consideration in this connection as the test.

The character of the lower phase or stage of the Deep Person is always a problem. It is the sphere in which the animal in us has its habitation. It forces itself with all the impulses it possesses. Its character is such that "I" has no control over it and its ways we can find in the dreams. We can also discover the outer expression of the mind in this region. What Prof. Jung speaks of as archetypes or the pictures of the past represent this character of the lower man. We can also say that these represent the impersonal aspect of the Deep Person. Yet their action on the individual is extraordinary. Such actions we attribute to the power that the lower region commands on us. Young people, *not understanding the secret of this nature*, are carried away in the wrong direction. Yet we know we have the power in us to direct them on the positive paths, for the forces emanate from us and we have a say over them. They

are a part and parcel of us and as such we can transform them in the way we like. Our will-power should be used in this connection. This is the positive direction and we can do this without arguing on their pros and cons.

A strong person can utilise the vital power that is in the Inner Man, if he wants, to reach the higher region of his consciousness and then all his activities will be natural. His real personality can then have a natural outlet. Even then our personal whims, sympathy and antipathy will have their movements, for these as well emanate from the Inner Man (*tieffen Person*) and work in us either as conscious factors or unconscious factors; without these affective experiences we cannot grasp our own personality. Yet, we should not be victims to these outer impulses when they go out of the way of the Inner Man himself; the moment we give in to these we behold all round nothing but a whirlpool of disturbances and our life will be empty and purposeless.

When these impulses are motivated by our own self itself, a power in us that touches the depths of our inner personality, then the person is not separated from himself and no complications will then arise in his outer reactions from his impulses and other emotional movements. His activity will then be spontaneous, and, in other words, will be an expression of his own real nature and out of his own vital power.

As such, the Inner Man lies in the heart of the individual himself and finds an outlet for his mental actions through the movement of his inner powers. Naturally this needs the will-power, a power that is latent in himself. A creative power it is, and as some say, the creative will that emanates not from the outer form of the consciousness but from the Inner Man himself. This will-power feels its own potentialities and it has the power to transcend all the barriers. It knows its responsibilities towards itself. In such a power, and in such a movement there is rhythm, there is tact, there is always an inclination to unite the unconsciousness and the consciousness and these become indivisible.

In such situations when one acts, he acts as a full man

from the sphere of this union of consciousness and unconsciousness that now finds its union with the Inner Man. It is not the intellect that acts now, it is not the mere mechanism of the physical body. It is the highest mental or spiritual action inspired by the entire personality, or we can say, the union of body and soul that expresses itself now.

When we have a longing to find a way out from whirlpools of confusion we have a feeling of reverence and respect to ourselves and the Life's Reality that moves us from our own self. This is no other than the Love for values. When we reach this sphere of Love, we can say "The person is really of value to his own self and understands the values", of the world as Scheler puts it. This stage cannot be identified with the realisation of values.

Through our understanding the powers that are inside and outside, we can move forward to that region that is called the *Intimate-Sphere* of the individual himself. The real worth of his life lies in this region and in this all the physical and mental forces find their interrelationship. Unconsciousness has a free scope to contribute its own creative powers. A person who reaches this region, this central sphere of unity, beholds his real nature or to him the powers of the Inner Man are revealed. This centre is the source of all things of which we speak so much when we describe the higher spheres. Things do not stay one next to the other but stream from one into the other.

This is the last stage of the *Inner Man*. It is not far away from the *Intimate-Sphere* of the man, a region we can safely call the heart. All our life's decisions are taken from this region. Plato was aware of this secret. So also Augustine and he calls this *ordo amoris*. The medieval philosopher, Dante, introduces us to this region in his hymn of the heart—extolling it as nothing but the divine power of love itself. In the age of new philosophy Pascal makes this familiar to us in his discourse on "*les passions d'amour*". The romantic philosopher is familiar with this, so also Nietzsche in our own day. The poet Rilke and M. Scheler, the founder of the school of phenomenological *Wertphilosophie*, brings us nearer to this. How can we forget in this connection,

Romano Guardini, who draws us often to this path?

The present tendency is to make us lose sight of this great secret and divert our mind to other directions. In other words it makes us deny this potential world of the heart making it frozen and inactive. We speak often of the hardening of the heart of a person who cannot be called an individual at all and whose actions are far from the depths of the heart. Such types of men need education and training so that they open their heart and make them sensitive and tender. We can meet often the types—soulless and "power men" who remind of the hard-boiled primitivity. In such types we cannot find that 'burning fire' of which Pascal speaks so much: Emperor Fr derich the Second, attempted an experiment more fitting into our own times to segregate in the lower Italian region a number of children who had no inner feelings and had them brought up without affection and love. The effect of this segregation was that these children died immediately, for their hearts suffered terribly from this new deprivation.

There is no worse denial on the part of the people than the denial of the heart. Such a denial is the worst danger we can think of to suppress our feelings, suppressing everything that emanates from the heart. Such a person has a sick heart and it is as good as death itself. The word "HEART" and its activity has now a physical biological significance and as such it has reached a negative pole, losing its real significance. With its negative interpretation its real form is lost sight of.

This negative approach is due to the fear and imagination that one attaches to the extreme love; by this we upset the harmony between the mind and the soul. When we really endeavour to understand the working of the heart, we can see how our feelings transcend all the imaginable limits. When we neglect this side, there surrounds us a danger and disorders we find all round. It is up to us to bring about order on all sides and this needs a higher discipline, a discipline based on the right mental approach. When one achieves this we can find the heart "glowing and glowing more than the knowledge itself" as Bernhard von Claireaux puts it. The heart can have an upper hand over

us, our speech becomes useless and we behold happiness and happiness all round, such a happiness that arises out of jubilation. It is our innermost answer in that state in which we are in union with the heart. Rightly it was known during the middle ages as the "Gift of the tears" a gift that every one cannot possess. Men can reach the highest stage of happiness or sorrow and it is a highest gift that is not given to all. The Greeks are aware of this kind of perfection in man and in the tears of their heroes they have seen this fullness of happiness.

Now let us consider the place the heart of man has in this philosophical understanding. We have already considered the INTIMATE-SPHERE, a higher gift the human person can give to his fellowmen. His services do not end with this; he can pass this on to the animal kingdom and he can serve with this unique gift all other kingdoms as well. This sphere of the heart unites us with our own self and as such, it is the burning point of our inner being itself. It is a state of life in which we find no indifference and a valuable gift it is the mankind needs very badly. When the inner voice of the heart speaks every thing is set in order. A real truth is spoken through this greatest instrument the man possesses. We say that "the heart clings to it" or when one takes the things leisurely or indifferently we say "it does not come from your heart". It might be a positive approach or a negative approach and the heart will have to submit itself to that and act in the manner in which these forces drive it. If we consider the heart as the INTIMATE-SPHERE of man, we demand from it that all the limitations will disappear and it can open itself to the highest power. It is left to us how we can take advantage of this privilege. Whatever step we take in this connection, it should not be a hard one. Our step should not be such a one that it could set everything forced in order so that it can remember its own sources.

Our heart and its work can be considered something supra, the source of all life's activities. It need not always speak of its activities in its own way and it shall often maintain silence as the zone of silence is a part and parcel of its nature. In all its activities it touches its sources. Responsibility for any situation

should be allowed to be taken by the heart itself. Love and compassion should as well be allowed to be taken from its highest spiritual compassion. From this we can see what the heart should avoid and not occupy its sphere either with the rational thought or with the unconsciousness of the sentimental, which is the neighbour of the brutal. That is why it should be our endeavour and desire that it should exercise its natural forces from its own sphere or permit it to stand on its own feet so to say so that the answers of the heart can be clearer and purer. To stand on its own feet is its right to make decisions when the reason fails and its duty is not fully realised. When the heart reaches such a state it is said that the man experiences from the highest sphere of his which God bestowed on him. So Augustine says "words we might not find, yet the heart feels the significance behind the words. Goodness and kindness is God Himself. Transcend that speechless region of your heart and then pour out uninterrupted your own happiness". According to Pascal God is to be understood by the heart and no reason is necessary to behold Him. Rational guidance is not sufficient when the heart is not prepared to move. The heart has its own sound and cannot compromise itself with the logical thinking or order itself to reason, yet it has the sensitiveness of the body and mind or in other words it has its own logic. Scheler brings home to us once again what Pascal spoke in this connection.

We can say safely that the heart is the seat of every form of understanding that takes part in our love and action. Love is the ultimate criterion, and not contradiction. The power of inner movement lies in it. *It leads man on his own path.* In other words it is the centre. It is the knowledge and the illuminating power of love, a power that takes us right to the depths of life itself. It is the heart that takes part in all things that lead us to the innermost. Augustine said touching this truth "A thing is understood to that extent as it is loved". The heart knows better than the intellect, i.e. according to rules of justice a person should be punished but the heart knows that this would lead to greater destruction. The heart is dynamic and

it has the capacity to find another way, ■ better one than the one which cold reason would choose.

In all its movements and activities it has a vision and a sensitiveness, the best combination of both as Pascal puts it. That power is other than that of mathematics ; different from a formal logical knowledge ; which it nevertheless recognises. It does not argue on this or on that but follows its own ways of approach. More than this, its sphere is the highest one ; all things move towards each other and the paths of rational and irrational thought meet in a harmonious manner. All things that are placed before the heart are seen in a clear manner, right from their sources themselves and as such it tackles them in its unique way of approach and understanding. Pascal who is a mathematician and at the same time an upholder of his own philosophical approach said rightly "man is created rightly to think and in this lies his uniqueness and his service". To fulfil this he achieves his purpose with the spirit of the embodiment of LOVE, as Dante says "an understanding love" (*Vita Nuova* XIX).

As mentioned in another place if we can overcome all the movements connected with the work of the senses, there remains in us one powerful stream, the Love and if men realise this secret they can adjust their day-to-day life in harmony with this stream of Love. Love is the powerful factor that can bring us nearer to our neighbour or make us look at all things with this good-neighbourly approach, an approach that can regulate all our activities in accordance with its own requirements. The activities of the heart cannot be judged so easily. Not only the pure ones but the disorderly ones as well cannot be judged abruptly. Whatever nomenclature we give to the disorderly ones they emanate from the heart itself and they emanate from a state when the heart is dry and as such it cannot control them. The activities or outpourings of the heart have their own ways and are beyond all possible subjective control. As such these might mislead us. One cannot set right this misdirection of the heart so easily. To protect the heart from this danger one needs ■ positive direction and such a direction can

make the heart steady and control its own movements and thus it can come back to its natural and real position. Then the part taken by the heart in all its rightful and natural actions will be a dynamic one and presents to it a capacity that is its own.

This steadiness and this security of the heart makes the individual to be in himself and makes him express himself without keeping anything back. It gives its own command, a command that has its source from us alone. For the love that is in it, is not a formal one, not a forced one and a commanded one, but it is a power that emanates naturally from itself. If the heart is in it, we can say that our hearts are full and natural. In such a stage we gain such a power with which we can face all the situations without fear. When we gain such a dynamic and endurable power, our inner movement can touch the depths of life itself and this gives naturally a quite different outlook to life with a hearty approach, not with a cold and wild approach. In such a person the spirit finds a natural outlet and can live and work "in its own world". That is why the movements of the heart have now a deeper expression with a power that is perfect and a power that can forget and forgive all that is unpleasant and opposing. In other words it is the state of life that is created with its own resourcefulness.

For us this has a special significance. The mental balance is now in its natural form and this makes us visualise the **INNER ENRICHMENT**. Even if differences are not eliminated harmony and peace dominate. We are taken back to the source itself. This state makes us masters in our activities.

We have now seen that there is a central sphere in man, which is his inner essential nucleus. If we go still further, we discover that beyond the foreground of consciousness there is the spiritual reality-layer of the unconsciousness, which is the deeper source of our experiences and values, with its strength and protecting power. If we ask what is the real and the humane in it, then it is necessary to stress the "**INNER MAN**" as our source of being. In it again we find as the innermost, the intimate sphere of the heart, which must remain strong

and alive if man wants to judge with his spiritual mind and if he wants values.

That is, this approach is known as the philosophy that is applicable to all times and to all climes.

There appeared after Cherussery, or perhaps almost during the same period three great poets belonging to the same family, who are known as "Niranam Panickers". One among them Madhava Panicker by name translated *Bhagavad Gītā* into Malayalam and this work written as early as 15th century A.D. is considered to be one of the earliest translations of *Gītā* in any of the Indian languages, the other two being one in Tamil by Sathinathar slightly earlier a work and the other in Marathi language. Malayalam is proud of having been able to convey the high philosophy of *Bhagavad Gītā* in its early period, thanks to this poet who was indeed a saint and a philosopher combined in one. But the fact that it is a translation should not be overlooked, however meritorious a service it might be, and therefore it serves no purpose to our point. Another poet of the triumvirate Rama Panicker by name composed a *Rāmāyaṇa*, a work which surpassed in its poetical merit its predecessor *Rāmacaritam*. But Panicker's *Rāmāyaṇa* (which is known as *Kaṇṇassa Rāmāyaṇa*) cannot be treated as a devotional composition. The same can be said about his *Bhāgavatā* also.

Another hundred years passed. By the time the people of Kerala passed through the vicissitudes of various political and social catastrophe. There were frequent wars; the bulk of the people especially the Nayers who were the warriors of the time became spiritually lethargic. When peace was established after the frequent wars fought inside the country, the soldiers became restless and naturally they looked for something beyond the mundane. It was at this time a great luminary in the literary horizon of Kerala rose illuminating the life of the people, till then immersed in utter darkness with his evershining divine lustre. That poet Thunchathu Ezhuthachan is still held in high esteem by the people of Kerala both for his poetical excellence and philosophical wisdom. Ezhuthachan lived in the days of the *Vaiṣṇava* revival in India and he was the spokesman of the *Vaiṣṇava* cult in Kerala. His first attempt was to translate the Sanskrit work *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇam* into Malayalam which is now considered as the best devotional literary work of the language. He wrote *Mahābhārata* and

Bhāgavatam also. But his *Rāmāyaṇa* enjoys a unique place in the minds of the devotees of Kerala. It is a well-known fact that in *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* the Rama-saga is retold in a peculiar manner, quite distinct from the path trodden by Adikavi Valmiki. According to *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* Rama is no mortal king only. He is not only an incarnation of Vishnu but Lord Vishnu Himself, adored by even Siva and Parvati. This treatment of *Rāmāyaṇa* brought all those who read Ezhuthachan's work into the fold of *Vaiṣṇavaite* cult. The Hindus in Kerala were till then mainly following the crude rituals of Sakti cult enforced by Kaula religion. According to the legend even Ezhuthachan was an ardent Sakteya. But it should be specially noted here that among those who followed Sakti cult of Saivism or any other crude form of rituals there was no ill-feeling or animosity brought out by the advent of a new cult called Vaishnavism. In fact there is no *Saivite* or *Vaishnavite* or for that matter a Sakta in the sense that each of them follows zealously his path of Dharma only. A Sakta or Saivite never considered it a sacrilege to worship in a Vishnu temple. In the daily prayers of an average Hindu devotee in Kerala one can listen to hymns or Kirtanas propitiating all the deities they knew or heard of. Vibhuti, the caste mark of a *Saivite* and sandal paste, that of a *Vaishnavite*, adorned alike the forehead of a zealous Hindu devotee of Kerala. Thunchathu Ezhuthachan was responsible for this remarkable feature of eclecticism now seen in the Hindu society of Kerala.

It became a regular practice in the Hindu families to read *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* every day and this brought a religious and linguistic union in the country which was till the formation of the linguistic states recently divided into various principalities, thus being separated politically and socially. The contribution of Ezhuthachan to Kerala culture was thus mainly one of the linguistic and religious synthesis brought to bear upon the people of the country. But at the same time it should not be forgotten that the philosophy of Ezhuthachan's poems has nothing unique in them. It was only an imitation or rather an interpretation of the *Vaishnava* philosophy revived at that

DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE IN MALAYALAM

S. K. NAYAR

It seems rather paradoxical that Kerala, the mother of Sri Sankara, claims not too many sons belonging to the sphere of either philosophers or devotees. While Tamilnad, the next door neighbour of Kerala, has to her credit numerous saints, philosophers, devotees and religious preceptors, we have but a few names only to be remembered in this connection. During the early centuries of the Christian Era there were, of course, a few saints and philosophers believed to have hailed from West Coast which was then a part of Tamilakam. Thus Cheraman Nayanar, Kulasekhara Alvar and a few others might appear to be saints and philosophers from Kerala, although strictly speaking they are owned by the people of Tamilnad at present. It is not strange that they do so and it is still less strange that the Keralites do not claim them ever. Those early saints and philosophers of Kerala recorded their wisdom either in Tamil or in Sanskrit. Perhaps the language of Kerala as we know it today was not born in their days. It had only the status of a dialect of Tamil spoken in West Coast and, was therefore, inadequate as a vehicle to convey the sayings of great souls.

Consequently, and naturally too, the Keralites would boast of having their own saints and philosophers who were born after the birth of a Kerala Language having its own idiosyncracies independent of Tamil and Sanskrit. Such a language as we call it now Malayalam was born only after ninth or tenth century A.D. This does not mean to say that there were no saints and philosophers during those days; they were

perhaps silent. There is no record available either in literature or in any other form to prove their existence.

Reading over the pages of the history of Malayalam literature, one could hardly find any poet who could be styled as a saint or philosopher. As has been the case with contemporary writers elsewhere in India, in Kerala also we have had poets who profusely drew their inspiration from all-India culture, religion and philosophy. Epics in Malayalam were written on themes based on *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*. In fact the majority of the early writings in Malayalam were based on such themes. Among them we seldom find anything by way of spontaneous expression of either a philosophical or devotional turn of mind.

Rāmacaritam is considered to be one of the earliest works. Excepting the invocatory lines which normally pass for a formal preface of any work of the kind at that age, there is nothing worth mentioning in *Rāmacarita* to be noted as devotional or philosophic.

Another notable work of the period is *Kṛṣṇapāṭṭu* by Cheruseri Nambudiri. He is indeed a devotee-poet. But his devotion has a tinge of humour around it and his approach to God is peculiar. The readers of *Kṛṣṇapāṭṭu* may find the author at times a zealous devotee of Lord Krishna, but very often he appears to be His play-mate. The last portion of this interesting work testifies to the fact above-mentioned. The poet has written a very beautiful epitaph wherein he refers to his experience in *Vaikuṇṭhaloka* when he reaches there after his death. He believes that he will be welcomed by the celestial damsels who sing the lines composed by the poet introducing him to Lord Vishnu. The poet is sure of his *sāmīpya* and *sālokyā* as his claim over that is entirely due to the fact that he showered divine pleasure on devotees by composing such a nice epic on the Lord. The only request of the poet to the Lord will be to allow him to be at His lotus feet, caressing them when the Lord makes a thorough perusal of the work he has written to see how far the accounts given in it are true to fact.

time by Madhva and Ramanuja. In a sense it was Bhakti cult revitalised by *Vaishnavia Vedānta*.

A host of poets followed the footsteps of Ezhuthachan and there appeared in Malayalam literature numerous works in the name of Vedanta and Bhakti, the authorship of which was ascribed to Ezhuthachan or to his disciples by the posterity.

A notable work of the period is *Jñanappana* by Poonthanam Nambudiri who was a contemporary of Metpattoor Narayana Bhattatiri, the author of *Nārāyaṇīyam*, and *Prakriyā Sarvasvam* in Sanskrit. It was the fashion of the day that neither a poet in Malayalam nor his works in the language was recognised by the Sanskrit scholars. Poonthanam wrote his works in simple Malayalam language. His *Śrīkṛṣṇa-Karṇāmṛtam*, *Santāna-gopālam* and *Jñanappana*, written in lucid style have a charm of their own, and they are held in high esteem by the people of Kerala even today. In fact *Jñanappana* is a unique work in Malayalam in so far as it is the best lyrical expression of high philosophical thoughts soaked in genuine Bhakti. The work does not claim to contain any dogmatic theory on Vedanta. It is nothing but the expression of the sincere feelings of a philosopher-cum-poet who could convey his thoughts in such a simple style that his readers never doubt for a moment that they are being initiated into high philosophy when they enjoy his poems. On the other hand they feel that they are reminded of everyday practical philosophy.

The legend says that he composed *Jñanappana* on the day of 'Annaprasam' of his only male child when it accidentally met with its doom. The poet began singing the hymns with his baby's dead body placed before him and tried to console himself. He asks himself: *When Baby Krishna does His Leela in our mind why should we want other children of our own?*

These two lines would give us an insight into the mental frame-work of the poet when he faced a tragedy in his life. His devotion to Lord Krishna is not that of an escapist; his musings on life's intricate problems are not those of a great thinker and scholar. He thinks with the common people; he

feels with them. He has nothing to tell you, which you cannot understand and follow. But at the same time you will feel that you have been told something which you badly wanted to hear from a great poet and a great philosopher. The moment you listen to his wise sayings you will certainly realise that philosophy is not a futile dream of a man for a life after death, but is a precious and useful good for everyday life. We want it for our daily sustenance. It is one with our breathing, drinking and eating. At the same time it is far above, and far more noble and divine a realm to which every one of us should ascend for the realisation of what we are and what we ought to be.

Jñānam, as the word indicates, is the knowledge of God, the realisation of the *Sat*. To achieve this, according to the poet, one should have devotion—*bhakti*—which is attained by the simple method of uttering the holy names of the Lord. He begins his poem thus :

Let our Preceptor be of help to us always;
 Let the holiness of the Lord
 Be always associated with our tongue
 And that will make our human birth fruitful.

Only by getting the human birth one can have the privilege of being bestowed with *jñānam*. But on getting this rare gift of human form every one tries to do injustice to that by his '*ahantā*'.

We know nothing of yesterday
 We know not what comes tomorrow
 What time this body will perish
 We know not!
 In the twinkling of an eye
 Oh, Lord, you make men disappear;
 In two or three days you make man
 Travel in a palanquin
 And a king a beggar.
 Some men do not realise even if they see,
 Some realise very early that

What they have seen are not true.

Some men quarrel for status and position

And they wander shamelessly thus

Some are proud and haughty

And thus they lose their wisdom.

Some men go to the houses of harlots

Only to play the role of monkeys.

Some men cannot give even food

To their father, mother and wife.

Some men never see their wives

Wedded before sacrificial fire, even in a dream.

Some are angry towards the good

Who dare advise them.

Many speak with contempt

About those whom we should treat with respect

Some men think that this universe stands

Simply for the matter of their talk.

Brahmins puffed with pride think

That even Brahman is not equal to them.

The poet Poonthanam who lived about 350 years ago is still read widely and appreciated by the people of Kerala. He lived his full age of ninety and was throughout his life a great devotee of Lord Krishna at Guruvayur. He used to visit the temple every month and when he was too old to perform his monthly routine of paying obeisance to his Lord he prayed that he might be excused. It is said that the Lord Himself appeared before him in his house and told him that he need not go to His temple to Guruvayur any more as His presence would be there in his house for ever. At the spot in the house where the Lord gave His *darshan* to Poonthanam a temple was erected and was thereafter named as the "Vamapuram Temple". It is still in the house of Poonthanam, at Valluvanad Taluq in Malabar.

It may be observed from the foregoing pages that the

philosophical classics are very rare in Kerala when compared with those existing in other languages in the surrounding areas. But when we look into the historical aspects of certain temples and social associations we may come to the conclusion that philosophy was more prevalent there. Marthanda Varma of Travancore after his annexations dedicated the entire state and wealth to Lord Padmanabha. The history of Amma Tiruvati Temple in Kerala by the Poomulli family also is an evidence of the Bhakti cult of Keralites and their devotion to God. There are several other instances of similar type showing the devotion of Keralites to God. All these will show that the Keralites are more interested in their practical side of philosophy than in the theoretical side.

B. *Veerasaiva-Literature*

During the twelfth century and the few following centuries the Veerasaiva mystics gave great fillip to religion through literature. Their musings in the form of a peculiar poetic prose composition called *Vacanas* have been extolled as one of the greatest types of world's literature. They are couched in sweet mellifluous language. Devaradasimayya (1040), Basavesvara (1160), Akka Mahadevi (1660), Chennabasava Siddharama (1160) are the most prominent among them. In those *vacanas* there is a wonderful blending of *bhakti*, *jñāna* and *vairāgya*. Each is like an epitome of great experience. Just one *vacana* of Basavesvara :

“O Sir, will the serpent die by beating the anthill ? What is the good in doing terrible penance ? *Kūḍala Sangama deva* will not believe those lacking in *antarāṅga śuddhi*: “(*huttava badidaḍe hāvu sāya ballude ayya, aghora tapava māḍidarenu antarāṅga śuddha illadavarānentu nambirvanayya Kūḍala Sangama deva*).”

Basavesvara's *vacanas* are classified as *Shatsthala vacanas* *Sikharatna vacanas* and *Kalajnana vacanas*. Students of comparative religion have shown evidences of Vedic and Upanishadic influence in some of the utterances of the Veerasaiva saints.

Harihara (1165)⁵, one of the chief architects of the Veerasaiva school employed and popularised the *Ragale* metre (native kind of metre) and sang the glory of almost all the 63 saints of the Saiva faith. His *Ragale* compositions are the living pictures of rich religious experiences. There is a commingling of religion, philosophy, literature and music in them, e.g., his great work, *Basavarāja devara Ragale* is a classical piece of poetry projecting before us the life and work of the great Basavesvara in undying colours. We see before us the triumph of religion over material wealth. In a tiny piece called *Guṇḍayyana Ragale*, Harihara

enacts the story of a humble potter, Gundayya, who laboured hard at his wheel for his daily bread. Gundayya was a devout soul and dedicated all his to Lord Siva. This pious person could commune with the Lord and during his honest 'Kayaka' of pot-making, he could make the Lord of Cosmos dance to the tune of the potter's wheel. (It appears the Lord would tell Gundayya—

"the music of the pot is sufficient for my dance (*maḍakeya vāḍyam salgu enmuttire*)".

Several other devotional Ragales and Shatpadi Kavyas (such as Chamarasa's *Prabhu-līṅga-leele*) from Veerasaiva writers have enriched Kannada literature. Most of the Veerasaiva works deal with the twenty-four Leelas of Siva, stories of "the sixty-three" and other devotees of Siva and exposition of Veerasaiva philosophy⁶

C. Brāhmaṇa Literature

Perhaps Jagannatha Vijaya by Rudrabhatta (1180), a smārtha Brahmin, seems to be the earliest work in Brahmana literature in Kannada. It is the story of Sri Krishna based mostly on the fifth *aṁśa* of Vishnu Purana. It is in the *champu* style and highly sanskritized. The *magnum opus* of this group is the *Kannada Bhārata* by Naranappa, a native of Gadag (Kumara Vyasa). This is written in *Bhāmini śaṭpadi* metre and is based on Vyasa Bharata, but is not its translation. The poet has filled the composition to the brim with *Kannada Desi* elements and immortalised Kannada life. It is an exceedingly devotional epic whose central figure is Sri Krishna. The poetry is so exquisite that one of our modern poets, Dr. K.V. Puttappa sings thus:

"*Kumāra Vyāsasu hāḍidanendare, Kaliyuga Dvāpara āḡavadu*"

(When Kumara Vyasa sings, Kali yuga becomes Dwapara).

RELIGION THROUGH KANNADA LITERATURE

M. M. BHAT

IN the following account an attempt has been made to give a brief acquaintance of the religious elements contained in Kannada literature.

Perhaps it is impossible to come across any ancient work under Indian literature that does not savour of some religious thought. *Puruṣārtha* was the keystone of the arch of life. Thus "religion is an all-absorbing heavenly canopy, like the life element which is always felt". Kannada was no exception to this golden maxim.

No writer would commence his work without offering obeisance to the Lord (his *iṣṭa-devatā*). Then he would state the 'argument'. Even a work on Grammar has its justification on grounds of *Puruṣārtha*, e.g., Kesiraja (1260) author of the famous Kannada Grammar, *Sabda-maṇi-darpaṇa* states in his argument thus :

"Through grammar, one will be enabled to grasp the (accurate) word, from the grammatical word one gets at the (correct) meaning, from the meaning one realises the truth (*tattvāloka*), from *tattvāloka*, one attains the desired salvation (*mukti*). That is the benefit for the learned from Grammar".¹ Hence the work.

In the same strain, Mangaraja (1350), author of *Khagendra-maṇi-darpaṇa*, a work in Kannada on medicine, pleads for the acceptance of his work thus :

"Medicine will keep man healthy; good health guarantees physique; physique ensures knowledge; and true knowledge

leads on to salvation (*mokṣa*). Hence I am going to write on medicine".²

If technical works like these could be viewed from a religious angle, it is needless to point out the influence of religion on other branches of literature.

The range of Kannada literature is vast and varied and can be traced as far back as the 5th century A.D. It was customary to classify Kannada literature (except the modern literature) under the following heads : (1) Jaina literature; (2) Veerasaiva literature and (3) Brahmana literature.

A. Jaina Literature

It is interesting to note that throughout the history of Kannada literature, the impetus for its growth at the critical points always emanated from some sect of religionists or other. The Golden Age of Kannada Champu literature was first ushered in by the Jains during the 10th century. They made an effective use of the mother tongue of the people of Karnataka to spread their religion and scored a march over the Brahmana religion.

Pampa (941 A.D.), Ponna (950 A.D.), Ranna (993 A.D.), Nagachandra (1100) and Nayasena (1112)³ are some of the best authors of the Jaina group. All of them have written important works which have immortalised Jaina religion and great poetry in Kannada. They have based their Tirthankara stories on *Pūrva-Purāṇa* and *Uttara-Purāṇa*. However, several of these works were highly sanskritized and could not be easily understood by the average Kannadiga. Nayasena raises his objection to such compositions and comes out with his *Dharmāmṛta* (nectar of Jaina Dharma) written in simple Kannada with popular illustrations and folk tales. The "fourteen great gems" of Jaina Darsana are beautifully treasured up in this useful work easily accessible to all. There are several other great works in Kannada (both in prose and verse) on lives of Tirthankaras and Jaina philosophy.⁴

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(When Kumara Vyasa sings, Kali yuga becomes Dwapara).

Lakshmi's Jaimini Bharata, (16th century) is another great classic. Narahari's (Kumara Valmiki) Torave Ramayana is the earliest Rama story in Kannada based on the Brahmana tradition. There are many other later writers like Chikupadhayaya (a Sree Vaishnavite) (1760) who produced voluminous works on Brahmana literature under royal patronage in Mysore. Ranganatha's *Anubhavāmṛta* (1675) is perhaps the greatest work in verse on Advaita philosophy in Kannada.⁷

Any account of this section will be incomplete without reference to the Haridasa literature. Kannada Vaishnava (Madhva) mystics called Haridasas were greatly aware of the powerful effect of the Kannada medium like their predecessors, the *Siva Saranas* (Veerasaiva mystics). They realised within their living experience the eternal truths propounded in the sacred Brahminical scriptures. They composed elegant poems called Kirtanas⁸ in simple sweet Kannada with ease and naturalness. They set them to Karnatic music and wandered from place to place singing to the people their great experiences in sweet melody. Naraharithirtha (1281) is said to be the pioneer in this field. Purandara Dasa⁹ and Kanaka Dasa (both C.1550 A.D.) are considered to be the celebrities of this group. Haridasas are great devotees of Sri Krishna. According to them steadfast devotion to Lord Krishna is the sure road to *mokṣa*. Despite their individuality, there is a certain amount of similarity in their approach to Godhead. They all believed in the initiation by the proper Guru. That is why Purandara Dasa exclaimed :

“O, brother! there is no salvation until a person gets properly apprenticed under the Guru (*Guruvina Gulāmanu āguva tanaka, doreyadaṇṇa mukuti*). In almost all their mystical utterances we find the following broad features :

- (1) efficiency of the Lord's name
- (2) Guru's mercy
- (3) Hymns to the Lord
- (4) Self-dedication

(5) Ways of the Lord—His Leela

(6) Ways of society and strictures thereon."

In all these compositions there is an exquisite blending of religion, philosophy, mythology, literature and music.

During the present century in addition to the editing and printing of the old and medieval Kannada literary works on Jaina, Veerasaiva and Brahmana religion and philosophy there have appeared monographs and commentaries in Kannada on them and on other religions such as Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. Kannada literature has all along lived in this faith: "Much is wrought by prayer."

NOTES

¹ *vyākaranādinde padam, vyākaranada padadim artham, arthade tatvāloham, tatvālohadim ākāṅkṣipa mukti akkum ade budharge phalam*

² *nararge arujate bheṣajadim, arujateyum deha, dehadindam jñānam, parama jñānade mokṣam dorekoḷḡum endu peḷḍapem bheṣajamam.*

³ Pampa, Panna and Ranna are the three great "gems" (*Ratna traya*) of Kannada literature. Each wrote two immortal works—one religious, the other secular (*dhārmika-laukika*).

Pampa — *Adi Purāṇa* and *Vikramārjuna Vijaya*.

Panna — *Sānti Purāṇa* and *Bhuvanaika Rāmābhyudaya*.

Ranna — *Ajita Tirthankara Purāṇa* and *Sahasā Bhīma Vijaya*.

Pampa proclaims that in his *Adi Purāṇa* three is to be found "*Dharma and Kāvya Dharma*".

⁴ Chavundaraya's (978) famous work *Triṣaṣṭikṣana Mahāpurāṇa* (also called *Chātuvṇḍarāyapurāṇa*) based on Kavi Parameswara's *Triṣaṣṭi Sādhaka Puruṣa Purāṇa* is perhaps the earliest extant Kannada prose work. It purports to deal with the lives of "Sixty-three ideal personages" (Tirthankaras 24 + other *Sādhaka* puruṣas 39).

Great Purāṇas in Kannada are available (mostly in Champu style) about the following Tirthankaras:

Adi Tirthankara (Rishabha), Ajita, Chandraprabha, Pushpadanta, Anantanatha, Dharmānatha, Santinatha, Mallinatha, Neminatha, Parswanatha and Vardhamana.

Excellent works on Jaina religion and mythology written in Desi metre during the nadugunnada period are available. *Bharateśa vaṃbhava* (1560) composed in the Sangatya metre is the most outstanding in this category.

⁵ Harihara also wrote a brilliant Champu called *Girijā Kalyāṇa* a *mātrā Kāvya* narrating the story of the wedding of the divine couple Siva-Parvati. Shadakshara Deva (1650) is another great Veerasaiva Champu poet whose three works *Rāja Sekhara Vilāsa*, *Shabara Shaṅkara Vilāsa* and *Vṛṣabhendra Vijaya* have sung the Leelas of the Lord.

* A good bit of didactic poetry based on religion and philosophy could be found in Satakas (this mode was adopted by Jainas, Vecrasaivas and others). Sarvajna (1700) the master Prefect, wrote his immortal lines in Tripadi metre.

† A number of commentaries in Kannada on Advaita, Dvaita and Visishtadvaita systems of philosophy are available.

* Haridasa Literature is usually classified under three heads : Ugabhoga, Suladi and Kirtane.

* It is said that Purandara Dasa composed four lakhs and seventyfive thousand kirtanas in Kannada.

MYSTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF 'RAMA'

S. SHANKAR RAJU NAIDU

I

TULASIDAS, the greatest exponent of the story of *Rāmāyaṇa* in Hindi (*Avadhi* Dialect) tells in one of the couplets in his *magnum opus*, the *Rām-Carit-Mānas*¹, translated by W.D.P. Hill as the 'Holy Lake of the Acts of Rama' as follows :

'The sound (word) and its meaning are like water and its waves. Verily there is no difference between the two'.²

In the Bible under the Gospel according to St. John in the New Testament, we have this significant statement in the very beginning :

"In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

II

Rama is generally known as the ideal son of the King Dasaratha of Koshala country in the epic *Rāmāyaṇa* which has attracted almost all the Language-literatures of India. The plot of the epic has its sources right from the pre-Valmiki period, at any rate from about the 5th century B.C. and culminates in the magnificent form of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Valmiki. It is said that it was the Rishi Narada who actually gave Valmiki a clue to this story in the form of an answer to the question enquiring about the greatest ideal man possessing the sixteen superb qualities³ which go to make a person great in the true sense of the term. Thus 'Rama' comes to be the name of that ideal man⁴

depicted by Valmiki. It is only much later that Rama is deified and the development of this element of deification has been so gradual that it reaches its culmination only in the *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa* which is the last *Kāṇḍa* of the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* and is supposed to be a work of the 14th or 15th Century A.D.⁵ Here Rama is described as the incarnation of the Supreme God (Para Brahma)⁶ and shows to Kaushalya his divine form with four hands carrying *śaṅkha*, *cakra*, *gadā* and Lotus.⁷ Tulasidas in his *Rām-Carit-Mānas* (1574 A.D.) has followed this pattern of the character of Rama notwithstanding the several touches of human reactions in the person of Rama. The one salient feature in the Rama of Tulasidas is that he is said to be in the know of his being the incarnation of Vishnu on several occasions. Still, *Rāma*, the name, is that of the eldest son of Dasaratha and Kaushalya. Tulasidas has not referred to any mystic significance connected with that name, though, as has already been mentioned, he believes that there is no difference between the name and the thing for which it stands. However, he has, in another work *Dōhāvalī* made a categorical statement about the efficacy of that name as follows :

'No sooner than you pronounce 'Rā', all the sins are ejected out of you, and the moment you follow it up by the utterance 'ma', the door is closed for any other sin to enter".⁸

Here the poet has very suitably offered a religious interpretation to the articulatory actions of the vocal organs while uttering the name 'Rama'. The approach is only physical.

Kambar of Tamil, Kumara-Valmiki of Kannada, Buddha Raju of Telugu, Ezhuttacchan of Malayalam, Krittivas of Bengali and several others have sung the glory of Rama, the God-incarnate, and invariably all have adored him and his name as the son of Dasaratha born after the *Putra-kāmeṣṭi yāga*.⁹ Nowhere here do we find a different approach to the name 'Rama'.

III

Kabirdas, the celebrated weaver saint of the 15th century, also has declared that the efficacy in the proper repetition of

the holy name 'Rama' is so great that crores of sins disappear in no time.¹⁰ He states thereafter that even Vishnu and Shiva have taken to the repetition of the very name 'Rama'. He says that the story of the name 'Rama' is an indescribable one,¹¹ and its significance is not understood still by man.¹² He frequently advises all to practise that 'Sabda,' i.e., sound, by which he means the sound of the word 'Rama,' for it is the true Mantra or spiritual symbol to be articulated by human vocal organs.

Kabirdas categorically states that the 'Word' Rama is significant not because it just happened to be the name of the son of Dasaratha,¹³ the mythical king of Ayodhya, for, this son of Dasaratha with his wife Sita, could not escape the exile of fourteen years when Sita was abducted by Ravana, the exile consequently leading to the sad demise of the King Dasaratha.¹⁴

Kabirdas explains the true significance of the name 'Rama' in a mystic pattern and declares it as a '*nirguṇa* entity,' i.e., an entity beyond all conceivable qualities. He states that it was the sound of the word 'Rama' which has been the cause of the creation of this world and the super or the spiritual suprasubtle world known as *piṇḍa* and *Brahmāṇḍa* respectively.¹⁵ He explains that the initial part of this Word, i.e., 'Ra' of 'Rama' is the name of that God-entity which is beyond all qualities and is the Absolute. Kabir mentions that as 'Rankar,'¹⁶ lingual (Cerebral) trill 'r'. Thus it is reduced that 'Ma' in 'Rama' represents 'Om'. Hence it is by the addition of 'Ranakara' and 'Om-kara' that the name 'Rama' has come into being.

IV

The same sentiment is, in general, expressed by Maharaj Saheb Pandit Brahm Shankar Misra substantiating his arguments based on the principles of modern physical science. He states : "The origin of creation must have commenced with an upheaval and subsequent flow of spiritual currents from the infinite reservoir of spirituality, the true Supreme Being. The

spirit force acts and forms a field of action in a way similar to some extent to the action of the magnetic force"¹⁷. Later on explaining the significance of the name 'Om', he points out :

"The greatest holy name or the 'Mantra', as revealed in the Vedas, viz., 'Om', does not represent distinctly the spiritual current sound and the source sound underlying it. It is merely an imitation in articulate speech of the sounds accompanying the functions of Brahm (the Universal Mind) in Brahmand."¹⁸

He believes that the supreme sound eternally manifesting itself everywhere, can be heard if one approaches that extent of spiritual centre by proper repetition of the sacred name and contemplation of the holy form in which He manifests Himself on earth.¹⁹

It is of common experience that we, in our speech forms, use frequently a word which has a similar sound to that which is produced by the thing in view, for example 'Cuckoo', 'Crow', 'Ding-dong' of the bell, slipping and sliding of the brook, etc. It may be observed that when a forceful sound emanates from any source, the sound waves get very many ripples and consequently a trill is heard. This is and should be true for planes both physical and spiritual in matters of currents. The 'Word' being 'God', His name should be one which should correspond to this scientific principle and the articulated sound produced by the human being should as far as possible be in keeping with this phenomenon. Now :

"The sound of 'R' is one which is produced by a most pronounced vibration of the tongue and this letter-sound must, therefore, be used in the first place for the purpose of imitation in articulate speech of the sound accompanying the action of a spirit-current at any point, which is one of tremor".²⁰

Thus 'R' represents the original 'commotion in the source' or 'the prime focus or kinetic centre of action'. So also, 'Ma' is the sound that represents to the nearest the inwardly convergent action.²¹ It may, however, be added that Maharaj Saheb has based his theory on personal spiritual experience, and consequently has said :

"It is experimentation alone which leads to practical results

everywhere and we would, therefore, lay special stress that in considering the arguments we have set forth above, the investigation should not end without a practical test."²²

He declares that this can be tested to be true, should 'the outward and material influences be overcome' and 'the August Name be spiritually repeated in the correct way'. This takes us to the mystic aspect of the name 'Rama' as being not only the name of the ideal king Rama, later coming to be known as the incarnation of Vishnu, but also as the name of the Supreme God.

NOTES

¹ "Over the whole Gangetic valley his (Tulasidas's) great work is better known than the Bible is in England".

Encyclopaedia of Religions and Ethics by Dr. George Grierson (1921 Edn.) p. 471.

² *Rām-Carit-Mānas* (1-34 Doha)—Shyam Sundar Das Edn.

³ *Vālmiki Rāmāyana*—The very first Sarga of Balakanda.

⁴ *The Rāmāyana*—C. Rajagopalachari (Bhavan's Book Literature Series No. 44), p. 1.

⁵ *Rām Kathā*—Dr. Kamil Bulkey, p. 164.

⁶ *Adhyatma Rāmāyana* (1-2-27, 28)

⁷ *Ibid.*, (1-3-17).

⁸ *Dōhāvalī* of Tulasidas. See page 294 of *Kavitā Kāumudī* Part I, Ed. by Ram Naresh Tripathi.

⁹ *Vālmiki Rāmāyana* (1-18).

¹⁰ *Kabir Vacanāvalī* by Ayodhya Singh Upadhyaya—*Shabdāvalī*—No. 36.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 33.

¹² *Kabir Granthāvalī*—Shyam Sundar Das, p. 162 (Stanza 218).

¹³ *Hindī Sahitya ka Itihās*—Ram Chandra Shukla, p. 71. See also pp. 117 to 119 of *Kabir* by Dr. Hazari Prasad Dwivedi.

¹⁴ *Kabir Vacanāvalī* by Ayodhya Singh Upadhyaya—Stanza No. 114.

¹⁵ See P. 122 of *Kabir* by Dr. Hazari Prasad Dwivedi.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁷ *Discourses on Radhasoami Faith* Published by Radhasoami Satsang Sabha, Dayalbagh (Agra)—1960. pp. 74.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁹ *Bhagavad Gītā*—(4-7,8).

²⁰ *Discourses on Radhasoami Faith*—p. 80.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

THE GOLAKI MATHA

T. V. MAHALINGAM

THE *matha* is an important organisation among the Hindus and devotes itself to the preservation of Hindu religion and its dissemination among its followers. There are many *mathas* in the country which belong to different religious systems and philosophical schools, having been founded at different times by highly spiritual and evolved souls; and each of them has been presided over by a regular succession of pontifs.

One of the most important and highly influential *mathas* that played a considerable part in the religious life of the people in large portions of the Deccan and South India was the Golaki *matha*. It was a Pasupata *matha* with a number of branches in different places in South India.

The Pasupatas who were strict worshippers of Pasupati were one of the oldest Saiva sects in India who find mention in the early literature of the country. One cannot be very definite as to when this Saiva cult was founded. But from the evidence of literature and inscriptions it has been surmised that it was founded by a Lakulisvara or Nakulisvara who was believed to be an incarnation of Siva. Probably he lived in the early centuries of the Christian era. Though in the initial stages the Pasupatas were probably followers of repulsive practices, later, possibly on account of the growing influence of the Vedanta school and the recognised importance of the temples and *mathas* in the religious life of the country, they like the Kapalikas and the Kalamukhas appear to have adopted mild and less repulsive ways in their religious practices. They interested themselves more and more in the organisation of the *mathas* and the propagation of the Saiva

faith through them. Inscriptions and literature frequently mention a number of such *maṭhas* some of which were large and had a number of branches in different parts of the country.

The origin of the Golaki *maṭha* is a subject of speculation. According to an inscription at Malkapuram in the Guntur district belonging to the Kakatiya queen Rudramba the Golaki *maṭha* was founded by a Saiva teacher called Sadbhava Sambhu who received from the Kalacuri king Yuvaraja as *bhikṣā* or gift a province in which there were three lakhs of villages. Sadbhava Sambhu established a monastery called the Golaki *maṭha* and made to it for its maintenance the gift that he had received from Yuvarajadeva. The inscription says¹ "In the country known as Dahala mandala situated between the rivers Bhagirathi and the Narmada, there flourished a line of Saiva teachers whose founder was Durvasa. In this line appeared Sadbhava Sambhu. He received from the Kalacuri monarch Yuvarajadeva the three lakh province (that is, a province in which there were three lakhs of villages) as a *bhikṣā* (maintenance gift). This Saiva ascetic founded a Saiva monastery (*maṭha*) called Golaki *maṭha* and gave away that province as the *ṛtti* for the maintenance of the teachers of that *maṭha*".²

The date of the foundation of the *maṭha* as also its name are not clearly known. Most probably Yuvarajadeva the founder of the *maṭha* was a king of the Kalacuri dynasty [Yuvarajadeva I 915-945 (?) A.D.].³ His patronage of Saivism is well indicated by the fact that he built a Saiva monastery in the Cedi kingdom and made one Prabhava Siva its abbot. He was a disciple of Cuda Siva of the Mattamayura line of Saiva teachers.⁴ With regard to the name of the *maṭha* the view of Hiralal may be quoted with approval. He says "In this country (Chedi) there is no Saivite monastery which could claim to be such a grand institution as the Golaki *maṭha* except the Chaunsatha Jogini temple at Bhedaghat, which is of a type suited for the Pasupata sect to which the teachers and priests of the Golaki *maṭha* belonged. The worship of the female energy is the prominent feature of this sect and the Bhedaghat *maṭha* enshrines female deities even ex-

ceeding sixty-four, the traditional number. The *maṭha* is *gola* or circular and the name Golaki fits in very well, if it was given on account of the structure of the hypethral cloister occupied by the Joginis. But the mention in some inscriptions of the alternative name Golagiri seems to indicate that the monastery took its name from the hill on which it was situated, which is a very natural thing to call after. The Chaunsatha Jogina *maṭha* is situated on a roundish hillock which was probably called Golagiri or the roundish hillock. When the *maṭha* was constructed on it, it superseded the name of the hillock and came to be named after the goddess installed there. It must be remembered that the word Bhedaghat cannot be the name of a hill. It plainly refers to a ghat or crossing of the Narmada river there. Therefore it does not come in the way of the Golaki *maṭha*. My view is that the original name was Golagiri *maṭha* which in course of time got corrupted into Golaki *maṭha*. I should also state here that Mr. R.D. Banerjee a superintendent of Archaeology and a competent palaeographer has recorded his opinion that the script in which the names of the Joginis have been carved on the pedestals belongs to the 10th century, the period to which Yuvarajadeva belonged."⁵

The subsequent history of the *maṭha* may in a way be traced with the help of three inscriptions, the Gurgi inscription,⁶ the Jabalpore stone inscription⁷ and the Malkapuram inscription⁸ mentioned earlier. The Gurgi inscription mentions five teachers, namely Cudasiva of the Mattamayura line of ascetics, his disciple Prabhavasiva to whom Yuvarajadeva mentioned above made a grant. His disciple was Prasantasiva who had for his disciple Isanasambhu whose brother Prabodhasiva was also his disciple. The Jabalpore stone inscription of Vimalasiva of the Kalacuri year 926 (A.D. 1174) mentions six ascetics, each of whom was the disciple of his predecessor. They were Vimalasiva, Vastusiva, Purusasiva, Saktisiva, Kirtisiva and Vimalasiva. Purusasiva is described as the cause of Yasahkarna's prosperity.⁹ Saktisiva is mentioned as connected with Gayakarna. Kirtisiva is said to have contributed to the prosperity of king Narasimha. Vimalasiva who was the *guru* of king Jayasimha is said to have built a

temple for Kirtisiva (Siva) to which the king made an endowment of three villages.

The Golaki *maṭha* appears to have gained much influence in the 13th century. The Malkapuram inscription gives a detailed account of the foundation and pontifical succession in the Golaki *maṭha* in the Andhra country. According to it king Ganapati Deva promised to the Saiva ascetic and his *guru* Visvesvara Sivacarya (also known as Visvesvara Sambhu) the village of Mandhara in the Kandravati of the Velanadu vishaya on the southern bank of the river Krishna and Rudramadevi, the Kakatiya queen granted the village to him in Saka 1183 Dhurmati, Friday, the eighth day of the dark half of the month of Caitra (the 25th March A.D. 1261). She also granted him another village called Velangapundi; Visvesvara Siva is recorded to have established a new village with the name Visvesvara Golagiri or Visvanatha Golagiri, established a Suddha Saiva *maṭha* at the place and peopled it with persons of different castes brought from various parts of the country. He also constructed in the village a temple for Siva (Visvesvara), a Sanskrit college, a *maṭha* for Saivas, a choultry for feeding people and a maternity hospital (*prasūtgyārogya-śāla*). He also founded a monastery called Upala *maṭha* at Kalisvaram for which he granted the village of Ponnagrama as a perpetual fief. He made benefactions at many other places also. He built a *maṭha* of sixteen *āvarakas* at Elisvarapura (Nalgonda district, Andhra Pradesh) for which the Kakatiya Ganapatideva made the grant of a village. Visvesvara Siva is also recorded to have set up lingas in various places in his empire among which were Mantrakuta, Candravalli, Kommugrama, Nivritti and Uttarasomasila. He also granted villages for their maintenance and worship.

In the course of the 13th and 14th centuries the Golaki *maṭha* particularly of the Suddha Saiva type gained much hold in the Andhra and Tamil countries. It seems to have continued to be popular in the Vijayanagar period also. It had its branches in many Andhra districts like Cuddapah, Kurnool and Guntur and in the districts of North Arcot, Ramnad and Madurai in the Tamil country. Among the important places

where it had its branches mention may be made of Srisailam, Pushpagiri, Tripurantakam, Devikapuram, Tirupparankunram¹⁰ and Tiruppattur. The inscriptions at Devikapuram mention Isanasivacarya of the *matha* who appears to have been its head between Saka 442 and 455. He was a prominent treasurer-trustee of the temple in the place.¹¹ A contemporary of his was one Visvesvara Siva who was also very intimately connected with the Devikapuram temple.¹² "Devikapuram still continues to be the headquarters of a line of Saiva acaryas whose head is called Santanasivacarya. Besides being the preceptors of certain sects of the Bericetti Saiva merchants, they also appear to be connected with the Jnanasivacaryas of Mullamdrum (North Arcot District) who are the preceptors of the Tamil speaking Vaniyan". Their predecessors appear to have been related to the Dindima family of Sanskrit poets of Vijayanagar¹³

A branch of the Golaki *matha* existed in Tiruppattur in the Ramnad district. One Isanasiva was in charge of a *kallumaḍam* (stone monastery) at the place. He belonged to the lineage of the Bhikṣa *matha* or *lakṣādyāyi* and the *Golakidharma*. He is mentioned in an inscription as belonging to the Gayatri gotra, Yajurveda, Bodhayana sutra and was styled as *Pāṇḍimaṇḍalā-dhipati* and *Pāṇḍināṣṭu mudaliyār*. He also presided over the *Arupattumīvar Tirumaḍam* at Tirukkodum kunram, i.e., Piranmalai. (Ramnad District).

One does not hear about these *mathas* after the sixteenth century. It is not known what happened to them. Probably they lost their popularity and influence or more probably they were overshadowed by the growing influence of the other *smārta mathas* among which those of Sri Sankaracarya deserve prominent mention.

NOTES

¹ South Indian Inscriptions, Vol. X, No. 395.

² अस्ति विश्वाम्भरासारः कमलाकुलमन्दिरम् ।

भागीरथीनर्मन्दयोर्मध्यं दहलमंडलम् ॥

उग्रं तत्र तपश्चरन्नियमयन्बाह्येन्द्रियनीडनम् ।

शान्दानन्दमये समावित्तमये चित्तेन लीनश्चिवे ॥

नीत्वा कालमनन्तमंतकजयी सद्भावशर्भुर्गुह-
 दुर्वसोन्वयसंभवस्सुचरितः प्राबुद्धपुष्पनूणां ॥
 शैवानां प्रथमाय शंकरपदध्यानामृतांभोनिधि-
 श्रीडांब्रडेन कर्म निर्म्मलतरस्वांताय श्वांतात्मने ॥
 तस्मै निस्पृहचेतसे ग(क)लचुरिह्मापालचूडामणि-
 प्रमाणां युवराजदेवनृपतिः भिक्षां त्रिलक्षं ददौ ॥
 कृत्वा शैवमुनिरद्भुतशीलमूर्ति श्रीगोलकीमठ-
 मुदारमुदात्तचित्तः तस्याकरस्य नृपदेशिक-
 तार्किकाणां वृत्ति चकार सकलामपि तां त्रिलक्षीम् ॥

¹ *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 23, p. 9; M.R. Majumdar, *Chronology of Gujarat*, p. 261.

² *Epigraphia Indica*, Volume XXII, pp. 127ff.

³ *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, XIII (1927) p. 138.

⁴ *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXII, pp. 127 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, XXV, p. 309.

⁶ *S.I.I.* Vol. X, No. 395; *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, No. 4, pp. 146 ff.

⁷ The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal plates of Govindacandra mention that Yasahkarna's *rājaguru* was Rudrasiva and not Purusasiva. Is it possible that the king had two *rājagurus*? (See *Ep. Ind.*, XXV, p. 311).

⁸ *Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy*, 272 and 323 of 1905; V. Rangachari, *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency* Vol. II, MR. 403.

⁹ 352, 368, 373 and 400 of 1912 Report, para 55.

¹⁰ 354, 365, 389 and 390 of 1912.

¹¹ *Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy*, 1924, para 50. For other references see 33 to 38 of 1917 and 209 and 211 of 1924.

THE PLACE OF THE SOUL IN SAIVA SIDDHANTA

V. A. DEVASENAPATHI

Saiva Siddhānta speaks of three verities—viz., *Paṭi*, (the Lord), *paṣu* (souls) and *pāśa* (bonds). The status of the soul in release and in mystic experience is taken up for consideration in this paper. Expressions like *sāyūjya* or *iraṇḍarakkalattal*—merging without difference as two—are likely to convey the idea that in the mystic state or in the state of release, there is a merger with the result that the soul ceases to exist as a separate entity. This is not a correct interpretation of *Saiva Siddhānta*. The Siddhāntin is ever aware of the need to stress the supremacy of the Lord. But he finds it necessary to say that the souls also continue to exist even in the state of release as entitatively different from the Lord even though they are in intimate union with Him. We may briefly recapitulate some of the declarations found in the philosophical exposition of the *Siddhānta* before taking up mystic experience for consideration.

An objection is raised against acceptance of a plurality of souls in the face of the Vedic declaration that there is only 'one'. The Siddhāntin's reply to this objection is that when the *Rg-Veda* speaks of 'one', it means that the Lord is one.¹ The Veda means that just as there can be no letters without the vowel 'a', so there can be nothing else if the Lord is not. The person who, following the Vedic declaration speaks of the 'one' is not the Lord (who is eternally free) but a soul bound by the fetter (hence the name *paṣu*—literally 'cattle'). The *Siva-jñāna-bodham* goes on to say, 'Because, like tune and sound, like fruit and its essential sweetness, the omnipresent Lord is in *advaita* relation with souls, the previous scriptures do not

say "one" but they say "not two". It illustrates how souls come to identify themselves with the Lord : 'Like the sand which unites with the wax when it is melted, He being closely joined to the world (of souls) is in inseparable union with it. Because He enters my solitary soul, I can now say, "I am the World".'²

As the Siddhantin examines arguments for the existence of the soul, a stage is reached when it is granted that there is an intelligent principle over and above the body, the sense-organs, etc. But the view is advanced that this intelligent principle may be the Lord Himself. The Siddhantin replies that this cannot be the Lord, for, the soul can know only when made to know, whereas the Lord ever knows (without any help).³

The *Siva-jñāna-bodham* speaks of the soul in the state of release in the following terms : 'As in the state of bondage, the Lord is one with the soul, even so in the state of release, they must be one with Him, because it is when the soul is one with Him that it puts away the self-conceit which speaks of "I" and "mine", and reaches the Sacred Feet.'⁴

It is significant that the *Siva-jñāna-bodham* emphasises the need for worship even for those who have reached the Lord's Feet. It says :

'For the enlightened He is not other than the World, He is not one with the World, He is not both other than and one with the world. But because the relation is non-duality which includes all these three, all things are His Form. Nevertheless, thou who knowest the truth of non-duality, worship in love'.⁵

Again, it says :

'To forget Him who helped him to know himself and made him like Himself is not a sin which can be expiated. Though He makes him like Himself, the soul which was a servant remains a servant. Therefore the worship of God is strength to the soul.'⁶

Thus, on the philosophical side, we have a consistent account that the soul, alike in the state of bondage and in that of release, is an entity different from the Lord ; and that while

in the state of bondage it is unaware of the Lord, in the state of release it becomes aware of Him and its utter dependence on Him. The *Siva-jñāna-bodham* is, as we have seen, very definite that the released soul also should worship the Lord. The reason given for this injunction is that while the soul's forgetting the Lord is understandable in its state of bondage because it is enveloped in ignorance, there is no excuse for its forgetting the Lord *after* He has removed its ignorance and restored it to its essential purity, making it like unto Himself. The commentator, Sivajnanamunivar, quotes in this context, the *Tirukkuraḷ* which says that while there can be expiation for all other wrong doing there can be none for the sin of ingratitude. The implication is that it is the height of ingratitude to forget the Lord but for whose grace, the soul could never have achieved restoration to its essential status as intelligence. We may note the grateful acknowledgement of the Lord's grace in Manikkavacagar's *Acchoppadigam* ('The wonder of salvation').

'Purging the foulness of my will, my Lord ruled over me, making me like unto Himself and gave me grace'.

In all the verses that follow the saint makes it clear that his salvation is due to the Lord's grace and that but for His grace, he would have been ceaselessly treading the path of folly and futility.

The Siddhantin's point that just because the soul enjoys consolation in the state of release it is not to forget its prior state of desolation is presented in a dialogue between two disciples in Prof. K. Sundaram Pillai's *Manonmaniyam*. One of them maintains that the world is a product of one's own imagination. "When the world (the object) disappears, your mind (the subject) also disappears. That very moment is born the wisdom of the inner self. There shines forth the illimitable Bliss and Intelligence which has no second or other ;...so practise contemplation in a calm manner ; this blissful experience will automatically follow". To this, the other disciple answers :

"What if the world is not real ? Is the grace of our Master not real ? Did you enjoy this blissful state before ? How did

you achieve equipoise and purity of mind ? Was it by your own skill ? It is strange that you should have forgotten the woes we suffered before our Master bestowed his grace on us ! What, if now, we enjoy unagitated stability and purity ? Did we not, before this, indulge in wrong-doing day and night, considering satisfaction of our hunger as a big thing and gaining the praise of others as the goal of our conduct ? Whether we were happy or miserable, whether we were engaged in worship or in righteous conduct or in lapses therefrom, whatever we did, wherever we went, we were actuated by our own interests, taking ourselves to be the centre of the universe and considering our welfare as the main purpose of creation. We were tossed helplessly on the boundless ocean of desire. Any obstacle in the way of satisfaction of our desire put us in a towering rage. A little success was sufficient to turn our heads and cause our fall. We were greatly depressed when we found others praised ; we were elated to see others in disgrace. Filled with our own importance we felt ourselves superior in the company of our inferiors. But in the presence of our superiors we were cowed down in envy. It makes me tremble even now to think of all this. When we were in such a helpless plight our Master recalled us from the wrong path we were pursuing and directed us to fight the evil forces of lust, etc., that had taken firm hold of us. It was he who encouraged us when we showed signs of defeat or depression. If we succeeded, it was due to his grace, not due to our effort. Mind is a limitless expanse with no fortification. The five senses are veritable poison. Why, the doors are not five but countless ! There is no reckoning how many evil thoughts can enter our minds in a moment's time and *make our mind a veritable hell*. How could you have escaped this danger by yourself ? Escape from this darkness was possible because of our Master's grace. Otherwise, all our efforts would have ended in failure. When the position is so clear, how can we doubt the grace of our Master ?"

As we said, we find here the sharp contrast between the miserable condition of the soul before it obtained grace and the blissful condition after it obtained grace. The Siddhantin

brings out this contrast by the use of the terms *anādimukta* and *ādimukta*, to designate respectively the Lord and the soul. The *Sivājñāna-siddhiyār* sums up the position thus: "The Lord is the Intelligence which is grace; the soul is the intelligence which seeks and unites with that grace. The Lord is the Intelligence which brings about release from the cycle of births; the soul is the intelligence which gets entangled in this cycle. The Lord is the informing Intelligence; the soul is the informed intelligence. Hence even when they unite, they do not become one but are non-different".

It is interesting to note that *Sivajnanamunivar*, the well-known commentator, presses Tamil Grammar into service to illustrate the point that though both the Lord and the soul are intelligent principles, yet they cannot therefore have the same value. Of the class of letters designated as 'the strong group' in Tamil grammar, there are the letters *ḍ* and *ṛ*. Though these are assigned to 'the strong group', they are incapable of being the first letters of a word. Even so, though the soul is called intelligence, it is not of the same value as the Lord.

Contemplative identification with the Lord (*Sivohambhāvanā*) is prescribed for souls in bondage. What is its significance? The Siddhantin replies that this identification is for weaning the soul from its attachment to *pāśa*. The analogy of *garuḍa-bhāvanā* is given to illustrate this. When a case of snake-bite is to be cured, the person who knows the *garuḍa* mantra identifies himself in contemplation with the *garuḍa* and is thus able to draw off the poison. Even so, the soul has to identify itself with the Lord in contemplation so as to realise its nature as intelligence, as different from *pāśa*. Just as when the snake-bite is cured, the person who practised contemplative identification with the *garuḍa*, reverts to his original state, so also once the influence of *pāśa* is shaken off, the soul reverts to its essential state as intelligence.

The *Siva-jñāna-bodham* ends on a note of worship, that even the *jīvan-mukta* should worship the habit of those who abound in devotion and His shrines as the Lord Himself.

The Siddhantin gives the instance of a case of combination

of two words in Tamil to illustrate the union-in-separateness of the Lord and the soul. When the words *tāl* (foot) and *talai* (head) combine, the resulting word is *tāḍalai*—where *l* of the first word and *t* of the second word merge to become *ḍ*. Here we have a union where the identity of the two combining words is not lost. The example is a happy one in that there is the suggestion that the head of the devotee must be in intimate touch with the Feet of the Lord. This is the accepted way of showing one's adoring allegiance. The head and the feet continue to have their identity in spite of the intimacy of their union.

What the Siddhantin illustrates here with the aid of grammar, is poetically conveyed in one of the hymns of saint Appar's *Tevāram*. The theme of the hymn is bridal mysticism. It is like the shortest of short stories narrating the love of the soul for the Lord. It may be paraphrased thus :

'At first she heard His name and then about His Form. She heard about the place of His residence. She became mad about Him. That very day she gave up her father and mother. She renounced the conventions of the people of the world. She forgot herself; she lost her name. She placed her head at the Feet of the Lord.'

In this narrative of the eternal romance between the soul and the Lord, the statements, "she forgot herself", "she lost her name" are significant. In the state of blissful union, the beloved has no awareness of herself, though she does not cease to exist. She forgets herself. She is aware of the Lord only. Again, the statement, "she lost her name" is significant. It seems to be the general practice to refer to a married woman, not by her name but as the wife of so and so. The soul which has entered into union with the Lord is considered to be the devotee of the Lord, the emphasis here being on the word 'Lord'. The devotee has not ceased to exist. He enjoys anonymity so far as his own name is concerned but revels in considering himself as a devotee of the Lord. He considers that in himself he is nothing. It is when egotism subsides that the Lord is pleased to shower His Grace. The couplet in the *Tirukkural*, 'When

I look at her, she averts her gaze from me; when I do not look at her, she looks at me and gently smiles' may be said to illustrate from the side of bridal mysticism the truth that it is when egotism subsides that there is union between the soul and the Lord.

While thus from the side of the soul, the emphasis is on the Lord, the Lord for His part reciprocates the soul's loving regard. He considers each soul as a unique entity of infinite value. Each soul is precious to Him and He would not willingly lose the love of any of them. It is because He considers each soul so unique and precious that He confirms its uniqueness. Those who have read the *Tirumurugāṟṟuppadai* (a Tamil classic which gives an account of how one who has received the Lord's grace guides a person who seeks His grace) will remember how, on approaching the precincts of the Lord, the pilgrim is to offer praises. Having done so, he is to say, "It is difficult for humans to know Thee, measuring Thy greatness. I have come here seeking Thy Feet. Thou art the Peerless !" When the seeker approaches Him thus, the Lord's messengers convey news of his arrival to the Lord. The Lord, thereupon, lays aside his exalted awe-inspiring Form and, assuming a youthful and fragrant divine Form appears before the seeker. Addressing him with affection, "Fear not ! I know thou hast come", He blesses him thus : "I grant thee such rare and precious gift as to make thee appear unique in all the world". One may venture to think that this implies that the Lord's grace is as boundless as the souls are countless and that He cherishes the uniqueness of each one of them as the bearer of infinite worth. Thus, if the souls in their love for the Lord completely empty themselves, so to say, His love for them fills them up with a richness that makes each of them, not only distinct but also unique. The personality of the seeker is enriched and fulfilled when he has no thought of himself and is completely centred in the Lord.

The metaphysics and the mysticism of Saiva Siddhanta, alike speak of a union-in-separateness, proclaiming the supremacy of the Lord and preserving the entitative difference of the souls. If they are for preserving the entitative difference of the

souls, it is not because there is reluctance to give up the claims for the independent existence of the souls, but because the Lord is the Lord of the souls (*paśūnām patiḥ*).

NOTES

- ¹ *The Śiva-jñānā-bodham*, Sutra I, v, 2,
- ² *The Śiva-jñāna-bodham* Sutra II
- ³ *Ibid.*, Sutra III.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, Sutra X.
- ⁵ *The Śiva-jñāna-bodham*, Sutra XII.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*

Nikaya Sangrahava, a Sinhalese chronicle records that Sena I, the king of Ceylon, was converted to the Saiva faith and that his daughter was cured of her dumbness by 'an ascetic clad in the robes of a priest'.¹¹ It is probable that the ascetic mentioned in this connection was Manikkavacagar, because we have some corroboration of this from the Tamil source.

In the legends connected with the career of Manikkavacagar, described in the Tiruvata-vurar Puranam, it is stated that he converted a Buddhist king of Ceylon to Saivism and that he cured the king's daughter of dumbness.¹² The story runs that the Ceylonese king had gone with his dumb daughter to Cidambaram to witness the religious controversy between the Buddhist priests of Ceylon and Manikkavacagar, and that when the saint performed the miracle of making the dumb princess gain her power of speech, the king and his followers including the Buddhist priests, all embraced Hinduism. One may or may not believe the supernatural element involved in the story. But the coincidence of the story itself in the Tamil Tiruvata-vurar Puranam and the Sinhalese Nikaya Sangrahava is striking. It is quite likely that a religious controversy had been held between Manikkavacagar and certain Buddhist priests at Cidambaram in the time of Sena I.

Now the determination of the date of Sena I is not very easy. The traditional date assigned for the reign of Sena I on the basis of the Culavamsa account is A.D. 846 to 866. But in the light of the Pandyan epigraphs of the period a correction of 24 years has to be effected in the Culavamsa chronology. This correction will give the approximate dates A.D. 822 to 842.¹³ Therefore, Manikkavacagar may be assigned to the first half of the 9th century A.D. And he must be considered to have been a contemporary of Varaguna I, whose reign ended in A.D. 815, rather than of Varaguna II, whose reign commenced only in A.D. 862.

NOTES

¹ See, for example, Sadasiva Pandarattar : "Kalagattin Airattettavatu Veli—ittu Mahar" p. 72.

- ¹ Tiruvacagam—Tiruvammanai 8
- ² —do— —Tiruccadagam 89
- ³ —do— —Ennappadigam 6
- ⁴ The contention that the term 'Poyyadimai-illada-pulavar' employed by Sundarar refers to none other than Manikkavacagar is too vague and unconvincing.
- ⁵ The Tamil Plutarch (1946) Note by Sri T. P. Mecnakshisundaranar on p. 63.
- ⁶ Porrit-tiru-ahaval—line 154 'Sirap palli meviya Sivane porri.
- ⁷ Tirukkuvai songs Nos. 306 and 327.
- ⁸ K.A. Nilakanta Sastri—The Pandyan Kingdom p. 60.
- ⁹ Pandarattar's view favouring Varaguna I on the ground that the Pandyas had lost control over the Cholas by the time of Varaguna II (op. cit p. 75) is not convincing.
- ¹⁰ Nikaya Sangrahava p. 18; see also C. S. Navaratnam : Tamils and Ceylon p. 95 and C. Rasanayagam : Ancient Jaffna. pp. 253-4.
- ¹¹ G.U. Pope : The Tiruvacagam—The Legendary History of Manikkavacagar pp. xxx-xxxi (Tiruvatavarar-Puranam Canto VI)
- ¹² K.A. Nilakanta Sastri—The Pandyan Kingdom pp. 70-71.

DATE OF MANIKKAVACAGAR

K. K. PILLAY

ONE of the disputed questions of South Indian history is the date of Manikkavacagar. For a long time the question centred around the controversy whether Manikkavacagar preceded or succeeded the *Devaram* Trio. Several scholars held that Manikkavacagar lived long before the *Devaram* hymnists, probably as early as the Sangam age itself. An equation of greatness with antiquity was largely responsible for the ingenious attempt to push back the date of Manikkavacagar. It was sought to be shown that certain references of Tirunavukkarasar pertain to none other than to Manikkavacagar. But some recent writers have refuted this deduction.¹

On the other hand, it has been indicated that in his songs Manikkavacagar has referred to Tirujnanasambandar,² Tirunavukkarasar³ and Sundaramurti⁴, not by name but by references to their distinctive role as Saiva devotees. These citations seem to show that Manikkavacagar lived subsequent to the *Devaram* saints.

But even more convincing is the circumstance that Sundarar does not include Manikkavacagar in his *Tiruttondattogai*. Sundarar had set about the task of recording systematically the names and achievements of Saiva devotees, and it is inexplicable how he could have ignored Manikkavacagar if he had lived before the time of Sundarar⁵. And since Sundarar had not mentioned Manikkavacagar, Sekkizhar who faithfully followed the *Tiruttondattogai*, also omitted the reference to this saint in his *Periyapuranam*.

The language used by Manikkavacagar is not very different from that of the *Devaram* hymnists. Even he who runs will

find it to be very different from the archaic pattern of the Sangam classics. Moreover, the philosophical views contained in the Tiruvacagam show a development of those found in Devaram⁶.

A specific piece of evidence which shows that Tirunavukkarasar and presumably therefore Tirujnanasambandar had preceded Manikkavacagar is found in his 'Porrittiru ahava!' in which he adores the Siva enshrined at Sirappalli. The Siva temple at Sirappalli, it is learnt from inscriptions, was originally a Jaina *vihara*. Manikkavacagar has sung in praise of the Siva⁷ who was installed by Mahendravarman I in the spot where the Jain *vihara* had flourished earlier. Therefore, he must have been posterior to Mahendravarman I (A.D. 600-630) and Tirunavukkarasar.

Above all, the reference in the present tense to a Pandyan monarch Varaguna in two of his songs,⁸ embodied in his Tirukkovai, suggests that Manikkavacagar was a contemporary of a Varaguna the Pandyan king. To the best of our knowledge there was no Varaguna in legend or history anterior to the kings of that name who ruled the First Pandyan Empire.

After the discovery of the larger Sinnamanur plates it is known that in the line of rulers of the First Pandyan Empire there were two Varagunas, the one a grandson of the other. The grandfather has been described as Varaguna Maharaja in the Sinnamanur plates, as Jatila Parantaka Nedunjadayan in the Velvikkudi grant and as Jatilavarman in the Madras Museum plates. He has been assigned slightly different dates by different scholars but there is little doubt that he was ruling in A.D. 770, the date of the Anamalai inscription (year 3871 of the Kaliyuga era). From other epigraphic evidence his reign may be taken to have lasted for fifty years—approximately from A.D. 755 to 815.⁹

The other was his grandson known as Varagunavarman (II), who ruled between A.D. 862 and 880. Of these two Varagunas, who could have been the contemporary and patron of Manikkavacagar? There is no clear indication on this question in the available sources.¹⁰

In this connection a clue comes from a Sinhalese source.

Nikaya Sangrahava, a Sinhalese chronicle records that Sena I, the king of Ceylon, was converted to the Saiva faith and that his daughter was cured of her dumbness by 'an ascetic clad in the robes of a priest'.¹¹ It is probable that the ascetic mentioned in this connection was Manikkavacagar, because we have some corroboration of this from the Tamil source.

In the legends connected with the career of Manikkavacagar, described in the Tiruvatavurar Puranam, it is stated that he converted a Buddhist king of Ceylon to Saivism and that he cured the king's daughter of dumbness.¹² The story runs that the Ceylonese king had gone with his dumb daughter to Cidambaram to witness the religious controversy between the Buddhist priests of Ceylon and Manikkavacagar, and that when the saint performed the miracle of making the dumb princess gain her power of speech, the king and his followers including the Buddhist priests, all embraced Hinduism. One may or may not believe the supernatural element involved in the story. But the coincidence of the story itself in the Tamil Tiruvatavurar Puranam and the Sinhalese Nikaya Sangrahava is striking. It is quite likely that a religious controversy had been held between Manikkavacagar and certain Buddhist priests at Cidambaram in the time of Sena I.

Now the determination of the date of Sena I is not very easy. The traditional date assigned for the reign of Sena I on the basis of the Culavamsa account is A.D. 846 to 866. But in the light of the Pandyan epigraphs of the period a correction of 24 years has to be effected in the Culavamsa chronology. This correction will give the approximate dates A.D. 822 to 842.¹³ Therefore, Manikkavacagar may be assigned to the first half of the 9th century A.D. And he must be considered to have been a contemporary of Varaguna I, whose reign ended in A.D. 815, rather than of Varaguna II, whose reign commenced only in A.D. 862.

NOTES

¹ See, for example, Sadasiva Pandarattar : "Kalagattin Airattettavatu Veli—ittu Malar" p. 72.

³ Tiruvacagam—Tiruvammanai 8

² —do— —Tiruccadagam 89

⁴ —do— —Ennappadigam 6

⁵ The contention that the term 'Poyyadimai-illada-pulavar' employed by Sundarar refers to none other than Manikkavacagar is too vague and unconvincing.

⁶ The Tamil Plutarch (1946) Note by Sri T. P. Meenakshisundaranar on p. 63.

⁷ Porrit-tiru-ahaval—line 154 'Sirap palli meviya Sivane porri.

⁸ TirukkovaI songs Nos. 306 and 327.

⁹ K.A. Nilakanta Sastri—The Pandyan Kingdom p. 60.

¹⁰ Pandarattar's view favouring Varaguna I on the ground that the Pandyas had lost control over the Cholas by the time of Varaguna II (op. cit p. 75) is not convincing.

¹¹ Nikaya Sangrahava p. 18; see also C. S. Navarstnam: Tamils and Ceylon p. 95 and C. Rasanayagam: Ancient Jaffna. pp. 253-4.

¹² G.U. Pope: The Tiruvacagam—The Legendary History of Manikkavacagar pp. xxx-xxxi (Tiruvatavurar-Puranam Canto VI)

¹³ K.A. Nilakanta Sastri—The Pandyan Kingdom pp. 70-71.

WORKS RELATING TO DATTATREYA CULT IN TELUGU LITERATURE

N. VENKATA RAO

PHILOSOPHICAL literature in Telugu is a new field of investigation. It begins with¹ *Līlānandasarveśvara-śatakamu* of Yadhavakkula Annamayya (1242 A.D.) the Saivite poet. During the 13th and 14th centuries, this literature was fostered by the writings of Sivadeva Bhavadura Sarabhanka, Vatamula, Chinmaya, Siddhesvara and Somasekhara. Vemana² (1412-1480) is a land mark in Telugu philosophical literature. After Vemana, the most popular poet philosopher, the Dattatreya cult came into prominence and there are a good number of works in Telugu literature relating to this cult,³ from the first half of the sixteenth century to the second half of the nineteenth century. We owe this philosophical literature to Dattatreya yogi living about 1550 A.D. and a succession of his disciples beginning from Paramanandatirtha, its first great exponent, and ending with Parasuramapantula Lingamurti Gurumurti, the last great representative of this cult and the author of *Sītārāmāñjaneyasairivādam*.⁴

Tarigonda Vengamamba (1794-1877), the woman saint and the well known philosophical poetess in Telugu is also influenced by this cult, as she pays homage to one of the disciples of Dattatreya yogi in her works.⁵

This cult is purely Advaita in character and originated from Maharashtra country but the seat of this cult is at Mahuram which is situated in Adilabad District in Telangana (Visalandhra) and is 215 miles from Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra Pradesh.⁶ A temple dedicated to Dattatreya is in Mahuram and

nearly half a lakh of people flock to that place in connection with the festivals of Dattatreya conducted by the Mahants thrice a year.


The peculiar geographical position of Mahuram as lying in the Adilabad District, which is the border district of Andhra-Maharashtra states, helps us to trace the cultural and historical connections of Andhras and Maharashtras, as we have many references to Marata language and Mahuram from 12th century A.D.⁷ in Telugu literature.


As regards 'cults' Professor Mahadevan observes thus : "Every system of Hindu philosophy except Advaita Vedanta, has a cult aspect. Even Advaita recognises the value of cult for the spiritual evolution of the human soul", (*Outlines of Hinduism*, Chapter VIII, p. 180).

The works in Telugu relating to Dattatreya philosophy by generations of disciples, who are both poets as well as philosophers amply justify the cult aspect of Advaita, as indicated above.

In this connection it has to be noted that at Mahuram, the head of the Dattatreya temple is called Dattatreya yogi⁸ and among them, the particular Dattatreya yogi relating to Telugu literature lived about 1550 A.D. The successive list of the disciples is appended below for the clarification of the subject.

Dattātreya yogi and his Disciples





VI

Dattatreya

|

Janardana

|

Ekojanardana

|

VII

Dattatreya

|

Janardana

|

Ekojanardana

|

Naraharimahesa

|

Nagojirama

|

Koneruguru

|

Mahadevaguru

|

Parasuramapantula Lingamurti Gurumurti
(author of *Sītārāmāñjaneyasamvādam*)

I Category

Dattatreya Yogi

Dattatreya yogi taught his disciple Dasa Gosayi, the principles of Dattatreya-cult in Marati language. Dasa Gosayi collected them in a book form known as *Vedāntavyavahāra-sārasaṅgraham*.⁸ Dasa Gosayi, in turn, taught in Telugu, the same work to his disciples Gopalabhatta and Sarva-deva. Both of the above rendered the work in Telugu.

II. Category (a)

Paramanandatirtha

Paramanandatirtha is the greatest exponent of Dattatreya cult in Telugu literature. He made Champakaranya Kshetra (Mannargudi)¹⁰ as his residence, and his own works as well as the works of a succession of poet-disciples inculcated the philosophy of Dattatreya yogi, the founder of the cult who lived Mahuram about 1550 A.D.

The works of Paramanandatirtha in Telugu falls under four categories: (1) *Sataka* (2) *Dvipada* (3) *Yakshagāna* (4) *Vacana*. Like Palkuriki Somanatha (1180-1240) the great apostle of Vira Saivism, who first made use of the vernacular Telugu for the propagation of Saivaite philosophic cult, Paramanandatirtha composed works in the Telugu language only in Tamilnad and, as we shall presently see, one of his works was rendered into Tamil.

1. *Sataka*. A *sataka* is a *laghukāvya*, which contains a centum or 108 stanzas with an address known as *makuṭa*. It is one of the most popular types in Telugu. *Sampagimannasatakamu* is in *kanda* metre and addressed to Mannaru deva, the presiding deity at Mannargudi. *Sampagimanna* is a *tadbhava*, i.e., derived from the compound *Champakamanna*. Though addressed to *Sampagimanna*, a personal God, it treats of the principles of Advaita philosophy only.

Sivamukunda—paramānanda—satakamu: This is also in *kanda* metre, with an address *Sivamukunda Paramānanda* in which the principles of Hariharadvaita cult are explained. A complete understanding will lead to Ananda and hence the poet's name Paramananda is added to the *makuṭa*.

Dattātreyā Sataka. A centum of stanzas in praise of his guru Dattatreya and contains a brief explanation of Advaita philosophy.

2. *Dvipada* or couplet metre is another popular form to inculcate religious principles—Somanatha is the first and greatest master of this style, and Paramanandatirtha followed him,

Anubhavadarpanamu. This is a work in four cantos, and deals with *Vedāntānubhava*.

Sivajñānamañjarī. This is also a *dvipada* work, and treats of Advaita *jñāna*, though named after Siva. Both the above are dedicated to Dattatreya yogi, his Guru. .

3. *Yakshagāna.* *Yakshagāna* is a type of Desi drama peculiar to Telugu. Generally all the *Yakshagānas* relate to *Bhāgavata* or puranic stories, some of which are particularly erotic in character (*Śṛṅgāra rasa*). The credit of first writing a *Yakshagāna* with a philosophic theme goes to Paramanandatirtha. No doubt Paramanandatirtha must have been acquainted with *Prabodhacandrodayam*, the well known philosophical drama in Sanskrit by Krishna Misra; and modelled his Telugu drama on the same lines.

In *Muktikāntāpariṇayamu* Purusha or the individual soul taking mukti or salvation for his bride is beautifully described as a heavenly wedlock.¹¹

Dattātreyaadvātrīṃśati is a *laghukāvya* and as the name indicates it is a stotra in 32 verses in *Kanda* metre—every verse ends with the *makuṭa*, *Dattātreya*.

Prose

1. *Vedāntavārtikamu* alias *Upadeśakramamu.* This is a prose rendering of the work of the same name by Vidyaranya-yati. The style is intelligible, even to the layman. At the end he says about his work thus in a Telugu verse :

“Paramānandayatiṇdruda
stīra dattātreya gurumi śiṣhyuḍa yoga
Sphuraṇānubhavuḍa nī kriti
sarasaṃrachiyinchinada sarvagjudaṇai”

“I, Paramanandayati, a disciple of Dattatreya Guru and a master of yoga philosophy, have written this work”.

This work is rendered into Tamil from Telugu *Aśrutārthopanyāsamu*, by Sadasiva yogi, who is a disciple of Chidghana-nanda yati. Here and there are *mañipravāla* passages (Tamil and Sanskrit).

This Tamil version is unprinted.¹²

2. *Brahmavidyā sudhārṇavamū*¹³. This is by far the greatest work of Paramanandatirtha. It contains the following thirteen chapters.

1. *Pañchikaraṇanirūpaṇamu*
2. *Prapañchanaṣṇanaivaichitrasvarūpaṇamu*
3. *Nivartya-nivartaka-bhāvanirūpaṇamu*
4. *Bhedavāda-khaṇḍaṇa karṇakāṇḍanirūpaṇamu*
5. *Saguṇa-nirguṇa-nirūpaṇamu*
6. *Vākyatrayanirūpaṇamu*
7. *Brahmānanda-nirūpaṇamu*
8. *Jīvanmuktinirūpaṇamu*
9. *Sadbhāva-pramāṇanirūpaṇamu*
10. *Vāsanālakṣaṇa-nirūpaṇamu*
11. *Vāsanākṣaya-nirūpaṇamu*
12. *Jīvanmukta-pañchaprayojana-nirūpaṇamu*

In this work, the author has chosen certain passages bearing on Advaita Vedānta from Śrutis, Smritis and Itihasas and has interpreted them according to his personal experience. This prose work serves as a handbook for those, who are not acquainted with Sanskrit, and who are eager to obtain the principles of Advaita.

13. *Uttaragītā Tīkā*.¹⁴

This is a Telugu rendering of *Uttaragītā* found in *Aśvamedhaparva* of *Mahābhārata*. Paramanandatirtha has commented on the text from an Advaita point of view.

3. *Viveka-Cintāmaṇi*¹⁵

This is a prose work in three *paricchedas* or parts dealing with Vedānta :

(1) *Vedānta-siddhānta*—as postulated by *Caturveda-mahāvākya*rtha, and Upanishada.

(2) *Sāiva siddhānta*

(3) *Brahmāṇḍa - prapañcabhūvanakośa - racana - vicitra siddhānta*.

The Colophon at the end of each parichcheda is in Sanskrit. "Iti śrīmatparamahansa-parivrājakācaryavarya Paramānanda yati kṛtam viveka-cintāmaṇi Brahmāṇḍa prapañca bhūvanakośa vistara varṇam nāma tṛtīya paricchedaḥ".

II. Category (b)

Sadananda Yogi

He is the author of a śataka known as *Sadānandayogi Śataka*¹⁶ inculcating the principles of Dattatreya philosophy in *Gītā* metre. His disciples are :

1. Challa Suraya : *Vivekana vijayamu*¹⁷ is the drama by Suraya modelled on *Probodhachandrodayamu*. The hero of the drama is Vivekendra and the heroine is Upanisadkanta.

2. Isvara Panibhatta : *Paratattvarasāyanam*¹⁸ in five cantos is written by Panibhatta and dedicated to Sadananda yogi. It deals with Advaita philosophy.

III. Category

Mallana

This disciple of Timmayogi is referred to by Tarigonda Vengamamba in her works. He is the author of three works :

(1) *Tattvachandrodayamu*: (*Dvipada*) not available.

(2) *Rāmastavarājamu*—a popular poetical work in three cantos dealing with *Tāraka*, *Amanaska* and *Rājayogas*.

(3) *Muktikāntā-priya-śatakamu*. In this śataka every verse ends with *Mallā mukti kāntā priyā*" (*Atmasambodhana*).

IV Category

Yoganandādvadhuta

He is the author of *Guruśiṣyasamvādam* based on *Avadhūtagītā*.

V Category

Kambhampati Narappa is the author of *Gurugītā Sāraṃu*.

VI Category

Janardana is the author of *Jīvaprabodhamu*, a poetical work in five cantos.

VII Category

Parasurama Pantula Lingamurti Gurumurti is also the author of *Adhyātmārāmāyaṇa* and *Manasātaka* and *Sita pata* (the principles of Rama cult popularized in *geya* metre to be sung by women.)

Vivekasindhuu:

This is a poetical work in Telugu by Veginati Kondayya and dedicated to Dattatreya yogi. This work is based on the Telugu prose version of Marati work *Viveka-sindhu* written by Mukundaraj, the oldest of Marati authors¹⁹. The Telugu work is in five cantos, and contains fifteen chapters. It deals with all aspects of Vedanta Philosophy²⁰ and contains good poetry.

Dattātreya śatakamu: This is *śataka*²¹ in praise of Dattatreya in *Sita* metre ending with a *makuṣa* "*Chīrasubhākara mokṣa lakṣmīvihāra*" "*Sandraruchi Dhurya Datta Yogīndravarya*".

*Muktikāntā Parīṇayamu*²²

This is another work of Kondayya and is based on the work of Paramanandatīrtha already referred to. But the present work is in a *Champu* form (prose and verse) in three cantos, and dedicated to Dattatreya Yogi.

*Muktikāntā vilāsamu*²³

This is a Yakshagana work on the same theme by Tarigonda Vengamamba. This plot of the Yakshagana is given below.

"Jagadisvara, the Lord of the Universe leaves Maya and enters the abode of Muktikanta in order to win her. Jnanakanta at the door obstructs him. There ensues a conversation between them. At this stage Mayasakti enters with Vairagya and Jnana Saktis and there arises a hot debate between Maya and Jnana. Finally Jnana succeeds and Jagadisvara marries Muktikanta."

The basis for this philosophical theme is undoubtedly *Jīvanmuktī Gītā* by Dattatreya.²⁴ The philosophy as embodied in the *Jīvanmuktī Gītā* is completely and meticulously explained by the very learned author of 'Dattatreya'—who has also given an English rendering of each verse of the text.

To bring out the nature and importance of this cult one should have a good knowledge of Telugu language and literature as all the materials available are in this language. The attention of the scholars to the religious books in the vernaculars was drawn by T.N. Farquhar so long ago as 1919 in the following words.

"Vernacular religious books are as truly a vital part of the growth of the sects as their more formal sanskrit manuals are. For a free understanding of the history, the whole must be envisaged as one great movement. These words have to be kept in view by any research worker in his task of gathering materials which lie scattered in different manuscripts and general libraries."²⁵

In this connection it is worth noting that the majority of the works extant bearing on the subject are in manuscript form and the few books available in print with the honorable exception of one or two bear little or no evidence of having been critically edited for the benefit of the interested reader.

If all this literature comes to light, then there will be a plethora of material not only for tracing the origin and development of philosophical literature in Telugu but also for assessing the Andhra contribution to Hindu religion, philosophy and ethics.

NOTES

¹ G.O.M. D.C. No. 789 Sataks.

² A report has been submitted on the subject "Ethics and Philosophy of Vemana" under the guidance of Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan.

³ For an exposition of the philosophy of this cult, the reader is referred to the excellent work on the subject entitled "Dattatreya" (The Way and The Goal) by His Highness Sri Jaya Chamarajendra Wodeyar Bahadur, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., LL.D., Maharaja of Mysore with an introduction by Sir Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956.

Also, *Dattatreya and his Philosophy* (in Tamil) A.I.R. Talk on May 21, 1960, by Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan.

Since this is the first time that this subject is introduced both to Andhras and Non-Andhra Scholars, the article is bound to be a list of authors and titles of works. But this is unavoidable as the information regarding names and titles is the only basis for any subject of advanced research especially in case of vernaculars.

⁴ A brief summary of the philosophy of *Sītārāmāñjaneyasamēdham*, S. Ramamurty, M.A., Journal of the Madras University, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1940, pp. 224-232.

⁵ See the article entitled "The literary and philosophical works of Tarigonda Vengamamba, a woman saint" by the present writer. Madras University Journal (Section A) Vol. XXXV No. 1 January 1953, pp. 16-29. Sri N. Satyanarayana made a special study of the philosophy of Tarigonda Vengamamba under the guidance of Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan and submitted a report.

⁶ Up till Adilabad, 165 miles, there is a train communication, but the next 50 miles one has to traverse through dense forests and hill tribal hamlets.

⁷ A passage in Marata language occurs for the first time in the works of Palkuriki Somanatha, (1180-1240) the well-known apostle of Virasaivism, in his work *Panditārādhyā charitra* (Parvataprakarana, Page 309). There are many references to Mahuram in Telugu classics. A few of them are quoted below.

(a) Kridabhiramamu, Srinatha, 1440 A.D. Verse 18.

(b) Varahapuramamu, Mallayya and Singayya, 1480 A.D. (1-20)

(c) Kalapurnodayamu, Pingali Suranna, 5-132, 5-194, 5-202, 5-203, 5-204 (1560)

(d) Chandrabhanucharitramu, Mallana (1600 A.D.) The work is dedicated to

Dattatreya yogi.

⁸ In the *Naishada Charita* of Sri Harsha, we have a reference to Dattatreya, as an avatar of Vishnu (20-100) Dr. K.K. Handique in his excellent English Critical Edition of (*Naishada Charita*), discusses, about the origin of Dattatreya (vide Minor allusions, Appendix II, pp. 520-522), 1st Edition 1934. But in the second Edition of the work in 1960, the learned Doctor appended a note in the introduction (P. 6) regarding the Dattatreya cult in Maharashtra, from the information obtained from the eminent Indologist Dr. P.K. Gode, who passed away a few months ago. It may be of interest to Telugu scholars, that Srinatha, (1365-1450) the great Telugu poet, who translated *Naishada Charita* in Telugu omits the praise of Dattatreya.

⁹ D.C. Vedanta. No. 2588

¹⁰ Tanjore, Dt. Tamilnad, South India.

¹¹ T.S.M. Nos. 557 & 558.

¹² *Asmutardhopanyasamu* (Tamil version of Vedanta varnika) by Sri D. T. Tatacharya Siromani, Journal of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute. Vol. VI. Revts. I & II pp. 136-137. Also known as *Upadesakramanu* (vide Tr. 195 and 2073).

¹³ D.C. 2066 vol IX.

¹⁴ Printed M.G.O. Library Series LXXXVIII. 1952.

¹⁵ T.S.M., No. 750-751, two manuscripts.

The above was translated from Telugu into Kannada by Njaguna Sivayogi (see D.C. of Kannada manuscripts, G.O.M. Library, No. 608) .

¹⁶ Printed Vavilla 1926.

¹⁷ Printed, Andhra University, Yakshaganas Vol. V, 1960.

¹⁸ Printed by the Madras University, 1940.

¹⁹ A note on Mukundaraja, the oldest Marathi author, *Journal of the Bombay Branch of Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 9. Article VIII. pp. 167-170.

²⁰ Printed, Vavilla, Madras, 1930.

²¹ Unprinted, G.O.M. Library, R. 27.

²¹ R. 801. G.O.M.

²² Printed 1869. Madras Pasala Parthasarathy Nayanivari Vidwanmoda Tarangini Press.

²³ See *Dattatreya*, Chapter III. *Dattatreya, the spiritual discipline*, pp. 50-74. Chapter IV. *Dattatreya the Philosopher*.

²⁴ *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India*, Introduction, p. 6.

Abbreviations:

D.C. Descriptive Catalogue of Telugu manuscripts.

G.O.M. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras.

T.S.M. Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, Tanjore.

R. Triennial Catalogue. G.O.M.

SOME ASPECTS OF INDIAN INFLUENCE ON FRENCH LITERATURE

S. SIAUVE

WE propose here to consider two questions : the first is to trace the history of Indian influences on French writers, especially from the beginning of the XIX century; the second is to show the main lines of interest for India in the France of today.

The earliest detectable traces of India in French literature appear to date from the XVII century. At that time India began to be an object of curiosity thanks to the tales of travellers. One of them, Bernier, was specially famous in literary circles ; he had been for eight years at the court of the Mogul sovereign Aurangzeb. Bernier was well known to one of the French writers La Fontaine. So, we find that some of the fables of La Fontaine are clothed in an oriental garb. He himself says that he borrowed several stories from an Indian sage whom he calls Pilpay, which name can perhaps be understood as Vidyapati. It is sure however that La Fontaine did not know the existence of the *Pañcatantra* collection of tales. Those stories were widely known in Europe from the Middle Ages through an Arabic version.

Can we really speak here of an Indian influence ? The Oriental flavour was only for the fabulist a means to arouse the reader's interest while producing in him some poetic feeling. La Fontaine as a true man of his time, namely the classical period, believed in the universal character of human nature. Hence when he sets his tales in the East it is only to show that man is everywhere the same with the same virtues or vices, and an identical wisdom.

In the XVIII century, the rationalistic view of man grew more systematic and developed into the so called "Philosophical Ideas". The "Philosophers" insisted on the identity of human nature, the world over, and on the dignity of the reasonable essence of man : this led them to be highly interested in the nations recently discovered, and also to protest against the abuses of traders and conquerors in Asia and America. Besides, in their eagerness for universal knowledge they started studying the history of every country. One such scholar was Deguignes, the first French historian of India. Voltaire also in his "Essay on Customs" tried to gather all possible information on eastern nations, including India. His work however, being mainly polemical, lacks scientific value, for, Voltaire, as is habitual with him, wanted to collect from everywhere arguments against Christianity ; he meant to prove that pure, natural religion is a kind of deism similar to his own.

We do not really find here a proper influence of Indian thought. Voltaire read his own thought in Indian texts ; in that way he made a wide use of a text which he believed to express truly ancient Indian ideas. Unfortunately for him this text, the *Ezour Vedam*, was not at all a part of the Hindu Sastras, but a very late text written apparently by a Bengali who may have been a Christian convert.

But in the XIX century the Romantic School of literature, with its new outlook, started a strong reaction against the whole of the classical and rationalistic tradition.

First this reaction manifested itself as a desire to find new sources of literary inspiration, instead of the classical Greek and Latin ones. The writers were interested in all forms of popular poetry, Celtic poems, Middle Ages writings, German epics, and also in the literatures of the East, Arabic and Indian. They wished to discover the fresh, original springs of literature, the spontaneous imagination of the popular mind, the wonderland of mythological tales, where supernatural beings interfere with human events. At the same time the great Indian epics and the *Purāṇas* began to be known through translations¹ ; they appeared to be immense receptacles of poetry, the poetry

of souls in touch with the living powers of Nature.

The Romantic movement was secondly a reaction against the rules of classical art, which had been so strictly defined during the classical period. Those rules had inspired great works in the XVII century but by and by they had caused the literary art to become rather formal and academic. And thus, in sharp contrast with the classical theatre, the dramas of William Shakespeare, their powerful style and richly varied themes, fascinated men's minds. So too the Indian theatre, in the first place *Sakuntalā* and also the *Mṛcchakatikā*. Those two works were represented in a French version with great success. The same reaction against formal rules was evident in the poetic field : the Romantic poets felt the ambition of writing big epics, both lyrical and philosophical in order to describe all the emotions and aspects of the human soul, through every epoch and country. Hence great was their admiration for the Indian epics, the width of their subject, the freedom of their literary composition which gave the impression of fulness of life and creative springing.

The third aspect of the Romantic reaction was against the intellectualism of the previous centuries, and against the tyrannical dominion of Reason. Thus in opposition to the rationalistic view of life, the Romantics considered poetry as the fruit of intuition, and as the real way to metaphysics. The poet was a kind of prophet, capable of expressing the true reality of Being, that reality which could be confusedly felt by the human soul when under the power of great and natural emotions. That true Reality was understood as the fundamental Unity of life, vegetative as well as animal and human. And that same Unity was interpreted as God himself. Pantheism was more or less implied in these romantic works. Here also the Indian ideas were appealed to as a confirmation. We would not say that this position was based on a profound knowledge of Indian thought, remembering how firmly the great Vedānta teachers rejected pantheism. But the confusion arose from the doctrine of reincarnation, which was understood as showing an identity of nature in all beings.

These, then, are the three main ideas which led the Romantic writers to give a place to India in their works. Thus, Lamartine tells us how the Vedic hymns moved him so intensely that he fell on his knees to read the text a second time. In his book entitled "Familiar Course of Literature" he devoted more than three hundred pages to Indian literature, including a full analysis of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. Victor Hugo was in turn attracted and confused by Indian poetry. He has given us a version of a passage of the *Kenopaniṣad*, in his poem entitled "Suprematie" but he has drawn his inspiration from the Arabs more frequently than from the Indians. Some of his themes however reveal an Indian influence, for instance his views regarding the "scale of beings" or "metempsychosis". Alfred Vigny with his solitary and desperate philosophy, believed that Buddhism was rooted in that same pessimism, leading to an absolute non-Being, and to an ethics of self-sufficiency in a world without God. Leconte de Lisle later in the XIX century very nearly adopted that same attitude. He admired the serenity and nobility of brahmanical philosophy, and also the doctrine of Maya which he felt as greatly poetical.

The great historians of the XIX century were also influenced by Indian thought. Michelet saw in the *Vedas* the Bible of Humanity, that is the pure, original stage of all the great ideas which had found their development during the course of history. When he interprets that same history as the revelation of an universal soul striving towards its perfection, through great personalities, we feel that he has given us a western version of the notion of *saṁsāra*, understood not as individual but collective, and that he has combined it with the European idea of Progress.

About the same time in Germany grew up the idea that the Sanskrit language was the one parent of all other languages, an idea that was to lead to the exaltation of Aryanism. In France the Count of Gobineau, rejected this idea of an original language but he adopted the theory of an original race, superior to all others, namely the Aryan. He proclaimed that the West had received everything from the East, that the whole of the Greek

thought and of Christianity had originated from India.

From these exaggerations we can gauge the enthusiasm which accompanied the discovery of India. We see also how this same enthusiasm deformed the Indian ideas. One such most striking deformation, already alluded to, was the interpretation of Indian literature as an expression of a spontaneous art, when we know, on the contrary, that the Indian literary rules are most precise. Another instance is the pantheistic version of Indian thought, for we know how all the Vedantic teachers struggled against such a theory. We have seen also how the Indian notion of *samsāra* has been transformed by the western notion of Progress.

Nevertheless we can speak rightly here of an Indian influence on French thought. The Romantic writers felt it as a new inspiration, stimulating their own thought. In a recent book, Raymond Schwab shows how that period can rightly be called an "Oriental Renaissance", a kind of Re-birth, giving a new starting-point to the literary creation, similar to the "classical Renaissance" of the XVI century.

We may now proceed to our second problem—and ask : what about our times ?

We must say that our modern age is as little romantic as possible. We find instead, a general attitude of suspicion towards sensibility and sentimentality, towards metaphysical enthusiasms and global intuitions, as well as towards the deification of Progress.

On the other hand France of today is much better informed about India of the past and the present. India is seen as a complex reality, with her own problems, her own evolution, her own relations to other civilizations—the thinkers know that no field of intellectual activity can be fully encompassed unless India is included in comparative and historical studies. Hence the number of introductory books to this or that aspect of India like literature, history, philosophy, religion as well as studies on economics, geography and so on. Hence also the keen interest for comparative literature or art, comparative mythology, philosophy or religion.

Coming to particulars we would point at least to three Indian words pregnant with a specific Indian significance and which are more or less widely known in France. Those words are *ahimsā*, *karma* and *yoga*. What do they mean for thinkers?

1) First the word *ahimsā* and the notion of non-violence. The French writer Romain Rolland popularised widely both the term and the concept, first through his book on Mahatma Gandhi in 1923; then by his serial three volumes on Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, where he proposed what he calls the "Universal Gospel" as a means to achieve the unity of mankind through spiritual values.

The example of Mahatma Gandhi gave to western peoples quite new conceptions about Indian ethics. Before him, the western thinkers were satisfied with the superficial opposition between the activity of the West and the passivity of the East, the optimism of the West and the pessimism of the East, and so on. They had now to understand that there was no such opposition and that Indian ideas could produce a positive attitude to life, and this not only at the individual level but at the social and national levels as well.

There have even been in France some small groups trying to follow the full ideal of Gandhi. In our own days Lanza del Vasto has founded a community which intends to imitate the way of life in Gandhian Ashrams. He had come to India in the thirties, and written a book on Gandhi *The Pilgrimage to the Sources* and another recently, in 1954, on Vinoba Bhawe.

Opinions in France concerning those same ideas are rather divided. Generally the French thinkers recognize fully the greatness of Gandhi's personality but they believe that this greatness must essentially be characterized by the fact that Gandhi found solutions perfectly adapted to the problems he had to solve, solutions which were in consonance with himself and his nation. They do not think that the same kind of procedure could be easily adapted to the West—which has to find its own solutions.

2) Secondly the word *karma*. By this we do not mean to say that many French men adhere to the Indian vision of the

individual souls that work out their destiny through the actions of successive lives. We should even add that the very idea is quite foreign to the western mind. When the Romantics spoke of this, they understood it not as an individual reincarnation but as a collective process: as one single current of the Spirit, one collective Soul incarnating itself in human beings. In fact the whole trend of contemporary French philosophy tends towards the opposite direction being more and more a personalistic philosophy, with a strong emphasis on the unique character of each human person and of every interpersonal relationship.

But the word *karma* is interesting for philosophers and psychologists because of the analysis of the psychic life it implies. After Bergson French psychology is laying a heavy stress on the dynamic aspect of psychic life, on the tendencies considered as the very texture of our psychological being. This reminds us of the Indian theory of *saṁskāra*. Bergson does not seem to have known it. But there is a mere coincidence which we like to note, for Bergson's position makes it easy for European philosophers to understand the Indian analysis of psychic life. The *karma* theory is based on the fact that the *saṁskāras* can remain invisible in the depths of consciousness and can later, through their unseen power, bear their fruits at the level of the conscious life. This leads to the view that there are various levels in the psychic life, from the Unconscious to the Conscious activity. Some of the European thinkers sought under the personal Unconscious a collective Unconscious where would be found the archetypal images which are common to the whole humanity, and which would be the sources of religious symbols. This is to be noticed in the work, written in French, of Mircea Eliade, who knows the Indian psychological conceptions.

3) Finally, the third word we mentioned, namely *yoga*, is rather widely known in France, even if not always accurately. *Yoga* as a technical method for spiritual achievement, is attractive to modern man, at the same time when the modern French philosophy lays such stress on the necessary connections between thought and action, and between freedom and self-realization. Books and guides on *yoga* and *yoga* schools can be found in

France, appealing to small circles. We must say that in many cases *yoga* is understood there in a way quite different from the classical *yoga* of Patanjali. It is very often transformed by the western mind, turning to be sometimes nothing else than will to power or self-assertion, or even only a guide for health or beauty. But in more serious cases the interest for *yoga* and the attempt to practise it, betrays a real need for psychic balance, a desire for silence and peace, occasioned by the inhuman way of modern life. We can say that the need is rather widely felt in France by religious souls. The attraction for *yoga*, in non-Christian circles, is significant of a more general trend. We find that there is at the same time, in the Christian Church, a going back to the traditional practice of inner life : meditation and contemplation are more and more integrated in the spirituality of the faithful at large, and not only of monks or nuns in monasteries. There have also been some attempts made by Christian theologians to compare the two sciences of inner life, the Hindu and the Christian.

We would now conclude by asking : what is common to the three points of interest that we have mentioned ? The first point is related to ethical life, the second to psychic life, the third to spiritual life. The common element is easy to find: in all those three cases the interest for Indian notions is closely connected with the interest for inner life. Such is the feature that the French thinkers have always considered as essential to Indian thought. Even if they misunderstood sometimes the Indian ideas, as we have seen, we can assert that they have been right at least on this very point on which, as we think, we could all agree.²

NOTES

¹ *Harivârṇa*, French translation by Langlois, Paris 1834-35.

RāmJyana, Italian translation by Gorresio, Paris 1847-58, edition Torino, Paris 1843-67.

Le RāmJyana de Vālmiki, Tome I *Adikāṇḍa*, Paris 1853, translated by Valentin Parisot.

RāmJyana— complete translation into French by Hippolyte Fauche, 9 vol, Paris 1854-58.

Le RāmJyana de Vālmiki, French translation by A. Roussel, Paris 1903-09.

source. The instructive fact is that the more deeply we can sleep and cease to bother about the objects of wakeful interest, the more are we refreshed, and fitter do we feel for the next lap of wakeful life.

We must constantly collect our scattered existence, withdraw into the centre of our being, to be able to discharge the day's duties with vigour, poise and harmony. A good speaker or writer never loses sight of his central theme which he only unfolds through various expressions, and never for a moment does he lose himself. A master singer never forgets the keynote. A skilful artist constantly remembers the background and the central theme to be expressed. A good life is centred in the true and abiding Self. It is marked, therefore, by poise, harmony and peace.

A person that is self-centred (*ātmaśtha*) attracts also others towards their real Self and Centre, by his very presence. This is testified by many who enjoyed the silent company of Ramana Maharshi who rarely spoke, and yet kept the visitors meditating on: "Who am I?" One of the few questions that the Maharshi asked his fortunate visitor used to be, "Who are you?" or "Who is that?"

Our esteemed friend and colleague, Professor Mahadevan, reminds me ever and again of the Maharshi's ideal of life centred in the Self. May his life inspire us for many more years to come.

A JOHANNINE DISCOURSE ON REBIRTH AND ETERNAL LIFE

LUCETTA MOWRY

WHAT is the meaning of existence? Throughout the centuries the question has haunted man and challenged him to wrestle with the problem. Some have replied with a tentative whisper; other have declared their views with authoritative assurance.

This paper makes no attempt to probe all answers to this great mystery nor to plumb the depth of the complex tradition of Hinduism. Silence on non-Christian answers, or even on *the* Christian answer, to the problem does not imply their lack of value but the author's hesitancy to deal with them. Readers of this volume who come with that treasury of past insight garnered from many lands will be able to correct this deficiency. For them it may be a contribution to discuss a single Christian response, one found in a passage of the New Testament, chapter three of the Gospel according to John.¹

This Christian evangelist sets forth the problem in a concrete situation, a dialogue between Jesus and Nicodemus (John 3: 1-10). It is in this section that the author deals especially with rebirth. However, as the author progresses with the development of his theme Nicodemus and the original situation fade from view and become merely the occasion for the presentation of Christian convictions, those of the author, in monologue form. Moreover, the development of ideas in the chapter as a whole presents a change of emphasis from rebirth to eternal life. It is also frequently not clear whether the author intends to represent Jesus or Christian believers (the Church) as speaking. One would conclude that this fluidity

Bhāgavata Purāṇa, French translation by E. Burnouf, Paris 1840-47, tomes I-III completed by Hauvette-Besnault and A. Roussel 2 vols. Paris 1884-98.

Sakuntalā, edited and translated into French by A. Chézy, Paris 1830.

* Paper read during the Indo-French Week, organized by the Madras University, in December 1960, at the Seminar presided over by Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan.

THE SELF-CENTRED LIFE

D. M. DATTA

'SELF-CENTRED', in common parlance, means 'selfish', and both words wrongly suggest that a life centred in the self or devoted to the self is socially undesirable. Really, however, the conflict is not between the self and others, but between the real Self and the apparent selves through which we grope in our ignorant search of the real Self, the Self in which we can centre our life, and around which we can organize life's interests and activities by reconciling the needs of others with our own.

The apparent selves are the tentative and imperfect centres of interest which acquire exclusive importance at particular moments and demand absolute allegiance. Most of us have, for the matter of that, many selves with conflicting claims and urges. The supreme task of life is the discovery of our real Self, the true centre, in reference to which we can harmonize and regulate our conflicting purposes. Considered by this norm most of us would be found subnormal. We mostly live on the surface. We are tossed about by the passing waves and winds, and have no deep mooring. But we inwardly keep hankering after peace and poise. This is evident from our continuing discontent and *ennui*, our feeling of being 'fed up with' and 'sick of' things we ran after so eagerly.

Sleep is a daily reminder of Nature that we must relax our hold on things we clasp so fast. A robber who stakes his very life for plundering wealth also falls asleep and relaxes his grip around the plundered purse. Even the nursing mother forgets the helpless baby in sleep. We withdraw completely into ourselves ; knowledge, emotion and will disappear into their

source. The instructive fact is that the more deeply we can sleep and cease to bother about the objects of wakeful interest, the more are we refreshed, and fitter do we feel for the next lap of wakeful life.

We must constantly collect our scattered existence, withdraw into the centre of our being, to be able to discharge the day's duties with vigour, poise and harmony. A good speaker or writer never loses sight of his central theme which he only unfolds through various expressions, and never for a moment does he lose himself. A master singer never forgets the keynote. A skilful artist constantly remembers the background and the central theme to be expressed. A good life is centred in the true and abiding Self. It is marked, therefore, by poise, harmony and peace.

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is an attempt to express the author's conviction that Jesus truly said and was what the evangelist believed him to be and say. These few preliminary observations are a warning to the interpreter of the chapter. It does seem clear, however, that to understand the evangelist's thought one must examine carefully the problem as set forth first in the dialogue (John 3 : 1-10) and then the development of the theme in the latter part of the chapter (John 3 : 11-21, 31-36).³

In the dialogue the characterization of Nicodemus is a significant factor. He is introduced and described as a member of the Jewish Sanhedrin, a Pharisee and a scribe, as one therefore who combines in his person the wealth of Jewish tradition and learning. He has studied the sacred books of this tradition, the Law and the Prophets, and regarded obedience to God's commands and ordinances as the necessary path to the achievement of a truly righteous and holy life acceptable to God. As a conscientious Jew he has come to Jesus, a new teacher on the Palestinian scene, to be instructed further lest he lose advantage of adding what this teacher may say about God's demands for ultimate salvation. It is clear from Jesus' reply to him that Nicodemus regards the realization of national hopes, or the realization of the Kingdom of God, as the goal of salvation.

It is in this connection that Jesus' reply is of particular interest. Jesus maintains, according to this evangelist, that one must experience rebirth before one can experience this ancient hope of Judaism : "except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God" (John 3 : 3) and "except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God ; that which is born of the flesh is flesh and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:5-6). Jesus' reply, therefore, raises the question of the nature of man's being. Born of the flesh, man is fleshy. So born man may strive with all the energies of heart and mind to be righteous before God and thus may achieve a perfection that is human and material. But as one born of flesh, man will always be bound by the limitations of his humanity. Ultimate salvation is only for one who is of the nature of God and of the world of the Spirit. No

effort on man's part, therefore, can make him essentially different for he is still 'of the flesh'. What is required to achieve the realization of religious hopes is an entirely new beginning which makes men of an order different from that of the flesh. Since this change of one's essential nature and being is required, the way of moral effort in the achievement of righteousness can have no avail. In other words, Jesus goes back to the premise upon which Nicodemus' words, by implication, are based and maintains that the premise is wrong.

Understandably, Nicodemus cannot comprehend what it means to be born again as for a Jew, and indeed for all Jews including Jesus and his Palestinian Jewish followers, reality is essentially unified and one. *The Christ of the Gospel according to John*, however, is a representative of a different way of thinking. For him there are two worlds, that of God and that of the flesh.³ For Nicodemus, therefore, there can be only one kind of birth for any individual, a physical one. If one were to contemplate a second birth, it would require a repetition of the first, issuance from the mother's womb.

In reply Jesus repeats his assertion: one must be born again. With the repetition he adds an explanatory element: *one must be born of water and spirit*. The statement serves to indicate that a repetition of the original act of birth is not contemplated but a second birth of a different order from the first, a new beginning which makes man a member of a new order of reality. It further indicates that the act of Christian baptism ('water and spirit') makes him a new kind of being in a different category of reality. Hence the rebirth which this evangelist associates with baptism is not a metaphor but a reality comparable to the first birth of man. In this particular passage of this chapter the act of baptism becomes the instrument by which the transition from the world of the flesh to that of the Spirit is achieved. It is so real in its potency that it divides men into two groups: those, on the one hand, who move on the material level, the level of ordinances, and thereby achieve piety; and those, on the other hand, who are of the order of the Spirit and find salvation by being one with God. The flesh-born

cannot be other than flesh, and the spirit-born cannot be other than spirit. A transformation of man's nature, not a graduation into a higher order or a growth into it, is required for ultimate salvation. Furthermore, the transformation can be accomplished only by a power outside of man, the divine Spirit which is, in fact, abroad in the world, and to be found in the Christian rite of baptism.⁴

To illustrate the activity of the Spirit the evangelist has Jesus speak of the wind as the closest analogy in the material world to the Spirit.⁵ One can discern the presence of the wind but not know why it blows in certain directions. Its whence and its whither are baffling for it seems to follow its own laws. The wind and the Spirit are alike, therefore, because their nature and mode of manifestation are inscrutable and their being is autonomous. Hence the process of rebirth is autonomous as well as those who are of the higher order of being.

The evangelist then allows Nicodemus to disappear from the scene for as a representative of the old order he is completely bewildered by the course of the argument. He is unable to understand the idea of a second birth into a new mode of existence because all reality is one. For him reality is one process that emanates out of God, and man's salvation is achieved by exhibiting in this life the full perfection of righteousness for which and in which God created him. Nicodemus cannot believe that there are two processes for man's life and that salvation requires entrance into the second process.

It is now clear that Nicodemus' thinking and that of Jesus, or more accurately the evangelist's own concepts spoken through Jesus, can never meet. Jesus' comments consequently extend beyond that of the concrete situation of his dialogue with Nicodemus. He now turns to the unbelieving, hostile world of men who must be judged because they cannot understand. As the concrete situation disappears so also do the questions regarding rebirth and entrance into the Kingdom of God. These questions give way to that of eternal life, a kind of existence which men can have here and now. With these alterations the dialogue becomes a monologue in which the Christ reveals himself to

his own followers and gives them an answer to the question : how can the transformation from the world of the flesh to that of the Spirit take place ?

The first element of the answer (John 3:11-16) places the emphasis on the idea that Jesus, as the Son of Man, by his death and ascension draws men after him into the new and higher mode of being. Here men have eternal life. In this section the evangelist argues his case as follows. He claims that Christians have experienced such a life in two worlds, the world of human reason and the world of revealed truth communicated by God. The Christian has also experienced the move from the one world to the other and describes this movement in terms of birth and rebirth. Since the new state cannot be proven or made comprehensible to the mind of one who is still in the world of mundane existence, the Christian can only testify to the fact (so he would call it) that he has experienced the transformation. The attempt has been made to explain that aspect of the new and other process of being at the point where it impinges upon the earthly events of men; when it makes men new by what has been called, after the analogy of the cosmic process, birth and rebirth. The crux of the other process of being is in God. If it is impossible to believe in the former where one can conceivably describe it in earthly terms such as rebirth, how then is it possible to accept the latter and know it in essence ? (John 3 : 11-12)

Then the evangelist proceeds to state that an understanding of the entire process lies in its merging into the heavenly world of God (John 3 : 13). The Christian knows this merging to be possible because he has known one who belongs essentially to the world of God, became incarnate, and ascended into heaven. By becoming incarnate Christ brought the new order into this world.

For the purpose of the argument, the author needed merely to assert the meeting of the two worlds in the incarnate Christ. However, the evangelist stresses the ascension rather than the incarnation of Christ and indicates the cogency existing in the process of Jesus' elevation (John 3 : 14-15). His ascent has a

parallel in the Old Testament story of Moses lifting up the serpent in the wilderness, a reference to a narrative in Numbers 21 where the Israelites are saved from snake bites by looking at a brass serpent elevated upon a pole. There is found here an analogy to what has happened to Christian believers. Those who lift up the eye of faith to the elevated Christ have as their reward eternal life. There is then a saving value attached to the elevation or ascension, an elevation which is not to be dissociated from the incarnation. In fact, in the elevation the soteriological significance of the incarnation comes most properly to expression.

The thrust of this affirmation of faith is expressed later in this Gospel in the following words: "if I be lifted up from the earth I shall draw all men to me" (John 12 : 32). The evangelist believes, therefore, that the incarnate Christ by his words and deeds not only reveals a knowledge of the world of God but more especially that the incarnate Christ by his death and exaltation through resurrection reveals the saving work of God for men. Therefore, if the evangelist tries to communicate heavenly reality, he must start with the central revealing and saving event, the elevation of the incarnate Son of God upon the Cross.

This attempt to state how the saving death of Christ and his ascension illuminates the impinging of material reality upon the spiritual will be even more incomprehensible than the earlier statements on rebirth when the evangelist tried to explain how the transcendent reality impinges upon the material. By these statements the evangelist suggests that the meaning of existence cannot be understood by information concerning the nature of spiritual reality but by an experience of the *significance* of an historical event in the life of the Christ of history. The significance of the event is given as an affirmation of faith. To believe in the one lifted up is to be drawn with him into the higher order of life. Furthermore, participation in that order which is divine and eternal is possible at the present moment (John 3 : 15).

In one of the most frequently quoted and well-known verses of the New Testament the evangelist continues his

affirmation that salvation and rebirth are not to be found in information conveyed by the incarnate Christ but in an act. The passage reads as follows:

For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life. (John 3 : 16)

Here the evangelist stresses the following points. The availability of salvation and rebirth into eternal life is not an accident but part of a great act of God. God gave his Son in the widest possible sense, not only a giving to death, but also a giving into incarnation, a giving of the Son as the revealer of his purpose, and as one who by the power of his death and ascension draws men to himself. The act is one of supreme love and as such a selfless act. Only the word 'love' is adequate to describe it. Since it is an act of divine love, its intention is unlimited. Love for the whole sinful world prompts the act. As an act of love it cannot have a negative function but must save men from destruction, and bestow upon men eternal life, an existence in a new type of being which is spiritual and not limited by death. However the evangelist attaches a condition. The act though prompted by love for the whole world is effective for those who in faith accept Christ as the instrument of God's salvation. This condition does limit the operation of God's saving love and so stated is contrary to the greater universalism found in Jesus' teaching. While this assertion is controversial, many New Testament scholars applying the principles of historical and literary criticism to the text of the gospel material maintain that Jesus stressed as the primary condition on man's part faith in God whose will is to redeem men.⁶ It seems likely that Jesus' followers, recognizing their dependence upon him, added to this basic assertion faith in Jesus Christ through whom they believed God to be working for their salvation.

In the second element of the evangelist's discourse (John 3 : 17-21) the positive and negative implications of the affirmation regarding God's sending of his Son are considered. The

purpose of the sending has not been for judgment but to give eternal life. To those immediate followers of Jesus who looked forward to the coming of the messianic Son of Man as the final judge, this Johannine statement must have been startling. According to the author of the Gospel according to John, the judgment or condemnation never applied to the one who accepts Christ in faith. For the believer the eschatological event is cancelled altogether (John 3 : 18). Equally important and even more revolutionary for Christian thought is the statement that the one who does not believe is already judged. Judgment, then, does not exist except as a part of the acceptance or rejection of Jesus by the individual. This evangelist has, therefore, radically altered such pictures of cosmic judgment found in other books of the New Testament, especially the Book of Revelation. For this evangelist the judgment is already consummated. He regards the judgment not as an eschatological event but as part of the soteriological process. Christ, the light of the world, has entered history. Those who do evil and try to hide their evil deeds from being manifested by that light condemn themselves. Those who have no fear about the manifestation of their deeds in the light and come to the light are given eternal life. The incarnation of the Son of God has as its purpose, therefore, the giving of eternal life. Though this soteriological aim is the purpose of the incarnation, Jesus' coming also becomes the occasion for the judgment of those whose deeds are evil.

The final section (John 3 : 31-36) appears to undergird the thought of the evangelist's previous claims for here he speaks of Christ as the revelation of God. Only if Christ is the revelation of God himself and has as the expression of God the nature and capacities of God can Christ draw men to him and give them eternal life. Consequently, the author turns quite correctly to a description of Christ's relation to God.⁷ Earlier in the chapter (John 3 : 13) the evangelist stated that the Son of Man descended from heaven. Now this claim is taken as the beginning for a new line of argument. If Christ is from above then he is above (John 3 : 31). Above in this second instance

is used to express Christ's authority. Hence in his capacity as one who is from above he is distinguished from him who is below, namely man who is of the earth. Man being of the earth is mortal and can speak only of earthly things. By contrast Christ can speak of what he has seen and heard in the heavenly sphere and bears witness to these heavenly things, i.e., the divine world and the divine will. According to the evangelist, the tragic fact is that Christ gains no acceptance by his witness. It is clear that this pessimistic statement is rhetorical because it is followed by the mention of some who receive the witness and attest, or affix the seal of approval, to what Christ says with regard to God's trustworthiness. This attestation is to God who speaks in and through Christ. Hence what the Son says is true if God is true and trustworthy. The Son can do so not because he is God himself but because God has given him a complete measure of his Spirit (John 3 : 33-34).

The gift of the Spirit, however, is only a partial explanation for the Son's power to reveal God's words and draw men into a new life. The further explanation lies in the belief that a relation of complete intimacy exists between the Father and the Son, an intimacy which only the word 'love' can describe (John 3 : 35). Since God loves the Son, God has given everything into his hand. Consequently, Christ is the absolute representation of God. Thus the author concludes that the Son can give eternal life which he does for God to those who believe.

One might expect the author to say also that the Son can in God's stead condemn the unbeliever to everlasting death. Actually he does not say this for the reason that Christ's work is to save men and not to judge them (cf. John 3 : 17). If men are judged by Christ's bringing of the light, it is not because Christ is the judge but because his coming, which is God's affair, results in judgment. Hence the author states that God's wrath abides upon those who do not believe in the Son.

This brief examination of the elements of the discourse makes it possible to review the entire complex, i.e. the narrative with the subsequent monologue. Interestingly, it is only in

the first section (John 3 : 1-10) that the author has brought together the idea of rebirth and the allusion to the sacrament of baptism. In the major section of the discourse, now in monologue form, he turns to the theme of eternal life, a theme which is discussed in quasi-mystical and speculative terms without reference to the sacrament as a necessary means of obtaining salvation whether it be thought of as rebirth or eternal life. Consequently, one asks this question : what does entrance into a new life coupled with rebirth of water and spirit have to do with the concept of eternal life given to those who have faith in Christ ? In short, what is the relation between the sacramental approach to salvation and the theological stress upon faith in God's work through Christ for man's redemption ? This combination found here involves a basic inconsistency which appears not only in this chapter but in the earlier writings of Paul and in later Christianity. The question leads to the two concluding remarks of this paper.

First, the significance of the rite of baptism and its importance in the soteriological process will be commented upon. One would conclude from the relevant material in the Acts of the Apostles that baptism was significant as an initiatory rite by means of which the convert became a member of the Christian community and eventually received as a distinguishing feature of his status the gift of the Holy Spirit. For Paul baptism became significant as a rite of participation in the death and resurrection of Christ. By dying and rising with Christ Paul maintained that sinful man died (i.e. the *compulsion* to sin was killed) and a new creature or new being was born and hence a new direction in life was opened up for him. For the Johannine evangelist baptism is significant as an act of rebirth out of water and spirit.

The Pauline and Johannine views are of particular interest here and are manifestly two different lines of sacramental thought. Paul recalls a mystical and ritual participation in the death and resurrection of the gods of the mystery cults. The Fourth Evangelist recalls ideas current in Syrian Gnosticism in which the baptismal rite was associated with a theogony

in which life came into being out of water.

It is in this connection, of course, that the section on John the Baptist (John 3 : 22-30) is relevant to the discourse as a whole. Obviously, for our evangelist John the Baptist's rite of water baptism as a dramatization of necessary repentance prior to the imminent judgment of God has little value. The polemical element here is quite apparent.

While our evangelist gives a unique interpretation to the rite as a sacramental means of participation in the soteriological process, it is clear from this chapter on rebirth and eternal life that sacramentalism is merely brought into his theological understanding of salvation and is utterly subordinate to his mystical and speculative approach to the meaning given to Christ and Christianity. One might assume that the evangelist has felt a compulsion to refer to the sacramental act because there was in the Church a group of Christians for whom the sacraments were efficacious in themselves apart from a theology. To include the spiritual needs of this group the evangelist has possibly referred to the sacrament and in doing so interpreted its significance along the lines of his theological insights. These theological insights, however, are of greater importance.

The second remark concerns these theological views, particularly that dealing with life or eternal life. Indeed, the author states at the conclusion of his book that the sole purpose for writing his gospel has been a discussion on finding life (John 20 : 31). This concern was not his alone. It was shared by those in his immediate environment, those of the Jewish and Hellenistic worlds, as indeed by men in every religious and philosophical tradition. Clearly the author has drawn upon Jewish and Hellenistic ideas. But in doing so he has combined and altered them in the light of his religious experience and contributed his ideas, distinctively Christian yet often quite revolutionary when compared with earlier Christian thought.

It is possible at the conclusion of this paper to mention briefly a few unique features of his theological insights. As

C.H. Dodd has pointed out, the Hebraic concept of life stresses the action, movement and enjoyment of existence.⁸ This view also looks forward to the fulfilment of life's dreams and ambitions beyond man's present earthly existence. In Judaism and in early Christianity this hope was expressed by the term Kingdom of God, or the Age to Come. God's Messiah, whether called by the title Son of Man or another designation, would be the chosen instrument for the bringing of the Kingdom. The evangelist substitutes for this Hebraic *summum bonum* of existence that of eternal life, a concept well-known and much discussed in Hellenistic circles, particularly those of the philosophers. For the evangelist the apocalyptic dreams of a future Kingdom of God gives way to eternal life which man can have now. This Eternal Now does away with a linear division of time and existence, namely of the Present Age and the Coming Age. The Eternal Now as it refers to existence must concern levels, namely that of the flesh and that of the Spirit.⁹ Consequently, the evangelist does not speak of everlasting life, of life in its quantitative sense, but of eternal life in its qualitative sense.

Such a view necessitates many drastic modifications of early Christian thought. One relevant example may be given. Christ, as the Son of Man, is no longer the eschatological figure associated with the coming of God's Kingdom. As Son of Man he is in Johannine thought the Mediator between heaven and earth and hence the vehicle for God's revelation of himself, for continuous contact with the world of the Spirit, and for placing at man's disposal all the power of the spiritual world (John 1:50-51).

The belief that Christ is the giver of life and even Life itself is a recurrent theme in this gospel and one that is frequently illustrated by allegorical treatment, as for example, the relation of the branches (the members of the Church) to the stock root of the vine (Christ). In particular the author explains the meaning of life as a kind of existence or a power to exist which men obtain from Christ through his words (John 6:63, 68). Life then is thought of as a dynamic rather than a static quality.

It is opposed to death which again is a kind of existence in which unenlightened and unbelieving men find themselves. Life is more than animate existence. It is an active force causing men to live in the fullest sense of the term and is available to them whether they find it in participation of the eucharistic sacrament (John 6:47, 54) or preferably in Christ whose words reveal the redemptive purposes of a loving God and who as the incarnate Word reveals in his person the nature and activity of God.

NOTES

¹ This gospel is regarded by most New Testament scholars to have been written by a Christian living at some distance in time from the events reported by him. Indeed, the events narrated about the life and teachings of Jesus have minimal historical value for our knowledge of Jesus. The importance of the gospel lies in the author's understanding of the meaning of Christian faith and as such is one of the most profound statements in the Christian tradition. To penetrate the thought of this evangelist demands of the interpreter a recognition of the deceptive character of simplicity in expression and style and a realization that many of his concepts are not self-explanatory.

² Since John the Baptist's witness to Jesus' mission (John 3 : 22-30) is not directly relevant for the subject of this paper a discussion of this section will be omitted.

³ As C.H. Dodd has correctly observed, there is no doctrine of regeneration in Judaism. The context of thought for the Johannine view of two levels of existence and the necessity of rebirth to enter the higher level is not Palestinian but Greek and Hellenistic. The Christian evangelist, however, has not designated the higher level as that of the mind, but that of the Spirit. See C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 304.

⁴ See especially John 1 : 12 where the evangelist states that power is given to believers to become sons of God. The concept is a departure from Jesus' view reflected in Matthew 18 : 3. Here Jesus presupposes that one merely needs to be 'natural', as one is, to be a child of God. To be a child worthy of the Father's love demands obedience to God's will, faith and trust in God, and love of God which includes as a manifestation of that love a love for one's fellow man. This response to God's love, according to Jesus' teaching, is given with full devotion and dedication, i.e. an involvement of the total person, his heart, soul, strength and mind. The response is one which man can make without a transformation of his nature and being. Sonship in the Gospel according to John, however, is the result of the entrance of power, a life-giving power. These statements of the Johannine evangelist appear to presuppose Pauline conceptions in which two factors are contrasted : 1) the vain effort of man to achieve salvation by obeying the Law and the experience of salvation as a gift of God's grace, and 2) the antithesis between Paul's sense of impotence and hopelessness during his earlier adherence to Judaism and the feeling of being a "new creature" which he had as a Christian.

Dr. V.A. Devasenapathi has called the author's attention to comparable doctrines regarding Law (*karma*) and grace (*kṛpā* or *anugraha*) in Hindu thought. The doctrine of *karma* is likely to give the impression that one can work out his own salvation. However, Hindu Theistic systems, especially Saiva Siddhanta, emphasize that *karma* is not the complete solution for man's salvation. Grace is also necessary.

11; The fact that in the documents of the Old Testament the Hebrew word for spirit and wind are identical makes the evangelist's use of this analogy even more appropriate.

12 Several sayings of Jesus which may be regarded as genuine in their basic content, though given their present form in oral and written tradition by his followers, can be cited to support this statement. Of particular significance are Jesus' two encounters with non-Jews; a 'Syro-Phoenician woman' (Matthew 15 : 22-28) and a Roman centurion (Matthew 8 : 5-13, especially verses 10-12, cf. Luke 7 : 2-9, especially verse 9). The narrative setting for both conversations with these Gentiles involves a manifestation of healing power and faith as a prior condition for the effectiveness of that power. The first narrative is significant because it indicates, on the one hand, Jesus' reluctance to include non-Jews within the scope of his ministry, and, on the other hand, his amazement at the woman's faith. Contrary to current Jewish teaching and practice, Jesus did not regard the woman's, or her daughter's, adherence to Judaism a prior condition of salvation. He did not insist or even mention the necessity of becoming a proselyte to Judaism with its demand for obedience to the Mosaic Law as the basis of salvation. He merely states that the woman's faith had saved her daughter. The second episode is significant because Jesus contrasts the faith of a Gentile with the lack of faith on the part of his fellow Jews. His approval of the Gentile's faith is intensified by his condemnation of the Jews' lack of faith. One further episode is necessary to indicate that Jesus directs men's faith towards God and not to himself. In the Beelzebub controversy (Matthew 12 : 22-32, cf. Luke 11 : 14-26), another narrative involving a mighty work, Jesus maintains that one can speak against the one who has performed the mighty work, namely Jesus whom the evangelists have designated as the Son of Man. The title is a messianic one which Jesus probably rarely, if ever, used for himself, at least with the significance given to that title by the author of Enoch, a Jewish pseudepigraphic work (see Enoch 37-71). In the Beelzebub controversy, however, Jesus does maintain that one can speak against him (the Son of Man) but not against the Spirit of God working through him to perform the cure. To call God satanic is blasphemy. Here Jesus attaches importance to himself merely as a channel through which God is working. In connection with the two episodes mentioned above other sayings of Jesus clearly imply trust and faith in God, not in himself. See, for example, Matthew 6 : 25-33, 7 : 7-11, etc.

13 In the text as it stands the statements made in John 3 : 31-36 appear to be a continuation of John the Baptist's witness to Christ. While it is not clear from the passage itself whether the evangelist or Christ himself is speaking, John the Baptist cannot be considered as the speaker.

14 See C.H. Dodd, *op. cit.* p. 150.

15 Dodd's comment in this connection is interesting: "it is more philosophical to deny an ending to that which is in its nature eternal, than to affirm perpetuity in time of that which is strictly timeless." *Ibid.* The author is indebted to Dr. Devasenapathi for calling attention to two comparable discussions of this view by Indian philosophers. The first is Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan's commentary on Sri Ramana's *Forty Verses*. See T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Ramana Maharshi and his Philosophy of Existence*, pp. 79-81, 140. The second reference is to Professor Suryanarayana Sastri's discussion of *jivanmukti*. See, *The Collected Papers of Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, pp. 244-251, especially p. 251.

WHO'S WHO

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S. P. Adinarayanan. Formerly Professor of Philosophy, Madras Christian College, Tambaram, Madras; now the Head of the Department of Philosophy, Annamalai University, Annamalai Nagar, South India; author of *The Human Mind*.

M. Arokiaswami. Reader in Indian History, University of Madras. Publications include *History of the Kongus* and *Kuruntogai*, a historical interpretation.

S. S. Barlingay. Visited Oxford in 1958; lectured at Manchester and Oslo Universities; taught in various colleges and now Reader in Philosophy, Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati; author of a work on Aesthetics (in Marathi).

Peter A. Bertocci. Taught at Bates College; since 1945 teaching at Boston University; taught Harvard University Summer Session, currently teaches in the Harvard and Boston University Adult Education Extension courses; in 1960-61 was in India as a Fulbright Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta; publications include *Freewill, Responsibility and Grace* (1957), and *Religion as Creative Insecurity* (1958). Editor of *Persons and Reality* (1957).

R. Bhaskaran. Professor of Politics and Public Administration, University of Madras; General President, Indian Political Science Congress, 1960. Principal publication: *Arasyal* (in Tamil), published by the Government of Madras.

Fernand Brunner. Professor of Philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, In-charge of the studies at the University of Berne, Switzerland.

C. T. K. Chari. Was Lecturer in Philosophy in the American College, Madurai, South India (1930-1940); now Chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Madras Christian College, Tambaram, Madras; has innumerable articles and Research papers to his credit.

publications include *Religions of the East* (1960), *The History of Religions—Essays in Method* (1959), *Modern Trends in World Religions* (1959), *The Comparative Study of Religions* (1958). Editorial Adviser on History of Religions, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; one of the Editors of *The History of Religion*; working on the religious situation in Asia.

K. Kunjunni Raja. Reader in Sanskrit, University of Madras; worked under Professor C. Kunhan Raja in the Madras University (1943-46) and took the Doctoral Degree by thesis on *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*; as a British Council Scholar, worked in the School of Oriental African Studies, London, under Prof. J. Burrow and took the Doctorate Degree of the London University by his thesis on *Indian Theories of Meaning*. Publications include *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, *Uṇādikōśa of Vedānti Mahādeva*.

T.V. Mahalingam. Professor of Ancient History and Archaeology, University of Madras. Principal Publications: *Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagar*; *Economic Life in the Vijayanagar Empire*; *The Bāṇas in South Indian History*; *South Indian Polity*.

G.R. Malkani. Director, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner; Managing Editor, *The Philosophical Quarterly*.

M. Mariappa Bhat. Professor and Head of the Department of Kannada, University of Madras, Chief Editor, *Annals of Oriental Research*, University of Madras. Vice-President, Linguistic Society of India; Member, Editorial Board of Kannada Dictionary, Sahitya Parishad, Bangalore; publications: *A Short History of Kannada Literature*; *Kannada Sanskrit*; *Comparative Proverbs in Dravidian Languages*; *Comparative Dravidian Vocabulary*; Edited *Abhinavamaryaraja nighantu*, *Parascanathapurana*, *Vardhamana Purana*, *Vishnu Purana* etc.

Dhirendra Mohan Datta. Formerly Professor of Philosophy, Patna University; Visiting Professor at Universities of Wisconsin and Minnesota, 1951-52; Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, Hawaii, 1949 and 1959. General President, Indian Philosophical Congress (1952). Principal Publications: *Six Ways of Knowing*, *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*.

V. A. Devasenapathi. Reader in Philosophy, University of Madras; Delivered Principal Miller Lectures for the year 1962 on *Towards Conquest of Time*; Delivered Tiruppanandal Endowment Lectures on Saiva Siddhanta at Banaras and Allahabad in 1960. Publications: *Saiva Siddhānta* (1960); Translation into Tamil of *Ten Saints* for the Southern Languages Book Trust.

Quentin Gibson. Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University, Canberra; with the assistance of the Spalding Trust, visited various Indian Universities including Madras; studied contemporary trends in philosophy in India; author of *The Logic of Social Enquiry* and *Facing Philosophical Problems*.

William Henry Harris. Was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Madras during 1953-54; studied under Professor Mahadevan; was an Associate Member of the East-West Philosophers' Conference in Hawaii; taught at the University of Arkansas during 1948-56, taught summer sessions at Scarritt College and the Garrett Institute; since 1956, an associate Professor at Southern Illinois University specializing in Philosophy of Religion and Asian Thought.

J.W. de Jong. Thesis for the award of Ph.D., *Candrakīrti's Prasamapāda*; Professor of Buddhism and Tibetan, University of Leiden, Holland, from 1956.

Joseph Mitsuo Kitagawa. Associate Professor of History of Religions in the University of Chicago since 1951; principal

publications include *Religions of the East* (1960), *The History of Religions—Essays in Method* (1959), *Modern Trends in World Religions* (1959), *The Comparative Study of Religions* (1958). Editorial Adviser on History of Religions, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; one of the Editors of *The History of Religion*; working on the religious situation in Asia.

K. Kunjunni Raja. Reader in Sanskrit, University of Madras; worked under Professor C. Kunhan Raja in the Madras University (1943-46) and took the Doctoral Degree by thesis on *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*; as a British Council Scholar, worked in the School of Oriental African Studies, London, under Prof. J. Burrow and took the Doctorate Degree of the London University by his thesis on *Indian Theories of Meaning*. Publications include *The Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, *Uṇādikōśa of Vedānti Mahādeva*.

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G.R. Malkani. Director, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner; Managing Editor, *The Philosophical Quarterly*.

M. Mariappa Bhat. Professor and Head of the Department of Kannada, University of Madras, Chief Editor, *Annals of Oriental Research*, University of Madras. Vice-President, Linguistic Society of India; Member, Editorial Board of Kannada Dictionary, Sahitya Parishad, Bangalore; publications: *A Short History of Kannada Literature*; *Kannada Sanskrit*; *Comparative Proverbs in Dravidian Languages*; *Comparative Dravidian Vocabulary*; Edited *Abhinavamarajya nighantu*, *Parascanathapurana*, *Vardhamana Purana*, *Vishnu Purana* etc.

E. Raphael Marozzi. M.A. Degree from the University of Hawaii; now conducting classes in *Vedānta* and *Yoga-sūtras* in Honolulu; has contributed several articles to *Vedānta for East and West*; was in India in 1950 for the study of Indian Art and Vedānta.

A.G.M. van Melson. Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Nijmegen and also at the University of Groningen; member of the International Institute of Philosophy; publications include: *From Atoms to Atom* (1960), *Science and Technology* (1961).

T.P. Minakshisundaram. Professor of Tamil, Annamalai University, Annamalai Nagar, Madras State; formerly Professor of Tamil, Presidency College, Madras; Visiting Professor to the Universities in the United States, 1962.

Charles A. Moore. Director, University of Hawaii, U.S.A.; Editor of *Philosophy: East and West*.

Lucetta Mowry. Professor of Biblical History, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts, U.S.A. Member of the Society of Biblical Literature, National Association of Biblical Instructors and American Schools of Oriental Research. Publications: *The Gospel according to John in the light of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, *Music in the Bible* etc.

P. Nagaraja Rao. Doctor of Letters from Banaras Hindu University for his thesis on *Śaṅkara and Whitehead*; now Head of the Department of Philosophy, Government College, Mercara, Coorg; Principal Publications: *Systems of Vedānta*; *Vādāvali*.

Hajime, Nakamura. Chairman of the Department of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy, University of Tokyo; Director of Japanese Association for Religious Studies; Visiting Professor of Religion at the University of Florida, 1961;

President of Japan-India Society; Life Member of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; Member of the American Oriental Society; Honorary Member of the International Academy of the Jains, Agra, India; Honorary Director, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta, etc., etc.; author of *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, (4 volumes); *The way of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*; made a trip to South India at the invitation of the Government of India in 1960.

S.K. Nayar. Reader and Head of the Department of Malayalam, University of Madras. Author of about 50 books both in Malayalam and English. Now engaged in the study of the Shasta Cult in Kerala. Important Research works—*Folk Drama of Kerala*; *Dravidian Cognates*; *Dravidian Proverbs*; *The Art and Literature of Kathakali*.

A.S. Narayana Pillai. Formerly Lecturer in Philosophy, University College, Trivandrum; (1936-51); Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy in the same college since 1951; visited United Kingdom in 1956 under the Colombo Plan; visited the States in 1961 to deliver lectures; now Principal, Government College, Chittur-Cochin.

Swami Nikhilananda. A Senior Delegate from India to the East-West Philosophers Conference held at the University of Hawaii, (the Second in 1949 and the Third in 1959); lectured at Columbia University on Indian Thought during 1952-1955; and at Douglass College in the State University of New Jersey on Hinduism; publications include: *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*; *Hinduism: Its Meaning for the Liberation of the Spirit*; and *Upanisads* (4 volumes).

James H. K. Norton. Was a Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras, on a Ford Foundation Fellowship in 1957; worked under Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan for his Doctorate thesis: *Reason and Viśiṣṭādvaita Philosophy*, a study of the *Nyāyakulīśa* of Ātreya

Rāmānija ; now a candidate for Holy Orders at the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

M.P. Pandit. Disciple of Sri Aurobindo and The Mother and inmate of the Ashram at Pondicherry ; author of several books on Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, the Vedas, Upanishads and Tantras ; Editor of *Dipti* (Kannada Quarterly).

Swami Paramatmananda. Editor, *Sri Ramakrishna Vijayam*, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Mylapore, Madras.

K.K. Pillai. Professor of Indian History, University of Madras. Doctorate from the Madras University and Oxford University. President, Medieval Indian History Section—Indian History Congress, 1959; Member, Indian Historical Records Commission; Convener, Regional Committee for the Survey of Historical Records, Madras. Principal Publications : *The Sucindram Temple; History of Local Self-Government in the Madras Presidency; A History of South India* (Tamil); *A History of England* (Tamil).

Karl H. Potter. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Minnesota ; twice visited India on Fulbright grants, to Andhra University in 1952, to Banaras Hindu University in 1959-60 ; author of *The Padārtha-tattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*.

V. Raghavan. Awarded Doctorate by the University of Madras for his thesis : *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* ; joined the University as member of the Sanskrit Department in 1935 ; now Professor and Head of the Dept. of Sanskrit, University of Madras ; toured Europe in 1953-54 ; visited U.S.S.R. as a member of the Government of India Indological Delegation in 1958 ; presided over the All India Oriental Congress in 1961 ; Member of the Sanskrit Commission etc. ; publications include : *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, 2 volumes ; *The Number of Rasas* ; *Some Concepts of Alankara Sastra* ; *Bhoja's ŚṛṅgāraPrakasa*.

Edited numerous Sanskrit manuscripts ; composed many poems in Sanskrit ; wrote many monographs ; was awarded the title of Padma Bhushan on the Republic Day 1962 by the President of India.

S. Rajagopala Sastri. Formerly Lecturer in Philosophy and Logic in the Theosophical College, Madanapalli, Andhra Pradesh, India, and in the Vivekananda College, Madras; Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Vivekananda College, Madras, since 1959.

M. Rajamanikkam. Ph. D. in 1951 from the Madras University, Professor of Tamil in Thiagarajar College, Madras; now Reader in Tamil, University of Madras; publications include *Critical Study of Peria Puranam* ; *Development of Saivism in South India* ; *History of the Tamil Land* ; *Tamilian Polity* ; *Arts of Tamils*, etc.

R. Ramanujachari. Professor of Education, Annamalai University, Annamalai Nagar ; formerly Professor of Philosophy in the same University ; Editor of Rangaramanuja's *Nyāya-Kulīta*.

S.V. Ramamurthy. Member, Indian Civil Service (Retd.) ; Publication : *Science and Spirit*.

Elizabeth Rankin. Formerly Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy, University of Madras; now teaches philosophy in New York, U.S.A.

Fritz Joachim von Rintelen. Professor at University of Mainz ; Director of Philosophical Institute ; Director of the Society for Philosophy in Germany, 1948-1955. Principal Publications : *Religionsphilosophie E.v. Hartmanns*, 1928 ; *Ueberwindung des Historismus* by E. Troeltsch, 1930 ; *Der Rang des Geistes*, *Goethes Weltverstaendis*, 1957 ; *Der Europaeische Mensch*, UNESCO, 1958.

S. Shankar Raju Naidu. Head of the Department of Hindi, University of Madras, since 1952; Member of the Central Hindi Education Board, Government of India; Doctorate from the University of Madras in 1959 on the thesis entitled: *A Comparative Study of Kamba Ramayanam and Tulasī Ramayana*; principal publications include *Kambar and Tulasidas* (this publication received award from the Government of Uttar Pradesh, India); Translation of *Tirukkural* into Hindi.

M.M. Sharif. Provost, Aligarh Muslim University (17 years); Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University (3 years); has been the President of the Indian Philosophical Congress and Pakistan Philosophical Congress; Academic and Managing Director, Institute of Islamic Culture; Editor: *Saqafat*, Pakistan Philosophical Journal and *Iqbal*; books: *Nature of Tragedy*; *Beauty and Expression*; *Muslim Thought, its origin and achievements*.

S. Siauue. Professor of Philosophy (Paris); Member, Asiatic Society, Paris; Member, French School for Far East Studies; Deputy Director, French Institute for Indology, Pondicherry. Publications: *La Voie vers la Connaissance de Dieu (Brahma-Jijñāsa) selon l'Amṛtyākhyaṇa de Madhva*. 1957. *Les Noms Vediques de Viṣṇu dans l'Amṛtyākhyaṇa de Madhva (Brahma-Sūtra I,1, adhikaraṇa 2 à 12)*. 1959.

Ninian Smart. Assistant Lecturer in the University of Wales during 1952-55; Visiting Lecturer at Yale University 1955-56; Lecturer in the History and Philosophy of Religion in the University of London 1956-61; Visiting Lecturer, Banaras Hindu University, India, 1960; now at the University of Birmingham; author of *Reasons and Faiths* (1958) and *A Dialogue of Religions* (1960).

Richard V. de Smet. Doctorate Degree in Philosophy from the Gregorian University, Rome for dissertation on *The Methodology of Sri Sankaracharya*; at present Professor of

Logic, Metaphysics and Indian Philosophy at De Nobili College, Poona; has written and published numerous articles on comparative studies in Vedānta and Thomism.

J. F. Staal. Studied under Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan in the University of Madras as a Government of India Exchange Scholar during 1954-56; worked for Doctorate on Neo-Platonism and Advaita Vedānta; teaching Assistant, University of Amsterdam in 1958 at present Lecturer in Sanskrit, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; publications include: *Advaita Vedānta and Neo-Platonism* (1962) and *Nambudiri Veda Recitation* (1961).

N. Subrahmanian. Received the Doctorate Degree in 1959 for the thesis entitled "Sangam Polity"; was Lecturer in History, A. M. Jain College from 1953 to 1959; now Lecturer in History, University of Madras, author of *Man and History* (an introduction to Universal History) 1956; and *An Introduction to the Cultural History of India* (1960); editor of a Tamil classic: *Ananda-ranga-kovai* for the Oriental Manuscripts Library.

S. Subrahmanya Sastri. Pandita Raja (Cochin Darbar), Reader in Sanskrit, University of Madras; edited *Bhāṣṭa Dīpikā* 4 volumes; *Braṭi*; *Nyāyasāra*; *Ābhoga*; *Vedānta Kaumudī*; *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, with hitherto unpublished commentaries, *Padārthatattvanirmaya*; *Nyaya Ratnadīpavali*, etc.

P. K. Sundaram. Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Madras; Doctorate for the thesis on *Advaita Epistemology*; Secretary, Union for the Study of the Great Religions in India, Madras Branch.

M. Varadarajan. Now Professor of Tamil, University of Madras; is the author of several critical works, some novels and a work on Tirukkural in Tamil; won prizes from the Government of Madras, and the award of the Sahitya Akademi, Delhi. Publications include *Ilakkiya Marabu*, *Ilakkiya-Tiran* and

Ilakkiya Arāici; President of the Academy of Tamil Culture, Madras.

K. C. Varadachari. Taught in Madras Christian College, Madras; Doctorate from the Madras University; now Reader in Philosophy in the Venkateswara University, Tirupati, South India; author of *Ramanuja's Theory of Knowledge*.

N. Venkatarao. Head of the Department of Telugu, University of Madras since 1949; Author of *Lives of Poets from Ancient Times to 1250 A. D.*, and *Southern School in Telugu Literature*; edited rare classical manuscript works both from the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, and Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, the chief among them being *Dvipada Ramayanamu* by Katta Varadaraju (16C) in 4 volumes; *Vīra Saiva Literature* works, like *Basavapurāṇam* and *Panditaradhya Gharitra*.

W. H. Werkmeister. Taught at the University of Nebraska (1926-53); Visiting Professor at Harvard University and the University of Berlin; currently (since 1953) the Director of The School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles; author of *A Philosophy of Science, Basis and Structure of Knowledge, A History of Philosophical Ideas in America, Theories of Ethics*, to mention a few; current interest in the field of Value Theory.

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